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THE 



COMMENTARIES OF CAESAR, 

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH: 



TO WHICH IS PRKFIXEl), 



A DISCOURSE 



CONCERNING THE ROMAN ART OF WAR. 



BY 

WILLIAM DUNCAN, 

PIIOFKSSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ABEBDEF.N. 



COMPLETE IN ONE VOLUME. 



PHILADELPHIA : 
THOMAS WARDLE— MINOR STREET. 

stereotyped by L. Johnsoot 

1837. 






1^^ Twjisjfer 
•/W S ISO? 




TO 

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS, 

GEORGE, PRINCE OF WALES. 

SIR, 

Though I am far from thinking that any performance of mine can be 
entitled to the honour of Your Royal Highness's patronage, yet, as the 
following work is a translation of the memoirs of the greatest general of 
antiquity, I hope the merit of the original, and the name of Caesar, will in 
some measure excuse the presumption of this address. 

In these memoirs Your Royal Highness will see displayed all that is 
great and most consummate in the Art of War. The ablest commander 
of the most warlike people upon earth entertains you with the history of 
his own campaigns. You are informed of the motives which determined 
him in all his enterprises, of the various difficulties he had to encounter, 
and of the steps by which in the end he was enabled to surmount all oppo- 
sition. In a word, prudence in counsel, courage and intrepidity in the 
field, a calm presence of mind in the midst of dangers, and an amazing 
dexterity in sudden and unforeseen emergencies, are here exemplified in 
the conduct of a leader, whom all succeeding ages have agreed to regard 
as the most finished pattern of military merit. 

It is the observation of one of the wisest of the Roman historians, "that 
war is in a peculiar manner the province of a prince ; and that though 
civil accomplishments are by no means to be neglected, yet to the person 
of the sovereign more immediately belongs the merit and praise of being a 
great general." And indeed as it is among the principal duties of a king, 
to protect his subjects from foreign invasions, to baffle the attempts of 
ambitious and aspiring tyrants, and to guard against the encroachments of 
powerful neighbours, nothing can be more evident, than that a due insti- 
tution in the Art of War ought to be considered as an essential part of the 
education of a prince. 

Some, perhaps, may be of opinion, that the maxims of the present age, 
which forbid kings to appear in person at the head of armies, and enjoin 
them rather to delegate their power to others, render military talents less 
necessary in the rulers of nations. But though this be in reality a very 



iv DEDICATION. 

wise policy, and excellently calculated to prevent those unjust wars which 
have no other foundation but the personal ambition and glory of princes, 
yet does it by no means dispense with the obligation of applying to the 
study of arms. The due modelling of the army, the introducing a proper 
discipline among the troops, and the disposal of military preferments, are 
entirely in the breast of the sovereign, who would be but ill qualified for 
the exercise of so great a trust, if wholly unacquainted with martial affairs. 
It is likewise well known, that in dangerous domestic seditions, to which 
all states are at times liable, nothing tends more to confirm the well affected 
in their duty, and to check the machinations of the factious, than when a 
king, every way qualified to command, appears in person at the head of his 
troops. In general confederacies, too, where many nations unite to oppose 
some threatening overgrown power, it is often impossible to reconcile their 
various interests, and preserve the unanimity necessary to give force and 
vigour to their operations, unless some prince of distinguished reputation 
and eminent quality in the league charge himself with the conduct of the 
war, and employ his whole authority to prevent those competitions, 
jealousies, and mutual animosities, which are every moment ready to 
break out in an army composed of so many separate and divided bodies. 

Hence it is that valour and the military virtues have always been con- 
sidered as objects highly worthy the pursuit of a prince ; nor do they ever 
fail to meet with their due share of applause, unless where they degenerate 
into hurtful ambition, that immoderate thirst of conquest, which prompts 
men rather to be the destroyers than the protectors of nations. As the 
Commentaries of Caesar furnish the best lessons and precepts of war, so 
the example and history of the same Caesar demonstrate, that the greatest 
talents, when not directed to laudable ends, are utterly insufficient, either 
for present security, or future fame. Though his abilities as a general and 
a statesman were never perhaps equalled before or since; yet, as he em- 
ployed them, not to promote the welfare, but to disturb the peace of society; 
not to defend, but to overturn the liberties of his country; he could neither 
escape the hatred of the age in which he lived, nor the reproaches of pos- 
terity. We find him often in distress, and sometimes in despair, ready to 
fly his country, threatened with being tried and condemned as a public 
criminal ; and at last, after a restless life, full of anxiety and care, cut off 
by a violent and untimely death, just as he had established his tyranny, 
though with it he could not establish his own happiness. Had he em- 
ployed his authority and address to preserve public liberty ; had he, for 
this glorious end, exerted his industry and admirable talents ; how amiable 



DEDICATION. v 

must he have appeared, in what security might he have lived, and with 
what veneration would he have been regarded by all future ages ! 

Your Royal Highness is born to govern a people who have at all times 
distinguished themselves by their love of liberty; a people always obedient 
to just laws, but impatient under oppression, and infinitely jealous of their 
privileges. Tacitus, speaking of them fifteen hundred years ago, says, 
" That they cheerfully complied with the levies of men, with the imposi- 
tion of tribute, and with all the necessary demands of government, pro- 
vided they received no illegal treatment or insults from their governors ; 
for those they bore with impatience : nor did they acknowledge any other 
subjection to the Romans, than what consisted in an obedience to just laws; 
not the submission of slaves." Such was the character of the British 
people at that time, such has been their character in all ages, and such it 
remains to this day. Princes who observed the laws always found them 
peaceable subjects, and ready to comply with their just demands ; but 
when infringements wei'e made upon the public liberty, they grew uneasy 
and discontented, and the sovereign, by grasping at too much, frequently 
lost all. 

Indeed, it appears in our history, that the design of assuming an autho- 
rity independent of the laws, was never entertained by any of the best and 
ablest of our princes; who always esteemed it more glorious to rule over a 
free people, than to command a nation of slaves. Among many remark- 
able examples of this, that of the ever memorable Henry the Fifth seems 
in a particular manner deserving of notice. He was a wise and valiant 
prince, who scorned to encroach upon the liberties of his subjects, and 
abhorred the unjustifiable arts by which they had been impaired. He 
esteemed their courage, strength, and love to be his greatest advantage, 
riches, and glory; and readily joined with them to extinguish the mis- 
chievous abuses that had been introduced by some of his predecessors. He 
aimed at making good his claim to the crown of France, which he knew 
was only to be effected by the bravery of a free and well satisfied people. 
Slaves will always be cowards, and, when they dare to declare themselves, 
enemies to their masters : by bringing his subjects into that condition, he 
must infallibly have ruined his own designs, and made them unfit to fight 
either for him or for themselves. He desired not only that his people 
should be free during his time, but that his successors should not be able 
to deprive them of so valuable a blessing. He knew that he did not reign 
for himself, but for his people ; and regarding their safety as the supreme 
law of government, always passed with the utmost cheerfulness such laws 

1* 



vi DEDICATION. 

as were presented to him in behalf of public liberty. The event was such 
as might be expected. Never prince was better obeyed and served by his 
subjects, more successful and formidable abroad, more beloved at home, or 
more sincerely lamented after his death. In fine, history nowhere fur- 
nishes a more perfect pattern of a wise, valiant, and virtuous king. 

It has been the good fortune of these nations, for some time past, to be 
blessed with a series of such princes. The excellent principles of govern- 
ment adopted by King William, at the Revolution, have been steadily 
adhered to by his successors of your Illustrious House. Ncfr has the 
security of domestic freedom alone employed their attention. Like that 
glorious monarch, they have exerted their utmost influence to preserve the 
independence of the other states of Europe, and by a conduct so truly 
noble, merited the greatest of all titles, that of being the patrons of public 
liberty and the friends of mankind. 

Your Royal Highness is now at an age when examples of this kind 
make the deepest impression ; and the early good dispositions you dis- 
cover, joined to the excellent institution under which you have the happi- 
ness to be formed, give the justest reason to believe, that they will not fail 
of having their due eflfect. The public beholds with pleasure the seeds of 
your many ripening virtues, and charmed with the prospect of the advan- 
tages to be reaped from their maturity, seems to address you in the words 
of vEneas to his son Ascanius, a young prince of great expectation, in 
whose person were centered the hopes of a whole people. 

Te, animo repetentem exempla tuorum, 



Et pater ^neas, et avunculus excitet Hector. 

That you may improve daily in every laudable and useful quality, and 
that when by the appointment of Providence you are called to the exercise 
of the Government, you may long sway the British sceptre with uninter- 
rupted prosperity, and the entire love of your subjects, is the sincere and 
ardent prayer of, 

SIR, 
Your Royal Highness's 

most humble, most dutiful, 

and most obedient servant, 

WILLIAM DUNCAN. 



ADVERTISEMENT. 



The following Translation of Caesar's Commentaries was done from the 
celebrated edition of the late Dr. Clarke, printed for J. Tonson, in 1712. 
All possible care has been taken to render it exact, and to preserve the dis- 
tinctness and perspicuity of expression for which the original is so justly 
famous. The reader will perceive that the very turn and manner of Caesar 
has been copied with the utmost attention ; and though the success may 
not always answer expectation, yet candour will induce him to make great 
allowances when he considers the inimitable beauty of the Latin, and the 
difficulty of expressing ancient manners and transactions in modern lan- 
guage. 

It was at first intended to accompany the translation with notes, explain 
ing what was difficult and obscure in the Roman Art of War. But as a 
few loose, scattered remarks would have contributed little towards giving 
the reader a distinct idea of what was necessary to be known on this head, 
there is substituted in their place a Discourse concerning the military cus- 
toms of the ancients, in which all that is curious and most interesting relat- 
ing to these matters is fully and copiously explained. Besides the ancient 
authors ; Rollin, Folard, Orrery, Feuquiere, Machiavel, Montesquieu, and 
several other moderns have been consulted, and all such passages selected, 
as tended to throw light upon this branch of the Roman antiquities. As 
the author, by his situation in life, is necessarily a stranger to the practical 
part of war, he pretends not to offer any thing of his own upon the subject. 
If he has collected with care from the writers before mentioned, and dis- 
posed the materials they furnished in such a manner, as sufficiently to dis- 
play the proficiency and improvements of the ancients in military know- 
ledge, he has compassed all he intended, and the reader will have no cause 
to complain. 

The ancient names of places are retained in the translation, as well to 
avoid giving too modern a turn to the author by a contrary practice, as 
because they are sufficiently familiar to an English ear, being constantly 
made use of by all historians who treat of those times in our language. 



viii ADVERTISEMENT. 

But as the following work may perhaps fall into the hands of persons little 
acquainted with ancient geography, and who would therefore be at a loss 
in comparing Caesar's descriptions with the present face of the country, the 
reader will find at the end of the book a large Geographical Index, in 
which the ancient names of places, as near as can be discovered with any 
certainty, are explained by the modern. It may be just proper to mention, 
that besides the seven books of the Gallic War, and the three of the Civil, 
written by Csesar himself, the Supplements of A. Hirtius Pansa are like- 
wise inserted in the following translation, consisting of one additional book 
to the Gallic War, and three books of the Alexandrian, African, and 
Spanish Wars. 



A DISCOURSE 



CONCEnNINO 



THE ROMAN ART OF AVAR. 



n 



A DISCOURSE 



CONCERNING 



THE ROMAN ART OF WAR. 



CHAP. I. 

OF THE UNDERTAKING AND DECLARATION 
OF WAR. 

I. The Romans, from small beginnings and 
an almost contemptible original, rose by de- 
grees to be sovereigns of the world. If we in- 
quire into the causes of this, we shall find, that 
nothing so much contributed to it, as the ex- 
cellence of their military discipline. War is 
a profession of the greatest importance to so- 
ciety. The security of our lives, liberties, pro- 
perties, and indeed of all that is dear and valua- 
ble among men, depends in a manner entirely 
on it. Good and wholesome laws may esta- 
blish peace and unity within, and if executed 
with vigour, will prevent the inroads of vice 
and corruption ; but are by no means sufficient 
to screen a state from powerful neighbours, or 
secure it against the assaults of the ambitious 
and aspiring. Hence in the most peaceful 
times, it has ever been esteemed a maxim of 
sound policy, to cultivate the science of arms 
with the same application, as when we are 
threatened with war and invasions. For how- 
ever little we may ourselves be disposed to dis- 
turb the tranquillity of the nations around us, 
yet the experience of all ages makes it abun- 
dantly evident, that the most powerful and pre- 
vailing argument to keep those quiet, from 
whom we have reason to apprehend any dan- 
ger, is by letting them see that we are prepared 
to receive them, and capable of making them 
repent of their rashness, should they unjustly 
seek a pretence of falling upon us. In all 
wise states, therefore, the profession of a 



soldier has ever been held in honour : nor do 
we read any part of ancient history with greater 
pleasure, than that by which we learn, how 
free nations have defended themselves against 
the attempts of encroaching tyrants, and when 
roused to a thorough exertion of their strength, 
overthrown in the end that very power, which 
once threatened to crush them. It is not in- 
deed to be denied, that the military virtues of 
a free people, have not always been confined 
to self-defence, and the avenging themselves 
of their enemies. Ambition, and a conscious- 
ness of superiority, have sometimes prompted 
even these to aspire at universal dominion. 
This is remarkably exemplified in the history 
of the Roman commonwealth, from whose con- 
stitution, and love of liberty, one would natu- 
rally expect a very different spirit. Who more 
likely to become the great patrons and defend- 
ers of the common rights and privileges of 
mankind than a people, whose prevailing pas- 
sion was an abhorrence of slavery ; and who, 
in a long series of struggles with the nations 
around them, were never weary of fighting in 
defence of that liberty, which is the birthright 
and inheritance of every reasonable creature 1 
And yet we find, that no sooner were they se- 
cure of their own freedom, than a thirst of rule 
took possession of their minds, and they forci- 
bly imposed that yoke upon others, which they , 
had disdained to submit to themselves. The 
superiority of their military discipline enabled 
them by degrees to accomplish this unjust de- 
sign. Trained up in a continued succession 
of wars, and equally attentive to their own 
victories and defeats, they were daily improv- 

3 



THE ROMAN 



ing themselves in the art of conquest, and 
attained at length to so great a mastery in it, 
that no nation was able to withstand their at- 
tacks. It cannot therefore but be an agreeable, 
as well as useful inquiry, to trace out the mili- 
tary customs of a people so renowned for their 
knowledge in the art of war. And as it is my 
design, to present the pubHc with a new trans- 
lation of the Commentaries of Csesar, who was 
confessedly the greatest general Rome ever 
produced, I imagine a discourse of this nature 
may not be improperly prefixed to that work. 

II. Let us then take a view of the conduct 
of the Romans, from their first engaging in a 
war, through all the different branches of its 
management, until they at last bring it to a 
happy period. This will naturally lead us to 
consider the ceremonies attending the declara- 
tion of war ; the manner of levying troops, 
and forming a Roman army ; the precautions 
used in marches and encampments; their or- 
der of battle, conduct in sieges, and the ma- 
chines and other contrivances made use of in 
the attack and defence of places. Under these 
several heads may be comprehended every 
thing that is material and important upon this 
subject. It is not, however, my design, to 
enter into grammatical niceties, or a minute 
detail of particular criticisms, but only to give 
a general idea of the militarj' customs of the 
Romans, intermixed with such remarks as may 
serve to lay open the policy of their first con- 
trivance, and show their natural tendency to 
that superiority and universal dominion, which 
they at length procured the commonwealth. 

III. The ceremonies relating to the decla- 
ration of war were instituted by Numa Pom- 
pilius, the second king of Rome. Romulus, 
the founder of that colony, was, during the 
whole course of his reign, engaged in perpetual 
contests with his neighbours. The necessity he 
■was under, at his first setting out, of procuring 
■wives for his subjects, by the rape of the Sa- 
bine virgins, exasperated all the nations round 
about, and begot no small jealousy of the new 
colony, which seemed to be founded on max- 
ims of violence and injustice. We are not 
therefore to wonder, if this drew on him a series 
of wars, which continued almost without inter- 
mission to the end of his life. Thus the Ro- 
mans, who were originally in a great measure 
a band of fugitives and outlaws, improving their 
natural fierceness by having their arms con- 
stantly in their hands, gradually grew to be a 



brave and warlike people, Numa, who suc- 
ceeded Romulus, being a prince of a pacific 
temper, set himself to check this martial ar- 
dour, and form them to religion, and a respect 
for the gods. In order to stifle that impetuous 
desire of war, which he found so prevalent 
among them, he established certain cere- 
monies, which were always to precede the 
commencing of hostilities, and committed them 
to the care of a college of heralds, called 
Feciales. The chief or head of this society had 
the name of Pater Patratus; and it was his pe- 
culiar office to make peace, or denounce war. 
Livy, indeed, seems to consider him as a 
temporary minister: for, in his account of the 
treaty concluded with the Albans, before the 
triple combat of the Horatii and Curiatii, he 
makes one of the Feciales choose a Pater Pa- 
tratus, on purpose to perform that ceremony. 
But as I have no design to enter into a con- 
troversy of this nature, little important in itself, 
and not easy to be decided, I shall content my- 
self with observing, that the officer here men- 
tioned, whether constant or temporary, was one 
who had a father and son both alive. Hence 
this title of Pater Patratxis, v/hich may be in- 
terpreted to imply a more perfect kind of father, 
as they seem to have imagined him to be, whose 
own father was still living, after he himself had 
been a father for some time. Such a one, it 
was believed, would be an equitable and mo- 
derate judge in affairs of this kind, and not 
over forward to plunge his country into a war, 
in which so many lives that must be dear to him, 
would unavoidably be exposed to hazard. 

IV. And indeed the ceremonies themselves, 
as instituted by Numa, seem peculiarly calcu- 
lated to render the Romans cautious and cir- 
cumspect, in a matter of so great importance. 
For before they entered upon a war with any 
state, the college of heralds were to commis- 
sion the Pater Patratus, to go and demand 
satisfaction in the name of the Roman peo- 
ple. Accordingly this officer, clothed in the 
habit of his order, set forward for the ene- 
my's country ; and entering the frontiers, pro- 
claimed aloud the cause of his arrival, calling 
all the gods to witness that he came to de- 
mand satisfaction, and imprecate the divine 
vengeance on himself and country, if he said 
any thing contrary to truth. When he came 
to the chief city of the enemy, he again re* 
peated the same declaration, adding fresh 
oaths and imprecations, and withal desired 



ART OF WAR. 



satisfaction. If his demands were c:rantcd, 
he returned immediately to Rome, and all 
thoughts of war were laid aside. But if they 
required time to consider, he gave them ten 
days, and then came again to hear their reso- 
lution. This he did, in some cases, three 
times; but if, after thirty days, nothing was 
done towards an accommodation, he called 
gods and men to witness the refusal, and ex- 
jiressly denounced, that the Romans would 
now think themselves sufficiently authorized 
to take such measures as the case required, 
in order to do themselves justice. Upon his 
return to Rome, he repaired to the senate, 
attended by the whole college of heralds; 
having there made a report of his embassy, 
declared the legality of the war. The affair 
was then debated among the Fathers : and if 
the majority of voices were for war, the same 
officer was sent back to the enemy's frontiers, 
where, in presence of at least three persons, 
he pronounced the usual declaration, throwing 
a spear at the same time into their territories, 
in token of defiance. 

V. These institutions continued long in 
force at Rome, even during the times of the 
commonwealth ; and it must be owned, were 
admirably well contrived to answer Numa's 
great design, of habituating the Romans to 
peace, and blunting the edge of their martial 
fury. For as a certain space of time was 
necessarily to intervene, between the injury 
received and the commencing of hostilities: 
this left room for reason and reflection, and 
gave them an opportunity of weighing ma- 
turely all the consequences of the step they 
were about to take. The imprecations too to 
be denounced by the herald against himself 
and country, if he advanced any thing contrary 
to truth, would naturally make them very 
cautious in their demands, and extremely 
attentive to the equity and justice of them. 
Add to all this, the great probability of ad- 
justing matters amicably, and obtaining a 
reasonable satisfaction, which cannot by any 
means be expected, where the parties fly im- 
mediately to arms, and by mutual acts of 
hostility exasperate one another. One would 
think, that a state under the check of so 
many restraints against oppression, could not 
easily break out into violent or unjust wars. 
Accordingly we find, not only the ancient his- 
torians, but even many modern writers of 
name and reputation, extolling the modera- 
2 



tion and uisiKterestidness of the Romans; 
their faith in treaties ; steady adherence to 
their allies ; and care to have equity on their 
side in all their undertakings. It is, however, 
methinks, a sufficiently obvious reflection that 
a people, who by degrees accomplished the 
conquest of the universe, and forced all na- 
tions to submit to their dominion, must in 
many instances have been the aggressors. For 
although in the first beginnings of their state, 
they were perhaps often unjustly attacked by 
their neighbours, out of envy and jealousy ; 
yet it is certain, that their power at last be- 
came so very formidable, that no nation was 
willing to enter the lists with them. We find 
them, notwithstanding, still pushing on their 
conquests, still engaged in new wars, and ex- 
tending the limits^f their empire. Now 
both reason and experience tell us, that in a 
controversy between states of unequal strength, 
the weaker will submit to many insults and 
hardships, rather than draw upon themselves 
a war which they foresee must end in the 
subversion of their liberties. And indeed if 
we examine narrowly into the conduct of the 
Romans, we shall find, that their reputation 
of justice is owing rather to an exact obser- 
vance of certain outward forms, and the par- 
tiality of their historians, than any steady 
adherence to the principles of equity. For as 
their power and dominion increased, and they 
became conscious of their superiority, they 
readily gave way to the dictates of ambition, 
and were never at a loss in contriving some 
ground of quarrel with those nations, whom, 
in their plan of universal conquest, they had 
resolved to bring next under subjection. 
But as all their attempts of this kind were 
preceded by complaints of injuries received, 
pretended grievances, and formal declarations 
of war; this gave a colour of justice to their 
undertakings, and effectually deceived the 
people ; who, convinced that they had equity 
on their side, followed their generals with an 
assured confidence, imagining themselves 
under the immediate protection of the gods. 
Add to this, that the historians, partly misled 
by the same notions, partly through a national 
and almost unavoidable partiality, have vied 
with one another in extolling the equity and 
moderation of the Romans, and varnishing 
over such parts of their behaviour, as seemed 
most liable to exception. The merit of these 
vsrriters, and the veneration paid them by sue- 



THE ROMAN 



ceeding ages, have given a kind of sanction 
and authority to their opinions. It looks like 
presumption to contradict authors of so esta- 
blished a reputation : and being accustomed to 
admire them from our infancy, we are easily 
led to believe, that we cannot do better than 
blindly give in to their sentiments. It is only 
upon this principle I am able to excuse some 
late writers of great name, who, in treating of 
the Roman commonwealth, have not scrupled 
to adopt the prejudices of the ancient historians, 
and represent that people as patterns of equity 
and justice in all their proceedings. 

VI. As nothing is of greater importance in 
history, than to form a right judgment of events 
and their causes, and penetrate into the real 
character of states and nations, I shall take 
some pains to set this matter in a true light ; 
and to that end shall lay before the reaaer a 
short view of the transactions between the 
Eomans and Carthaginians. It is well known, 
that these last were characterized by the Ro- 
mans, as a faithless and perfidious people, re- 
gardless of oaths, and whom no ties or treaties 
could blind. They even went so far as to make 
Punic faith serve only as another expression for 
insincerity. Who would imagine, after such a 
representation of things, that in all the Punic 
wars the Romans were the aggressors ; and that, 
in the two last especially, thty forced the Car- 
thaginians into them by the most flagrant acts 
of injustice] But let truth and an impartial 
account of facts determine. The occasion of 
the first Punic war was as follows. A body 
of Campanian soldiers, known in history by 
the name of Mamertines, and who had served 
under Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse, upon 
the death of that prince retired to Messina; 
where, being received as friends, they treach- 
erously massacred one part of the inhabitants, 
expelled the rest, and seizing upon the lands, 
houses, and even wives of those unfortunate 
men, remained sole masters of that important 
city. Some time after this, the people of 
Rhegium, to screen themselves from the in- 
sults of the Carthaginians, whose fleets ap- 
peared frequently off their coast, applied to the 
Roman senate for a garrison, A legion of 
four thousand men, raised in Campania, and 
commanded by Decius Jubellius, was appointed 
to that service. At first they behaved suita- 
bly to the intention of those who employed 
them : but at length, tempted by the wealth 
of the place, emboldened by the example of 



the Mamertines, and strengthened by their aid, 
they acted the same perfidious and cruel part 
towards the Rhegians, which the other had 
acted towards the people of Messina. 

VII. As these two cities were parted only 
by the narrow strait which separates Italy from 
Sicily, and were not insensible of the odium 
they had brought upon themselves by their 
treachery, they entered into a strict confederacy 
mutually to support each other in their usurpa- 
tions. This alliance subsisted for some time. 
But at length the Romans, having disengaged 
themselves from the many wars, in which they 
were entangled, turned their thoughts towards 
the punishment of their perfidious legion. 
Rhegium was invested, and after an obstinate 
resistance taken by assault. All that remained 
alive of the garrison, amounting to about 
three hundred, were carried to Rome, beaten 
with rods, and then publicly beheaded in the 
Forum. The destruction of this confederate 
city produced a mighty change in the affairs 
of the Mamertines. While aided by their 
friends at Rhegium, they had not only lived 
fearless of danger, but had often made inroads 
into the territories of the Carthaginians and 
Syracusans, putting many of their towns and 
villages under contribution. The case was 
now greatly altered ; for being attacked by 
Hiero, prsetor of Syracuse, they were over- 
thrown in battle, and their army almost totally 
cut off. Humbled and reduced by so terrible 
a blow, they thought themselves no longer in 
a condition to defend Messina ; and differing 
in opinion about what measures to pursue, one 
party surrendered the citadel to the Cartha- 
ginians, whilst another sent ambassadors to 
implore the protection of the Romans. 

VIII. The affair was debated in the senate ; 
where, being considered in all its lights, it gave 
no small perplexity to the Fathers. On the 
one hand they thought it dishonourable, and 
altogether unworthy of the Roman virtue, 
to undertake the defence of traitors, whose 
perfidy was exactly the same with that of 
the Rhegians, which they had lately punished 
with so exemplary a severity. But then 
again it was of the utmost consequence to stop 
the progress of the Carthaginians ; who, not 
satisfied with their conquests in Africa and 
Spain, had also made themselves masters of 
Sardinia, and the adjacent isles on the coast 
of Italy ; and would certainly get all Sicily 
into their hands, if they should be suffered to 



ART OF WAR. 



posses themselves of Messina, From thence, 
into Italy, the passage was very short : and it 
was in some measure to invite an enemy to come 
over, to leave him that entrance open. These 
reasons, though strong, could not prevail with 
the senate to declare in favour of the Mam. 
ertines ; and accordingly motives of honour and 
justice prevailed over those of interest and po- 
licy. But the people were not so scrupulous. 
In an assembly held on this subject, it was re- 
solved that the Mamertines should be assisted ; 
and Appius Claudius, one of the consuls, 
was ordered to conduct an army into Sicily for 
that purpose. Appius, to learn the true 
state of things, went over in person to Messina, 
and conducted himself so happily, as by some 
means to persuade the Carthaginian officer to 
evacuate the citadel. This so highly offended 
the people of Carthage, that they condemned 
their officer to be crucified as a traitor and a 
coward. At the same time they invested the 
place by sea and land, and entering into an 
alliance with Hiero the new king of Syracuse, 
were joined by his troops. Meanwhile Ap. 
pius, having by an artful stratagem eluded the 
vigilance of the Carthaginian admiral, crossed 
the strait with all his forces, and attacking the 
Syracusans and Carthaginians one after an- 
other, compelled them to abandon the siege. 

IX. Such was the beginning of the first 
Punic war, in which I think it evidently ap- 
pears, that the Romans were the aggressors. 
For they undertook the defence of a traitorous 
and perfidious set of men, against a people with 
whom they were in alliance and amity. I deny 
not that reasons of state, and the maxims of 
policy, plead strongly in their behalf on this 
occasion. It was certainly not their interest 
to suffer the Carthaginians to become too 
powerful, or get entire possession of an island 
that lay so contiguous to Italy. But if we ex. 
amine their conduct by the rules of strict justice, 
it will be found no easy matter to vindicate it. 
And in fact we have seen, that the senate ab- 
solutely declared against aiding the Mamer- 
tines, as inconsistent with honour, and the dig- 
nity of the Roman name. Whether they acted 
sincerely upon this occasion, or only to save 
appearances, is not my business to determine. 
It is enough that the thing itself serves to 
justify the Carthaginians, and exempt them 
from the charge of having been the first ag. 
gressors in this war. Nor indeed do the Ro- 
man writers throw the blame of it upon them, 



but generally allow, that jealousy, and an ap. 
prehension of each other's growing power, em. 
broiled the two states upon the present occa. 
sion. 

X. But let us now pass to the second Punic 
war. Here it is that the charge of insincerity 
seems to lie heaviest against the Carthaginians. 
The Romans, exasperated by the losses they 
had received, gave a free vent to their hatred, and 
spared no endeavours to blacken their ad. 
versaries, and lay the whole blame of the war 
upon them. And indeed they have contrived 
to give a specious colour to this accusation, by 
representing the taking of Saguntum as the 
cause of the quarrel. For to consider only the 
first appearance of this step ; Hannibal, con. 
trary, as they pretend, to the express tenor 
of treaties and without any formal declaration 
of war, falls upon a city in alliance with the 
Romans. But as Polybius has very judicious- 
ly observed, the taking of Saguntum is to be 
looked upon as the beginning, not the cause 
of the war : and if we trace matters to their 
source, we shall find that the Carthaginians 
were provoked to this step, by a series of the 
mosj unjustifiable injuries on the side of the 
Romans. Soon after the conclusion of the 
peace of Sicily, the mercenaries who had serv. 
ed in the armies of Carthage revolting, brought 
that state to the very brink of destruction. The 
Sardinians, taking advantage of these troubles, 
shook off the Carthaginian yoke, and expelled 
all their garrisons out of the island. Things 
continued for some time in this situation, until 
at length the Carthaginians, having quelled 
the rebellion in Africa, prepared to recover 
possession of Sardinia. The Romans, who 
during all the foregoing troubles of Carthage 
had behaved with great justice and mode- 
ration, now seeing that people like to regain 
their former strength, pretended a jealousy of 
the new preparations, and declared war against 
them. The Carthaginians, unable at that time 
to enter the lists with so powerful an adversary, 
were forced to submit to a second treaty ; by 
which they gave up Sardinia to the Romans, 
and obliged themselves to an additional pay- 
ment of twelve hundred talents. 

XI. This injustice of the Romans may be 
considered as the first and principal cause of 
the second Punic war. For Hamilcar, sur- 
named Barcha, highly exasperated on account 
of a treaty, which necessity alone had com. 
pelled the Carthaginians to submit to, resolved 



8 



THE ROMAN 



to break with Rome the first favourable op- 1 
portunity ; and accordingly directed all his 
views to ihe success of that enterprise. How 
deeply he resented the injury of which we 
speak, appears bj- his making Hannibal swear 
upon the altar, at the age of nine years, that 
he would ever be an irreconcilable enemy to 
the Romans. During his command in Spain 
he brought the greatest part of that country 
under the power of the Carthaginians ; but 
falling in batile before he had completed the 
conquest of it. Asdrubal his son-in-law succeed- 
ed him, and continued the war with success. ! 
"^his alarmed the Romans, who thinking it a 
necessary piece of policy to check the growing 
power of a rival state, obliged Asdrubal to enter 
into a new treaty-, in which it was stipulated, 
that he should attempt no conquest beyond 
the Iberus. How this may appear to others I 
cannot say, but to me it carries the idea of a 
fresh insult, as the Romans hereby claimed a 
manifest superiority over the Carthaginians, 
and assumed the power of setting bounds to 
their empire : a point upon which they were 
always so very nice themselves, that no ex- 
cuse can be offered for their disregarding it 
in their conduct towards others. 

Xn. Hannibal succeeded Asdrubal in the 
command of the army ; and having in a very 
short time completed the reduction of Spain, 
began to think seriously of avenging the many 
wrongs done his country by the Romans. 
To that end he contrived a pretence of quarrel 
with the Saguntines, that by attacking their 
city, he might give occasion to a rupture be- 
tween the two states. For though Saguntum 
lay on this side the Iberus, and therefore was 
within the plan of conquest permitted to the 
Carthaginians by the Romans ; yet these last, 
as if repenting of the concession they had made 
to their adversaries, concluded an alliance 
■with the Saguntines soon after the signing of 
the treaty with Asdrubal. Now as by an article 
of that treaty, neither state was to make war 
upon the allies of the other, the Romans pre- 
tended that Saguntum, though on this side the 
Iberus, could not be attacked without violating 
the peace. On the other hand the Carthagi- 
nians maintained, that the very alliance with 
the Saguntines was a violation of the treaty, as 
being no other than a mean artifice to wrest the 
power of making war upon the Saguntines out 
of their hands, after it had been expressly con- 
ceded to them by that article, which permitted 



the conquest of ail the nations of Spain on this 
side the Iberus. I think it needless to enter into 
a discussion of this nice point, because the 
taking of Saguntum ought to be considered 
rather as the beginning of the quarrel, than the 
cause of the war. The Carthaginians were 
determined upon hosliiitics ; and it appears by 
the above deduction, that the Romans, by a 
continued series of insults and provocations, 
had given them but too just ground to come 
to that extremity. Polybius himself, a great 
admirer of the Romans, ai.d who endeavours 
on all occasions to represent their conduct in 
the most favourable light, though he blames 
the attempt upon Saguntum as an infraction 
of the treaty, is yet forced to acknowledge 
thus much. " It would be a great mistake," 
says that judicious historian, " to consider the 
taking of Saguntum by Hannibal as the real 
cause of the second Pnnic war. It was the 
beginning, but not the cause of it. The regret 
of the Carthaginians for the loss of Sicily ; 
the violence and injustice of the Romans, in 
seizing Sardinia, and imposing a new tribute ; 
and lastly, the success of the Carthaginian 
armies in Spain, which inspired that state with 
courage and alarmed their adversaries ; these 
were the real causes of the rupture. If we con- 
sider only the siege of Saguntum, we cannot 
avoid throwing the whole blame upon the 
Carthaginians, whose attack of that city was 
a manifest violation of the treat}' with Asdru- 
bal. For though the Saguntines were not in 
alliance with Rome at the time of the conclu- 
sion of that treaty, it is evident the Romans 
did not thereby divest themselves of the liberty, 
of making new alliances. In this view of 
things, therefore, the Carthaginians would be 
altogether inexcusable. But if we go back 
to the times when Sardinia was forcibly seized, 
and a new tribute imposed, it must be con. 
fessed," adds the historian, " that the conduct 
of the Romans in these two points cannot be 
justified." 

XIII. Thus we see that Polybius throws the 
whole blame of the second Punic war upon 
the Romans ; and I believe every thinking 
man will be of the same opinion ; which ought 
to make us cautious of giving too easy credit 
to the representations of their historians, when 
they charge their enemies with infidelity and 
breach of faith, and bestow such magnificent 
eulogiums of justice and moderation upon their 
own commonwealth. For allowing the Car- 



ART OF WAR. 



9 



thaginians to have been the first in breaking 
the peace, it may with reason be asked, whe- 
ther the notorious injustice of the Romans, 
previously committed, did not justify them in 
no longer observing a treaty concluded in all 
the forms ; and whether it was not a legitimate 
reason for entering into a war. I cannot how- 
ever but observe, that Polybius seems to be 
a little too severe in his censure of the Car- 
thaginians for attacking Saguntum. It will 
surely admit of debate, whether the article re- 
lating to the allies of both states could be ex- 
tended any farther than to the alliance actually 
subsisting at the time of the signing of the 
treaty. If we extend it to all alliances what- 
soever, either made or to be made, this seems 
mutually to invest thcra v^ith a power of pro- 
hibiting each other from engaging in any war : 
because either of them contracting an alliance 
with that people against whom war was intend- 
ed, rendered them thereby sacred and invio- 
lable. But allowing the reflection of Polybius 
to be just, that the two states by that treaty 
did not absolutely divest themselves of the 
liberty of making new alliances : it seems yet 
pretty evident that the Romans did so, in re- 
spect of all the nations lying on this side the 
Iberus. For by giving up to the Carthagi- 
nians the entire conquest of those countries, 
they plainly bound themselves not to come 
under any engagement inconsistent with that 
article. The alliance therefore with the Sagun- 
tines, as it tended to divest the Carthaginians 
of a power expressly conceded to them by the 
treaty, ought to be considered as a direct vio- 
lation of it ; and the Romans might with equal 
justice have contracted amity with all the other 
nations of Spain yet unsubdued, and theroby 
utterly deprived the Carthaginians of the power 
of making war in that country. 

XIV. But it is now time to take a view of 
the causes that gave rise to the third Punic 
war; in which, I believe, it will be abundantly 
manifest, that the Romans proceeded without 
the least appearance of justice. Among the 
conditions of the peace granted by Scipio to 
the Carthaginians, there was one which im- 
ported, that they should not make war without 
the consent of the Romans. Masinissa, king 
of Numidia, taking advantage of this article, 
made daily encroachments upon their territories 
and dispossessed them of several towns and 
districts. He was himself in great favour with 
the Romans, on account of the many services 
2* 



he had done them in the second Punic war ; 
and being no stranger to their hatred and jeal- 
ousy of the Carthaginians, imagined they 
would not be displeased at his attempts to 
weaken the power of a rival state. The event 
showed that he was not mistaken in his judg- 
ment. The Carthaginians not daring to do 
themselves justice, applied to the Romans for 
redress. But all tlieir solicitations were to no 
purpose. Commissioners indeed set out for 
Africa, to examine the pretensions of the par- 
ties, and bring matters to an issue. These find- 
ing Masinissa already possessed of the territo- 
ries in question, ciiose rather to leave the afifair 
undecided than either oblige the king to aban- 
don his conquests, or declare expresisly against 
the Carthaginians. The same conduct was ob- 
served in two following deputations : whence it 
was generally believed, that the commissioners 
acted in a nianncr bj' order of the senate, and 
had received ])rivate instructions to favour 
I\Iasinissa, who, by this delay, had an oppor- 
tunity of establishing himself in his usurpations. 

XV^. It was upon occasion of the last of 
these deputations that the elder Cato, who 
was one of the commissioners, observing the 
flourishing condition of Carthage, and its great 
power and riches, notwithstanding the many 
losses it had sustained, could not help consi- 
dering it as a very dangerous rival to his coun- 
try. Accordingly at his return, he declared in 
the senate, that Rome could never be safe, so 
long as Carthage should subsist. Nay, so deeply 
had this apprehension rooted itself in his mind, 
that in order to keep alive in his countrymen 
a sense of their danger, he never spoke upon 
public aflairs, but he always concluded his 
opinion with this sentence, Cavtiiage must be 
destroyed. — And indeed the Romans, naturally 
averse to that city, and mindful of the many 
calamities they had suftcred from it, were easily 
persuaded to come into this design. Nor was 
it long before an opportunity offered itself. 

The Carthaginians, exasperated to the last 
degree by the continual encroachments of Ma- 
sinissa, and seeing no hopes of redress from 
the senate, had recourse to arms. A battle 
was fought, in which they were defeated, their 
camp taken, and their whole army cut to pieces. 
The Romans resolving to take advantage of 
this blow, and of the pretence furnished by the 
quarrel with Masinissa, declared war in form. 
All the endeavours of the Carthaginians to 
mollify them were without eflTect. They even 
C 



10 



THE ROMAN 



made an absolute surrender of their city and 
territories ; and, in obedience to the orders of 
the senate, sent three hundred of their principal 
nobility as hostages, and delivered up without 
fraud all their arms. But these acts of sub- 
mission were enjoined, only in the view of 
weakening, and rendering them incapable of 
resistance. For the Romans still peremptorily 
demanding that they should abandon their city 
and give it up to be demolished, compelled 
them at last to arm in their own defence. 

XVI. I thought it necessary to be thus 
particular in my account of the wars between 
these two states, because they best serve to 
show what credit is due to the pompous ac- 
counts we meet with in historians, of the sin- 
cerity and inviolable justice of the Romans. 
For here, if any where, we may expect to 
find samples of that equity and moderation. 
Here we may look for a conduct altogether 
clear and void of reproach. It is certain 
that the Romans always valued themselves in 
a particular manner upon their good faith, and 
exact observance of treaties with the Cartha- 
ginians. This evidently appears by the ad- 
vantageous testimony Caesar gives of his 
countrymen in this respect, in that famous 
speech of his in Sallust, upon occasion of 
the conspiracy of Catiline. « Bellis Punicis 
omnibus, cum sspe Carthaginienses, et in 
pace, et per inducias, multa nefanda facinora 
fecissent ; nunquam ipsi per occasionem talia 
fecere ; magis quod se dignum foret, quam 
quod in illis jure fieri posset, quserebant." 
« Although in all the Punic wars, the Car- 
thaginians, both in peace, and during truces, 
were guilty of many abuses and violations of 
their engagements ; the Romans, how invi- 
ting soever the opportunity might be, could 
yet never be prevailed upon to retaliate the 
like usage. They were more attentive to 
their own glory, than to the revenge they 
might have justly taken on such perfidious 
enemies." We find likewise a great many 
reflections to the same purpose sprinkled up 
and down the writings of Cicero ; from all 
which it is easy to judge, how irreproachable 
they thought their conduct on this head, and 
what a pattern of justice and moderation. But 
if, notwithstanding all these favourable repre- 
sentations, it still appears so very liable to 
exceptions, how much less can it be justified 
with regard to other states'? And, indeed, 
were I to enter into a particular detail, I 



could easily evince,^ that it was no other than 
a continued train of insults and provocations 
designedly calculated to exasperate such states 
as were most obnoxious, and force them to have 
recourse to arms. It will doubtless appear 
wonderful to the reader, how, amidst such a 
series of oppressive conduct, the Romans still 
found means to preserve, in some measure, the 
reputation of justice and equity. But this, 
as we have before intimated, was chiefly 
owing to their observance of certain outward 
forms. They never failed to contrive some 
ground of complaint against those nations 
they intended to attack ; to send deputies to 
demand satisfaction ; and to make formal de- 
claration of war by a herald, previous to the 
commencing of hostilities. It must indeed 
be owned, that it required no small art and 
policy, so to involve and entangle themselves 
with all the nations of the then known world, 
that they could at pleasure find some specious 
pretence of quarrel, when their interest re- 
quired them to break with any state. This 
gave a colour of justice to all their undertak- 
ings, inspired their armies with assurance and 
confidence, inviolably attached to them their 
old friends, and procured them new allies 
at pleasure. And as it seems to have beei^ 
one of their master-strokes in politics, and 
the principal engine by which they pushed 
on their conquests, it may not be amiss to 
give the reader some little insight into their 
artful conduct in this respect, that he may 
the better comprehend the motives and ten- 
dency of it. 

XVII. Although I cannot bring myself to 
think, with some modern writers, of pretend- 
ed depth and penetration, that Numa Pom- 
pilius had a political view in the several re- 
ligious regulations he established at Rome ; 
yet I am ready enough to allow, that many of 
his institutions were afterwards, by the prudent 
management of the senate, converted into 
maxims of state, and rendered very servieeabk 
in the administration of the government. Of 
this nature particularly were the ceremonies 
relating to the declaration of war. Nothing 
is of greater consequence to an ambitious re 
public, which aims at universal dominion, an 
a gradual subjection of all nations, than U 
prevent such a general confederacy against 
her, as might not only put a stop to her coj 
quests, but even threaten her in her turn wi 
destruction. This the senate effected by thi 



ART OF WAR. 



11 



singular address and conduct, in the several 
wars in which they were engaged. For they 
always found means to colour them over with 
s-uch a specious pretence of justice, as gave 
no umbrage to the neighbouring states, nor 
begot any jealousy of a power which seemed 
to have nothing ia view but the redressing of 
its own wrongs, or those of other nations in 
alliance with it. That strong bent towards 
religion, and the worship of the gods, which 
Numa introduced among the people, and 
which the senate carefully cherished for many 
generations, helped greatly to forward this 
persuasion. Men were not apt to distrust a 
religious republic, where virtue was held in 
honour, and vice of every kind discounte- 
nanced. Let me add, that in the early ages 
of this state, this was more than mere pretence. 
They were really distinguished by their pro- 
bity, by a steady adherence to justice, and 
a faithful observance of treaties. Most of 
their wars were defensive, or undertaken for 
the sake of their allies. And though in after 
times, in proportion as their power increased, 
they gave way to the dictates of ambition and 
became less scrupulous in their conduct ; yet 
as they never departed from those outward 
©bservances, by which the appearance of jus- 
tice is maintained, and took care to signalize 
themselves from time to time, by such par- 
ticular instances of moderation, as could not fail 
to make a deep impression ; their reputation for 
equity and good faith continued still the same. 
XVIII. Observe, I beseech you, the differ- 
ent sentiments entertained of the Romans and 
Carthaginians, at the time of the rupture be- 
tween the two states. The Romans, though 
they had gradually subjected all the nations 
of Italy, and raised themselves to a very formi- 
dable pitch of greatness, were yet so far from 
being considered as an ambitious republic, 
against whom it was necessary for other states 
'o be upon their guard, that the fame of their 
'irtue and justice seems at this time to have 
: een at the highest ; insomuch that foreign na- 
;ions, instead of dreading their power, courted 
. leir alliance and amity. It was otherwise 
T.'ith the Carthaginians. They had been less 
.'ireful to conceal their ambition, or cover their 
breach of treaties under a pretence of injuries. 
JTence their designs became suspected, all 
their actions were viewed in their worst light, 
and the general prejudice against them was so 
strong, that every thing laid to their charge 



by their enemies found a ready belief. By 
this means it happened, that though in the in- 
terval between the first and second Punic wars, 
the Romans acted without the least regard to 
justice and the faitii of treaties, yet very little 
notice was taken of the complaints of the Car- 
thaginians : and when, in consequence of re- 
peated insults and provocations, they were at 
last obliged to have recourse to arms, the whole 
blame of the war, though so manifestly flowing 
from the injurious behaviour of the Romans, 
was nevertheless charged upon the perfidy of 
the Carthaginians. 

XIX. After the entire conquest of Italy, 
and the reduction of the greatest part of Si. 
cily in the first Punic war, it required a more 
refined policy in the Romans, to extend the 
limits of their empire, and at the same time keep 
up the reputation of their integrity. They were 
not immediately surrounded with those nations, 
which it was their interest to attack ; and there- 
fore could not easily provoke them to such acts 
of hostility, as might justify a declaration of 
war. And should they upon slight pretences 
transport an army out of their own territories, 
to fall upon a distant prince, their design of 
conquest would be visible, and beget a general 
alarm. Besides, their power was become so very 
formidable, that foreign states did not care to 
contend with them, and therefore industriously 
avoided giving them any just ground of com. 
plaint. In this situation they took upon them- 
selves the title of patrons and protectorsof all na- 
tions, and by contracting alliances with weaker 
states, found means to fall upon the stronger at 
pleasure.without seeming themselves to have any 
particular interest in the quarrel. It was upon this 
principle that they attached themselves to the 
Saguntines and if^tolians, which afterwards fur. 
nished them with such a plausible colour for the 
Carthaginian and Macedonian wars. To know 
the full reach and value of this policy, we need 
only reflect, that though the second Punic war 
wasunexceptionably juston the part of the Car- 
thaginians ; yet the Romans, by diverting the 
attention of the public from the usurpation of 
Sardinia, and fixing it upon the fate of Sagun- 
tum, threw the whole odium of that war upon 
their adversaries, whilst themselves were con. 
sidered as a humane generous people, actuated 
merely by a concern for their allies. 

XX. And here it is particularly deserving 
of our notice, that amongst the many wars in 
which they were engaged, after the conclusion 



12 



THE ROMAN 



of that with Hannibal, we hardly meet with 
any that can be deemed personal. It was al- 
ways, at least in appearance, to support the 
cause of some of their allies, or prevent their 
being crushed by a powerful neighbour. One 
would be apt to think, that they had it not so 
much in view to aggrandize themselves, as to 
prevent the growth of any dangerous power, 
from which weaker states might be exposed 
to suffer. Upon the conclusion of the first 
Macedonian war, they proclaimed liberty to 
all the states of Greece. This action, so 
magnificent in appearance, was in reality a 
refined stroke of policy. The Greeks were a 
warlike people, well disciplined, and capable 
of bringing great armies into the field. Had 
they suspected the Romans of a design upon 
their liberties, and united in their own defence, 
they must have been invincible. But this 
seeming grant of freedom eflTectually lulled 
them asleep, and by the artful conduct of the 
Romans, gave birth to infinite divisions among 
them ; which ending commonly in an appeal 
to Rome, furnished the senate with frequent 
opportunities of taking part in their quarrels. 
Thus they insensibly grew to be rulers and 
dictators over them, and by slow impercep- 
tible steps accomplished their subjection. 

XXI. Their ambassadors to foreign princes, 
and such as had not yet felt the weight of 
their power, commonly delivered themselves in 
such a haughty magisterial way, as could not 
fail to draw upon them some indignity or ill 
treatment, and thereby furnish a sure pretence 
of war, when the interest of the commonwealth 
rendered such a step necessary. If a people 
at any time had given them umbrage, and 
afterwards repenting of their rashness, sur- 
rendered up the principal offenders; they 
would often refuse to punish them, choosing 
rather to consider the whole nation as guilty, 
and reserve to themselves an useful vengeance. 
When they saw two nations engaged in war, 
although they were not in alliance, nor had 
any contest with either of them, they would 
nevertheless appear upon the stage of action, 
and affected always to side with the weakest. 
It was an ancient custom, says Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, for the Romans to grant suc- 
cour to all who came to implore it. If princes 
of the same blood were at variance for the 
crown, they seldom failed to make themselves 
parties in the dispute ; and if one of them was 
a minor, declared in his favour, proclaiming 



themselves his guardians, in quality of pro- 
tectors of the world. When subjects, oppress- 
ed and tyrannised over by their sovereigns, 
were provoked to renounce their allegiance, 
they immediately indulged them the title of 
ally, declaring themselves the professed ene- 
mies of tyranny and lawless power. 

XXII. These were the arts and policies, 
by which the Romans so entangled themselves 
with all nations, that they could with pleasure 
engage in a war with any state, and colour it 
over with such an appearance of justice, as 
not only prevented any general confederacy 
against them, but even warmly engaged their 
allies in the support of their usurpations. 
Nor were they less politic in the choice of 
their wars, and in the manner of conducting 
and bringing them to a period. For as their 
power was very formidable, and they had con- 
trived to draw many nations over to their in- 
terest ; whatever state took up arms against 
them, found it impossible to make any long 
resistance, and was in the end forced to ac- 
cept of such conditions of peace as they 
thought fit to propose. For this reason war 
was seldom declared against them, but them- 
selves always made it, at a season, with a 
people, and in such a manner as best suited 
their interest. If they were opposed by 
several enemies at the same time, they grant- 
ed a truce to the weakest, who thought 
themselves happy in obtaining it, considering 
it as a great advantage, that their ruin was at 
least suspended. They never engaged in far- 
distant wars, till they had first made an 
alliance with some power contiguous to the 
enemy they invaded, who might unite his 
troops to the army they sent ; and as this was 
never considerable with regard to numbers, 
they always had another in that province 
which lay nearest the enemy, and a third, in 
Rome, ever ready to march at a minute's 
warning. In this manner they hazarded but 
a small part of their forces at once, and 
found it easy to repair any loss they might 
sustain, whilst their enemy was often ruined 
by a single battle. It was this consideration 
that inspired Hannibal with the resolution of 
attacking them in Italy itself, the centre of 
their dominions. He was sensible that a blow 
struck there, must effectually weaken them ; 
whereas distant defeats, so long as the capital 
remained unmolested, and was at liberty to 
send a fresh supply of troops to recruit the 



ART OF WAR. 



13 



army, were, properly speaking, little other 
than so many lessons of prudence to their 
generals, who soon found themselves in a 
condition to renew the war with greater forces, 
and more circumspection. Accordingly we 
find, that when the same Hannibal after- 
wards offered his service to Antiochus, in his 
intended war against the Romans, there was 
no principle he inculcated more earnestly, than 
the necessity of sending an army into Italy, 
and cutting them off from those continual re- 
sources, by which, in any other method of at- 
tack, they found themselves invincible. 

XXXIII. But nothing gives us a greater 
idea of the address and policy of this people, 
than the manner in which they terminated 
their wars, when they had at last brought them 
to the point they desired. They sent the gar- 
risons out of the strong holds ; had the horses 
and elephants delivered up to them ; and if 
their enemies were powerful at sea, obliged 
them to burn their ships, and sometimes re- 
move higher up in the country. If the prince 
they had overcome was possessed of numerous 
armies, and surrounded with warlike nations, 
one of the articles of the treaty was, that he 
should not make war with any of the allies of 
the Romans, but submit his differences to ar- 
bitration. And as they never refused their al- 
liance to any people who bordered on a pow- 
erful prince, this condition inserted in a treaty 
of peace, cut him off from all opportunities of 
making war, or employing his troops, and there- 
by deprived him of a military power for the 
time to come. Nay, they even bereaved their 
very allies of this force. The instant any con- 
test broke out amongst them, they sent ambas- 
sadors who obliged them to conclude a peace. 
It was in this manner they terminated the wars 
between Attalus and Prusias ; and v^hoever is 
in the least acquainted with their history, must 
be sensible, that they all along adhered strictly 
to this policy. The result was, that they alone 
were possessed of warlike and veteran armies, 
whilst those of other nations degenerated into 
a raw unpractised rabble. When any state 
composed too formidable a body, from its situa- 
tion or union, they never failed to divide it. 
The republic of Achaia was formed by an as- 
sociation of free cities. The senate declared, 
that every city should be governed by its own 
laws, independent on the general authority. 
Macedonia was surrounded with inaccessible 
mountains. The senate divided it into four 



parts ; declared those free ; prohibited them 
every kind of alliance among themselves by 
marriage ; carried off all the nobles into Ita- 
ly ; and by that means reduced this power to 
nothing. 

XXIV. These customs of the Romans were 
not certain particular incidents which hap- 
pened by chance; but so many invariable prin- 
ciples, from which, in a long course of years, 
they never deviated. The maxims they put 
in practice against the greatest monarchs, were 
exactly the same with those they had em- 
ployed in their infant state, against the little 
cities which stood round them. They made 
Eumenes and Masinissa contribute to the sub- 
jection of Philip and Antiochus, as they had 
before employed the Latins and Hernici to 
subdue the Volscians and the Tuscans. They 
obliged the Carthaginians and the kings of 
Asia to surrender their fleets to them, in like 
manner as they had forced the citizens of An- 
tium to give up their little vessels. And in- 
deed it is surprising to consider, that during 
the course of that long and mighty prosperity 
which attended the Roman arms, and in which 
it is so usual for mankind to forget themselves, 
the senate continued to act all along with the 
same depth of judgment, and the same steady 
views to the public interest. They were not 
dazzled by their good fortune, nor moved to 
precipitate their enterprises before the proper 
season. Observe, I entreat you, the wisdom 
and policy of their conduct. After the defeat 
of Antiochus, they were possessed of Africa, 
Asia, and Greece, without having a single city 
in those countries, that could be called imme- 
diately their own. They seemed to conquer with 
no other view but to bestow. But then they 
obtained so complete a sovereignty, that when- 
ever they engaged in war with any prince, 
they oppressed him, as it were, with the weight 
of the whole universe. The time proper for 
seizing upon the conquered countries was 
not yet come. Had the Romans kept the 
cities they took from Philip, the Greeks would 
have seen at once into their designs. Had 
they, after the second Punic war, or that with 
Antiochus, possessed themselves of lands in 
Africa and Asia, they could never have pre- 
served conquests so slightly established. It 
was the interest of the senate to wait till all 
nations were accustomed to obey as free and 
as confederate, and to let them blend and lose 
themselves insensibly in the Roman com- 



14 



THE ROMAN 



monwealth before they should attempt reduc- 
ing them to the condition of subjects. After 
overcoming a nation, they contented themselves 
with weakening it, and imposing such condi- 
tions as consumed it insensibly. If it recovered, 
they depressed it still more, and it became 
subject, without a possibility of dating the era 
of its subjection. This was indeed a slow way 
of conquering, but founded in the deepest policy. 
Rome, by steady adherence to these maxims, 
gradually increased in strength ; and having 
at length got the better of all opposition, se- 
curely took possession of the sovereignty of 
the universe. 



CHAP. H. 



OF THE MANNER OF LEVYING TROOPS, AND 
FORMING A ROMAN ARMY. 



I. The levies, during the times of the com- 
monwealth, to which period we chiefly con- 
fine ourselves, were commonly made by the 
consuls. Every year they issued out an edict, 
commanding all who had reached the military 
age, to appear in the field of Mars, or in the 
capital. Two legions composed a consular 
army ; and as there were two consuls, it was 
usual to raise four legions yearly. The age for 
serving in the army was from seventeen to 
forty-five. None but citizens were admitted ; 
and all of that rank within the age prescribed 
by law, were obliged to be present on the day 
prefixed, under pain of a fine. To fail in this 
respect was long criminal during the common- 
wealth. The people being assembled, the con- 
suls began, by nominating the military tribunes, 
twenty-four in number, six to every legion. 
Of these, fourteen were chosen out of the body 
of the knights, and the rest from among the 
people. The first were required to have 
served at least five years, and the others ten. 
They were divided to the four legions in this 
manner. Of the fourteen youngest tribunes, 
four were assigned to the first legion, three to 
the second, four to the third, and three to the 
last. Of the ten eldest, two to the first and 
third legions, and three to the second and last. 

II. The four and twenty tribunes thus chosen 
and appointed, every tribe was called out by 
lot, and ordered to divide into its proper cen- 
turies. Four men, as much alike in all circum- 



stances as could be found, being presented out 
of the century on whom the lot fell, the tri- 
bunes of the first legion chose one, then the tri- 
bunes of the second another, the tribunes of the 
third legion a third, and the remaining person 
fell to the tribunes of the fourth. After this four 
more were drawn out. And now the right of 
choosing first belonged to the tribunes of the 
second legion ; in the next four to the tribunes 
of the third legion ; then to the tribunes of the 
fourth legion ; and so continually, those always 
choosing last in every turn, who chose first 
the time before. From this manner of choos- 
ing the soldiers, one by one, the several large 
bodies into which they were formed, obtained 
the name of legions, from the Latin word legere, 
to choose ; and the levy itself was called de- 
lectiis, choice. No soldier was admitted under 
the height of five Roman feet and ten inches, 
except in an extreme want of troops, which 
would not allow of choosing. It is observed, 
that the men of the first cohorts of each legion 
were not under six feet high, which amounts 
to five feet ten inches of our measure, the 
Roman foot making eleven inches and six hun- 
dred and four decimal parts of an inch English. 
III. The horse were chosen out of the body 
of the Eqiiites, into which order, after the in- 
stitution of the Census by Servius Tullius, all 
were admitted who were worth four hundred 
sestertia. They had a horse and ring given 
them at the public charge, and formed a third 
and middle order between the senate and the 
people. They are known in history under the 
name of Roman knights, and were obliged to 
appear on horseback, as often as the state had 
occasion for their service. Thus there was 
always a sufficient number of cavalry in readi- 
ness, and it belonged to the censors to review 
them, and furnish what was necessary to com- 
plete the legions. It is indeed hard to con- 
ceive, that all the Roman horse in the army 
should be knights ; and therefore many 
learned men are of opinion, that, after the siege 
of Veii, there were two sorts of cavalry in the 
Roman armies : one, whom the public supplied 
with horses, and who were said to serve eqvo 
publico; the other, who furnished themselves, 
and served eq2io privato. The former they 
allow to have been of the order of knights, the 
latter not. But Grsevius has abundantly de- 
monstrated, by the course of history, that from 
the beginning of the Roman state, till the time 
of Marius, no other horse entered the legions 



ART OF WAR. 



15 



but the true and proper knights, except in the 
midst of public confusion, when order and dis- 
cipline were neglected. After that period, 
the military affairs being new modelled, the 
knights thought not fit to expose themselves 
abroad in the legions, as they had formerly 
done, but generally kept at home to enjoy 
their estates, and to have a hand in the 
transactions of the city, leaving their places 
in the army to be supplied by foreign horse. 
Or if they ever made campaigns themselves, 
they held some post of honour and command. 
Hence, under the emperors, a man might be 
a knight and have the honour of a public 
horse, without ever engaging in the public 
cause, or so much as touching arms : which 
consideration made some princes lay aside the 
custom of allowing the knights a horse, and 
leave them only the gold ring to distinguish 
their order, as Pliny the elder affirms to have 
been done in his time. 

IV. When the levies were completed, the 
tribunes of every legion obliged the soldiers, 
one by one, to take the military oath. The 
form in this case was, to choose out a soldier, 
who repeated the oath aloud. By this oath he 
engaged to hazard his life for the common- 
wealth, to obey his general, and not to quit 
the army without leave. In pronouncing it 
he held up his right hand, raising the thumb 
of it upright ; after which all the soldiers of 
each legion declared that they swore the 
same thing, but without repeating the form. 
This was not a mere ceremony, but a very so- 
lemn act of religion, and so essential to the 
military state, that no man was deemed a sol- 
dier nor allowed to strike or kill an enemy, if 
he had not taken the customary oath. We 
have a remarkable example of this in the be- 
haviour of Cato the Censor. A legion, in 
which the son of that illustrious senator served, 
being dismissed by the consul who commanded 
in Macedonia, young Cato chose to continue 
with the army. His father, thereupon, wrote 
immediately to the consul, to desire, if he 
thought fit to suffer his son to remain in the 
service, that he would make him take a new 
oath, because being discharged from the for- 
mer, he had no longer any right to join in 
battle against the enemy. We find, likewise, 
that among the Greeks the military oath was 
accounted inseparable from the state of a sol- 
dier. And Xenophon in his history of Cyrus 
tlie Great, informs us, that that prince ex- 



ceedingly applauded the action of an officer, 
who having raised his arm to strike an enemy, 
upon hearing the retreat sounded, stopped 
short, regarding that signal as an order to 
proceed no farther. 

V. After administering the military oath, 
the next care of the tribunes was to form the 
troops into legions. The exact number of 
soldiers in such a battalion was not always the 
same. Romulus fixed it at three thousand 
foot, and three hundred horse. It afterwards 
rose to four, five, and six thousand. Under 
the consuls it was commonly four thousand 
two hundred foot, and three hundred horse. 
This was the number in the time of Poly- 
bius, and here I shall fix it. In order 
thoroughly to comprehend the nature of the 
legion, so famous in history, we must be- 
gin with observing that the whole infantry 
of which it was composed, was divided into 
four orders, Velites, Hastati, Principes, and 
Triarii. The Velites were young, active 
soldiers, and formed the light-armed troops 
of the Roman commonwealth : They had 
their name a volando, or d velocitate, from 
their swiftness and expedition. They were 
not divided into companies, nor had any fixed 
post assigned them in a day of battle, but 
hovered in loose order before the army, or 
were disposed among the cavalry and heavy- 
armed troops, as occasion required. The 
Hastati were so called, because they used 
in ancient times to fight with spears, which 
were afterwards laid aside as incommodious. 
These were taken out in the next age to the 
Velites, and formed the first line in a day of 
battle. The Principes were generally men of 
middle age, in the prime and vigour of life, 
whence probably they took their name. Their 
post in an engagement was the second line. 
The Triarii were old soldiers of distinguished 
valour, who had served long and acquired 
great experience. They had their name from 
their post in the field of battle, forming the 
third line or reserve. They are likewise some- 
times called Pilani, from their weapon the 
Pilum. 

VI. These several divisions formed twelve 
hundred men a piece in the three first orders, 
and six hundred in the last, amounting in all 
to four thousand two hundred, the entire in. 
fantry of a legion. Each body, the Velites 
excepted, was subdivided iato ten parts oi 
maniples, consisting of a hundred and twenty 



16 



THE ROMAN 



in the Hastati and Principes, and of sixty in 
the Triarii. Every maniple made two centu- 
ries of companies. Anciently, and at its first 
institution by Romulus, the century had a 
hundred men, from which it took its name. 
But afterwards, it consisted only of sixty in the 
hastati and principes, and of thirty in the 
triarii. Three maniples, one of the hastati, 
another of the principes, and a third of the 
triarii, composed a cohort. Every legion, 
therefore, consisted of ten cohorts, besides the 
twelve hundred velites, who, as we have al- 
ready observed, were divided into distinct com- 
panies. The number of legions kept on foot 
was different according to the different exigen- 
cies of the state. During the commonwealth, 
four legions were usually levied every year, and 
divided between the two consuls. But in case 
of necessity, the number was augmented, and 
we sometimes meet with eighteen in Livy. 

VII. We have observed that every maniple 
was divided into two centuries or companies. 
Over each of these presided an officer, called 
a centurion. To determine the point of prior- 
ity between them, they were created at two 
different elections. Those of the first elec- 
tion, as the most honourable, always took the 
precedency of their fellows, and therefore com- 
manded the right hand orders, as the others 
did the left. He who commanded the first 
century of the first maniple of the triarii, 
called also pilani, was the most considerable 
of ail the centurions, and had a place in 
the counsel of war with the consul and prin- 
cipal officers. He bore the name of pri- 
mipihis, or primipili centurio ; and was called 
likewise primipilus prior, to distinguish him 
from the centurion who commanded the second 
century of the same maniple, who had the title 
of primipilus postei-ior. This distinction of 
prior and posterior had place also in all the 
other maniples. The centurion who com- 
manded the first century of the second mani- 
ple of the triarii was called secundi pili cen- 
turio ; and so on to the tenth, who was called 
decimi pili centurio. The same order was 
observed among the hastati and principes. 
The first centurion of the principes was called 
primus princeps, or primi principis centurio. 
The second, secundus princeps, &c, and so cm 
to the last. So likewise among the hastati, 
primus hastatus, or primi hastati centurio, 
secundus hastatus, &c. through all the differ- 
ent orders. As it belonged to the military 



tribunes to appoint the centurions, so these 
last chose vexillarii, or ensigns, two to every 
maniple. They had likewise officers under 
them, called succenturiones, or optiones, and 
who were in the nature of our lieutenants. 
Polybius mentions them under the name of 
tergiductors, their post being in the rear of 
the company. 

VIII. The cavalry required to a legion 
was three hundred. They were divided into 
ten turmx, or troops, thirty to a troop. Every 
troop consisted of three decurix, or bodies of 
ten men. Over each of these was a captain, 
called decurio. He that was first elected 
commanded the whole troop, and had the title 
of prsfectus. The decurions had every one 
his optio, or deputy, under him, who, in like 
manner as in the foot, were called tergiduc- 
tors. These squadrons often occur in history 
under the name of alas, because they always 
formed the wings of the legion. At the time 
the Romans warred against the lesser nations 
of Italy, their horse was incomparably supe. 
rior to that of their enemies, for which reason 
they were composed of none but the most con- 
siderable among the citizens, being, as we have 
observed, selected wholly out of the order of 
the knights. When they alighted, no infantry 
was more formidable, and they very often turn, 
ed the scale of victor}^ It must be owned, how- 
ever, that their cavalry were but few, in pro. 
portion to their foot ; and though they served 
well enough for their Italian wars, yet they 
became fully sensible of this inconvenience 
when they had to do with Hannibal. It was 
chiefly by the superiority of his cavalry, and 
his manner of using it, that he gained so many 
victories over them. Accordingly, they applied 
themselves seriously to the improvement of 
this part of their strength, not only by inter, 
mixing platoons of foot with their cavalry and 
training them particularly to that service, but 
likewise by taking foreign horse into their pay, 
Numidians, Gauls, and Germans. 

IX. Besides the troops already mentioned, 
there were always in the Roman armies a 
number of soldiers, of a more eminent degree, 
known by the title of evocati. They were 
such as had served out the legal time, and 
been distinguished by particular marks of fa- 
vour, as a reward of their valour. It was 
usual for the consuls, especially in important 
wars, to invite a great number of these into the 
service, by circular letters despatched for that 



ART OF WAR. 



17 



purpose. The reputation of a general was 
what chiefly induced them to grant their at- 
tendance, and therefore it was considered as a 
particular mark of honour. In the field they 
usually guarded the chief standard, being ex- 
cused from all the military drudgery of stand- 
ing on the watch, labouring in the works, or 
other servile employments. They had like- 
wise the privilege of using the v/'iis or rod, 
which was the badge of the centurion's office, 
and indeed were in all respects rather superior 
to the centurions. It was very common, when 
any general of an established reputation, and 
who had long distinguished himself in the ser- 
vice of his country, was appointed to the man- 
agement of a difficult war, to see great numbers 
of these flock to his standard, and offer them- 
selves anew to dangers and fatigues, in hopes 
of gaining fresh laurels, under the auspices of 
a commander who had often in their youth led 
them to honour and victory. Thus it happened 
to Paulus -■Emilius, when he was charged with 
the conduct of the Macedonian war. And thus 
also to the younger Scipio Africanus, when, af- 
ter a series of disgraces before Numantia, the 
Romans cast their eyes upon him, as alone 
capable of restoring the reputation of their arms. 
X. But to return to the legions. The of- 
ficers next in dignity to the centurions were the 
military tribunes, of whom we have already 
given some account. They owed their name 
ind institution to Romulus, who having divi- 
ded the whole body of the citizens into three 
tribes, appointed an officer over each, with 
the title of tribune. The number afterwards 
increased to six in every legion. During the 
infancy of the commonwealth they were no- 
minated by the consuls ; and afterwards, paitly 
by the consuls, partly by the people. Their 
business was to decide all controversies in the 
army; to give the word to the watch; to see 
that the soldiers observed discipline, obeyed 
orders, and did their duty ; and to take care 
of the works and camp. None could attain this 
dignity, who had not served in the army five 
years ; and of the twenty-four that were annu- 
ally chosen, ten at least must have served ten 
years. Care was also taken to distribute them 
in such a manner, that in each legion the most 
experienced were united with those who were 
younger, in order to instruct and form them 
for commanding. By this means the legions 
were always provided with able officers, which 
could not fail of having an excellent eflect up- 



on the troops, as it naturally tended to inspire 
them with valour, and beget an esteem and 
confidence in their commanders. During the 
campaign, which lasted six months, they com- 
manded the legion by turns, two at a time, for 
two months together. The order in which 
they were to command was decided by lot. 

XI. The troops we have hitherto been de- 
scribing, may j^roperly be termed the natural 
forces of the republic, as consisting wholly of 
her own citizens. They were indeed the origi- 
nal armies of Rome, and all along constituted 
her main strength. But this political common- 
wealth, when she began to extend her dominion 
over Italy, instead of reducing the vanquished 
nations to slavery, indulged them the title of 
allies, and the free enjoyment of their own 
laws, upon condition of supplying her in her 
wars with a certain proportion of men. These 
were called the allied troops, and as to number, 
were equal to the natural forces in foot, and 
double in horse. The manner of levying 
them was this. The consuls, while they were 
employed in completing the legions at Rome, 
gave notice to the allied states what number 
of forces they would have occasion for, and 
appointed a time and place of rendezvous. The 
states accordingly convened their men, and 
choosing out the desired number, gave them 
an oath, and assigned them a commander-in- 
chief, and a paymaster-general. W' hen they 
arrived in the camp, they were divided jnto 
two great bodies, termed ate, or cornva, from 
their position in the army. For the Romans 
always reserved the centre to themselves, placing 
the confederates, half on the right, and half 
on the left wings. And because they were 
more numerous than the natural forces, care 
was taken farther to separate them, by se- 
lecting a third part of the horse, and a fifth 
of the foot, and posting them near the con- 
sul's person, under the name of extraordi- 
narii. It is not certainly known how the 
smaller bodies of the confederate forces were 
commanded. Most probably the Romans mar- 
shalled them according to their own disci- 
pline, and assigned them officers of the same 
nature with those of the legions. This seems 
to follow from the manner in which they 
fought, it appearing evidently by the course 
of history, that, both as to their arms and 
order of battle, they differed in nothing 
from the troops of the republic. We are as- 
sured, however, that the two olsp, or great di- 
D 



18 



THE ROMAN 



visions of the allies, had each a prefect appoint- 
ed them by the Roman consul, who governed 
in the same manner as the legionary tribunes. 
In aftertimes, all the states of Italy were ad- 
mitted to share the freedom of the city, and 
their forces incorporated with those of the re- 
public. From this period, therefore, the name 
of the allies ceased, and in their stead the aux- 
iliary troops were procured. These were sent 
by foreign states and princes, at the desire of 
the Roman senate, or generals, and were 
allowed a set pay from the republic ; whereas 
the allies received no consideration for their 
service, but a distribution of corn. 

XII. Over these armies of the Roman peo- 
ple, the two consuls presided, who were the 
standing generals of the republic. They were 
created yearly, and in the field possessed an 
unlimited authority : the senate reserving to 
themselves only the power of making peace, 
and decreeing war, unless upon extraordinary 
occasions. The annual change of generals was 
doubtless in some cases an obstacle to the 
advancement of affairs ; but the danger of 
infringing on the public liberty, by continuing 
the same man longer in the command of all 
the forces of the state, obliged them to over- 
look this inconvenience, from the apprehen- 
sion of a much greater. The necessity of 
affairs, the distance of places, and other reasons, 
reduced the Romans at length to continue 
their generals in the command for several 
years together, under the name of proconsuls 
or proprsetors. And as these generals had 
often a great extent of country to defend, and 
were obliged to employ different bodies of 
troops in different places, they found it neces- 
sary to have officers under them, of a more 
extensive authority than the military tribunes. 
This gave rise to the institution of the Legati, 
who commanded in chief under the general, 
and managed all affairs by his permission. 
We find them sometimes at the head of one 
legion, sometimes of three or four, and some- 
times of only part of a legion. Their office 
was accounted very honourable, insomuch that 
the greatest men of the state, and even such 
as had been consuls and dictators, did not 
disdain to accept of it. The great Fabius, as 
is well known, was his son's lieutenant; 
and Scipio Africanus served in the same ca- 
pacity under the consul his brother. The 
number was according to the general's plea- 
sure, on whom alone the choice depended ; 



and it appears, that they commanded under 
him, and received his orders, as lieutenant- 
generals in our armies serve under the gene- 
ralissimo. In the absence of the consul, or 
proconsul, they had the honour of using 
the fasces, and were intrusted with the same 
charge as the officer whom' they repre- 
sented. 

XIII. Having thus sufficiently explained 
how the armies of the Roman people were 
formed, and the dift'erent degrees of rank and 
military service that prevailed in them, it is 
time to consider a little more particularly 
wherein their strength consisted, and to what 
they were indebted for that superiority, which 
rendered them victorious over the troops of 
all other nations. The first thing that offers 
itself to our observation here is, the nature and 
form of the legion ; whose contrivance was so 
admirable, that Vegetius thinks nothing less 
than a god could inspire the idea of it. The 
soldiers of which it was composed, were armed 
with weapons of a heavier and stronger kind 
than those of other nations, as we shall have 
occasion to show more at large in the next 
chapter. But because some things must be 
done in war, which a heavy body is not able 
to execute, it was therefore made to include 
within itself a band of light forces, which 
might issue from it in order to provoke the 
enemy to battle, or draw back into it in case 
of necessity. It was likewise strengthened 
with cavalry, and with spearmen and slingers, 
to pursue those who fled, and complete the 
victory. The troops were all of different ex- 
perience and standing in the service, and 
so mixed together in the cohorts that no party 
of Roman forces was without a sufficient 
number of veterans, to give life and vigour 
to its operations. The number of men in a 
legion seems likewise to have been the effect 
of a wise policy. For these amounting to 
four thousand five hundred, formed a con- 
siderable body of troops, animated by one and 
the same spirit, and who, from their mutual 
relation among themselves, would take a near 
interest in each other's preservation. They 
were in effect men of the same regiment, and 
had all that zeal and concern for one another, 
which is usual among those lesser divisions 
of our troops. 

XIV. The Marquis de Feuquire, in his 
Memoirs, observes, that, the regiments of 
which modern armies consist, are not sufficient- 



ART OF WAR 



19 



ly strong in the number of men. He thinks 
it might do well to form them of several 
battalions ; because such a multitude of differ- 
ent bodies, without any immediate tie among 
themselves, seems directly contrary to that 
union and subordination, which constitutes 
the great beauty of military discipline. It is 
certain that troops always exert themselves 
more in behalf of those of the same regiment, 
than where the party for which they are en- 
gaged belong to a different division. This the 
Romans were fully sensible of, and had an 
eye to it particularly in the constitution of their 
legion. It was doubtless of great advantage 
to them in a day of battle, that their lines 
were made up of a few large bodies, linked 
together by the strongest military ties, and 
nearly interested in each other's preservation. 
Nor did the number of men in these bodies 
render them unwieldy or unmanageable ; be- 
cause being judiciously disposed into cohorts, 
they could be commanded with the same ease, 
and vvere no less nimble in their operations, 
than if they had formed so many independent 
battalions. And here it is worthy of notice, 
that in drawing up the army, the troops were 
so disposed, as tended wonderfully to their 
mutual support and encouragement. For as 
the Romans commonly fought in three lines, 
so in every one of these lines, the soldiers 
were always so posted, as to be sustained by 
others of the same legion. This was owing 
to the manner of forming the lines, not by en- 
tire legions, but by the different military 
orders that composed the legions. The Has- 
tati were placed in the first line, the Principes 
in the second, and the Triarii in the third. 
By this means the Hastati of every legion 
were supported by the Principes of the same 
legion, and these again by the Triarii. What 
spirit and confidence this must add to the 
troops, and how effectually in would tend to 
preserve them from slaughter, when any 
particular line was broken, will be evident 
upon the least reflection. It is found by ex- 
perience, that soldiers never fight better, nor 
exert a greater share of courage, than when 
they know themselves to be well supported ; 
and if at last they are obliged to give way, 
yet still the retreat is managed with less 
terror and confusion. The Romans, in case of 
a repulse, retired through the intervals of the 
lines behind them ; and these consisting of 
men of the same legion, advanced imme. 



diately to their relief, and doubtless would 
do every thing in their power to preserve their 
fellows. This kept up the spirits of those 
that fled, prevented their throwing away their 
arms, and encouraged them to rally and renew 
the charge. 

XV. There was also another advantage in 
the constitution of the legion, arising from the 
several military orders of which it was com- 
posed, with their division into maniples and 
companies. For these being very numerous, 
and differing in point of rank and superiority, 
opened a large field for preferment, and 
thereby excited an incredible ardour and emu- 
lation among the troops. A private soldier, 
after passing through the different mihtary 
orders, came to be a centurion among the 
Hastati ; and rising from one maniple to ano- 
ther, was at length promoted into the rank 
of the Principes. Thence, by a like gradation, 
he reached the order of the Triarii ; and in 
time attained the dignity of Primipilus. Nor 
was he even obliged to stop here. For as 
military merit was every thing at Rome, it 
seldom failed to raise those who possessed it, 
in any eminent degree, to the first dignities 
of the state. The manner too in which pro- 
motions were made, seems wonderfully calcu- 
lated for the advancement of true bravery. 
Every higher order of officers created those 
next below them, and so in train continually, 
through all the different steps of the service. 
As therefore the persons on whom the choice 
depended, had the best opportunities of 
knowing the merits of the several competi. 
tors, and were likely to be determined by 
that alone, in a matter that so nearly concern- 
ed their own honour and safety, it is natural 
to suppose, that every one would endeavour 
to recommend himself by such qualifications, 
as rendered him truly worthy of the place to 
which he aspired. This progressive choice 
of officers, which established so just a subor- 
dination in the army, and gave a great as- 
cendant to the principal commanders, con- 
tributed more than any thing to the perfection 
of military discipline. It is worth while to 
observe how gradually the Romans proceeded 
herein. The people, or state, elected the two 
consuls ; the consuls chose the military tri- 
bunes ; the military tribunes, the centurions ; 
and the centurions, their vexillarii and tergi- 
ductors. This method opened the fairest 
prospect to valour, and tended to beget that 



20 



THE ROMAN 



spirit among the troops, which is of all others 
the happiest that can be raised in an army, an 
emulation to surpass each other in deserving 
honours. 

XVI. What we have hitherto said regards 
chiefly the form and structure of the legion. 
Let us now consider the quality of the troops 
of which it was composed. None but citizens 
were admitted into this body, and of all these 
the tribunes had their choice, from seventeen 
to forty-live years of age. We are to observe, 
however, that it was not every citizen whom 
they judged worthy of this honour. By the 
institution of the Census, the whole Koman 
people were divided into distinct classes, found- 
ed on a valuation of their estates. Those of 
the sixth and lowest class, consisting of the 
poorer citizens, useful only by stocking the 
commonwealth with children, were not allowed 
to serve in the army. The Romans were for 
having soldiers, whose real interest in the pre- 
servation of the state, would prompt them to 
act with zeal in its defence. They had every 
one their portion of land, and for the most part 
lived in the country, to improve and cultivate 
it with their own hands. Thus accustomed 
to the toil of husbandry, to endure sun, rain, 
and hail, to handle heavy instruments, dig 
trenches, and carry burdens ; when they entered 
the service they only changed their arms and 
tools, and came with bodies inured to labour, 
and seasoned to all the fatigues of the field. 
Besides, as war was the proper profession of 
this people, and what they were all obliged to 
engage in, as soon as they reached the age for 
bearing arms, military exercises made an es- 
sential part of their education. They were 
trained up in them from their infancj^, and 
had a space of ground within the city, called 
the Campus Martius, where, as if actually in 
the field, they formed themselves to all the 
branches of the service. After their fatigues 
they plunged into the Tiber, to accustom 
themselves to swimming, and cleanse away 
the dust and sweat. Hence the Romans were 
never obliged, on any sudden emergency, to 
commit the honour and safety of the state to a 
raw undisciplined multitude. They had always 
a sufficient number of men in readiness, trained 
and habituated to war, for the forming and re- 
cruiting their armies. 

XVII. In reading the history of ancient 
commonwealths, we can hardly forbear fancy- 
ing, that we peruse the annals of a set of men 



altogether different from ourselves. The pro- 
digious fortune to which the Romans attained, 
seems incredible to us. We are amazed to see 
that republic, from an obscure inconsiderable 
village, rising insensibly to power, extending 
her dominion over Italy, and at last rendering 
herself mistress of the universe : to behold her 
citizens, even those of weight and authority in 
the administration, serving as private men in 
her armies ; and to find that soldiers, who in 
our days are the dregs of every nation, were 
in that commonwealth made up of the very 
same people, who, at home, in times of peace, 
created magistrates, enacted laws, and obliged 
the senate itself to submit to their decisions. 
Nor is it less a matter of wonder when we 
consider the number and greatness of her 
armies. It is . evident, by experience, with re- 
spect to modern times, than a European prince, 
who has a million of subjects, cannot, without 
destroying himself, keep up and maintain above 
ten thousand men. But when we look into 
the affairs of ancient states, especially those of 
Sparta, Athens, and Rome, the case appears 
to be quite otherwise. We there find, that this 
proportion between the soldiers and the rest of 
the people, which is now as one to a hun- 
dred, could not in them be less than as one to 
eight. Rome was yet confined within very 
narrow bounds, when the Latins having re- 
fused to succour her with the troops which had 
been stipulated, ten legions were presently 
raised in the city alone. And if we examine 
the histories of Athens and Sparta, we shall 
there meet with instances no less surprising, 
of powerful and numerous armies, when com- 
nared with the extent of their territories. 
A XVIII. To account, in some measure, for 
so wonderful a revolution in the course of hu- 
man affairs, it behooves us to call to mind, that 
the founders of ancient commonwealths had 
taken care to make an equal distribution of 
lands, and that the several portions were al- 
lotted to individuals, upon condition of serv- 
ing the state in her wars. This circumstance 
alone raised a nation to power, gave strength 
to its armies, and made it a well regulated 
society. By this it became equally the interest 
of every member of the commonwealth, and 
that a very great interest too, to exert him- 
self in defence of his country. Romulus, 
after assigning one part of the Roman territory 
to the expenses of religious worship, and an- 
other to the uses of the state, divided the re- 



ART OF WAR. 



21 



mainder into thirty portions, to answer to the 
thirty Curix. Under the commonwealth, in 
proportion as the public domain increased, it 
was the constant practice of the senate, for 
several ages, to allot part of the conquered 
lands to the use of the poor citizens, and share 
it equally among them. This was what at 
first enabled Rome to soar above its humble 
condition ; and the people were strongly sen- 
sible of it, even in their corrupted state. We 
find them constantly struggling for an agrarian 
law, and contriving means to check the artifices 
of those who endeavoured to elude it. The 
avowed patrons of liberty considered this law 
as the main bulwark of the state, and were ever 
sounding in the ears of the senate, the mis- 
chiefs to which they exposed themselves by 
the violation of it. Tell mc, would Tiberius 
Gracchus say to the nobles, which is the most 
valuable character, that of a citizen, or of a 
perpetual slave ? Who is most useful, a 
soldier, or a man entirel}' unfit for war 1 Will 
you, merely for the sake of enjoying a few 
more acres of land than your fellow-citizens, 
quite lay aside the hopes of conquering the 
rest of the world, or be exposed to see your- 
'selves dispossessed, by the enemy, of those 
very lands which you refuse us 1 

XIX. And in fact we find, that in propor- 
tion as the Romans deviated from this great 
and original principle of government, aflfairs 
began to wear the very same face, under 
which they appear in our days. The avarice 
of some, and the lavish profuseness of others, 
occasioned the land to become the property of 
a few. Immediately arts were introduced, to 
supply the reciprocal wants of the rich and 
poor ; by which means but very few soldiers 
or citizens were to be seen. For the revenues 
of the lands, that had before been employed 
to support the latter, were now wholly be- 
stowed on slaves and artificers, who adminis- 
tered to the luxury of the new proprietors. But 
it was impossible that people of this cast should 
be good soldiers, they being cowardly and ab- 
ject, already corrupted by the luxury of cities, 
and often by the very art they professed. Be- 
sides, as they might reap the fruits of their in- 
dustry in every clime, and could not properly 
call any country their own, they had no suf- 
ficient tie to bind them to its defence. Nor 
was this revolution peculiar to the republic 
of Rome. Sparta before her had experienced 
the like vicissitude. Lycurgus left no less 
3* 



than thirty thousand citizens behind him, who 
in the time of Agis and (.'leomencs were 
reduced to seven hundred, scarce an eighth 
part of whom was possessed of lands. The 
rest were no more than a cowardly populace. 
These two kings undertook to revive the an- 
cient laws on this occasion, and from that time 
Lacedemonia recovered its former power, and 
again became formidable to all the states of 
Greece. Had Tiberius and Caius Gracchus 
equally succeeded in their design of reform- 
ing the Roman commonwealth, the loss of 
liberty, and all the miseries consequent upon 
it, might have been prevented. But their 
untimely fate discouraging others from engaging 
in the same cause, Rome soon after, instead of 
being defended by, became a prey to, her own 
legions. Nor ought we to wonder, if men who 
had no property in the state, and might hope 
more from its overthrow than preservation, 
were easily induced to conspire its ruin. 

XX. But the equal distribution of lands, 
was not that alone which gave strength to the 
armies of Rome. There were other circum- 
stances, peculiar to the times and constitution 
of that republic, which contributed not a little 
to its grandeur. The trade of a soldier was 
not then, as m our days, a slavery for life, at- 
tended with infinite fatigue, and scarce any 
profit. As the art of exactly fortifying places 
was little known, and less practised, national 
quarrels were decided by battle, and one 
gained, often put an end to the war. Hence 
the service was, properly speaking, little more 
than so many summer campaigns. The ar- 
mies were renewed yearly, and for several ages 
never kept the field during the winter. A 
battle commonly was attended with the con- 
quest of an entire province or kingdom ; and 
the pillage got in over-running the enemy's 
country, was often not only sufficient to enrich 
the conquerors, but sometimes even served to 
aggrandize their posterity. At the close of the 
campaign, the soldiers were dismissed, every 
one to his own home, to look after his domes- 
tic affairs, and cultivate his inheritance. Thus 
there were many inducements to a military life : 
the short duration of the service, the prospect 
of wealth and affluence, to which it often con- 
ducted ; the necessity of defending their own 
possessions ; and the hope of acquiring new 
ones from the enemy. For as we have already 
observed, it was the constant practice of the 
senate, for several ages to assign part of the 



22 



THE ROMAN 



conquered lands to the use of the poor citizens ; 
either dividing it among those who had no pa- 
trimony of their own, or granting an additional 
allowance to such whose inheritance was but 
scanty. In our times the condition of a soldier 
is very different. National quarrels are not 
now decided by battles, but most commonly 
by sieges, which spins out the war to an im- 
moderate length, and occasions an infinite loss 
of men. Towns are seldom taken by storm, 
or abandoned to be plundered, but given up 
by capitulation, and the inhabitants left in the 
quiet possession of their properties. A country 
exposed to pillage redeems itself by contribu- 
tions, no part of which comes into the hands 
of the private men, whose pay at the same 
time is so small, that the meanest occupation 
yields a far greater income. Thus the miseries 
of hunger, heat, and cold, which are insepa- 
rable from a military life, the certainty of 
blows, and the uncertainty of plunder, render 
the usual parts of war full of sufferings 
and dangers, and of little or no profit to the 
soldiers. 

XXI. Indeed in the latter times of the com- 
monwealth, war began to partake of those 
inconveniences, with which it is attended in 
the present age. But then the encourage- 
ments they had to face the dangers of the ser- 
vice, and the high honours to which it paved 
the way, made all difficulties vanish and dis- 
appear. For as the Romans devoted them- 
selves entirely to the profession of arms, and 
considered it as the only study worthy their 
care, they omitted no methods to recommend 
and place it in esteem. Innumerable rewards 
and distinctions were invented, suited to the 
different stations of men, and the several kinds 
of valour in which they might render them- 
selves conspicuous. Magistracies and dignities 
were almost always conferred, according to the 
reputation of the candidate for bravery in war. 
And at the same time that military merit never 
failed to promote the person in whom it was 
lodged, no one was capable of civil employ- 
ment in the commonwealth, who had not served 
in the army at least ten years. We are not 
therefore to wonder, that amidst so many in- 
centives, which rendered the life of a soldier 
not only honourable, but in some measure 
necessary, multitudes flocked to the service 
and strove with emulation to be admitted into 
the legions. Interest and ambition are the 
two ruling principles of human life ; and as 



both conspired to urge the Romans to war, it 
was easy for them to find armies, and to in- 
crease and multiply them at pleasure. But 
in our days, none of those motives operate 
upon the minds of men. The condition of a 
common soldier is of all others the most des- 
picable ; and even with regard to officers of 
the first rank, long service is so far from 
being a recommendation to state-preferment, 
that they are on that very account, in the 
judgment of many, the less fit for civil em- 
ployments. 

XXII. But what chiefly contributed to 
the strength and greatness of the Roman 
armies, was the custom established by Romu- 
lus, of incorporating the vanquished nations, 
and admitting them to the privileges of citi- 
zens. Without this it would have been im- 
possible for Rome to raise herself to that 
height of grandeur, to which in time she at- 
tained. The spirit of her citizens, the bravery 
of her troops, and the admirable discipline of 
her armies, might have enabled her to subject 
the nations around her, and extend her sway 
over a considerable part of Italy ; but in pro- 
portion as she advanced in conquest, she would 
have become sensible of her own weakness ; 
and the difficulty of maintaining herself in 
her new territories, when they grew large 
enough to employ the whole natural forces of 
the commonwealth, would have either made 
her drop all thoughts of farther empire, or 
forced her to have recourse to mercenary 
troops, which have always in the end proved 
the ruin of those states, who were imprudent 
enough to venture upon so dangerous an ex- 
pedient. This is remarkably exemplified in 
the history of Athens, Sparta, and Carthage. 
The two first of these cities acquired consi- 
derable dominion and authority in Greece, and 
for some time maintained themselves in the 
possession of that power, to which their 
valour, and abilities in war had raised them. 
But as the number of citizens in either state 
seldom, exceeded thirty thousand, and they 
were unacquainted with the policy of incor- 
porating the vanquished nations, it was impos- 
sible for them to enlarge their territories in 
any extensive degree. For great conquests 
require great armies to maintain them, which 
cities so constituted as Athens and Sparta, 
were not able to furnish. Accordingly we 
find, that when ambition prompted them to 
undertakings beyond their strength, they 



ART OF WAR. 



23 



were so far from being able to increase their 
dominions, that their very conquests proved 
their ruin, and they sunk under the weight of 
their own greatness. For the countries they 
had brought under subjection, not consider- 
ering themselves as part of the state, but rather 
as tributaries and slaves, were glad of an op- 
portunity of shaking off the yoke ; and there- 
fore seldom failed to revolt, when they saw 
them engaged in any difBcult war. By this 
means they were not only deprived of a con- 
siderable part of the revenues, at a time when 
they stood most in need of money and sup- 
plies ; but obliged likewise to divide their 
forces, which was a great check upon their 
designs, and in the end so weakened them, 
that they were no longer able to maintain 
themselves in that grandeur and reputation 
they had acquired. 

XXIII. The case of Carthage was indeed 
somewhat different. That commonwealth, by 
its riches and commerce, was able to set great 
armies on foot, and make extensive conquests. 
But as the genius of the citizens was turned 
more to traffic than war, and as they never 
admitted the conquered nations to the privi- 
leges of natural subjects, they were under a 
necessity of employing mercenary troops, 
both for enlarging their territories, and hold, 
ing the vanquished countries in obedience. 
Hence the many shocks and convulsions to 
which that state was liable. For as her 
armies had no other tie to the republic, but 
that of their pay, they were easily induced to 
throw off their allegiance, when any more ad- 
vantageous prospect offered itself. Their re- 
volt more than once brought Carthage to the 
very brink of destruction. Instead of con- 
tributing to secure the tranquillity of the tri- 
butary countries, they often spirited them up 
to rebellion ; and, which is indeed a neces- 
sary consequence of employing mercenary 
troops, upon any sudden reverse of fortune, 
they were ever ready to abandon the service. 
Thus the Carthaginians, though absolute mas- 
ters at sea, possessed of immense territo- 
ries, and able to set on foot numerous armies, 
were in reality rather a rich than a powerful 
republic. They were successful indeed for a 
time against a number of barbarous states and 
nations, without discipline or experience in 
war; but when they came to enter the lists 
with a brave and a military people, their un- 
dertakings almost always miscarried. Witness 



their many attempts upon Syracuse, the ex- 
tremity to which they were reduced by 
Ag^thocles ; and the ease with which they 
were in a manner totally driven out of Sicily, 
by Pyrrhus. Indeed in their first and second 
war with the Romans, they make a very con- 
siderable figure in history, whether we regard 
the greatness of their victories, or the strength 
of their armies. But the merit of that seems 
rather owing to the abilities of their generals, 
than to the intrinsic power of the common- 
wealth itself. Accordingly, in the third Punic 
war, when they had neither a Hamilcar, nor 
a Hannibal at the head of their troops, they 
in a very short time fell a prey to their 
enemies. 

XXIV. But now the Romans, by the 
admirable policy of incorporating the van- 
quished nations, avoided all the inconveni. 
ences to ivhich the above-mentioned cities 
were liable, and built their greatness upon a 
sure foundation. The forces of the state in- 
creased with their territories, insomuch that 
it is amazing to consider, in how short a time, 
from small beginnings, they rose to an incre- 
dible multitude of citizens. The conquered 
provinces were so far from being an incum- 
brance upon them, by exhausting their strength 
in guards and garrisons, that, on the contrary, 
they became real parts of the commonwealth, 
and contributed greatly to her power, by 
augmenting her revenues, and adding to the 
number of her subjects. Thus, in proportion 
as Rome grew in greatness, and stood in need 
of mighty armies to support the weight of her 
enterprises, she found within herself an inex- 
haustible stock of men and riches, and without 
having recourse to mercenary troops, could 
furnish more than sufficient to answer all the 
demands of the state. Polybius, when he 
comes to speak of the war with the Italic 
Gauls, takes occasion to describe the mighty 
preparations made by the Romans, to oppose 
that formidable enemy. We there find, that 
the forces of the commonwealth, at that time, 
amounted to about seven hundred thousand 
foot, and seventy thousand horse. Compare 
this account with the histories of Athens and 
Sparta, and it will soon appear, what a disad- 
vantage these two states lay under, for want 
of such an institution as that of Romulus. 
For as they never admitted the vanquished 
nations to the right of citizens, but always re- 
duced them to the condition of tributaries, the 



24 



THE ROMAN 



multitude of their conquests served only to 
enlarge their territories, without adding to 
the number of their natural subjects. Hence 
even in the most flourishing period of their 
greatness, they could seldom bring into the 
field above thirty thousand men. Kome, on 
the other hand, by a contrary policy, increased 
daily in the multitude of her citizens, and 
in time was enabled to furnish out armies, 
adequate to the conquest of the universe. 



CHAP, HI. 

OF THE AKJIS AXD DISCIPLINE OF THE 

EOItlANS. 

I. It is generally allowed among the' writers 
upon the art of war, that as in many other 
things, so particularly in their arms, the Ro- 
mans excelled all other nations. I shall not 
here confine myself to the usual distinction 
into offensive and defensive, but rather de- 
scribe them according to the several military 
orders of which the legions were composed. 
By the velites we are to understand all the 
light-armed troops of the commonwealth, of 
whatever rank and denomination. They were 
equipped with bows, slings, javelins, a Spanish 
sword, a buckler, and a helmet. The bow is 
of very remote antiquity, and has leen used 
by almost all nations. Crete in paiticular 
was famous for its excellent archers. It does 
not seem to have been much regarded by the 
Romans in the earliest times of the republic, 
and when it was afterwards introduced, was 
confined chiefly to the auxiliary troops. We 
find, however, in the description of battles, fre- 
quent mention made of the sagittarii ; and it 
appears, that they sometimes contributed not a 
little to the victory. The sling was also an 
instrument of war much used by many na- 
tions. The Baleareans especially, who in- 
habited the islands now called Majorca and 
Minorca, are beyond all others celebrated for 
their expertness at this weapon. They were 
so attentive in exercising their youth in the use 
of it, that they did not give them their food in a 
morning till they hit a mark. These Baleareans 
were much employed in the armies of the Car- 
thaginians and Romans, and greatly contributed 
to the gaining of victories. Livy mentions some 
cities of Achaia, particularly Egium, Patrse, 
and Dymse, whose inhabitants were still more 
dextrous at the sling than the Baleareans. 



They threw stones farther, and with greater 
force and certainty, never failing to hit what 
part of the face they pleased. Their slings dis. 
charged stones with so much force, that nei- 
ther buckler nor head-piece could resist their 
impetuosity. Instead of stones, they some- 
times charged the sling with balls of lead, which 
it carried much farther, and with greater im- 
petuosity. The javelin, or hasta, was the 
proper missive weapon of the velites. It was 
a kind of dart not unlike an arrow, the wood of 
which was generally three feet long, and one 
inch thick. The point was four inches long, 
and tapered to so fine an end, that it bent at 
the first stroke in such a manner, as to be use- 
less to the enemy. Every man carried seven 
of them to battle. The Spanish sword was for 
a close encounter. The Romans judged this 
weapon the fittest for execution, as having both 
edge and point. It was short, of excellent 
temper, and in shape not unlike a Turkish 
scimitar, only sharper at the point. Livy tells 
us, that though it was principally intended for 
stabbing, it would yet serve likewise to cut off 
arms, legs, and heads at a blow. The buckler 
or panna, was of a round form, about three 
feet in diameter, and made of wood, covered 
with leather. The helmet, called galea, or 
galeriis, was a light casque for the head, gene, 
rally made of the skin of some wild beasts, to 
appear the more terrible. 

>''^I. The arms of the hastati, principes, and 
triani, were in a great measure the same ; 
for which reason we shall not divide them in 
our description, but speak of them altogether. 
Those most deserving our notice are the sword, 
the sctitum, the pilum, ihegalea, and the Torica. 
The sword was the same as that of the velites, 
and therefore requires not any particular de- 
scription here. It was usual with the Romans 
to wear it on the right side, that they might 
be the more at liberty to manage their shields. 
In ancient monuments however we sometimes 
meet with it on the left. The scutum was a 
buckler of wood, oblong, and bending inward 
like a half cylinder. Its parts were joined to- 
gether with little plates of iron, and the whole 
was covered with a bull's hide. An iron ring- 
went round it without, to keep off blows : and 
another within, to hinder it from taking any 
damage by lying on the ground. In the 
middle was an iron boss, or umbo, jutting out, 
very serviceable to glance off stones and darts, 
and sometimes to press violently upon the 



ART OF WAR. 



25 



enemy, and drive all before them. It appears 
that these bucklers were large enough to cover 
almost the whole body. Poly bins makes them 
four feet long, and two and a half broad. And 
in Livy we meet with soldiers who stood on the 
guard, sometimes sleeping with their head laid 
on their shield, having fixed the other part of 
it on the earth. Some make the scutum the 
same with the chjpeus: but this is evidently a 
mistake ; since in the institution of the census, 
by Servius Tullius, we find the clypeus given 
to those of the first class, and the scvtwn to 
those of the second. In fact, the scutum was 
long and square, and came at last to be the 
only shield of the heavy-armed troops. The 
clifpeus was of a smaller size, and quite round, 
belonging more properly to other nations, 
though for some time used by the Romans. 

III. The pilum WdiS a missive weapon, which 
in a charge they darted at the enemy. It 
was commonly four-square, but sometimes 
round; composed of a piece of wood about 
three cubits long, and a slip of iron of the 
same length, hooked and jagged at the end. 
They took abundance of care in joining the 
two parts together, and did it so artificially> 
that it would sooner break in the iron itself, 
than in the joint. Every man had two of these 
pila, which they discharged at the enemy be- 
fore they came to close fight. When they had 
neither time nor room they threw it upon the 
ground, and charged the enemy sword in hand. 
Marius, in the Cimbrian war, contrived these 
pila after a new fashion. For whereas before 
the head was fastened to the wood with two 
iron pins, he suffered one of them to remain 
as it was, and pulling out the other, put a 
weak wooden peg in its place. By this means, 
when it stuck in the enemy's shield it did not 
stand outright as formerly : but the wooden 
peg breaking, the javelin hung dovv'n, and 
sticking fast by its crooked point, drew after 
it the shield. Next to the pilum we mentioned 
the galea. This was a head-piece, or morion, 
coming down to the shoulders. It was either 
of iron or brass, open before, and leaving the 
face uncovered. Some of them were so con- 
trived, that they might be let down, on occa- 
sion, to cover the face. Upon the top was the 
crista, or crest, in adorning of which the 
soldiers took great pride. In the time of Pol y- 
bius they wore plumes of feathers, dyed of 
various colours, to render them beautiful to 
their friends, and terrible to their enemies. 



The officers in particular were extremely cu 
rious and splendid in their crests, which were 
usually worked in gold and silver, and so con- 
trived as to represent animals of various kinds, 
lions, leopards, tigers, and griffins. If we 
might speak of those of foreign commanders, 
the crest of king Pyrrhus, as very singular, 
would deserve our notice. It was made, ac- 
cording to Plutarch's description, of two goats' 
horns. Alexander the Great, as he is repre- 
sented on ancient medals, wore a crest of the 
same nature. 

IV. We come now to the lorica, which was 
a defensive armour for the body, a§ the galea 
was for the head and neck. In our language 
it is called the cuirass, and was generally made 
of leather, covered with plates of iron in the 
form of scales, or iron rings twisted within one 
another in the form of chains. These are 
what we call coats of mail, in Latin, lorica ha- 
mis conserta, or hamata. Sometimes tlie cui- 
rass consisted of thongs, with which the soldier 
was girt from the arm-pits to the waist, and 
whence probably it took the name of lorica, 
from lorum, a thong or strap of leather. We 
find likewise that it was oftentimes a sort of 
linen cassock, made with many folds, which 
resisted, or very much broke the force of 
blows. Amongst the Greeks this piece of ar- 
mour had the name of thorax, and was made 
either of iron or brass, in two pieces, which 
were fastened upon the sides by buckles. 
Alexander left the cuirass only the two pieces 
which covered the breast, that the fear of be- 
ing wounded on the back, which had no de- 
fence, might prevent the soldiers from flying. 
Some of these cuirasses were of so hard a metal, 
as to bo absolutely proof against weapons. 
Zoilus, an excellent artist in this way, offered 
two of them to Demetrius Poliorcetes. To 
show the excellency of them, he caused a dart 
to be discharged from a catapulta, at the dis- 
tance of only twenty-six paces ; which, though 
it struck the cuirass with the utmost violence, 
yet made no impression, and scarce left the 
least mark behind it. After all it must be 
owned, that the thorax of the Greeks was 
much less capable of motion, agility, and 
force ; whereas the girts of leather, succes- 
sively covering each other, left the Roman 
soldier entire liberty of action, and fitting him 
like a vest, defended him against darts. The 
poorer soldiers, who were rated under a thou- 
sand drachms, instead of the lorica, wore a 
E 



26 



THE ROMAN 



pectorale, or breastplate of thin brass, about 
twelve inches square ; and this, with what has 
been already described, and greaves and gaunt- 
lets upon their legs and arms, v/hich were 
common likewise to the rest, rendered them 
completely armed. 

V. What we have hitherto said regards only 
the foot. It is now time to speak of the 
cavalry, who at first were but very indifferently 
armed, either for offence or defence. They 
used only a round shield, with a helmet on 
their head, and a couple of javelins in their 
hand, great part of the body being left without 
defence. But as soon as they found the many 
inconveniences to which they were hereby ex- 
posed, they began to arm themselves like the 
Grecian horse, or much in the manner of their 
own foot, only their shield was a little shorter 
and squarer, and their lance or javelin thicker, 
with spikes at each end, that if one miscar- 
ried, the other might be serviceable. It is 
remarkable, and what indeed we are hardly 
able to comprehend, that amongst the ancients, 
the horse had neither stirrups nor saddle. 
Education, exercise, and habit, had accustomed 
them not to want those aids, and even not 
to perceive that there was any occasion for 
them. There were some horsemen^ such as 
the Numidians, who did not know so much as 
the use of bridles to guide their horses : and 
who, notwithstanding, by their voice only, or 
the use of the heel or spur, made them ad- 
vance, fall back, stop, turn to the right or left ; 
in a word, perform all the evolutions of the 
best disciplined cavalry. Sometimes, having 
two horses, they leaped from one to the other, 
even in the heat of battle, to ease the first when 
fatigued. These Numidians, as well as the 
Parthians, were never more terrible than when 
they seemed to fly through fear and cowardice. 
For then, facing suddenly about, they dis- 
charged their darts or arrows upon the enemy, 
and often put them to flight with great slaugh- 
ter. The Romans were more than once sur- 
prised by these unexpected attacks, and on 
some occasions suffered considerably. But 
they at last found out a method of securing 
themselves, by holding their targets over their 
heads, and forming what historians call the 
testudo. It was to this invention that Marc 
Antony owed the preservation of his army, 
when miscarrying in his expedition against the. 
Parthians, he found himself obliged to retreat 
into Syria before a great body of their horse. 



VI. These were the arms with which the 
Romans conquered the world : and I believe 
it will be readily owned, that they were admi- 
rably well calculated both for defending them- 
selves, and offending their enemies. Polybius, 
in more places than one, gives them the ad- 
vantage in this respect over all other nations, 
and expressly affirms, that the many victories 
they obtained over the Gauls was owing en- 
tirely to the superiority of their arms. It is 
true the cutting swords of that people terrified 
them greatly at first, and was the cause of a 
fatal overthrow. But they soon learnt from 
experience what a contemptible weapon that 
was, when employed in close fight against 
troops substantially armed for defence : for the 
Gauls, to give force and vigour to their blows, 
were obliged to avoid too near an approach to 
the enemy, that they might have room to wield 
their swords. Their first ranks therefore only 
could do execution, because the Romans, 
knowing their safety to lie in close fight, ad- 
vanced continually under cover of their shields, 
and crowded upon them in such manner, that 
they left them not sufficient space for the free 
use of their weapons. It is besides observed, 
that the swords of the Gauls were of so ill a 
temper, as after two or three strokes to stand 
bent in their hands, and thereby become wholly 
useless to them, if they had not time to straight- 
en them on the ground with their feet. This 
was not to be expected in the heat of fight 
against an enemy that pressed so hard ; so 
that the Romans closing in with them, stabbed 
them in the face and breast with their pointed 
swords, and made terrible slaughter. The 
Chevalier Folard is astonished, that under all 
these disadvantages, his countrymen should 
obtain so many victories over the Romans. 
He can hardly forbear fancying, that, had 
they so far improved by their defeats, as to 
change the fashion of their weapons, and arm 
themselves after the manner of their adver- 
saries, we should not have heard so much 
of the boasted exploits and conquests of 
that people. Be that as it will, it is certain 
the Gauls wanted neither bravery, nor military 
conduct, and, if we except the single article 
of their arms, showed themselves on many 
occasions no way inferior to the Romans. 

VII. But let us now compare their arms 
with those of the Greeks. Here, it must be 
owned, the advantage does not appear so ma- 
nifest. Many are rather of opinion, that the 



ART OF WAR. 



27 



Greeks excelled the Romans in this respect. 
The Earl of Orrery particularly, in his Trea- 
tise of the Art of War, wonders much that 
the Romans, who borrowed most of their wea- 
pons, whether offensive or defensive, from 
the Greeks, did not also follow their example 
in furnishing some of their infantry with long 
pikes, which he observes are the best offen- 
sive arms, either to charge or defend, and of 
excellent use against horse. It is well known 
that the Macedonian phalanx, to which Philip 
and Alexander were indebted for most of their 
victories, fought always with this weapon. 
One would therefore be apt to think, that an 
experience so much in its favour, could not 
have failed of recommending it powerfully to 
the Romans. And yet it is certain, that after 
making trial of it for some time, they laid it 
aside as incommodious, ordering the hastati, 
who at first were equipped with it, and thence 
took their name, to arm themselves after the 
fashion of the rest of the legionary foot. This 
could not arise from any scrupulous attach- 
ment to their own customs, or dislike of foreign 
manners ; because no people were ever less 
tenacious in this respect, or showed a greater 
readiness to adopt the institutions of other na- 
tions, when they saw any real benefit likely 
to accrue from them. The principal reason 
seems to have been, that they found the use 
of the weapon incompatible with that of the 
shield. For as it necessarily required to be 
managed with both hands, those who fought 
with it were obliged to lay aside the buckler ; 
which piece of armour appeared to the Romans 
of greater consequence than the pike, because 
this last was in some measure supplied by the 
sword and javelin. If we might judge of things 
by the event, the Romans reasoned very justly 
on this occasion ; since without the assistance 
of the pike, they not only gained greater and 
more numerous victories than the Macedonian 
phalanx, but even beat that very phalanx it- 
self, so formidable by the use of this wea- 
pon. As this is a very curious and interesting 
subject, and capable of furnishing many useful 
reflections in relation to the ancient art of war, 
it will not, I believe, be disagreeable to thJ 
reader, if we enlarge a little upon it. 

VIII. The Macedonian phalanx was a body 
of sixteen thousand men, armed with pikes, 
four and twenty feet long, which historians de- 
scribe under the name of sarhss;. This corps 
was generally divided into ten battalions, each I 



consisting of sixteen hundred men, a hun- 
dred in front, and sixteen deep. To form 
some idea of their strength and order of battle, 
we need only reflect upon what passed a few 
centuries ago in Europe, when Italy was a 
continual theatre of war, by reason of the dif- 
ferent pretensions of France, Spain, and the 
Emperor. The battalions of Switzerland were 
then in great reputation, and generally looked 
upon as the best infantry in the world, chiefly 
on account of the many victories they had 
gained by the pike. They were forced at 
first to have recourse to this weapon, in order 
to secure themselves against the ambition of 
the German princes, who were daily making 
attempts upon their liberty. For these princes 
being rich, and able to bring into the field a 
numerous cavalry, the Switzers, whose whole 
strength, on the contrary, lay in their foot, saw 
themselves under a necessity of contriving 
arms, that might defend them against the 
enemy's horse. None appeared so proper for 
this purpose as the pike ; and so successful 
were they, by the perfection they attained to 
in the use of it, and their admirable orders and 
discipline, that with fifteen or twenty thousand 
foot, they would often venture to attack avast 
body of horse, and generally came off victo- 
rious. From that time the pike became fa- 
mous, and was introduced into all the armies 
of Europe. We find that they usually had 
one half of their infantry sliot, and the other 
half pikes ; and it is particularly deserving of 
our notice, that for several ages, the chief de- 
pendence of the general in a day of battle 
seems to have been upon the pikes. By de- 
grees the musket began to prevail over the 
pike ; yet gained ground so very slowly, that 
it is not much above half a century, since wc 
find one third of the infantry still pikes. 

IX. But though the pike was found to be 
of admirable service in engagements with 
horse, experience constantly made it appear, 
that it was by no means sufficient against a 
resolute and well-armed infantry. For as 
this weapon required to be managed with both 
hands, and therefore necessarily excluded 
the use of the target, those who carried it 
were left altogether without defence, if, in 
the course of an engagement, the enemy 
should chance to get within their pikes. 
Hence the generals who were acquainted 
with this weakness in the Swiss battalions, 
and could bring their troops to press the 



28 



THE ROMAN 



charge vigorously, seldom failed of defeating 
them with great slaughter. We have a re- 
markable example of it in the case of Count 
Carmignola, general to Philip Viconti, Duke 
of Milan. That brave officer being sent 
against a body of eighteen thousand Switzers, 
with only six thousand horse, and a few foot, 
advanced boldly to the encounter ; but though 
the attack was resolute and well conducted, 
he was repulsed with considerable loss. Car- 
mignola quickly perceived the advantage 
which the enemy had in their foot over his 
horse. As he was a man of determined 
courage, and rather roused than dispirited by 
the check he had lately received, he soon ral- 
lied his men, and led them on again to the 
charge. When he caine within a certain 
distance, he ordered his cavalry to dismount ; 
and engaging the Switzers smartly in that 
posture, put them all to the rout, and most 
of them to the sword. Only three thou- 
sand were left, who, finding themselves past 
remedy, threw down their arms. It will 
be proper to take notice on this occasion, 
that the cavalry led by Carmignola were all 
men at arms, and therefore completely pro- 
vided both for offence and defence. Now 
such a body of troops was well enough able 
to deal with the Switzers, if they but once 
got close up with them, and came to use 
their swords. For then the enemy being 
without defensive arms, and deriving no as- 
sistance from their pikes, whose very length 
rendered them unserviceable, were exposed 
to unavoidable slaughter. Considering, there- 
fore, the advantages and disadvantages on 
both sides, it will appear, that they who have 
no defensive arms are without remedy, if 
the enemy charges but home, and passes 
their pikes. This cannot miss to happen in 
an engagement with resolute troops : be- 
cause battles always advancing, and the par- 
ties on each side pressing on perpetually, 
they must of necessity come so near at last, 
as to reach one another with their swords ; 
and though some few perhaps may be killed 
or tumbled down by the pikes, yet those that 
are behind, still pressing on, are sufficient to 
carry the victory. 

X. From these reasons it will be easy to 
conceive, why Carmignola overcame, with so 
great a slaughter of the Switzers, and so little 
of his own army. Nor is this example sin- 
gular in its kind. We meet with many others 



in history, all tending to demonstrate, that 
an infantry, armed with swords and bucklers, 
have great advantages over the pike. When 
Gonsalva was besieged in B arietta by the 
French, a detachment of Spanish foot was 
sent out of Sicily, and landed in the kingdom 
of Naples, with orders to march to his relief. 
Monsieur d'Aubigny had notice of their ap- 
proach, and went to meet them with his men 
at arms and a body of about four thousand 
Switzers. These last pressed upon them 
with their pikes, and at first put them into 
some disorder; but the Spaniards, by the 
help of their bucklers, and the agility of their 
bodies, having at length got under the pikes 
of the Switzers and so near that they could 
come at them with their swords, defeated 
them with great slaughter, and very little 
loss on their own side. Every one knows 
what terrible havoc was made of the Switzers, 
at the battle of Ravenna, and all upon the 
same account, the Spanish foot having got 
to them with their swords : nay, it is certain 
they must have been all cut to pieces, had 
they not been happily rescued by the French 
horse, and yet the Spaniards, drawing them- 
selves into close order, bravely sustained the 
assaults of the cavalry, and retired without 
loss. It appears therefore, that though the 
pike be excellent against horse, it is yet insuf- 
ficient in an encounter with foot; whereas 
an army judiciously armed for offence and 
defence, at the same time that it can very 
well deal with cavalry, is likewise an over- 
match for a body of pikes. 

XI. And hence it was that the Macedonian 
phalanx, which seems to have been just such 
an order of battle as the battalions of Switzer- 
land, experienced likewise the same fate, when 
it came to encounter the warlike and well-armed 
troops of the Romans. Historians ascribe 
the defeat of it to several causes ; the advan- 
tageous disposition of the Roman troops, who 
fought in separate bodies, yet so drawn up 
that they could unite and join upon occasion : 
the artful conduct of the generals, in drawing 
it into rugged and uneven places, where it 
could not preserve itself entire, but became 
disjointed and broken: the opportunity this 
gave of charging it in the openings and 
void spaces, whereby it was totally disunited, 
and being attacked in front and rear, fell 
an easy prey to its enemies. These things 
doubtless contributed in part to the overthrow 



ART OF WAR. 



29 



of which we speak ; but the principal defect of 
the phalanx lay in its disadvantageous armour 
and order of battle. In reaUty, the pikes of 
the two first ranks only were serviceable in an 
engagement ; those of the rest scarce availed 
any thing. The men of the third rank could 
not see what passed in the front, nor had any 
command of their long pikes, which were en- 
tangled and locked up between the files, with- 
out a possibility of moving them to the right 
or left. Hence the Roziians found no great 
difficulty in surmounting an obstacle, formi- 
dable indeed in appearance, but at bottom very 
trifling. They had oidy to gain upon the pikes 
of the two first ranks, that they might join the 
enemy, and fight hand to hand. This they 
were enabled to do by the help of their large 
bucklers, with which they bore up the pikes 
of the Macedonians, and forcing their way 
under, reached them with their swords. All 
resistance then was at an end. The phalanx, 
unprovided for defence, and rather embar- 
rassed than aided by their pikes, could no 
- longer stand the furious charge of the Romans, 
who made dreadful havoc with their pointed 
swords. We find at the battle of Pydna, where 
Paulus ^milius gained so complete a victory 
over Perseus, that no less than twenty thou- 
sand Macedonians were slain with the loss of 
only one hundred men on the side of the Ro- 
mans. This agrees so exactly with what we 
have above related of the Switzers, that it is 
impossible not to ascribe it to the same cause, 
namely, the insufliciency of the pike, when 
opposed to an infantry armed with swords 
and bucklers. 

XIL We come now to speak of the military 
discipline of the Romans, to which, no less 
than to their arms, they were indebted for 
their many victories and conquests. If we 
compare this with other nations, we do not 
find that they surpassed the Gauls in number 
or boldness, the Germans in stature, the Span- 
iards in strergth of body, the Africans in stra- 
tagem, or the Greeks in learning and the arts 
of civil life. Nay, it is evident from history, 
that they were inferior in all these respects. 
But as to what regards the use and exercise 
of arms, the choice of soldiers, and the train- 
ing them up in all the duties of war ; here in- 
deed lay their chief excellence, and by this 
they were enabled to baffle all the advantages 
of their enemies, whether derived from nature 
or education. We have already observed, that 
4 ' 



none were admitted into the legions till tbey 
had reached their seventeenth year. But 
though this was the age for entering the ser- 
vice, it was not then that they began to learn. 
For as war was the darling study of the Ro- 
mans, they habituated their youth to it from 
their infancy, and carefully instructed them in 
all its branches, having set apart the Field of 
Mars for this purpose, which was a kind of 
military school within the city. We are not 
however to imagine, that they looked upon 
this early institution as suflicient, or were less 
assiduous in exercising their men, after they 
were admitted into the service. They knew 
that constant practice alone makes troops ex- 
pert, and brings them to the habit of applying 
their knowledge with readiness upon all oc- 
casions. Hence not only among the young 
soldiers, but even among those of oldest stand- 
ing in the army, the military exercises were con- 
tinued without intermission. These exercises 
had a threefold tendency : to inure the men 
to labour, and render them robust and active ; 
to instruct them in the use of their arms, and 
lastly, to teach them the necessary evolutions, 
and how to preserve their ranks and orders, 
in marches, battles, and encampments. 

XIII. As to the first, the Romans took 
great pains to form their youth to be nimble in 
running, active to leap, strong to throw the 
bar and to wrestle, which are all necessary 
qualifications in a soldier. For running and 
nimbleness fit them to get possession of a 
place before the enemy, to fall upon them on 
a sudden in their quarters, and to pursue them 
with more execution in a rout ; activity enables 
them with greater ease to avoid blows, leap a 
ditch, or climb a bank ; and strength makes 
them carry their arms better, strike better, and 
endure the shock better. Swimming was 
likewise considered as an essential part of a 
military education. Armies are not sure of 
bridges wherever they come, nor are boats 
always to be had ; so that if men cannot swim, 
they will necessarily be deprived of several 
conveniences, and lose many fair opportuni- 
ties of action. One principal reason why 
the Romans made choice of the Campus 
Martius to exercise their youth in was, its 
nearness to the Tiber, into which they plunged 
after their fatigues, to accustom themselves 
to swimming, and cleanse away the dust and 
sweat. But of all their exercises of this kind, 
none was pursued with greater attention, than 



30 



THE ROMAN 



the inuring the troops to the military pace ; 
that is, to walk twenty miles, and sometimes 
four and twenty, in five hours. This habituat- 
ed the soldiers to a certain stated and regular 
progress in their marches, taught them to keep 
close together, and prevented their exposing 
themselves scattered and dispersed to the 
enemy. They were obliged likewise on these 
occasions, to carry burdens of threescore pound 
weight, which not only accustomed them to 
bear fatigue, but was found serviceable in 
many other respects. For whether it might 
be necessary in an expedition to take along 
with them several days' provisions, or to carry 
a certain quantity of water through a desert 
and sandy country, or to provide a number of 
stakes for the execution of any particular en- 
terprise ; against all these exigencies they had 
prepared themselves by the practice of which 
we speak : and hence great dangers were 
many times avoided, and great victories many 
times obtained. 

XIV. The second particular we mentioned 
in the Roman exercises was, the instructing 
the men in the use of their arms. Here also 
we meet with many proofs of the industry and 
sagacity of that people. They set up a great 
post about six feet high, suitable to the stature 
of a man, and fastened it so strongly, that no 
blows might be able to batter or shake it. 
This the soldiers were wont to ' assail with all 
the instruments of war, as if it had been in- 
deed a real enemy. Sonietimes they would 
aim their blows at the head, sometimes strike 
it on the face, then on the sides, legs, before 
and behind, now retreating, and then advanc- 
ing again ; during all which they were taught 
to proceed with so much caution, that in 
directing their weapon against their adversary, 
they should not meanwhile lay themselves 
open to wounds. By this contrivance they 
learned how to place their blows aright, and 
became dextrous and nimble, both at defend- 
ing themselves, and offending their enemies. 
They were instructed rather to thrust than to 
cut with their swords ; because thrusts are 
more mortal, harder to be defended, and he 
that makes them is not so easily discovered, 
and is readier to double his thrust than his 
blow. We must not here forget, that in these 
exercises they made use of helmets, shields, 
and swords, double the weight of common 
weapons. This made them ready and alert 
in battle, which they found so far from being 



attended with any unforeseen encumbrances, 
that it was rather an ease from the fatigue of 
ordinary duty. Nor let any one wonder that 
the Romans were so extremely attentive to 
these little things, since, according to the 
manner of fighting then used, in which the 
troops encountered hand to hand, every small 
advantage was of great importance. They 
were besides sensible, that experience in this 
kind makes men bold and courageous ; for no 
one fears to do that which he thinks he 
understands. A soldier who had often made 
trial of himself in these imaginary combats, 
grew impatient to come to action in good 
earnest, that he might the better judge of his 
own proficiency, and have an opportunity of 
putting that in practice, which he had so well 
learned in theory. Hence battles were not 
what they dreaded, but what they desired ; 
and generals often found it more difficult to 
restrain their men from fighting, and check 
the ardour of their courage, where prudence 
obliged them to decline the onset, than to 
prevail upon them to face the enemy, when 
they judged it necessary to come to an en- 
gagement. 

XV. But it is not sufficient to inure men 
to labour, to make them strong, swift, and ex- 
pert at the use of their weapons ; they must 
learn likewise to keep their ranks well, to 
obey orders, and follow the directions and 
signals of their commanders. This was the 
third branch of the Roman exercises, about 
which they were no less solicitous than about 
the other two. I shall not here enter into a 
minute detail of the common evolutions, the 
opening and closing of the files, doubling 
their ranks, turning to the right, and left, 
marchings, wheelings, &c. because they dif- 
fered but a little from the practice of the 
present age. Their manner of forming too in 
order of battle, their conduct in an attack or 
repulse, with the general disposition of their 
marches, will come in more properly under 
other heads of this discourse. Let it suffice 
for the present to observe, that they exercised 
their men without intermission in all these 
different branches of the service, and by the 
force of constant habit brought them to that 
degree of expertness, that they could practise 
without hurry and confusion in the heat of 
fight, what they had been so thoroughly 
trained to in the field. Above all, it was their 
particular care to accustom the troops to rally 



ART OF WAR. 



31 



and recover their order readily when broken. 
To this end, besides distinguishing the several 
companies by pecuhar ensigns, every man had 
his fixed and invariable post in the battalion, 
and was taught, by long practice, to know, in 
a manner habitually, the number of his file, 
his place in that file, his right and left-hand 
man, where he belonged to the front rank, 
and both these and his file-leader, where he 
belonged to the other ranks. Nay, so very 
curious were the Romans in this point, that to 
imprint these things the deeper upon the 
minds of the soldiers, they caused them to be 
engraven in great characters upon their hel- 
mets and bucklers. 

XVI. Nor were they less careful in train- 
ing up the cavalry, whom they taught par- 
ticularly to ride well, and sit fast when they 
came to a charge. To this end they had 
horses of wood, upon which they were exer- 
cised, vaulting upon them, sometimes with 
their arms, and sometimes without, very neatly 
and exactly, without any assistance ; so that, 
upon a signal from their captain, they were 
immediately on horseback, and upon another 
signal, as soon upon the ground. As they 
fought in squadrons, like the cavalry of our 
time, their evolutions were much the same 
with those in use at present, allowing only the 
difference of armour ; and among the horse, 
as well as the foot, were carried on without 
intermission. Indeed, there is nothing more 
admirable in the whole Roman discipline than 
the continual exercise to which the troops 
were kept, either within or without the camp ; 
insomuch that they were never idle, and had 
scarce any respite from duty. The new raised 
soldiers performed their exercises regularly 
twice a day, and the old ones once : for it 
was not, in the opinion of this people, length 
of service that constituted warlike and veteran 
troops, but the uninterrupted habit and prac- 
tice of arms ; nor did they consider an unex- 
ercised soldier, after what number of cam- 
paigns you will, as any other than a novice in 
the profession. Accordingly, they were con- 
stant and indefatigable in training their men 
to all the different operations of the field. 
They obliged them to make hasty marches of 
a considerable length, laden with their arms 
and several palisades, and that often in steep 
and craggy countries. They habituated them 
always to keep their ranks, even in the midst 
of disorder and confusion, and never to lose 



sight of their standards. They made them 
charge each other in mock battles, of which 
the officers, generals, and even the consul 
himself were witnesses, and in which they 
thought it for their glory to share in person. 
When they had no enemy in the field, the 
troops were employed in considerable works, 
as well to keep them in exercise, as for the 
public utility. Such in particular were the 
highways, called for that reason vix militares, 
which still subsist, and are the fruits of that 
wise and salutary custom. 

XVII. How much the Romans relied upon 
this manner of training and employing their 
troops, appears evidently from the conduct of 
their senate and generals, during a course of 
several ages ; for in all their difficulties and 
straits, this was that to which they had im- 
mediate recourse, as their surest refuge, and 
the only means by which they could hope 
to extricate themselves. Did they think them- 
selves exposed to any danger, or were they 
desirous to repair some loss 1 It was a 
constant practice among them to invigorate 
and give new life to their military discipline. 
Are they engaged in a war with the Latines, 
a people no less martial than themselves "? 
Manlius reflects upon the best method of 
strengthening the command in the field, and 
puts to death his own son, for conquering 
without his orders. Are they defeated before 
Numantial Scipio ^^milianus immediately 
removes the several blandishments which had 
enervated them. Have the Roman legions 
passed under the yoke in Numidia 1 Metel- 
lus wipes away the ignominy the instant he 
has obliged them to resume their ancient in- 
stitutions. Marius, that he may be enabled 
to vanquish the Cimbri and the Teutones, 
begins by diverting the course of rivers ; 
and Sylla employs in such hard labour his 
soldiers, who were terrified at the war which 
was carrying on against Mithridates, that they 
sue for battle to put an end to their hardships. 
Publius Nasica made the Romans build a fleet 
of ships at a time when they had no occasion 
for such a force. In a word, industry, dili- 
gence, and a perseverance in all kind of mili- 
tary toils, was the very characteristic of this 
people ; they dreaded idleness more than an 
enemy. 

XVIII. These men thus inured were gene- 
rally healthy and vigorous. We do not find, 
by historians, that the Roman armies, which 



32 



THE ROMAN 



waged war in so great a variety of climates, 
fell often a prey to diseases ; whereas, in the 
present age, we daily see armies, without once 
engaging, perish and melt away, if I may use 
the expression, in a single campaign. Nor 
can I forbear taking notice, that the dexterity 
and address the soldiers attained, by means of 
their continual exercises, served not only to 
render them skilful and active in the duties of 
the field, but inspired them likewise with 
boldness and intrepidity. In the battles fought 
in our age, every single soldier has very little 
security and confidence, except in the multi- 
tude ; but among the Romans, every indivi- 
dual, more robust and of greater experience in 
war, as well as more inured to the fatigues of 
it than his enemy, relied upon himself only. 
He was naturally endued with courage, or, 
in other words, with that virtue which a sen- 
sibility of our own strength inspires. To the 
same admirable discipline too were they in- 
debted for a certain haughtiness and opinion 
of superiority, which made them rank them- 
selves above the troops of all other nations, 
and despise the service of any foreign prince 
or state, compared with that of their country. 
Desertions are very common among us, for 
this reason, because the soldiers are the dregs 
of every nation, and not one of them possesses, 
or thinks himself possessed of a certain advan- 
tage, which renders his condition preferable 
to that of his adversaries. But among the Ro- 
mans they were less frequent, it being scarce 
possible that soldiers, raised from among a 
people naturally so imperious and aspiring, 
and so sure of commanding over others, should 
demean themselves to such a degree as to 
cease to be Romans. We may likewise ob- 
serve, as a necessary- consequence of their 
being so carefully trained, that it was next to 
impossible in a battle, how unfortunate soever, 
but some troops must rally in one part or other 
of it, or the enemy be defeated in some quarter 
of the field, either of which was often sufficient 
to secure the victory. And indeed we find 
every-where in history, that whenever the 
Romans happened to be overpowered in the 
beginning, whether by numbers or the fierce- 
ness of the onset, they seldom failed at last to 
wrest the victory out of the enemy's hands. 

XIX. There are still many other particulars 
that might be mentioned to the advantage of 
the Roman discipline : their strict regulations 
with regard to all the different branches of the 



service; their admirable policy in making 
motives of honour and shame operate strongly 
upon the troops ; their steady adherence to the 
received maxims of war, so as never, on any 
occasion, to abate of the rigour of military 
severity, where the soldiers were found to 
have neglected their duty, abandoned their 
post, thrown away their arms, or surrendered 
themselves to the enemy. History abounds 
with examples of this kind. As their armies 
were for the most part but small, the com- 
mander had a better opportunity of knowing 
the several individuals, and could more easily 
perceive the various faults and misdemeanors 
committed by the soldiery, against which care 
was taken to provide immediately. Nor were 
they so tenacious of their own customs as not 
to pay a due attention to those of other na- 
tions, which they adopted without hesitation, 
wherever they appeared attended with any 
real benefit. In their war with Pj'rrhus, they 
improved themselves in the knowledge of posts 
and encampments ; in that with Hannibal, tjiey 
learned the true use of cavalrj', and how to 
apply address and stratagem in the conduct 
of a campaign. If any nation boasted, either 
from nature or its institution, any peculiar 
advantage, the Romans immediately made use 
of it. They employed their utmost endeavours 
to procure horses from Numidia, bow-men 
from Crete, slingers from the Balearean isles, 
and ships from the Rhodians : so that it ma}' 
with justice be said of them, that no nation in 
the world ever prepared for war with so much 
wisdom, and carried it on with so much in- 
trepidity. 

XX. Thus have we endeavoured to give 
some account of the arms and discipline of the 
Romans, and to point out their excellency over 
those of other nations. How much they 
were indebted to them for their grandeur and 
successes, appears evidently from this : that so 
long as their armies adhered strictly to these 
primitive institutions, they were invincible ; 
but in proportion as they deviated from them, 
became like other men. When they began to 
look upon their armour as too weighty and 
cumbersome, and their discipline as attended 
with too marv restraints, and of course to re- 
lax in these two important articles, they gra- 
dually sunk into a level with the troops of 
their enemies, and at last so totally degenera- 
ted, that we find not in their behaviour the least 
traces of their original bravery. I know it is a 



ART OF WAR. 



33 



maxim of long standing, that money is the sin- 
ews of war. How far this may suit the con- 
stitution of the present age, I will not pretend 
to say ; but it seems by no means to agree with 
antiquity. I am sure the whole current of his- 
tory is against it. Had this been the case, 
Cyrus could never have prevailed against 
Croesus, nor the Greeks against the Persians, 
nor the Romans against the Carthaginians. 
It is true money is requisite for the carrying 
on of a war, but not principally, and in the first 
place. Good soldiers and good discipline are 
of infinitely greater avail. Where these are, 
it will be easy to find money ; but money is not 
always sufficient to procure them. Had not 
the Romans done more in their wars with their 
iron than their gold, the treasure of the wh(51e 
world would not have been suflficient for them, 
considering their great enterprises abroad, and 
their no less difficulties at home. But having 
good and well disciplined troops, they were 
never in want of money ; for those who were 
afraid of their armies, strove with emulation to 
supply thein. Nay, it is remarkable, that tiieir 
most celebrated victories, and those which re- 
quired the greatest exertion of strength, were 
gained during the period of their poverty. It 
was then that they subdued the Samnites, 
forced Pyrrhus to quit Italy, and cut in pieces 
the mighty armies of the Carthaginians. After 
they became possessed of the treasures of the 
universe, they had, for the most part, only 
weak and effeminate nations to deal with, 
and were so far from increasing in real power, 
that by the concurrent testimony of all his- 
torians, they are to be considered from that 
time as upon the decline. Livy, in that fa- 
mous question relating to the Greeks and Ro- 
mans, where he endeavours to determine what 
would have been the event, had Alexander the 
Great turned his arms against Italy, observes, 
that in war there are three things funda- 
mentally necessary ; good soldiers, good 
officers, and good fortune : and then arguing 
whether Alexander or the Romans were more 
considerable in these three points, concludes 
without the least mention of money. It is well 
known that the Spartans, so long as they ad- 
hered to their primitive institutions and 
poverty, were the most powerful people of all 
Greece, and never proved unsuccessful in their 
wars, till they became possessed of great riches 
and revenues. I conclude therefore, that it was 
by the bravery of their troops, the advantage 
4* ■ "" "■"■■■ 



of their arms, and the excellence of their disci- 
pline, that the Romans rendered themselves 
victorious over all nations : and, accordingly, 
we find, that when they ceased to have the su- 
periority in these, the revenues of the whole 
world were not sufficient to defend them. 



CHAR IV. 

OF THE SPIRIT AND BRAVERY OF THE 
ROBIAN TROOPS. 

I. Although military discipline, and the 
continual exercise of arms, naturally conduce 
to make a people bold, daring, and intrepid ; 
yet there is something so peculiar in the spirit 
and character of the Romans, that I flatter 
myself it will not be unacceptable to the 
reader, to offer a few reflections on this subject, 
and give some insight into those institutions 
and maxims of conduct, which chiefly con- 
tributed to exalt their courage, and animate 
their bravery. Two things here naluraliy 
present themselves to our consideration. First, 
the admirable principles upon which the com- 
monwealth was founded. Secondly, the suc- 
cession of great men that for several ages pre- 
vailed in it, and who supported, invigorated, 
and, from time to time, gave new life to these 
principles. Among the principles of the Ro- 
man polity, none seems to have taken deeper 
root, than the fear of the gods, and a venera- 
tion for religion. This perhaps, at first sight, 
may not be thought so immediately to concern 
a martial people ; but if we examine the effect 
of it upon their armies, and the many valuable 
purposes it was made to serve in war, we shall 
have reason to conclude that, of all their insti- 
tutions, not one contributed more to the gran- 
deur of the state. For hence in particular it 
was, that the military oath was held so sacred 
among the troops, and became an inviolable 
bond of fidelity and subjection. The soldiers, 
however displeased and enraged, did not dare 
to quit their generals so long as this tie was 
supposed to remain in force : nay, so very ten- 
der and scrupulous were they, that even in 
their greatest impatience to be discharged, 
they would yet never admit of any interpreta-. 
tion, that carried in it the least strain or ap- 
pearance of deceit. We have a remarkable 
example of this, in their behaviour to Qumc- 
F 



34 



THE ROMAN 



tius Cincinnatus, after the defeat of Appius 
Herdonius. That Sabine had seized the Capi- 
tol, with four thousand men. The danger 
was imminent, and required speedy redress ; 
but the Tribunes, who were then pushing the 
Terentian law, in order to force the senate to 
a compliance, opposed the levies. The people 
however, partly by promises, partly by remon- 
strating on the danger of the city, were at 
length prevailed upon to take an oath of 
fidelity to the consuls ; and marching against 
Herdonius, soon recovered possession of the 
Capitol. PubUus Valerius, to whom the 
charge of the attack fell, chancing to be 
slain, Quinctius Cincinnatus was immediately 
chosen in his room ; who, to keep the troops 
employed, and leave them no room to think of 
their law Terentilla, ordered them out upon 
an expedition against the Volsci, alleging, that 
the oath that they had taken to the late consul 
obliged them to follow him. The tribunes, to 
evade the engagement, pretended that the oath 
bound them only to the person of Valerius, and 
so was buried with him in his tomb. But the 
people, more sincere, and plain-hearted, could 
not resolve to shelter themselves under so frivo- 
lous a distinction, and therefore prepared every 
man to take arms, though very unwiUingly. 
" Nondum (says Livy) hsec, quae nunc tenet 
seculum, negligentia deum venerat, nee inter- 
pretando sibi quisque jusjurandum, et leges 
aptas faciebat." " That neglect of the gods, 
which so much dishonours the present age, was 
not known in those days, nor had men learned 
the pernicious art of interpreting the laws of 
religion according to their own purposes." 

II. I could produce many instances of the 
like nature, all tending to show, how servicea- 
ble religion was, to the governing of armies, 
the uniting of the people, and the keeping 
them in due subjection to their officers and 
magistrates ; insomuch that should it fall into 
dispute, whether Rome was more indebted to 
Romulus or Numa, I am clearly of opinion that 
Numa would have the preference. For where 
religion is once fixed, military discipline may 
be easily introduced : but where religion is 
wanting, discipline is not brought in without 
great difficulty ; and never can be carried to 
perfection. If we inquire into the nature of 
the religion professed by the Romans, we find 
that it ran much upon the answers of oracles, 
divinations, soothsayings, sacrifices, and innu- 
merable other ceremonies, that argue more of 



superstition, than any just knowledge of the 
deity. But absurd as this religion may appear, 
it had nevertheless a wonderful influence upon 
the minds of men, and was often made use of 
with success, to inspire courage in battles and 
dangers. It is well known that all their mili- 
tary expeditions were preceded by the augu- 
ries and auspices : and according to the omens 
that offered on these occasions, did the people 
judge of the issue. Hence their wisest and 
best generals, by a strict regard to these ob- 
servances, and accommodating the ceremonies 
of religion to their own designs, generally found 
means to give a favourable turn to the omens ; 
which greatly contributed to exalt the courage 
of their troops, and made them face the enemy 
with confidence. On the contrary, it is ob- 
served, that where the usual forms were ne- 
glected, and generals affected to act in con- 
tempt of the auspices, they seldom succeeded 
in their designs. This may well enough be 
accounted for, without allowing any real in- 
fluence to these ceremonies, or supposing that 
the flight and chirping of birds could in the 
least affect future events. Nothing in truth 
can be more trifling, than the pretended pre- 
sages of which we speak ; but as they were 
firmly believed by the bulk of the army, where 
at any time they appeared unfavourable, it 
could not fail of casting a great damp upon 
the spirits of the soldiers. "^And yet this does 
not seem to me to have been the principal 
cause of those miscarriages, that were usually 
observed to follow a neglect of the auspices. 
The ignorance and incapacity of the generals 
will much better account for them ; nor need 
we a stronger proof of this incapacity, than 
the contempt with which they affected to treat 
religion. War is necessarily attended with 
so much uncertainty, and requires such a mul- 
titude of different attentions, that a prudent 
general will be far from neglecting any advan- 
tages, which he sees may be drawn from the 
established prejudices of those under his com- 
mand ; much less will he turn those very pre- 
judices to his own hurt, by an ill-judged con- 
tempt ; and the general who is so indiscreet 
as to act in this manner, plainly discovers 
himself unfit for the conduct of any great en- 
terprise. I know it is asserted by some, that 
religion checks the natural fierceness and ob- 
stinacy of men, and renders them poor-spirited 
and abject ; but whoever talks in this manner, 
shows himself little conversant in the history 



ART OP WAR. 



35 



of mankind. Consider the Romans in the 
best times of the republic, the English under 
Queen Elizabeth and Oliver Cromwell, the 
French in the age of Henry the Fourth, the 
United Provinces in that of Philip the Second, 
and the Swedes under Gustavus Vasa, and 
then tell me, whether the most flourishing and 
formidable periods of nations, be not those 
when a spirit of religion has strongly taken 
possession of the minds of the people. 
< III. Next to a veneration for religion, love 
of their country was the prevailing character- 
istic of the Romans. This virtue naturally 
rouses men to great designs, and begets vigour 
and perseverance in the execution of them ; 
and as it had taken a deeper root among the 
people of whom we speak, than in any other 
nation mentioned in history, no wonder we 
here meet with so many instances of magna- 
nimity, public spirit, fortitude, and all the vir- 
tues that tend to form a race of heroes. It is 
certain that the constitution of the Roman 
commonwealth was peculiarly fitted to nourish 
this spirit. The people had many ties and 
obligations to the state, many endearing con- 
nections to inspire the love of it. They chose 
the senators, by whose counsels the republic 
was governed, the magistrates, by whom jus- 
tice was administered, and the generals who 
conducted and terminated their wars ; so that 
the public successes were in a manner their 
own work. Hence the principle of which we 
speak became so strong in then, that (hey 
were ready to sacrifice every other considera- 
tion to it, whether of interest or ambition. No 
hazards, no sufferings appeared great where 
their country stood in need of taeir assistance. 
We find, even in the disputes between the 
different orders of the state, where the passions 
of men are wont most strongly to be engaged, 
and where particular animosi.ies are but too 
apt to get the better of reason, that the consi- 
deration of the public safety was always suffi- 
cient to calm their resentments, and bring 
them to temper and moderation. How violent 
soever the contest might be, however much 
the parties appeared exasperated against one 
another, they were yet sure to unite, when 
any danger from without threatened the com- 
monwealth. This is evident through the 
whole course of the Roman history, and re- 
quires not to be illustrated by particular exam- 
ples. I shall therefore only add, that a prin- 
ciple so powerful and universally dilfused, as 



it could not fail of having many desirable ef- 
fects upon the people, so did it in a particular 
manner tend to render them brave and reso- 
lute ; for courage being of indispensable neces- 
sity to the defence of our country, wherever 
the love of that predominates, there we are 
sure to find the other likewise. 

IV. But if the Romans are remarkable for 
the love they bore the country, they are no 
less so when we consider how passionately 
fond they were of liberty. This spirit sub- 
sisted from the very foundation of the state. 
Though Rome was at first governed by kings, 
these kings were far from being absolute : for 
besides the authority enjoyed by the senate, 
the people too had a considerable share in the 
administration, since to their assemblies were 
committed the creation of magistrates, the en- 
acting of laws, and the resolving upon peace 
or war. Indeed, under Tarquin the Proud, 
the government degenerated into a real 
tyranny ; but this, instead of extinguishing 
served only to rouse the love of liberty ; and 
the behaviour of Brutus, who puts his own 
sons to death, for attempting to establish the 
royal authority, made so strong an impression 
upon the minds of the people, that they hence- 
forward considered slavery as the greatest of 
evils, and bent all their thoughts to the pre- 
serving and enlarging the freedom they had 
acquired. I need not here say how much li- 
berty tends to ennoble the mind, and how ne- 
cessary it is to the prosperity and greatness of 
a state. It is well known that Athens, so long 
as it continued under the tyranny of Pisistra- 
tus and his descendants, made scarce any 
figure in Greece : and whereas, soon after their 
expulsion, it rose to so astonishing a pitch of 
grandeur, as not only to baffle all the efforts 
of the Persians, but even to render itself formi- 
dable to that mighty empire. And if we look 
into the history of the Roman commonwealth, 
we find, that in proportion as liberty increased, 
and the people got from under the dominion 
of the nobles, they became inspired with a 
more elevated courage, a more unwearied for- 
titude, and pushed their conquests with greater 
rapidity. Nay, in the very infancy of their 
freedom, when Tarquin was endeavouring to 
recover his lost authority, they gave manifest 
indications of that spirit, for which they are so 
justly admired by succeeding ages. It is upon 
this occasion that we read of the astonishing 
valour of Horatius Codes, the intrepid firmness 



36 



THE ROMAN 



of Scaevola, and the masculine boldness of 
Clelia ; insomuch that Porsenna, king of the 
Clusians, who had undertaken the reinstating 
of 'i'arquin, admiring their bravery, would not 
any longer disturb them in the enjoyment of 
a liberty to which their merit gave them so 
just a title, and which he found them so reso- 
lutely bent to defend. 

V. And here I cannot but observe, that 
this passionate desire of freedom gave rise to 
a peculiar circumstance in the Roman consti- 
tution, which, though seemingly inconsis- 
tent with the prosperity of the state, was yet 
in reality one of the principal causes of its 
grandeur, as it more than any thing contri- 
buted to exalt the character of the people, and 
produce among them the most finished mo- 
dels in every species of merit. What I mean 
is, those continual dissensions between the 
nobles and commons, of which ws meet wiih 
so frequent mention in the early ages of the 
commonwealth. Two bodies at Rome divi- 
ded the whole authority • the senate and the 
people. A mutual jealousy, founded on the 
one side upon a desire of governing, on the 
other, upon that of keeping themselves free 
and independent, raised between them con- 
tentions and quarrels, which ended not but 
with the republic itself. These contests, 
though attended with many inconveniences, 
procured notwithstanding a considerable ad- 
vantage to the state, in forming a number of 
persons of distinguished merit, and perpetua- 
ting a succession of them in the common- 
wealth. The patricians, who were obstinately 
bent to keep to themselves alone the com- 
mands, the honours, the magistracies, as they 
could not obtain them but by the suffrages of 
the plebeians, were obliged to use their ut- 
most endeavours to prove themselves worthy 
by superior qualities, by real a!id repeated 
services, by illustrious actions of which their 
adversaries themselves were witnesses, and to 
which they could not refuse their esteem and 
applause. This necessity of depending on 
the judgment of the people for admission to 
posts, obliged the young patricians to ac([uire 
all the merit capable of gaining the suffrages 
of the judges, who examined them rigorously, 
and were not inclined to have a remiss indul- 
gence for the candidates, as well out of love 
to the honour and welfare of the state, as out 
of an hereditary jealousy of the patrician 
order. The plebeians on their side, in as- 



piring to the highest dignities of the state, 
were forced to prepare themselves so as to 
convince their brethren, that they had all 
the qualities necessary to fill them with 
honour. Proofs were to be given of a dis- 
tinguished valour, of a wise and prudent con- 
duct, of a capacity to discharge all the func- 
tions of government, and to pass with repu- 
tation through the several offices, which led 
by degrees to the highest. It was needful to 
have not only the military virtues, and ability 
to conduct an army ; but the talent of ha- 
ranguing the senate and people, of reporting 
the great affairs of state, of answering foreign 
ambassadors, and entering with them into 
the nicest and most important negotiations. 
By all these obligations, imposed by ambi- 
tion on the plebeians, to qualify them for 
the posts to which they aspired, they were 
under the necessity of making proof of an 
accomplished merit, at least equal to that of 
the patricians. 

VI. These were some of the advantages 
arising from the sharp contests between the 
senate and the people, from whence resulted 
a lively emulation between the two orders, and 
a happy necessity of displaying talents, which 
perhaps by a continual concord and peace 
would ha\e lain dormant and fruitless : just 
as, if I may use the comparison, from a steel 
struck with a flint, sparks of fire fly out, which 
without thai violence would remain for evei 
concealed. This is not all. It was by means 
of these contests that the public liberty was 
improved and settled, without which the com- 
monwealth would never have become great 
and flourishing, By the revolution which ex 
pelled Tarquin the Proud, the commons of 
Rome were delivered from a tyrant, but not 
from tyranny. The particians still held them 
under subjection ; and though, while their 
fears of Tarquin's return were alive and strong, 
they behaved wilh great lenity and modera- 
tion, yet no sooner were they informed of that 
prince's death, than the weight of oppression 
was renewed, and fell as heavy upon the 
people as ever. The Valerian law, to permit 
appeals from the sentence of the magistrates 
to the people assembled, was not sufficient to 
protect the plebeians from injustice and cru- 
elty. They found it necessary to have magis- 
trates of their own body, to screen them from 
the tyranny of the great, and therefore ex- 
torted from the senate a consent to the esta- 



ART OF WAR. 



37 



blishment of the tribunitian power. The in- 
stitution of the Comitita Tribiita, and the 
practice of bringing into judgment, before 
those assemblies, the most exalted of the no- 
bles, upon accusations of treason against the 
people, was another bulwark, against the over- 
flowings of ambition. The publication of the 
laws of the twelve tables, gave some check to 
the abuse of that prerogative, which the pa- 
tricians tenaciously kept, of being the sole 
judges in civil causes ; and on many other 
occasions we find, that the commons, urged 
by oppression to fury, exerted their natural 
strength in such a manner as proclaimed them 
sovereign masters of the administration, and 
gradually extended their privileges. 

VII. But the commonwealth of Rome was 
never truly a free state, till after the publication 
of the Licinian laws, those laws which, in their 
consequences, made merit alone the ordinary 
scale whereby to ascend to the highest offices ; 
and which, by admitting the plebeians to a rea- 
sonable share of what was purchased with 
their blood, delivered them from that servile 
subjection to the wealthy nobles in which 
their indigence had so long detained them. 
From this period, the Roman people, when 
they made laws, or elected magistrates for the 
execution of them, were generally speaking, 
free from all undue influence; not overawed, 
as before, by the rich and the great, nor con- 
strained by any force, but that of reason and 
natural justice, in the most absolute subjection 
to which is the most perfect freedom. No 
citizen who had showed superior talents and 
virtue, stood excluded, on account of the low 
degree of his birth, from the dignities of the 
state ; and hence proceeded an emulation 
among the individuals to surpass each other 
in deserving honours. Indeed the haughty 
patricians, as, when vanquished by the ple- 
beians, they had given ground with an an- 
gry reluctance, and retired fighting, so they 
afterwards, from time to time, showed a strong 
disjiosition to renew their unrighteous sove- 
reignty : but their efforts were faint and inef- 
fectual ; and at length acquiescing in what 
they could not undo, there ensued domestic 
peace and union, and an established liberty. 
Union at home gave new strength to the 
state, and liberty seems to have inspired the 
people with a nobler spirit, a more exalted 
courage, and a greater ardour to enlarge the 
bounds of their empire. For, whereas, before, 



during the space of four hundred years, they 
had not pushed their conquests beyond a few 
leagues round the city ; we find that from that 
period, in the course of seventy years, they, 
by a series of victories, made themselves mas- 
ters of all Italy. And though destitute of 
naval strength and naval skill, their next en- 
terprise was against a rival republic beyond 
the continent ; a republic that with greater 
riches, and more ample territories than theirs, 
had possession of the absolute dominion of the 
sea. The boldness of the undertaking, and 
the amazing constancy with which they sup- 
ported it, in spite of the most terrible adversi- 
ties, are not to be paralleled in the history of 
any other nation ; but the Roman legions were, 
at that time, legions of free citizens, whose 
predominant passion was glory, and who placed 
the highest glory in facing every danger, and 
surmounting every difficulty, to preserve their 
liberty, and extend their empire. 

VIII. The love of glory is indeed a natural 
consequence of liberty, and if to this we join 
that remarkable disregard of wealth, which 
prevailed for so many ages among this people, 
we shall have reason to conclude, that these 
likewise contributed not a little, towards form- 
ing in them that firm and intrepid bravery, 
which makes a distinguishing part of their 
character. For the love of glory pushes men 
on to great actions, and a disregard of wealth 
prevents their being biassed by mean sordid 
views, or shaken by the low considerations of 
self-interest. It is certain that glory was the 
main spring of all those noble and illustrious 
undertakings, which have rendered the Ro- 
mans so famous. By this motive, the republic, 
after liberty prevailed, made an incredible pro- 
gress in a short time. The frequent exam- 
ples of patriotism, and of an inviolable at- 
tachment to the public good of which Rome 
was witness in those critical times, and which 
she rewarded in so eminent a manner, kindled, 
not only in the patricians, but likewise among 
the plebeians, that noble fire of emulation and 
glory, which dares all things, and influenced 
all along the whole nation. Greedy of praise, 
they reckoned money as nothing, and valued 
it only to disperse it. They were content with 
moderate fortunes, says Sallust, but desired 
glory without measure. Accordingly we find, 
that for four hundred years after the building 
of Rome, the city was in very great poverty : 
and of this the probable cause seems to be, that 



38 



THE ROMAN 



poverty was no impediment to preferment. 
Virtue was the only thing required in the 
election of magistrates, and the distribution of 
offices ; and wherever it was found, let the 
person, or family, be ever so poor, he was sure 
to be advanced. Quinctius Cincinnatus was 
taken from the plough, and raised to the of- 
fice of dictator, though his estate did not ex- 
ceed four acres of land. Fabricius and Atilius 
Regulus are likewise examples of this kind ; 
and indeed the Eoman history everywhere 
abounds with them. 

IX. The thirst of glory usually produces 
that of dominion. It appears noble to be mas- 
ters, to command others, to compose laws, 
to be feared and obeyed. This passion, natu- 
ral to mankind, was more strong and active 
in the Romans, than in any other people. 
One would think, at seeing the air of authori- 
ty that they very early assume, that they 
already believed themselves destined to become 
one day lords of the universe. Nay, it ap- 
pears from many indications in their history, 
that this notion subsisted from the foundation 
of the state. The answers and interpretations 
of the augurs frequently glanced this way. A 
head was found in digging for the foundations 
of the Capitol. This was given out to imply 
the €ternity of their empire, and that the city 
to which that temple belonged, was to become 
the head of the universe. We see likewise 
in the speech of Coriolanus to the deputies 
of the senate, upon occasion of his investing 
Rome with an army of Volscians, that the 
conceit of universal dominion not only strongly 
prevailed in his time, but was carefully che- 
rished among the people. Nor was it with- 
out reason that the senate contrived to raise 
and propagate this persuasion, as it tended 
wonderfully to exalt the courage of the citi- 
zens, and not only animated them in the pur- 
suit of conquest, but kept them firm and steady 
under the severest strokes of adversity. Thus 
at the same time that poverty and a disregard 
of wealth rendered them modest, the love of 
glory and dominion inspired them with magna- 
nimity. When put into command, and placed 
at the head of armies, kings appeared but little 
before them ; nor was any danger, difficulty, 
or opposition able to dismay them : but when 
their commissions expired, and they returned 
to a private station, none so frugal, none so 
humble, none so laborious, so obedient to the 
magistrates, or respectful to their superiors as 



they ; insomuch that one would think it im- 
possible the same minds should be capable of 
such strange alterations. 

X. From these distinguishing characteris- 
tics of the Roman people, it will be easy to 
perceive, how courage and a sense of honour 
came to be so prevalent in their armies. And 
here I cannot but observe, that the military 
rewards were wonderfully calculated to pro- 
mote this spirit ; since without being consi- 
derable for their intrinsic value, they were 
extremely coveted by the troops, because 
glory, so precious to that warlike people, was 
annexed to them. A very small crown of 
gold, and generally a crown of laurel or oak- 
leaves, became inestimable to the soldiers, who 
knew not any marks more excellent than those 
of virtue ; nor any distinction more noble than 
that which flows from glorious actions. These 
monuments of renown were to them real 
patents of nobility, and descended to their pos- 
terity as a precious inheritance. They were, 
besides, sure titles to rise to places of honour 
and advantage, which were granted only to 
merit, and not procured by intrigue and cabal. 
We have already had occasion to take notice 
of the large field there lay for promotion in the 
Roman armies, and that such as distinguished 
themselves by their valour had reason to hope 
for every thing. What an agreeable prospect 
for an inferior officer, to behold at a distance 
the chief dignities of the -state and army, as 
so many rewards to which he could aspire ! 

XI. And indeed, if any thing be capable 
of inspiring man with bravery, and a martial 
ardour, to pass through a succession of dif- 
ferent honours, and to be entitled to a number 
of military rewards, which were all considered 
as so many standing monuments of renown, 
seems to bid fairest for it. I cannot better 
represent the effect this had upon the troops, 
than by the following relation, from which the 
reader may form some idea of what a Roman 
soldier was. When the war against Perseus, 
the last king of Macedonia, was resolved upon 
at Rome, amongst the other measures taken 
for the success of it, the senate decreed, that 
the consul charged with that expedition, should 
raise as many centurions and veteran soldiers 
as he pleased, out of those who did not exceed 
fifty years of age. Twenty-three centurions, 
who had been Primipili, refused to take arms, 
unless the same rank was granted them, which 
they had in preceding campaigns. As it was 



ART OF WAR 



39 



impossible to gratify them all, and they per- 
sisted obstinately in their refusal, the affair was 
brought before the people. After Popilius, who 
had been consul two years before, had pleaded 
the cause of the centurions, and the consul his 
own, one of the centurions, who had appealed 
to the people, having obtained permission to 
speak, expressed himself to this effect. 

XII. " I am called Spurius Ligustinus of 
the Crustumine tribe, descended from the Sa- 
bines. My father left me a small field and 
cottage, where I was born, brought up, and 
now live. As soon as I was at age to marry, 
he gave me his brother's daughter to wife. 
She brought me no portion but liberty, chastity, 
and a fruitfulness sufficient for the richest 
houses. We have six sons, and two daugh- 
ters, both married. Of my sons four have 
taken the robe of manhood, the other two are 
still infants. I began to bear arms in the 
consulship of P. Sulpicius and C. Aurelius, 
and served two years as a private soldier in 
the army sent into Macedonia against King 
Philip. The third year, T. Quintius Fla- 
mininus, to reward me for my services, made 
me captain of a century in the tenth maniple 
of the Hastati. I served afterwards as a vo- 
lunteer in Spain under Cato ; and that general 
who is so excellent a judge of merit, made me 
first centurion of the first maniple of the 
Hastati. In the war against the ^^Itolians 
and King Antiochus, I rose to the same 
rank amongst the Principes. I afterwards 
made several campaigns, and in a very few 
years have been four times Primipilus: I 
have been four and thirty times rewarded by 
the generals, have received six civic crowns, 
have served two and twenty campaigns, and 
am above fifty years old. Though I had not 
completed the number of years required by 
the law, and my age did not discharge me, 
substituting four of my children in my place, 
I should deserve to be exempt from the neces- 
sity of serving. But by all I have said, I 
only intend to show the justice of my cause. 
For the rest, as long as those who levy the 
troops shall judge me capable of bearing arms, 
I shall not refuse the service. The tribunes 
may rank me as they please ; that is their 
business : mine is to act, that none be ranked 
above me for valour ; as all the generals under 
whom I have had the honour to serve, and 
all my comrades can witness for me, I have 
hitherto never failed to do. For you, centu- 



rions, notwithstanding your appeal ; as even 
during your youth you have never done any 
thing contrary to the authority of the magis- 
trates and senate, in my opinion, it would be- 
come your age, to show yourselves submissive 
to the senate and consuls, and to think every 
station honourable, that gives you opportunity 
to serve the republic." 

XIII. It is easy to discern in this speech, 
the spirit and magnanimity of a true Roman; 
and particularly a certain boldness and con- 
fidence, derived from a sense of his many 
services, and the rewards and honours with 
which they had been attended. And if this 
be so conspicuous in the inferior officers, what 
may we not expect in those of a more eminent 
degree ? If civic and mural crowns, collars, 
chains, bracelets, and such like, were sufficient 
to rouse these sentiments of heroism among 
the lower order of troops, what would not the 
prospect of a triumph effect in the mind of 
the general : This honour was granted only 
to dictators, consuls, and praetors. After the 
general had distributed a part of the spoils to 
the soldiers, and performed some other cere- 
monies, the procession began, and entered -the 
city through the triumphal port, to ascend ta 
the capitol. At the head of it were the 
players upon musical instruments, who made 
the air resound with their harmony. They 
were followed by the beasts that were to be 
sacrificed, adorned with fillets, and flowers, 
many of them having their horns gilt. After 
them came the whole booty, and all the spoils, 
either displayed upon carriages, or borne upori 
the shoulders of young men in magnificent 
habits. The names of the nations conquered 
were written in great characters, and the cities 
that had been taken represented. Sometimes 
they added to the pomp extraordinary ani- 
mals, brought from the countries subjected, 
as bears, panthers, lions, and elephants. But 
what most attracted the attention and curi- 
osity of the spectators, were the illustrious 
captives, who walked in chains before the vic- 
tor's chariot ; great officers of state, generals 
of armies, princes, kings, with their wives and 
children. The consul followed upon a mag- 
nificent chariot, drawn by four horses, and 
robed with the august habit of triumph, his 
head encircled with a crown of laurel, holding 
also a branch of the same tree in his hand, 
and sometimes accompanied with his young 
children sitting by him. Behind the chariot 



40 



THE ROMA.N 



marched the whole army, the cavalry first, 
then the infantry. All the soldiers were 
crowned with laurel, and those who had re- 
ceived particular crowns, and other marks of 
honour, did not fail to sho-v them on so great 
a solemnity. They emulated each other in 
celebrating the praises of their general, and 
sometimes threw in expressions, sufficiently 
offensive, of raillery and satire against him, 
which savoured of the military freedom ; but 
the joy of the ceremony entirely blunted their 
edge, and abated their bitterness. When the 
procession arrived at the capitol, the consul, 
immediately upon his entering the temple, 
made this very remarkable prayer to the god : 
— " Filled with gratitude and with joy, I re- 
turn you thanks, most good and most great 
Jupiter, and you queen Juno, and all the 
other gods, the guardians and inhabitants of 
this citadel, that to this day and hour you 
have vouchsafed, by my hands, to preserve 
and guide the Roman republic happily. Con- 
tinue always, I implore you, to preserve, guide, 
protect, and favour it in all things." This 
prayer was followed by sacrificing the victims, 
and a magnificent feast, given in the capitol, 
sometimes by the public, and sometimes by 
the person himself who triumphed. It must 
be allowed, that this was a glorious day for a 
general of an army ; and it is not surprising 
that all possible endeavours should be used to 
deserve so grateful a distinction, and so splen- 
did an honour. Rome had not any thing more 
majestic and magnificent than this pompous 
ceremony, which seemed to raise the person 
in favour of whom it was granted, above the 
condition of mortals. 

XIV. The Romans, in war, knew how to 
make use of punishments, as well as rewards. 
The steadiness of a dictator, with respect to 
his general of horse, who could not be saved 
from death but by the entreaties and urgent 
prayers of all the people : the inexorable se- 
verity of the consul Manlius to his own son, 
whom he unmercifully put to death, though 
victorious, for fighting contrary to his orders ; 
these examples made a terrible impression of 
fear upon the people, which became for ever 
the firm bond of military discipline. Where- 
fore never was it observed in any nation so 
inviolably as among the Romans, nor did any 
thing contribute so much to render them vic- 
torious over all their enemies. How should 
they have been otherwise than victorious with 



troops formed as we have seen, and above all 
guided in their operations by principles the 
most proper to make conquerors ? One of 
which was, not to know any other end of war 
but victory, and for its sake to surmount, by 
an indefatigable perseverance, all the o' stacks 
and all the dangers by which it can be re- 
tarded. The greatest misfortunes, the most 
desperate losses, were incapable of daunting 
their courage, or making them accept a base 
and dishonourable peace. To grant nothing 
by compulsion, was a fundamental law of the 
Roman policy, from which the senate never 
departed; and in the most melancholy junc- 
tures, weak counsels, instead of prevailing, 
were not so much as heard. As far back as 
Coriolanus, the senate declared, that no agree- 
ment could be made with the Volsci, so long 
as they remained on the Roman territory. 
They proceeded in the same manner with 
Pyrrhus. After the bloody battle of Cannae, 
wherein above fifty thousand of the Romans 
lay dead on the field, it was resolved no pro- 
posal of peace should be listened to. The 
consul Varro, who had been the occasion of 
the defeat, was re'ceived at Rome as if he had 
been victorious, because in so great a misfor- 
tune he had not despaired of the Roman 
affairs. Thus, instead of disheartening the 
people by an unseasonable instance of severity, 
these generous senators taught them, by their 
example, to bear up against ill fortune, and 
assume in adversity the haughtiness with 
which others are inspired by prosperity. 

XV. One thing, indeed, has been gene- 
rally considered, as tending greatly to obstruct 
the conquests of the Roman people : I mean 
the two limited space of the consulship, which 
often afforded not the general time to finish a 
war he had begun, a good part of the year 
being sometimes spent in preparations. This 
inconvenience was afterwards remedied, as 
far as possible, by prolonging the command to 
the general, as proconsul, and sometimes con- 
tinuing him in the consulship itself. But this 
was practised sparingly in the wiser ages of 
the republic : the danger of infringing the 
public liberty, making the frequent change of 
generals appear necessary to the safety of the 
state. If the generals had been long conti- 
nued at the head of the armies, they might 
have been able to usurp all the authority, and 
become masters of the government, as hap. 
pened under Csesar, in the latter end of the 



ART OF WAR. 



41 



commonwealth. We are likewise to call to 
mind, that these annual commands were well 
enough suited to the earlier times of Rome, 
when wars seldom lasted above one campaign ; 
and though perhaps they might not be without 
their inconveniences afterwards, yet they had 
this one manifest advantage attending them, 
that thereby a number of great generals was 
formed in the state, and the Romans were not 
often reduced to the necessity of placing all 
their hopes in the abilities of a single person. 
For this quick circulation of authority, by 
raising many in their turns to the highest 
offices of the republic, excited an incredible 
emulation among individuals, to qualify them- 
selves for the conduct of armies ; and at the 
same time furnished them with frequent op- 
portunities of acquiring experience in supreme 
command, which is one of the most requisite 
accomplishments in a great general. 

XVI. Thus every thing at Rome led to 
great conquests : the constitution of the gov- 
ernment ; the admirable political principles 
on which it was founded ; the nature of the 
troops ; the ability of the generals ; and above 
all, the steadiness of the senate, in attachment 
to the ancient maxims of the state. This last 
particular leads me to the second thing I 
mentioned, as the cause of that noble spirit 
which we so much admire in the Roman 
armies, namely, the succession of great men 
that for several ages prevailed in the common- 
wealth, and who supported, invigorated, and 
from time to time gave new life to the funda- 
mental principles of the constitution, Happy 
is the state that is blessed with this privilege ! 
and it was the good fortune of the Romans to 
enjoy it in a supreme degree. It were endless 
to recount all the names that history furnishes 
on this subject; I shall therefore content my- 
self with mentioning only two, Manlius Tor- 
quatus and Valerius Corvinus ; the one famed 
for his severity, the other for his clemency. 
Manlius commanded with rigour, excused his 
soldiers from no labour, and never remitted 
any punishment. Valerius, on the other side, 
used them with as much gentleness and fa- 
miliarity. Manlius, to support the vigour of 
military discipline, executed his own son. Vale- 
rius acted upon principles so different, that he 
is said never to have offended any man. Yet, 
in this great diversity of conduct, the effects 
were the same, both as to the enemy, the com- 
monwealth, and themselves : for none of their 
5 



soldiers ever declined fighting, none of them 
rebelled, none so much as disputed their or- 
ders, though the discipline of Manlius was so 
severe, that afterwards all excessive and ar- 
bitrary commands were from him called Man- 
liana imperia. If Manlius be considered as he 
is represented by historians, we find him to 
have been very valiant, pious to his father and 
country, and submissive to his superiors. This 
appears by his defence of his father, at the haz- 
ard of his own life, against a tribune who ac- 
cused him ; by his readiness to offer himself to 
single combat with a Gaul, where he thought 
the honour of his country concerned ; and by 
his first applying to the consul for leave, be- 
fore he would accept the challenge. Now 
when a man of this constitution arrives at 
command, he desires that all men may be as 
punctual as himself: and being naturally brave 
he commands brave things, and when they are 
once commanded, requires that they be exe- 
cuted exactly ; this being a certain rule, that 
where great things are commanded, strict obe- 
dience must be exacted ; in which case mild- 
ness and gentleness will not always prevail. 
But where a man has not this greatness and 
magnificence of mind, he is by no means tft 
command extraordinary things, and may there- 
fore safely exercise the virtue of clemency ; 
with which ordinary punishments are com^ 
patible enough, because they are not imputed 
to the prince, but to the laws and customs of 
the place. Manlius then was a severe man, 
and kept up the Roman discipline exactly ; 
prompted first by his own nature, and then by 
a strong desire to have that obeyed, which his 
own inclination had constrained him to com- 
mand. Valerius Corvinus, on the other hand, 
might exercise his gentleness without incon- 
venience, because he commanded nothing ex- 
traordinary, or contrary to the customs of the 
Romans at that time : for, as those customs 
were good, and not very troublesome to ob- 
serve, he was seldom necessitated to punish of- 
fenders, because there were but few of that 
sort ; and where they were, their punishment 
was imputed to the laws, and not to his cruelty. 
Hence, Valerius had an opportunity, by his 
gentleness, to gain both affection and authority 
in the army, which was the cause, that the 
soldiers, being equally obedient to the one as 
the other, though their tempers and discipline 
were so very different, they could yet do the 
same things, and their actions have the same 
G 



42 



THE ROMAN 



effects. I shall only add, that could a state be 
so happy, as to have always persons succeeding 
one another within a reasonable time, who, 
however different in inclination and temper, 
would yet by their examples renew the laws, 
restrain vice, and remove every thing that 
tended to its ruin or corruption, that state must 
be immortal. 

XVII. In thus ascribing the bravery and 
successes of the Romans, to the excellent prin- 
ciples of their constitution, and the great men 
by whom these principles were supported, I 
do no more than follow the opinion of their 
own writers upon this subject. Sallust tells 
us, " that after much reading and reflection 
upon the causes of the growth and grandeur 
of the Romans, he found reason to conclude, 
that the distinguished virtue of a few citizens 
had effected all that mighty run of prosperity." 
Cicero too, in his reflection upon that verse of 
the poet Ennius, 

Moribus antiquis res slat Eomana, virisque, 

makes the same observation. " It is," says he, 
" the union of these two advantages, which has 
produced all the grandeur of Rome : on the 
•ne hand, the good manners, the wise political 
principles established from the beginning : on 
the other, a succession of great men, formed 
upon these principles, and employed by a state 
in the administration of affairs. Before our 
times, that happy union was always the same, 
and these two advantages ever existed to- 
gether ; otherwise a republic so powerful and 
extensive as ours could not have subsisted so 
long with honour, nor so constantly kept up 
its reputation amongst all nations." I omit 
the complaints Cicero subjoins to the de- 
generacy of the age in which he lived, and 
of the total decay of ancient manners. Every 
one knows, that these soon after occasioned 
the ruin of the republic. Meanwhile it may 
not be improper to observe that these two ad- 
vantages were not only the chief causes of the 
Roman greatness, but likewise produced that 
slow and gradual increase of power, so ne- 
cesssary to lay a solid foundation of strength, 
and support the weight of their many and ex- 
tensive conquests. 

XVIII. For there never was an empire, 
either more flourishing, or more extensive than 
the Roman. From the Euphrates and Tanais, 
to Hercules' pillars, and the Atlantic ocean, 
all the lands and all the seas, were under 



their obedience. It is astonishing to consider, 
that the nations which at present make king- 
doms so considerable, all Gaul, all Spain, al- 
most the whole island of Great Britain, Illy- 
ria, to the Danube, Germany, to the Elbe, 
Africa to the frightful and impassable deserts, 
Greece, Thrace, Syria, Egypt, all the king- 
doms of Asia Minor, and those between the 
Euxine and Caspian seas, with many others, 
became Roman provinces, almost all before 
the end of the republic. I have often won- 
dered to observe in historians a certain affec- 
tation of ascribing the successes of the Ro- 
mans to fortune, as if that, rather than valour 
and wisdom, had been the occasion of their 
prosperity. To me it evidently appears, through 
the whole course of their history, that the unu- 
sual pitch of grandeur to which they arrived, 
was the necessary result of the talents and 
accomplishments of which they were possessed, 
whether they are considered with regard to 
moral virtues, or to a political government, or 
to martial merit and the art of war. For as 
Livy observes, in the preface to his history, 
there never was a republic more religious, or 
more abounding in good examples, or where 
avarice and luxury gained ground so late, or 
where simplicity and poverty were so much 
and so long held in honour. All the debates 
and transactions of the senate, show, to a de- 
monstration, how much wisdom of counsel, 
love of the public, steadiness to the maxims of 
the state, lenity and moderation with regard 
to the conquered nations, prevailed in that au- 
gust assembly. Courage, boldness, intrepi- 
dity in the midst of the greatest dangers, an in- 
vincible patience in the hardest labours, an in- 
exorable firmness to maintain the military dis- 
cipline in its utmost rigour, a settled resolution 
to conquer or die, a greatness of soul, and a 
constancy, proof against all misfortunes, have 
at all times constituted the character of the 
Romans, and rendered them in the end victo- 
rious over all other nations. Cyrus and Alex- 
ander, it is true, founded great empires ; but 
the qualities proper for the execution of such 
a design, being confined to the persons of these 
two illustrious conquerors, and not inherited 
by their descendants, the grandeur to which 
they gave a beginning, did not support itself 
long with any reputation. It was very differ- 
ent with the Romans. Their empire was not 
founded, nor raised to the state of grandeur it 
attained by the rare endowments, or rapid con- 



ART OF WAR. 



43 



quests, of a single person. The Roman peo- 
ple themselves, the body of the state, formed 
that empire by slow degrees, and at several 
times. The great men that helped, each in 
their time, to establish, enlarge, and preserve 
it, had all different characters, though in the 
main they followed all the same principles ; 
and hence the empire itself was both more 
extensive, and of longer duration, than any 
that had ever gone before it. 



CHAP. V. 

OF MARCHES. 

I. What we have hitherto seen, relating to 
the raising of troops, their divisions, and sub- 
divisions, armour, discipline, and exercises, is 
in a manner only the mechanism of war. There 
are other still more important cares, which 
constitute what is called the higher detail of 
the service, and depend more immediately 
upon the general's ability and experience. 
To him it belongs to settle the general dis- 
position of marches ; to encamp the troops 
advantageously ; to draw them up in order of 
battle, provide against the exigencies of the 
field ; pursue with caution, or retreat with 
judgment ; and lastly, in conducting an attack 
or defence, to put in practice all the arts, 
stratagems, and address, that long experience 
in the service, and a consummate knowledge 
of all the parts of war, are jointly able to 
suggest. I shall offer some reflections upon 
the practice of the Roman generals in all 
these great points of military conduct, and 
begin with that which follows immediately 
after the rendezvous of the troops, I mean, the 
marching of an army. This subject naturally 
divides itself into three branches; the gene- 
ral order of marches in advancing against 
an enemy ; the knowledge and choice of 
posts ; and lastly, the disposition and con- 
duct of a retreat. We shall speak of each in 
order. 

II. The marching against an enemy sup- 
poses many preliminary cares in the general, 
and many previous steps taken, in order to 
his own safety, and the success of his de- 
signs. I shall suppose the plan of the war 
settled, as likewise the manner of acting, and 
measures concerted accordingly. Yet still it 
is incumbent upon a wise commander, before 



he puts his troops in motion, to provide every 
thing necessary for their accommodation and 
subsistence ; to acquire an exact knowledge of 
the country through which he marches ; to 
inform himself of the number and quality of 
the enemy's forces; to penetrate, if possible, 
into his designs ; to study the character of the 
generals employed against him ; and, by a 
wise foresight, to be prepared for all the 
events and contingencies that may happen in 
the course of a campaign. Now though these 
things come not so properly under fixed 
rules, but depend in a great measure upon 
the ability and prudence of the commander 
in chief; yet we find every where in history, 
that the Romans had many regulations about 
them, and always treated them with particu- 
lar attention. To begin with the care of 
provisions, which is of principal account in an 
army, it appears to have been the constant 
practice, to furnish the soldiers with a certain 
proportion of corn, which they were obliged 
to carry along with them in their marches. 
This, on extraordinary occasions, amounted to 
four bushels, or a month's allowance, and 
seldom was less than what might serve for 
fifteen or twenty days. They chose rather to 
give them corn than bread, because it was 
lighter, and might therefore be carried with 
greater ease. Indeed this put them to the 
trouble of grinding and baking it themselves ; 
but then they were used to it, and could upon 
occasion make it into I know not what variety 
of dishes. Besides the common bread, they 
made a kind of soft boiled food of it, very 
agreeable to the troops : they mingled it with 
milk, roots, and herbs, and made pancakes of 
it upon a small plate laid over the fire, or 
upon hot ashes, as was anciently the manner 
of regaling guests, and is still practised 
throughout the east, where these kind of 
thin cakes are much preferred to our best 
bread. Their drink was answerable to this 
diet, being no more than a mixture of vinegar 
and water. It was called posea, could at all 
times be easily procured, and was particu- 
larly serviceable to quench the thirst immedi- 
ately. 

"^11. I have heard it observed, that nothing 
gives greater difficulty to military men, in the 
reading of ancient history, than the article of 
provisions. Cato's maxim, that the war 
feeds the war, holds goods in plentiful 
countries, and with regard to small armies : 



44 



THE R OMAN 



yet still it is more generally true, that the 
war does not furnish provisions upon com- 
mand, or at a fixed time. They must be pro- 
vided both for the present and the future. 
We do not however find, that either the 
Greeks or Romans had the precaution to 
provide magazines of forage, to lay up pro- 
visions, to have a commissary-general of stores, 
or to be followed by a great number of car- 
riages. But then we are to consider, that 
in the wars of the Greeks against each other, 
their troops were little numerous, and accus- 
tomed to a sober life ; that they did not re- 
move far from their own country, and almost 
always returned regularly every winter ; so 
that it is plain, it was not difficult for them to 
have provisions in abundance, especially the 
Athenians, who were masters at sea. The 
same may be said of the Romans. The care 
of subsisting the troops was infinitely less 
weighty with them, than it is at present with 
most of the nations of Europe. Their armies 
were much less numerous, and they had a 
much smaller number of cavalry. A consular 
army consisted of near seventeen thousand 
foot, to which they had not above eighteen 
hundred horse. In our days, to seventeen 
thousand foot, we have often more than six 
thousand horse. What a vast difference must 
this make in the consumption of forage and 
provisions ! Let me add, that the sober 
manner of life in the army, confined to mere 
necessaries, spared them an infinite multitude 
of servants, horses, and baggage, which now 
exhaust our magazines, starve our armies, re- 
tard the execution of enterprises, and often 
render them impracticable. Nor was this the 
manner of living only of the soldiers, but 
likewise of the officers and generals. Not 
only consuls and dictators in the early ages of 
the commonwealth, but even emperors them- 
selves ; Trajan, Adrian, Pescennius, Severus, 
Paobus, Julian, and many others, not only 
lived without luxury, but contented them- 
selves with boiled flour or beans, a piece of 
cheese or hacon, and made it their glory to 
level themselves, in this respect, with the 
meanest of the soldiers. It is easy to con- 
ceive how much this must c&ntribute to di- 
minish the train of an army, to support the 
taste of frugality and simplicity amongst the 
troops, and banish all luxury and idle show 
from the camp. 

IV. But though the care of provisions was 



less burdensome to the ancients, we find that 
both it, and all other accommodations proper 
for the march of an army, were not less at- 
tended to by their generals. Xenophon, who 
was himself a soldier, and whose writings 
abounds with maxims of war, is frequent in 
his reflections upon this article. One of the 
principal instructions he makes Cambyses 
king of Persia give his son Cyrus, who after- 
wards became so glorious, was not to em- 
bark in any expedition, till he had first in- 
formed himself, whether subsistence were 
provided for the troops. In his account of 
the behaviour of the same Cyrus, after his 
arrival in the camp of his uncle Cyaxares, he 
enters into an immense detail, with respect to 
all the necessaries of an army. That prince 
was to march fifteen days, through countries 
that had been destroyed, and in which there 
were neither provisions nor forage. He 
ordered enough of both for twenty days to be 
carried, and that the soldiers, instead of 
loading themselves with baggage, should ex- 
change that burden for an equal one of pro- 
visions, without troubling themselves about 
beds and coverlets for sleeping, the want of 
which their fatigues would supply. They 
were accustomed to drink wine ; and as a 
sudden and total disuse of it might be attend- 
ed with ill consequences, he ordered them to 
carry a certain quantity with them, and to use 
themselves by degrees to do without it, and 
be contented with water. He advised them 
also to carry salt provisions along with them, 
hand-mills for grinding corn, and medicines 
for the sick ; to put into every carriage a 
sickle and a mattock, and upon every beast of 
burden an axe and a scythe ; and to take care 
to provide themselves with a thousand other 
necessaries. He carried also along with him, 
smiths, shoemakers, and other workmen, with 
all manner of tools used in their trades. For 
the rest, he declared publicly that whoever 
would charge himself with the care of send- 
ing provisions to the camp, should be honoured 
and rewarded by himself and his friends ; 
and even supplied with money for that service, 
provided they would give security, and en- 
gage to follow the army. 

V. The reader will here be pleased to ob- 
serve, that as I am now entered upon the 
higher detail of war, I shall not so entirely 
confine myself to the Romany, as not from 
time to time to mention the practices of other 



ART OF WAR. 



45 



nations, where they any way tend to illustrate 
the point in hand. For as the Roman writers 
upon this subject are but few, and have not 
entered very circumstantially into matters, we 
are often at a loss with regard to some of the 
most important parts of their discipline. This 
however we may be certain of, that as they 
excelled particularly in the art of war, and 
readily adopted the improvements of other 
nations, the more we know of the progress 
and attainments of the ancients in this re- 
spect, the better we shall be able to judge of 
the uncommon proficiency of the Romans. 
We have already seen some of their wise 
precautions with regard to the subsistence and 
accommodation of the troops ; for which they 
provided no less by fixed and general regula- 
tions, than Cyrus does in the particular in- 
stance recorded by Xenophon. I shall only 
add, that history abounds with examples of this 
prudent care and foresight in their generals. 
Paulus iEmihus would not set out for Mace- 
donia, till he had fully settled every thing re- 
lating to provisions. Cffisar, in all his wars, 
was extremely attentive to the safety of his con- 
voys, and the keeping up a free communication 
with those countries whence he received his 
supplies. We find that he regularly distributed 
corn to the army, and always took care, before 
the time for a new distribution arrived, to have 
it brought to the camp by means of his allies : 
or if he chanced to be disappointed here, so 
contrived his march, as to pass by some great 
town, where he could readily be furnished 
with whatever he stood in need of. 

VI. But besides the care of provisions, it is 
further incumbent upon a wise general, to ac- 
quaint himself thoroughly with the nature of 
the country through which he is to march. I 
take it for granted that the Romans omitted 
none of the usual and obvious methods for this 
purpose : that they furnished themselves with 
guides ; interrogated the natives ; and, where 
such were to be had, procured exact maps of 
the country, delineating the towns, their num- 
ber and distance, the roads and mountains, the 
rivers, the fords ; and the nature and quaUties 
of them all. But what particularly deserves 
our notice in the Roman policy ; they scarce 
ever entered into a war with any distant state, 
till they had first contracted an alliance with 
some contiguous power, who might unite his 
forces to theirs in the intended invasion. This 
practice was attended with numberless advan- 
5* 



tages. They had hereby timely notice of the 
enemy's designs ; they were made acquainted 
with the number and quality of his forces : and 
when they approached with their army, were 
not only plentifully supplied with all kind of 
military stores, but joined by a considerable 
body of troops perfectly acquainted with the 
country, and able to inform them where they 
might make their impression with greatest 
probability of success. Thus when they in- 
vaded Philip king of Macedonia, they took 
care to secure the friendship of the ^tolians, 
whose troops were of unspeakable service to 
them in that war. In their expedition against 
Antiochus they made use of the same policy, 
having previously contracted amity with seve- 
ral of the petty princes and states of Asia 
Minor. Every one knows what use Csesar 
made of the pretended alliance with the jEdu- 
ans ; and that it was one of the principal en- 
gines by which he completed the reduction of 
Gaul. Indeed nothing can fall out more for- 
tunately for an army, about to invade a coun- 
try to which they are strangers, than to act in 
conjunction with troops contiguous to the ter- 
ritories they attack : because as by this means 
they make war with all the advantage of 
natives, they are not only the better enabled to 
guard against ambuscades and surprises, but 
can in their turn make use of all those strata- 
gems and favourable opportunities of action, 
which the particular nature of the country fur- 
nishes. Whoever therefore considers the 
artful conduct of the Romans in this respect, 
will find himself necessitated to own, that de- 
signs concerted with so much wisdom and 
foresight merited all the success with which 
they were for the most part attended. 

VII. These preliminary cares settled, it is 
now time to put the troops in motion. The 
Romans were very exact in the order of their 
marches. In the morning, at the first sound- 
ing of the trumpet, every one took down his 
tent, and began to make up his baggage ; 
at the second sounding, every one loaded his 
baggage ; and at the third, the legions moved 
out of their quarters, and put themselves in the 
form and order they were that day to march 
in. But none were to take down their tents, 
till the consul and military tribunes had first 
taken down theirs ; whether for the greater 
respect, or because their tents and baggage 
being larger than the rest, it was necessary 
they should be the first at work, that their 



46 



THE ROMAN 



baggage might be in a readiness to march at 
the third sound of the trumpet, as well as that 
of the private soldier. For commanders, who 
give rules to all the rest, ought to be very ex- 
act in observing them themselves ; since, if 
they break their own orders, they encourage 
others to do the like ; example always ope- 
rating more strongly than precept. Hence 
that constant care in the Roman generals, to 
be themselves patterns to the troops, with re- 
gard to all the duties of the service ; nor do we 
meet with any thing in their whole discipline, 
more truly deserving of imitation, or better 
calculated to promote submission and obedi- 
ence in the army. For when soldiers find the 
general keeps strictly to the rules he gives, 
they are the more careful to observe them 
likewise ; concluding, that as he therein 
grants no indulgence to himself, he certainly 
will not do it to others : nay, they implicitly 
believe such orders good and necessary, be- 
cause he that gave them is so punctual an 
observer of them. 

VIII. As to the particular form and dis- 
position of the Roman march, we meet with 
very little on that subject in ancient anthors. 
In the general it appears, that whether they 
marched in a friend's or enemy's country, 
whether they believed the enemy near or far 
off, they proceeded with the same care and 
circumspection : and this certainly was a very 
wise policy. For a general may be mistaken 
in his intelligence or intelligencers ; nay, 
may think those friends, who want but an 
advantageous opportunity of declaring them- 
selves foes : so that all imaginable caution 
ought to be observed, in all times, and in all 
places. To which let me add, that were there 
nothing else as a motive to it, but the keeping 
up exactly the military discipline, yet for that 
reason singly, it ought constantly to be done. 
The method followed most commonly by the 
Romans in their marches seems to have been 
this. They had always some troops of horse 
scouting abroad, in order to discover the 
roads. After them followed the right wing, 
with all its carriages immediately in the rear. 
Then came a legion, with its carriages ; after 
that another ; and so a third, a fourth, &c. in 
order. Last of all came the left wing and its 
baggage, with a party of horse in their rear. 
If, during the march, the army happened to 
be assaulted in the front or in the rear, they 
caused all their carriages to withdraw to the 



right wing cr the left, as they found it con- 
venient, and most agreeable to the nature of 
the place ; and then, when they were cleared 
and disencumbered of their baggage, all of 
them unanimously made head against the 
enemy. If they were assaulted in the flank, 
they drew their carriages on that side where 
they were like to be most safe, and then ad- 
dressed themselves to the fight. 

IX. This, I say, was the most common 
order of their marches : for as to any fixed ' 
and standing rule, none could possibly be 
established ; because the form must vary, ac- 
cording to the country you are in, and the 
enemy you have to do with. Julius Caesar, 
when he marched against the Nervians, so 
long as he thought the enemy at a distance, 
proceeded exactly according to the disposi- 
tion here described. But upon a nearer ap- 
proach, he changed it entirely. For then 
all the cavalry were sent before. After them 
followed six legions, without baggage ; and 
last of all, the carriages, guarded by two new 
raised legions. This was an excellent me- 
thod, as he was sure the enemy could only at- 
tempt him in the van ; but might be of ill con- 
sequence, where the rear of the army was lia- 
ble to be attacked. One thing the Romans 
particularly attended to, and that was, that the 
troops did not straggle or march unequally, 
some too fast, others too slow, which very 
much weakens an army, and exposes it to 
great disorder. Hence their care, in training 
up their men, to inure them to the military 
pace : that is, to the walking over a certain 
stated piece of ground within a fixed and 
limited time. This, as we have already 
observed, amounted to twenty miles in five 
hours, which made the usual day's march of a 
Roman army. To accustom the soldiers to it, 
three times a month, the foot as well as horse 
were obliged to take this march. Upon ex- 
traordinary occasions they were wont to march 
four and twenty miles in the same space of 
time. By an exact calculation of what CsBsar 
relates of a sudden march, which he made at 
the time he besieged Gergovia, we find that 
in four and twenty hours he marched fifty 
miles. This he did with the utmost expedi- 
tion. In reducing it to less than half, it 
makes the usual rate of an extraordinary 
day's march. 

X. It is remarkable with regard to modern 
wars, that they not only impoverish the princes 



ART OF WAR. 



47 



that are overcome, but even the conquerors 
themselves : for as one loses his country, so 
the other loses his money. In ancient times 
the case was otherwise ; it appearing that the 
conqueror always enriched himself by the war. 
The reason of this difference seems to be, that 
in our times no public account is taken of the 
plunder ; or indeed rather, that the barbarous 
custom of pillaging the conquered countries, 
is not now so much practised as formerly. 
Amongst the Komans, all the spoil was de- 
livered in and appropriated to the public, 
which afterwards distributed it as it saw cause. 
To this purpose they had their questors, in 
whose hands all the pillage and taxes were 
deposited, of which the general disposed as 
he thought good, for the payment of his 
soldiers, the curing of the wounded or sick, 
and discharging the other necessities of the 
army. It is true the consul had power to 
give the plunder of a town to his soldiers, and 
he frequently did it ; but that liberty never 
bred any disorder. For when a town was 
taken, or an army defeated, all the spoil was 
brought into a public space, and distributed 
man by man, according to every one's merit. 
This custom made the soldiers more intent 
upon victory than plunder. The practice of 
the Roman legions was, to break and disorder 
an enemy, but not to pursue ; for they never 
went out of their ranks upon any occasion 
whatever. Only the horse, the light armed 
troops, and what other soldiers were not of 
the legions, followed the chase. But had the 
plunder of the field belonged to whoever 
could catch it, it would have been neither 
reasonable nor possible to have kept the le- 
gions to their ranks, or to have exposed them 
to so many dangers. Hence it was, that upon 
a victory, the public was always enriched. 
For when a consul entered in triumph, he 
brought with him great riches into the trea- 
sury of Rome ; consisting of taxes, contribu- 
tions, ransoms, and plunder. The Romans 
had likewise another custom well contrived 
for the preservation of discipline ; and that 
was, to deposit a third part of every soldier's 
pay, with the ensigns of their respective com- 
panies, who never restored it, till the war was 
at an end. This served two very excellent 
purposes ; first every soldier had a stock of 
his own, which without this precaution would 
have been squandered away, as they were 
most of them young and profuse. Secondly, 



knowing their stocks to be in their ensign's 
hands, they were the more careful to defend 
and keep by him, whether in the camp, in the 
field of battle, or upon a march. This cus- 
tom contributed much to their valour, and is 
necessary to be observed by any general, who 
would reduce his soldiers to the discipline of 
the Romans. 

XI. Among the various orders of the Ro- 
man marches, one particularly deserves our 
notice, which is frequently mentioned by 
historians, and which they term forming the 
army itineri et prselio. It was, when the line 
of march was so contrived, as to correspond 
exactly with the line of battle; or, to express 
myself a little more clearly, when the columns 
of horse and foot were disposed in such a 
manner, that, upon the sudden appearance of 
an enemy, they could fall immediately into an 
order proper for fighting. There is not per- 
haps any thing in the science of arms more 
subtle and useful than this, and the Romans 
seem to have made it their particular study. 
I do not at present recollect in any of their 
historians, a minute and circumstantial account 
of a march of this kind, where the disposition 
of the columns is exactly marked, and the 
manner in which they formed in order of 
battle, upon the approach of the enemy. 
What most readily occurs to my memory, is 
the fine march of Hamiicar against Spendius, 
which has been so judiciously explained by 
the Chevalier Folard, in his admirable com- 
ment upon Polybius. As the whole art of 
War furnishes nothing more complete in its 
kind, whether we regard the boldness of the 
attempt, or the well concerted motions by 
which it was accomplished, I am satisfied I 
shall do the reader a particular pleasure, in 
laying a full and distinct account of it before 
him. 

Xn. Upon the conclusion of the first Punic 
war, the Carthaginian mercenaries revolting, 
chose Matho and Spendius for their leaders. 
Hanno was sent against them with an army ; 
but receiving a considerable check, the rebels 
blocked up Carthage on every side, and pos- 
sessed themselves of all the passes leading to 
the peninsula on which it stood. In this exi- 
gence, the Carthaginians had recourse to 
Hamiicar, the father of Hannibal, who had 
given eminent proof of his abilities when he 
commanded their armies in Sicily. Accord- 
ingly he took the field with ten thousand 



48 



THE ROMAN 



men, and seventy elephants ; but was for 
some time at a loss how to meet with the 
enemy upon equal ground. For besides the 
other places of advantage which the merce- 
naries had seized, Hanno had suffered them to 
get possession of the only bridge by which 
the river Bagradas was passable to those who 
were to travel from Carthage into the con- 
tinent. This river had not many fords, and 
the few it had were so well watched, that it 
was not easy for even a single man to get 
over without being seen. As for the bridge 
itself, the enemy guarded it with the utmost 
care, and had built a town close by it, for the 
more commodious lodgings of the troops that 
were appointed to that service. Hamilcar 
having in vain tried all means possible to 
force a passage, at length bethought himself 
of an expedient to gain one by stealth. He 
had observed, that upon blowing of certain 
winds, the mouth of the Bagradas used to be 
choked up with sand and gravel, which 
formed a kind of bar across, and rendered it 
fordable. Remaining therefore in his camp 
between the sea and the mountains, he waited 
the opportunity of these winds ; which no 
sooner arrived, than marching suddenly in the 
night, he passed the stream unperceived, and 
the next morning appeared in the plain, to the 
great astonishment both of the Carthaginians 
and the enemy. 

XIII. Hamilcar by this step put all to the 
hazard- Had he failed in his attempt against 
Spendius, his whole army must inevitably have 
been destroyed ; for a retreat was now become 
impossible. But neither was the danger less 
great to his country by continuing inactive ; 
and therefore he wisely considered, that in 
such an extremity it was better to try some 
way where fortune and his own ability in war 
offered a prospect of success, than by a timor- 
ous diffident conduct expose himself to the 
same ruin, without a single effort to evade it. 
He was now upon the other side the Bagradas. 
The plains were favourable to him, because 
ke had a considerable body of horse. The 
river itself too was of no small advantage, as 
it served to secure his baggage, and cover one 
of his flanks. Spendius was advancing to 
meet him at the head of ten thousand men. 
Besides these he understood that a detach- 
ment of fifteen thousand was marching with 
all diligence from Utica ; and as it was their 



business to come upon his flank and rear, 
rather than to join Spendius, he made no 
doutt of their proceeding accordingly. Upon 
these considerations he regulated his order of 
battle, and the disposition of his march. To 
make head against Spendius, he placed his 
elephants in the first line, and immediately 
behind them his cavalry, intermixed with 
platoons of light armed foot. The heavy- 
armed infantry formed the third line, in order 
to oppose the detachment he expected upon 
his rear, from Utica. By this disposition he 
was enabled to make head on all sides. For 
as he made no doubt but his first line of ele- 
phants, of which Spendius was totally unpro- 
vided, would be sufficient to break the body 
he commanded ; and that the cavalry, aided 
by the light armed foot, falling in immediately, 
would serve to complete the rout : so his third 
line, consisting of the flower of his African 
infantry, he thought himself strong enoagh 
likewise to deal with the rebels from Utica. 

XIV. Each of these lines marched in four 
columns, the columns of cavalry following 
immediately behind the elephants, and those 
of the infantry immediately behind the cavalry. 
The distance between the columns was equal 
to the space they were to occupy in the line 
of battle. By this disposition, upon the first 
appearance of the enemy, the army could form 
in an instant. For the columns being com- 
manded to halt, and wheel at once into their 
place in the line, were in order of battle 
presently. Hamilcar continuing his march, 
perceived, as the enemy approached, that the 
detachment from Utica, instead of coming in; 
upon his rear, had actually joined Spendius, 
and formed a second line of foot behind that 
he commanded. As he had foreseen that 
this might happen, his order of march was con- 
trived to furnish a speedy remedy. It now 
became necessary to change his whole dis- 
position, and oppose a strong front of infantry 
to the enemy, with the elephants at the head 
of all, according to the usual custom. To 
that end the columns were ordered to halt, and 
the elephants forming in front, the cavalry 
meanwhile fell back between intervals of the 
foot, ranging themselves in two divisions be- 
hind the two extremities of the line of infantry, 
which was formed in an instant by the wheel- 
ing of the columns. The rebels deceived by 
this artful motion, and mistaking the retreat 



ART OF WAR. 



49 



of the cavalry for a real flight, advanced 
briskly to the attack, broke through the ele- 
phants, and charged the Carthaginian foot. 
Meanwhile the cavalry, which, as we have 
already observed, had ranged itself in two 
columns behind the two wings of the infantry, 
wheeling to the right and left from the rear, 
appeared all on a sudden in the same line with 
the foot, covering the flanks of the Carthagi- 
nian army, and considerably overwinging the 
enemy. The rebels, astonished at this extra- 
ordinary motion, quickly fell into disorder, 
and at last betook themselves to flight. Ha- 
milcar pursued them with his horse and ele- 
phants ; and following them quite to the town 
and bridge, easily got possession of that im- 
portant pass. 

XV. From this recital it appears, to what 
a degree of perfection the ancients had arrived 
in the science of marches, which is a capital 
article in the grand operations of war. And 
though the instance here given be of an African 
commander, and therefore does not so imme- 
diately regard the Koman people, yet if we 
consider, that these last are allowed to have 
excelled all nations in the knowledge of 
arms, and that they often regulated their 
marches upon this plan, it seems reasonable 
to believe, that had their historians entered 
into particular details of this kind, we should 
have met with many examples of military con- 
duct in their generals, no less surprising than 
that now before us. Indeed, as it frequently 
happens in war, that the enemy, though not 
actually in sight, is yet hourly expected, this 
waj' of ordering an army seems very neces- 
sary ; and the general who excels in it, and is 
at the same time sufiiciently on his guard 
against surprises, will seldom or ever be worst- 
ed. I have often admired, in reading Cae- 
sar's Commentaries, the consummate prudence 
and circumspection of that great man, espe- 
cially in relation to surprises. Though he was 
the ablest general of his time, and commanded 
the finest army that perhaps ever appeared in 
the world, yet he always proceeded with the 
utmost caution, and was extremely careful of 
believing any thing too easily, that was not 
reasonably to be supposed. If a great number 
of the enemy was beaten and pursued by a few 
of his men, if a few of them attacked a greater 
party of his, if they ran unexpectedly, and 
without any visible cause, on these occasions 
he was always very much upon his guard, and 



never fancied his enemy so weak, as not to 
understand his own business. It seems in the 
general a good rule, the weaker and more 
careless an enemy appears to be, the more to 
apprehend and dread him. In cases of this 
kind, an experienced commander will comport 
himself in two diiferent manners. He will 
fear the enemy in his own thoughts, and order 
his affairs accordingly ; but in his words and 
outward behaviour, he will affect to despise 
him. This last way gives courage to the 
soldiers, and makes them confident of victory. 
The other keeps the general upon his guard, 
and renders him less liable to be circumvented ; 
for to march through an enemy's country is 
more dangerous, and requires a greater address 
and foresight than to fight a pitched battle. 

XVI. We proceed now to the second par- 
ticular mentioned on the head of marches, 
namely, the knowledge and choice of posts. 
As this will again fall under our notice in the 
next chapter, concerning encampments, we 
need say the less of it here. It has however 
a strict and necessary connexion with the 
marching of an army. For whether we are to 
retreat or advance, or which way so ever our 
route lies, it often happens, that the safety of 
the army depends upon seizing some advan- 
tageous posts that command the country 
through which we march. The Romans ap- 
plied themselves with particular attention to 
this part of war, and we meet with several 
very early traces of it in their history. Livy 
relates an example of this kind in the person 
of Publius Dccius, who being a military tri- 
bune in the army which the consul Cornelius 
commanded against the Samnites, and finding 
the consul and army falling by accident into a 
vale, where they might have been encompas- 
sed and cut off by the enemy : " Do you see, 
(said he to Cornelius,) that eminence which 
commands the enemy's camp ] There lies our 
hope. It is a post that may serve to extricate 
us out of our present danger, if we are careful 
only to seize it quickly, and avail ourselves of 
the blindness of the Samnites, who have ne- 
glected it." The historian had before in- 
formed us, that Decius observed a hill over the 
enemy's camp, not easily to be ascended by 
those who were completely armed, but to those 
lightly armed, accessible enough. The con- 
sul ordered him to take possession of it with 
three thousand men. He obeyed the order, 
secured the Roman army, and designing to 
H 



50 



THE ROMAN 



march away in the night, and save both him- 
self and his party, addressed himself in these 
words to some of his companions : " Follow 
me, fellow-soldiers, that whilst we have yet 
light, we may explore where the enemy keeps 
his guards, and which way we may make our 
retreat." Accordingly he went out in person 
upon this design, and habited like a soldier, 
that the enemy might not know his rank in the 
arm}', took an exact view of the ground, and 
the situation of their camp. Whoever atten- 
tively considers this relation, will find how 
useful and necessary it is for a commander to 
be acquainted with the nature of coasts and 
countries, and that not only in a general, 
but in an exquisite and more particular way. 
Had not Decius understood those things very 
well, he could not so suddenly have discerned 
the advantage of that hill, and of what im- 
portance it would be to the preservation of 
the Roman army. Neither could he have 
judged, at that distance, whether it was acces- 
sible or not : and when he had possessed him- 
self of it, and was to draw off afterwards, as 
the enemy environed him on every side, he 
could never have found out the best way for 
his retreat, nor have guessed so well where the 
enemy kept his guards. Fabius Maximus is 
another example of a consummate knowledge 
this way. He commanded the Roman army six 
months against Hannibal, and by a series of 
well-concerted motions, and a judicious choice 
of posts, conducted himself so happily, that 
during all that time he never suffered any con- 
siderable disaster, nor could be compelled to 
fight against his will, though the artful Car- 
thaginian left no stratagem untried, to draw 
him to an engagement, or entangle him in an 
ambuscade. But of all the Roman generals, 
none seems to have been a greater master in 
this part of war than Julius Cassar. We meet 
with many instances of it in his Commentaries, 
particularly in that famous campaign in Spain, 
where by a happy choice of posts, and an ex- 
quisite address in improving the advantages 
the nature of the country afforded, he com- 
pelled a veteran army to surrender themselves 
prisoners of war, without striking a blow. 

XVn. The third and last particular we 
mentioned in relation to marches, was the dis- 
position and conduct of a retreat. This is, 
without dispute, the nicest point in the whole 
business of war. For besides all the attentions 
requisite in ordinary marches, you are under the 



disadvantage of being continually pressed by 
an enemy, commonly superior in force, and 
flushed with success. The finest retreat we 
meet with in ancient history, is that of the ten 
thousand Greeks under the conduct of Xeno- 
phon, who has left us a particular account of 
that famous expedition. We there see that 
the hollow square, which was invented pur. 
posely for a retreat, is very incommodious 
when the enemy is directly in your rear. Xeno- 
phon says so in express terms, and that the 
Greeks were obliged to discontinue that order, 
and march in two columns, with a body of re- 
serve of six hundred men, who were not con- 
fined to the space between the columns, so as 
to complete the figure of the square, but formed 
sometimes the van, sometimes the rear, filed 
off by the two flanks where the columns were 
obliged to approach, or posted themselves in 
the interval when they extended to the right 
and left ; in a word, without being tied down 
to any fixed post, ran wherever their assistance 
was wanted. What surprises most in this re- 
treat is, that upon a computation of the way 
made by the troops, which Xenophon regu- 
larly sets down, we find their day's marches 
one with another, to fall but little short of 
twenty-four miles. Our armies seldom advance 
half the way, even when they have no enemy 
upon their hands, nor any of those other dis- 
advantages the Greeks laboured under. We 
find likewise in the Roman history, several ex- 
amples of well-conducted retreats, in which 
their generals have happily extricated them- 
selves out of dangers that seemed to threaten 
their armies with unavoidable destruction. 
Quintus Lutatius having the Cambri upon his 
heels, and being arrived at a river ; that the 
enemy might give him time to pass, pre- 
tended a resolution to fight them, pitched his 
camp, intrenched himself, set up his standard, 
and set out parties of horse to provide forage. 
The Cambri believing he meant to encamp 
there, came and encamped by him, and divided 
themselves into several parties, to go in quest 
of provisions. Lutatius having notice of this, 
seized the opportunity so favourable to his de- 
sign, and throwing bridges over the river, passed 
it before the enemy could have time to disturb 
him. Lucius Minucius a Roman consul was 
in Liguria with an army, and shut up by the 
enemy between two mountains, insomuch that 
he could not disengage himself. Being sen- 
sible of the danger he was in, he sent certain 



ART OF WAR, 



51 



Numidians which he had in his army, upon 
small ill-conditioned horses, towards the places 
where the enemy had their guard. At first 
sight they put themselves into a posture to de- 
fend the passes : but when they observed the 
Numidians in ill order, and ill-mounted in re- 
spect of themselves, they began to despise 
them, and to be more remiss in their guard ; 
which was no sooner perceived by the Numi- 
dians, than clapping spurs to their horses, and 
charging them suddenly, they passed on in 
spite of all opposition, and by the mischief and 
devastation they made every where in the 
country, constrained the enemy to give free 
passage to the whole army. I shall mention 
only one instance more, and that is the retreat 
of Marc Antony, when he was pursued into 
Syria by a great body of Parthian horse. He 
observed that every morning by break of day 
they were upon his back as soon as he moved, 
and continued skirmishing and molesting him 
quite through the march. In order to deceive 
them, and obtain some respite, he resolved 
not to remove before noon ; which the Par- 
thians observing, concluded he could not stir 
that day, and returned to their posts, insomuch 
that he had an opportunity of marching all the 
rest of the day without interruption. But this 
was only a temporary expedient, calculated 
for present relief; and therefore to screen 
himself from the arrows of the Parthians, with 
which the army was greatly incommoded, he 
made use of the following device, practised 
often by the Romans on other occasions. He 
ordered the soldiers, when the enemy came 
near them, to cast themselves into the figure 
of the testvdo, so that their targets should close 
altogether above their heads, and defend them 
from the missive weapons discharged at them. 
In this case the first rank stood upright on 
their feet, and the rest stooped lower and low- 
er by degrees, till the last rank kneeled down 
upon their knees ; so that every rank covering 
with their targets the heads of all in the rank 
before them, they represented a tortoise-shell, 
or a sort of pent-house. By this contrivance 
he made good his retreat, and arrived in Syria, 
without considerable loss. 

XVIII. Before I conclude this chapter, it 
will naturally be expected I should explain 
what was the practice and discipline of the 
Romans, when they had finished the day's 
march, and were arrived near the place of en- 
campment. In this case the military tribunes 



and centurions appointed for that service ad- 
vanced before all the rest diligently to view 
and consider the situation of the place. When 
they had chosen the ground, they began by 
marking the general's quarter with a white flag 
or streamer, and distinctly set out its bounda- 
ries. Then the quarters of the several tri- 
bunes were appointed, and afterwards those 
of the legions, all with distinct flags of several 
colours. Every legion, as well of the allies 
as of the Romans, had their portion of ground 
assigned and marked out, for drawing the line 
round the camp, which was set about immedi- 
ately, part of the troops continuing meanwhile 
under arms, to defend those that were at work 
upon the intrenchment, in case of any sudden 
surprise. All this was finished in a very short 
space, the Romans being remarkably expert 
in it by constant practice ; for they never al- 
tered the figure of their camp, nor omitted to 
fortify it in all the forms, though but for one 
night's continuance. But this naturally leads 
me to the subject of the next chapter. 



CHAP. VI, 



OF ENCAJVIPMENTS. 



I. One of the most necessary and beneficial 
parts of the military art is, to know how to en- 
camp well, and to practise it constantly. No 
wonder therefore that the Romans, among 
whom military discipline was carried to such 
a degree of perfection, and who exacted the 
most rigorous submission to all the laws and 
rules of it, were particularly attentive to this 
article. And indeed the armies of that people, 
though still in the territory of Rome, and 
though they had only one night to pass in a 
place, encamped nevertheless in all the forms, 
with no other diflTerence than that the camp 
was less fortified there, perhaps, than in the 
enemy's country. It was always of a square 
form, contrary to the custom of the Greeks, 
who made theirs round. The ditch and ram- 
part, which consisted of four equal sides, was 
equally distributed to be raised by the two Ro- 
man legions, and the two legions of the allies 
who perfected it without intermission. If the 
enemy were near, part of the troops continued 
under arms, whilst the rest were employed in 
throwing up the intrcnchments. They began 
by digging trenches of greater or less depth, 



52 



THE ROMAN 



according to the occasion. They were at least 
eight feet broad by six deep : but we often find 
them twelve feet in breadth, sometimes more, 
to fifteen or twenty. Of the earth dug out of 
the trenches, and thrown up on the side of 
the camp, they formed the rampart, and to 
make it the firmer, mingled it with turf cut in 
a certain size and form. Sometimes they drove 
double rows of stakes into the earth, leaving 
so much of the length above ground, as the 
height of the work was to be of; and then in- 
terweaving them with twigs, in the manner of 
basket-work, filled the space between with the 
earth rising out of the ditch. This was an ex- 
peditious and safe way of forming the line, and 
appears to have been always practised, when 
they encamped in places where these mate- 
rials were to be found. Upon the brow of 
the rampart the palisades were planted. Po- 
lybius, speaking of the order given by Q. Fla- 
minius to his troops, to cut stakes against there 
should be occasion for them, offers several 
very curious remarks upon this subject ; and 
as that judicious historian, who was himself 
an expert warrior, seems to lay great stress 
upon the conduct of the Romans in this point, 
I shall beg leave to lay some of his observations 
before the reader. 

II. This custom, says Polybius, which is 
easy to put in practice amongst the Romans, 
passes for impossible with the Greeks. They 
can hardly support their own weight upon 
their marches, whilst the Romans, notwith- 
standing the buckler which hangs at their 
shoulders, and the javelins, which they carry 
in their hands, load themselves also with stakes 
or palisades, which are very different from 
those of the Greeks. With the latter those 
are best, which have many strong branches 
about the trunk. The Romans, on the con- 
trary, leave but three or four at most upon it, 
and that only on one side. In this manner a man 
can carry two or three bound together, and 
much more use may be made of them. Those 
of the Greeks are more easily pulled up. If 
the stake be fixed by itself; as its branches are 
strong, and in great number, two or three 
soldiers will easily pull it away, and thereby 
make an opening for the enemy, without 
reckoning that the neighbouring stakes will be 
loosened, because their branches are too short 
to be interwoven with each other. But this is 
not the case with the Romans. The branches 
of their palisades are so strongly inserted into 



each other, that it is hard to distinguish the 
stake they belong to : and it is as little practi- 
cable to thrust the hand through these branches 
to pull up the palisades ; because, being well 
fastened and twisted together, they leave no 
opening, and are carefully sharpened at their 
ends. Even though they could be taken hold 
of, it would not be easy to pull them out of 
the ground, and that for two reasons. The 
first is, because they are driven in so deep, 
that they cannot be moved : and the second, be- 
cause their branches are interwoven with each 
other in such a manner, that one cannot be 
stirred without several more. Two or three 
men might unite their strength in vain to draw 
one of them out, which however if they ef- 
fected, by drawing a great while to and fro 
until it was loose, the opening it would leave 
would be almost imperceptible. These stakes 
therefore have three advantages. They are 
every where to be had ; they are easy to carry ; 
and are a secure barrier to a camp, because 
very difficult to break through. In my opi- 
nion, adds the historian, there is nothing prac- 
tised by the Romans in war, more worthy of 
being imitated. 

III. The form and distribution of the seve- 
ral parts of the Roman camp, admits of great 
difficulties, and has occasioned many disputes 
amongst the learned. The following descrip- 
tion is taken chiefly from Polybius, who of all 
the ancients is the most full and explicit upon 
this article. He speaks of a consular army, 
which in his time consisted of two Roman le- 
gions, and two legions of the allies. A Roman 
legion contained four thousand two hundred 
foot, and three hundred horse. A legion of 
the allies was equal to the number of infantry, 
and generally double in cavalry. Altogether 
therefore, Romans, and allies, they made 
eighteen thousand six hundred men. After 
the place for the camp was marked out, which 
was always chosen for its convenience in re- 
spect to water and forage, a part of it was al- 
lotted for the general's tent, called otherwise 
the prxtorhim, because the ancient Latins 
styled all their commanders prxtores. The 
ground pitched upon for this purpose was 
generally higher than the rest of the camp, that 
he might with the greater ease see all that 
passed, and despatch the necessary orders. A 
flag was planted upon it, and round that a 
square space marked out in such a manner, 
that the four sides were a hundred feet distant 



ART OF WAR. 



53 



from the flag, and the ground occupied by the 
consul about four acres. Near tliis tent were 
erected the altar, on which the sacrifices were 
ofiered, and the tribunal for dispensing jus- 
tice. The two Roman legions had each six 
tribunes, which made twelve in all. Their 
tents were placed in a right line parallel 
to the front of the prietorium, at the dis- 
tance of fifty feet. In the space of fifty feet 
were the horses, beasts of burden, and the 
whole equipage of the tribunes. Their tents 
were pitched in such a manner, that they 
had the praetorium in the rear, and in the 
front all the rest of the camp. The tents of the 
tribunes, at equal distance from each other, 
took up the whole breadth of the ground upon 
which the two Roman legions were encamped. 
IV. Between the tents of the legions and 
tribunes, a space of a hundred feet in breadth 
was left, which formed a large street, called 
prill ctpia, that ran across the whole camp, and 
divided it into two parts, the upper and lower. 
Beyond this street, were placed the tents of 
the legions. The space which they occupied 
was divided in the midst, into two equal parts, 
by a street of fifty feet broad, which extended 
the whole length of the camp. On each side 
of this street, in so many several lines, were 
the quarters of the Jiorse, the triarii, the pri7i- 
cipes, and the hastati. The veUtes had no 
distinct quarters, but were variously mingled 
with the rest of the foot, four hundred and 
eighty of them being joined to the liastati, a 
like number to the principes, and two hundred 
and forty to the Uiarii. To form a distinct 
idea of the Roman camp, we must call to mind 
that the cavalry of each legion was divided 
into ten troops, thirty men to a troop ; and that 
the triarii, principes, and hastati, were like- 
wise severally divided into ten maniples, of a 
hundred and twenty men each, except those 
of the triarii, which consisted only of half that 
number. In conformity to this distribution, 
the lines on which these several bodies en- 
camped, were each divided into ten squares, 
extending length-wise from the tents of the 
tribunes. These squares were a hundred 
feet every way, except in the lines of the 
triarii, where, because of the smaller number 
of troops, they were only fifty feet broad by a 
hundred long, and may therefore more properly 
be termed half squares. Across the middle 
of these lodgments, between the fifth and sixth 
squares, ran a street of fifty feet broad, cutting 
6 



the line at right angles, and extending from 
one side of the camp to the other. It was 
called qiiintana, because it opened beyond the 
fifth maniple. 

V. The order and disposition of the seve- 
ral lines was as follows. On each side of the 
middle street, that ran according to the length 
of the camp, the cavalry of the two legions 
were quartered facing each other, and sepa- 
rated by the whole breadth of the street. As 
there were ten squares on each side, and every 
square lodged thirty horse, the twenty together 
contained just six hundred, which made the 
entire cavalry of two legions. Adjoining to 
the cavalry the triarii were quartered, a mani- 
ple behind a troop of horse, both in the same 
form. They joined as to the ground, but faced 
differently, the triarii turning their backs 
upon the horse. And here, as we have al- 
ready observed, because the triarii were less 
in number than the other troops, the ground 
assigned to each maniple was only half as 
broad as long. Fronting the triarii on each 
side, was a street of fifty feet broad, running 
parallel to that between the quarters of the 
horse. On the opposite side of the street was 
the line of the lodgments belonging to the 
principes. Behind the principes the hastati 
were quartered, joining as to the ground, but 
fronting the other way. 

VI. Thus far we have described the quarters 
of the two Roman legions. It remains that we 
dispose of the allies. Their infantry equalled 
that of the Romans, and their cavalry was 
twice the number. In removing for the 
extraordinarii a fifth part of the foot, or six- 
teen hundred and eighty men, and a third of 
the horse, or four hundred men, there remain- 
ed in the whole seven thousand five hundred 
and twenty men, horse and foot, to quarter. 
These were disposed upon the two wings of 
the legions, being separated from the hastati 
on each side, by a street of fifty feet. The 
cavalry were directly opposite to the hastati 
upon a breadth of a hundred and thirty-three 
feet, and something more. Behind them, and 
on the same line, the infantry were encamped 
upon a breadth of two hundred feet. The 
prmfecti were lodged at the sides of the tri- 
bunes, over against their respective wings. At 
the head of every troop and maniple, were the 
tents of the captains of horse and centurions. 
On the right side of the prsetorium stood the 
qusestorium, assigned to the qusestor, or trea- 



54 



THE ROMAN 



surer of the army, and hard by the forum. 
This last served not only for the sale of com- 
modities, but also for the meeting of councils 
and giving audience to ambassadors. On the 
other side of the praetorium were lodged the 
legati, or lieutenant-generals. On the right 
and left, still in the same line with the prse- 
torium, and directly behind the prsefects of the 
allies, were the quarters of the extraordinary 
cavalry, evocatorum, and of the other volun- 
teer Roman horse, selectorum. All this cav- 
alry faced on one side towards the forum and 
place of the quasstor, and on the other towards 
the lodgments of the legati. They not only 
encamped near the consul's person, but com- 
monly attended him upon marches, that they 
might be at hand to execute his orders. The 
extraordinary and volunteer Roman foot ad- 
joined to the horse last spoken of, forming the 
extremities of the line towards the two sides 
of the camp. Above this line was a street 
of a hundred feet broad, extending the whole 
breadth of the camp, and beyond that the 
quarters of the extraordinary horse of the 
allies, facing the prEetorium, treasury, and the 
tents of the legati. The extraordinary foot 
of the allies were directly behind their horse, 
fronting the intrenchment and upper extremity 
of the camp. The void spaces that remained 
on both sides were allotted to strangers and 
allies, who came later than the rest. 

VII. Between the ramparts and the tents, 
there was an open place or street of two hun- 
dred feet in breadth, which was continued 
all along the four equal sides of the camp. 
T^ This interval was of very great use, either for 
the entrance or departure of the legions. For 
each body of troops advanced into that space 
by the street before it, so that marching thither 
different ways, they were in no danger of 
crowding and breaking each other's ranks. 
Besides which, the cattle, and whatever was 
taken from the enemy was placed there, where 
a guard was kept during the night. Another 
considerable advantage of it was, that in the at- 
tacks by night, neither fire nor dart could do 
any great execution in the camp ; the soldiers 
being at so great a distance, and under cover 
of their tents. But the principal intention of 
it seems to have been, for the drawing up of 
the troops who were to defend the line, and to 
leave sufficient room for the cavalry to scour 
it. My Lord Orrery, however, is of opinion, 
that it was rather too narrow to answer both 
these services. If it was only designed for the 



foot, they lost the benefit of their horse, which 
experience teaches us to be of singular use 
on such occasions. For whatever foot storm 
a line, must enter it in great confusion and 
disorder, and can very hardly indeed resist 
small squadrons of horse, who are ready to re- 
ceive them, and charge them all along the in- 
side of the line. For these reasons he consi- 
ders the narrowness of this space as a defect 
in the Roman method of encamping, and , 
thinks that a breadth of three hundred feet at 
least ought to have been allowed for the de- 
fence and scouring of the line. It is probable 
the Romans would have done so, had they 
not found the other sufficient ; and we have 
this to say in their favour, that though their 
camps were frequently attacked, we meet with 
but few instances in history of their being 
forced. 

VIII. The gates were only four in num- 
ber, one to each side. Livy says so in ex- 
press terms. " Ad quator portas exercitum 
instruxit, ut, signo dato, ex omnibus portubus 
eruptionem facerent." " He drew up his 
men facing the four gates, that upon a signal 
given, the army might sally from all the 
several gates at once." These are afterwards 
called by the same author, the extraordinary, 
the right principal, the left principal, and the 
queestorian. They have also other names, 
about which it is not a little difficult to re- 
concile authors. It is believed that the ex- 
traordinary gate was so called, because near 
the place where the extraordinary troops en- 
camped ; and that it was the same as the 
prsetorian, which took its name from its 
nearness to the prsetorium. The gate oppo- 
site to this, at the other extremity of the 
camp, was called Porta Decumana, because 
near the ten maniples of each legion ; and 
without doubt is the same with the quasstorian, 
mentioned by Livy in the place above cited. 
As to the right and left principals, they had 
their name from being on the right and left 
of the camp, fronting the street called prin- 
cipia. I shall conclude this description of 
the Roman camp with observing, that when 
a consular army consisted of more than four 
legions, they were lodged still in the same 
order, only the figure of the camp was a long 
square in proportion to the additional forces 
which were to be contained in it. When both 
the consular armies were united, they took 
up the ground of two such perfect squares. 

IX. A wonderful order was observed night 



ART OF WAR. 



55 



and day throughout the camp, in respect to 
the watchword, sentinels and guards ; and it 
was in this its security and quiet consisted. 
To render the guard more regular and less 
fatiguing, the night was divided into four 
parts or watches, and the day into four 
stations. There seems to have been assigned 
one company of foot, and one troop of horse 
to each of the four gates every day. The 
Roman discipline was extremely strict in this 
particular, punishing with an exemplary se- 
verity such as deserted their post, or aban- 
doned their corps of guard. Polybius takes 
notice of the excellent effects of this disci- 
pline, upon occasion of the siege of Agri- 
gentum in Sicily, during the first Punic war. 
The Roman guards had dispersed themselves 
a little too far in quest of forage. The Car- 
thaginians laying hold of the opportunity, 
made a vigorous sally from the town, and 
had well nigh forced the camp ; when the 
soldiers, sensible of the extreme penalty they 
had incurred by neglecting their duty, re- 
solved to repair the fault by some remarka- 
ble behaviour; and accordingly rallying to- 
gether, they not only sustained the shock of 
the enemy, to whom they were far inferior 
in number, but in the end made so great a 
slaughter among them, as compelled them to 
retreat into the town, though they were upon 
the very point of carrying the Roman lines. 
The night guards were four out of every 
manipulus, who continued on duty three 
hours, and were then relieved by those next 
in turn. To keep the soldiers alert they had 
the circnitio vigiluin, or patrols, performed 
commonly four times in the night by some of 
the horse. Upon extraordinary occasions, 
the tribunes and lieutenant-generals, and 
sometimes the general himself, made these 
circuits in person, and took a strict view of 
the watch in every part of the camp. 

X. What we have hitherto said, regards 
only the plan, disposition, and well ordering 
of the Roman camp. But there are many 
other particulars to be taken into considera- 
tion, in encamping an army to advantage : 
the choice of the ground ; the convenience of 
provision and forage ; the security of convoys ; 
and the precautions needful to prevent sur- 
prise, or the being taken at a disadvantage. 
We cannot however here enter into a particu- 
lar detail of the Roman practice, with relation 
to these several articles ; because not being 



subject to any fixed and invariable rules, they 
depend in a manner entirely upon the pru- 
dence and discretion of the general, who must 
therein be guided by the nature of the coun- 
try, the posture of the enemy, and his own 
strength. Two things in particular they were 
more than ordinarily attentive to ; health, and 
safety. The first they endeavoured to secure, 
by avoiding all morasses and fenny places, or 
where the wind was cold and unwholesome ; 
which unwholesomeness they did not so much 
compute from the situation of the place as 
from the appearance and complexion of the 
inhabitants. Exercise contributes greatly to 
health, and therefore the Romans took care 
to keep their troops always employed, either 
in casting up new works round the camp, or 
in hunting after provision and forage, or in 
performing those several exercises, that tend 
to render the bodj' robust and active. It is 
observed in our days, that the immoderate 
labour soldiers are obliged to undergo, de- 
stroys our armies : and yet it was by incredible 
labour that the Romans preserved themselves. 
The reason of the difference I take to be this : 
their fatigues were continual and without re- 
spite : whereas our men were perpetually shift- 
ing from the extremes of labour to the extremes 
of idleness, than which nothing can be more 
destructive. Who could believe, that there 
was nothing, even to cleanliness„of which par- 
ticular care was not taken in the Roman camp. 
As the great street situated in the front of the 
prffitorium was much frequented by the officers 
and soldiers, who passed through it to receive 
and carry orders, and upon their other occa- 
sions ; a number of men were appointed to 
sweep and clean it every day in winter, and 
to water it in summer to prevent the dust. 

XI. But besides health, safety was like- 
wise another important consideration with the 
Romans. To this end, in choosing a place of 
encampment, they always had a particular eye 
for the convenience of water, provisions, and 
forage. We see evidently in Cajsar's Com- 
mentaries, that there was nothing about which 
he was more solicitous, than the contriving 
his marches in such manner, as to have his 
camp seated near some navigable river, and a 
country behind him, whence he could be 
easily, and at a reasonable rate, supplied with 
every thing necessary for the subsistence of 
his army. Other inconveniences may find a 
remedy in time, but hunger, the longer it lasts 



56 



THE ROMAN 



the more infallibly it destroys. And hence it 
was, that where the above-mentioned advan- 
tages could not be obtained, the Romans 
made it their first care, after fortifying their 
camp, to lay in such a quantity of all neces- 
sary stores, as might be sufficient for the time 
of their continuance in it. Nor were they 
less attentive to the strength of their camp, and 
the precautions necessary for its defence. 
This is a part of the art of'^var in which they 
incontestably excelled all nations. Constant 
practice made them expert in it ; for they never 
quartered their troops in towns and open 
villages, but always in standing camps, which 
were carefully intrenched and fortified, in pro- 
portion to the danger to which they fancied 
themselves exposed. And here we may ob- 
serve, that whereas the Greeks chose always 
to encamp where there was some river, or 
wood, or bank, or other natural rampart to 
defend them ; the Romans, on the contrary, 
stood not so much on the strength of situation, 
as on their own ways of fortifying. Hence 
the Grecian camps were often without in- 
trenchments, and varied in their form, accord- 
ing to the nature of the place : but among 
the Romans one constant method was invio- 
lably observed, nor would they ever lodge in a 
camp, that was not surrounded with a ditch 
and a rampart. 

XII. The practice of intrenched and forti- 
fied camps was attended with many solid and 
desirable advantages. The army was hereby 
kept safe, and freed from the danger of having 
any of its quarters beat up, by surprise or a 
sudden attack. It was eased of the trouble 
of keeping many and great guards, since a 
few serves the turn of all, when all are at 
hand in case of an attempt. It could never 
be compelled to fight against its will, than 
which no greater misfortune can befall an 
army. In fine, as the success of arms is 
uncertain, it had always a secure retreat in 
case of the worst. These things considered, 
it will not appear wonderful, that the Romans 
were so strict in this article, and considered 
the custom of fortifying camps regularly, as 
one of the most essential parts of military dis- 
cipline. In the war with the Gauls, the com- 
manders of the Roman army were reproached 
with having omitted this wise precaution, and 
the loss of the battle of AUia was in part 
attributed to it. Hence it was, that to avoid 
the like misfortune for the time to come, it 



became in a manner an established law 
amongst them, never to hazard a battle until 
they had finished their camp. Paulus ^mi- 
lius, in the second Macedonian war, suspended 
and arrested the ardour of his whole army to 
attack Perseus, for no other reason, but be- 
cause they had not formed their camp. The 
fortified camp, in case of a disaster, put a stop 
to the enemy's victory, received the troops 
that retired in safety, enabled them to renew 
the battle with more success, and prevented 
their being entirely routed ; whereas without 
the refuge of a camp, an army, though com- 
posed of good troops, was exposed to a final 
defeat, and to being inevitably cut in pieces. 
I may add to all these advantages that an 
intrenched camp, by reason of the open air, 
the healthiness of its situation, which always 
must be minded, and the cleanliness which 
may and ought to be kept in it, is exceedingly 
less subject to infection and sickness, than 
villages and strong towns; insomuch that 
some great captains have concluded, an army 
would be likelier preserved, and kept sound 
and untainted three months in a well seated 
and regulated camp, than three weeks in the 
ordinary villages and country towns, 

XIII. I have the longer and more parti- 
cularly insisted on the practice of intrenched 
camps, because it appears evident from his- 
tory, that the Romans owed as many of their 
victories to their ability in this part of war, as 
to their other excellent military discipline and 
valour. It would be almost endless to enu- 
merate, what kingdoms and provinces they 
kept in obedience by their standing camps ; 
and how often they warded off dangers, and 
brought their wars to a fortunate issue by the 
same proceeding. For having first wearied 
out their enemies by safe and tteneficial de- 
lays, they would, on some great advantage, 
give them battle and defeat them ; which 
artful method of making war they neither 
could have effected, nor rationally attempted, 
but by their thoroughly knowing how to en- 
camp advantageously, by constantly practising 
it, and by a timely providing of food and 
forage. Vegetius observes, that one of the 
principal causes of the ruin of the Roman em- 
pire was, that they had lost the art of fortify- 
ing their camp : by which negligence they 
were easily overwhelmed by the barbarian 
horse. And indeed when, under the empe- 
rors, they had ascertained the limits of their 



ART OF WAR. 



57 



dominion, resolving to extend their conquest 
no farther, but to rest satisfied with maintain- 
ing the possession of what they had acquired : 
it is well known, that they effectually accom- 
plished this design by means of the standing 
camps, which they kept upon the Euphrates, 
the Danube, and the Rhine. And so long as 
this method was followed, the bordering na- 
tions found it impossible to break through 
the Roman barriers, or hurt the tranquillity of 
their empire. But when, in process of time 
the military discipline began to decline, and 
the art of encamping, in particular, was lost, 
or grew into disuse ; the Romans, by aban- 
doning the banks of these several rivers, 
opened a free passage to the barbarians, who, 
meeting now with no resistance, poured in 
upon them like a torrent, and easily over- 
whelmed a feeble race of men, whom luxury, 
and an undisturbed peace of many ages, had 
rendered utterly unfit for war. 

XIV. And here, as it falls so naturally in 
my way, and has a strict connexion with my 
subject, I cannot forbear observing, that in the 
last age, the French, who had many excellent 
commanders, if not the most in any one nation, 
and to whom the art ofivar owes much of its 
present improvement, began to revive, and 
with great benefit to themselves, this almost 
obsolete part of it. For when the Prince of 
Orange, the Imperialists under the Count de 
Souches, and the Flemish forces were united ; 
the Prince of Conde, one of the greatest cap- 
tains that any age has produced, being sent to 
oppose them, would not give them battle, 
but encamped himself advantageously on the 
French frontiers, so that they were justly afraid 
to enter them, and leave him at their backs. 
By this management he kept them long at bay, 
and when he found his opportunity, gave them, 
at Seneff, so considerable a blow, that the 
French, from having been on the defensive, 
became afterwards the assaulters, and closed 
that campaign with taking some of the enemy's 
towns. The Marshal de Turenne also, who 
was sent general to the war in Germany, and 
who in the military art had hardly a superior, 
having there to do with Count de Montecu- 
culi, one of the greatest captains of his time, 
would still, by intrenched camps, when the 
Germans were the strongest, preserve himself 
and army, spin out the war, and cover those 
territories and places he had won while he 
himself had been the most powerful. 



XV. And here it is particularly worthy of 
notice, that when, upon the Marshal de Tu 
renne's death, the French king sent the Prince 
of Conde to command in his stead, he also, 
by intrenched encampments, weathered that 
storm ; which in itself was so threatening, not 
only by the sudden loss of so great a captain, 
but also b}' the Germans being led by the 
Count de Montecuculi, and the Duke of Lor- 
raine, two persons as considerable as the very 
forces they headed. I say, it particularly de- 
serves our observation, that two such justly 
celebrated commanders as the Prince of Con- 
de and Monsieur Turenne, should observe 
the very same methods in managing the same 
war ; whereas, usually, when one general suc- 
ceeds another, in heading the same army, and 
ordering the same war ; the last comer judges 
it a kind of diminution to his own skill, to 
tread in the very paths of his predecessor. 
But as the Prince of Conde observed a quite 
different conduct on this occasion, we may 
thence naturally gather the three following 
particulars. Fiist, that he judged himself 
so justly secure in his own reputation, that it 
could receive no diminution by his following 
the steps of the dead general, more especially 
as he had done the like before, and success- 
fully, in Flanders. Secondly, that a wise and 
great captain will rather, by imitating his pre- 
decessor, confirm that course to be the best 
which he knows to be so in itself, than try 
new methods of war, whereby out of a mere 
hope to do the like thing by a different way, 
he may hazard his reputation, his army, and 
the country he is to cover and protect. 
Thirdly, what two such generals have prac- 
tised, all circumstances considered, amounts to 
little less than a demonstration, that by camps 
intrenched and well posted, a country may bo 
best secured, an invading enemy best resisted, 
and in time, all advantages being judiciously 
taken, defeated, or made to retire. 

XVI. These examples, ancient and modern, 
sufiiciently evince the benefit of this practice, 
and with what judgment the Romans made it 
an essential part of their military discipline. I 
shall only add, as an indisputable argument 
in its favour, that the great Caesar himself has 
given his sanction to it, by constantly following 
it in his wars with the Gauls. He had to do 
with a brave and warlike nation, passionately 
fond of liberty, and therefore extremely averse 
to the Roman yoke. To keep them in awe, 

I 



58 



THE ROMAN 



he established standing camps in different 
parts of the country, where the soldiers were 
quartered in large bodies, and surrounded 
with strong intrenchments. This he thought 
the likeliest method to prevent insurrections, 
or suppress them speedily when they should 
happen, as the troops would be always in 
readiness to march, and in condition to act. 
It was likewise the best security against 
treachery and surprise. Accordingly we find, 
that all the efforts of the Gauls to recover 
their liberty were without effect, the Roman 
camps standing as so many bulwarks, against 
which, though they made frequent attacks, 
they were yet never able to prevail. 



CHAP. VII. 

OP BATTLES. 

I. Having raised our troops, armed and 
disciplined them, put them upon the march, 
and lodged them in a camp, it is now time to 
draw them out into the field, that we may see 
how they acquitted themselves on a day of bat- 
tle. It is in this view military merit appears 
in all its extent. To know whether a gene- 
ral were worthy of that name, the Romans 
examined the conduct he observed on this 
critical occasion. They did not expect suc- 
cess from the number of troops, which is often 
a disadvantage, but from his prudence and 
valour, the cause and assurance of victory. 
They considered him as the soul of his army, 
that directs all its motions, whose dictates 
every thing obeys, and upon whose good or 
bad conduct the issue of the battle depends. 
The first consideration, and that which de- 
mands the greatest force of judgment, is, to ex- 
amine whether it be proper or not to come to 
an engagement, and to balance exactly the ad- 
vantages with the disadvantages. The blind 
temerity of Varro, notwithstanding his col- 
league's remonstrances, and the advice of Fa- 
bius, drew upon the republic the unfortunate 
battle of Cannse ; whereas a delay of a few 
weeks would probably have ruined Hannibal 
for ever. Perseus, on the contrary, let slip the 
occasion of fighting the Romans, in not taking 
the advantage of the ardour of his army, and at- 
tacking them instantly after the defeat of their 
horse, which had thrown their troops into dis- 
order and consternation. Csesar had been lost 
after the battle of Dyrrhachium, if Pompey had 



known how to improve his advantage. Great 
enterprises have their decisive moments. The 
important point lies, in wisely resolving what 
to choose, and in seizing the present occasion 
which never returns when once neglected. 

II. But not to insist any longer upon this, 
which rests entirely in the breast of the gene- 
ral ; we shall suppose the resolution to fight 
taken, and proceed to examine what precau- 
tions the Romans made use of, in order to se- 
cure the victory. These may in general be 
reduced to two. Fii^st, the inspiring their 
troops with courage and confidence. Secondly, 
the ranging them judiciously in order of battle. 
To inspire their troops with confidence, they 
began by consulting the gods, and endeavour- 
ing to incline them in their favour. They 
consulted them either by the fiight or singing 
of birds, by the inspection of the entrails of 
the victims, by the manner in which the sa- 
cred chickens pecked their corn, and by things 
of the like nature. They laboured to render 
them propitious by sacrifices, vows, and pray- 
ers. Many of the generals, especially in the 
earlier times, discharged these duties with 
great solemnity and sentiments of religion ; 
and would never hazard an engagement, until 
by some favourable omens they had brought 
the troops to believe that the gods were on 
their side. Paulus ^milius, before he gave 
Perseus battle, sacrificed twenty oxen succes- 
sively to Hercules, without finding any fa- 
vourable sign in all those victims. It was not 
until the one-and-twentieth, that he believed 
he saw something which promised him the 
victory. This attention to rehgion was highly 
necessary among a people strongly addicted 
to superstition, and over whom the omens of 
which we speak, however trifling in themselves, 
had yet a powerful influence. Hence the 
generals who neglected this precaution, had 
often but too just cause to repent of their fol- 
ly : as it tended greatly to dispirit the troops, 
and begot an ill opinion of their conduct ; in- 
somuch that we seldom find them successful 
in their undertakings. The wisest and best 
commanders chose always to comply with the 
prejudices of the vulgar ; and even where they 
despised these ceremonies in their hearts, affect- 
ed yet a greater veneration for them in public. 

III. After having paid these duties to the 
gods, they applied themselves to men, and the 
general exhorted his soldiers. It seems to 
have been an established custom with all na- 



ART OF WAR. 



59 



tions among the ancients, to harangue their 
troops before a battle ; nor can we deny that 
the custom was very reasonable in itself, and 
might contribute greatly to the victory. When 
an army is upon the point of engaging an en- 
emy, what can be more proper, than to oppose 
the fear of a seemingly approaching death with 
the most powerful reasons, and such as, if 
not capable of totally extinguishing it, may 
yet in some measure allay and overcome it. 
Such reasons are the love of our country, the 
obligation to defend it at the price of our 
blood, the remembrance of past victories, the 
necessity of supporting the glory of our nation, 
the injustice of a violent and cruel enemy, the 
dangers to which the fathers, mothers, wives, 
arid children of the soldiers are exposed ; these 
motives, I say, and many of the like nature, 
represented from the mouth of a general, be- 
loved and respected by his troops, may make a 
very strong impression upon their minds. Not, 
as Cyrus, in Xenophon, observes, that such 
discourses can in an instant change the dis- 
position of the soldiers, and from timorous and 
abject as they might be, make them imme- 
diately bold and intrepid : but they awaken, 
they rouse the courage- nature had before given 
them, and add a new force and vivacity to it. 
To judge rightly of this custom of haranguing 
the troops, as constantly practised among the 
Romans, we must go back to the ages wherein 
they lived, and consider their manners with 
particular attention. Their armies were com- 
posed of the same citizens, to whom in the 
city, and in time of peace, it was customary to 
communicate all the affairs of the state. The 
general did no more in the camp, or in the 
field of battle, than he would have been obliged 
to do in the rostrum or tribunal of harangues. 
He did his troops honour, and attracted their 
confidence and affection in imparting to them 
his designs, motives and measures. Add to 
this, that the sight of the generals, officers, 
and soldiers assembled, communicated a re- 
ciprocal courage and ardour to them all. 
Ever)' one piqued himself at that time upon 
the goodness of his aspect and appearance, 
and obliged his neighbour to do the same. 
The fear of some was abated or entirely ban- 
ished by the valour of others. The disposition 
of particular persons became that of the whole 
body, and gave affairs their aspect. 

IV. Let me observe here, that there were 
many occasions, besides hattlps, when it was 



necessary to excite the good will and zeal of 
the soldier ; if, for instance, a difficult and 
hasty march was to be made, to extricate the 
army out of a dangerous situation, or obtain 
one more commodious ; if courage, patience, 
and constancy were required for supporting 
famine, and other distresses, painful to nature : 
if some difficult, dangerous, but very important 
enterprise was to be undertaken ; if it was 
necessary to console, encourage, and re-ani- 
mate the troops after a defeat ; if a hazardous 
retreat was to be made in view of the enemy, 
in a country he was master of: in fine, if only 
a generous effort was wanting to terminate a 
war, or some important undertaking. Upon 
these and the like occasions, the generals never 
failed to speak in public to the army, in order 
to sound their dispositions by their acclamations 
more or less strong ; to inform them of their 
reasons for such and such conduct, and con- 
ciliate them to it ; to dispel the false reports, 
which exaggerated difficulties, and discou- 
raged them : to let them see the remedies pre- 
paring for the distresses they were under, and 
the success to be expected from them ; to 
explain the precautions it was necessary to 
take, and the motives for taking them. It was 
the general's interest to flatter the soldier, in 
making him the confidant of his designs, 
fears, and expedients, in order to engage him 
to share in them, and act in concert, and 
from the same motives with himself. The 
general in the midst of soldiers, who, as well 
as himself, were all not only members of the 
state, but had a share in the authority of the 
government, was considered as a father in the 
midst of his family. 

V. It may not be easy to conceive how he 
could make himself heard by the troops : but 
if we call to mind, that the armies of the Ro- 
man people were not very numerous, that dif- 
ficulty will in a great measure vanish. Besides, 
I pretend not to say that the generals were heard 
distinctly, or in any other manner than the ora- 
tors in the public assemblies. All people did not 
hear : yet the whole people were informed, 
the whole people dehberated and decided ; 
and none of them complained of not having 
heard. It sufficed that the most ancient, the 
most considerable, the principals of companies 
and quarters were present at the harangue, of 
which they afterwards gave an account to the 
rest. On the column of Trajan, the emperor 
is seen haranguing the troops from a tribunal 



60 



THE ROMAN 



of turf, raised higher than the soldiers' heads, 
with the principal officers around him upon 
the platform, and the multitude forming a cir- 
cle at a distance. The great men at Rome 
accustomed themselves from their youth to 
speak upon occasion with a strong and clear 
voice ; and as these harangues were made in 
the camp to the soldiers quiet and unarmed, it 
is not easy to conceive in how little room a 
great number of them could stand upright, 
when they pressed close to each other, I insist 
the longer upon this, because many blame the 
historians of antiquity, for the supposititious 
harangues, as they call them, which they have 
inserted in their works. It must indeed be 
owned, that the discourses made by generals 
on the occasions of which we speak, were not 
always exactly the same as historians have re- 
peated them. For the most authors, writing 
in the time when the art of eloquence was 
highly in esteem, have endeavoured, in adorn- 
ing and enlarging the harangues they record, 
to leave proofs to posterity, that they were not 
less excellent orators than historians. But 
the fact itself, that generals frequently spoke 
in public to their troops, is evident beyond 
dispute, Cffisar, whose Commentaries are a 
plain and naked relation of what he himself 
performed at the head of his army, furnishes 
many examples of this kind. When he marched 
against Ariovistus, a sudden consternation 
seizing the soldiers, which was like to be at- 
tended v\ith very disagreeable effects, he as- 
sembled them, reprehended them in a long 
and severe speech, and thereby put a stop to 
the growing evil. In like manner, upon occa- 
sion of a considerable check received before 
Gergovia, owing to the too forward valour of 
the troops, and their neglect of his injunctions, 
he judged it necessary to call them together, 
expostulate with them upon their ill-timed 
bravery, and fortify them against any damp 
their late disaster might have thrown upon 
their spirits, I could easily produce other 
instances of the same kind, but these are 
abundantly sufficient to evince the point in 
question. 

VI. When the armies were numerous, and 
upon the point of giving battle, the ancients 
had a very simple and natural way of ha- 
ranguing the men. The general on horse- 
back rode through the ranks, and spoke 
something to the several bodies of troops, in 
order to animate them. Where he had to do 



with different nations, as very often happened, 
he addressed those of his own language in 
person, and made known his views and de- 
signs to the rest by interpreters. Hannibal 
acted in this manner at the battle of Zama in 
Africa. He thought incumbent on him to ex- 
hort his troops : and as every thing was dif- 
ferent among them, language, customs, laws, 
arms, habits, and interests, so he made use of 
different motives to animate them. To the 
auxiliary troops he proposed an immicdiate 
reward, and an augmentation of their pay out 
of the booty that should be taken. He in- 
flamed the peculiar and natural hatred of the 
Gauls against the Romans. As for the Ligu- 
rians, who inhabited a mountainous and bar- 
ren country, he set before them the fertile 
valleys of Italy, as the fruit of their victory. 
He represented to the Moors and Numidians, 
the cruel and violent government of Masinissa, 
to which they would be subjected, if over- 
come. In this manner he animated these 
different nations, by the different views of 
hope and fear. As to the Carthaginians, he 
omitted nothing that might excite their valour, 
and addressed himself to them in the warmest 
and most pathetic terms. He put them in 
mind of their country, their household gods, 
the tombs of their ancestors, the terror and 
consternation of their fathers and mothers, 
their wives and children ; in fine, that the 
fate of Carthage depended upon that battle, 
the event of which would either ruin and re- 
duce her into perpetual slavery, or render her 
mistress of the universe, every thing being 
extreme which she had either to hope or 
fear. This is a very fine discourse ; but how 
did he make these different nations under- 
stand it 1 Livy informs us: he spoke to the 
Carthaginians himself, and ordered the com- 
manders of each nation to repeat to their re- 
spective troops what he had said. In this 
manner the general sometimes assembled the 
officers of his army, and after having ex- 
plained what he desired the troops might be 
told, he sent them back to their several bri- 
gades or companies, in order to report what 
they had heard, and animate them for the 
battle. Arrian observes this particular of 
Alexander the Great, before the famous battle 
of Arbela. 

VII. After inspiring the troops with resolu- 
tion and confidence, and disposing them to act 
courageously against the enemy, the next 



ART OF WAR. 



61 



care of the general was, to range them judi- 
ciously in order of battle. The manner of 
drawing up the infantry in three lines, con- 
tinued long in use among the Romans, and 
with uniformity enough. The hastati were 
placed in the front, in thick and firm ranks ; 
the principes behind them, but not altogether 
so close ; and after them the triarii, in so 
wide and loose an order, that upon occasion, 
they could receive both the principes and 
hastati into their body, in any distress. The 
vclites, and in latter times, the bowmen, and 
slingers, were not drawn up in this regular 
manner, but disposed of either before the front 
of the hastati, or scattered up and down among 
the void spaces of the same hastati, or some- 
times placed in two bodies in the wings ; but 
wherever they were fixed, these light soldiers 
began the combat, skirmishing in flying par- 
ties with the first troops of the enemy. If 
they prevailed, which very seldom happened, 
they prosecuted the victory ; but upon a re- 
pulse, they fell back by the flanks of the army, 
and rallied again in the rear. When they 
were retired, the hastati advanced against 
the enemy ; and in case they found themselves 
overpowered, retiring softly towards the pri7i- 
cipes, fell into the intervals of their ranks, 
and, together with them, renewed the fight. 
But if the principes and hastati, thus joined, 
were too weak to sustain the fury of the bat- 
tle, they all fell back into the wider intervals 
of the triarii, and then altogether being united 
into a firm mass, they made another effort, 
much more impetuous than any before. If 
this assault proved ineffectual, the day was 
entirely lost as to the foot, there being no far- 
ther reserves. This way of marshalling the 
foot, was exactly like the order of trees, which 
gardeners call the qnincunx ; as appears from 
the beautiful comparison between them in Vir- 
gil's second Georgic. And as the reason of 
that position of the trees is not only for beauty 
and figure, but that every particular tree may 
have room to spread its roots and boughs, with- 
out entangling and hindering the rest; so in 
this ranking of the men, the army was not only 
set out to the best advantage, and made the 
greatest show, but every particular soldier had 
free room to use his weapons, and to with- 
draw himself between the void spaces behind 
him, without occasioning any confusion or 
disturbance. 

VIII. The stratagem of rallying thus three 



times, has been reckoned almost the whole 
art and secret of the Roman discipline ; and it 
was almost impossible it should prove unsuc- 
cessful, if duly observed. For fortune, in 
every engagement, must have failed them 
three several times, before they could be 
routed ; and the enemy must have had the 
strength and resolution to overcome them in 
three several encounters, for the decision of 
one battle ; whereas most other nations, and 
even the Grecians themselves, drawing up their 
whole army as it were in one front, trusted 
themselves and fortunes to the success of a 
single charge. The Roman cavalry was posted 
at the two corners of the army, like the wings 
on a body; and fought sometimes on foot, 
sometimes on horseback, as occasion required, 
in the same manner as our dragoons. The 
confederate, or auxiliary forces, composed the 
two points of the battle, and covered the whole 
body of the Romans, As to the stations of the 
commanders, the general commonly took up 
his post near the middle of the army, between 
the principes and the triarii, as the fittest 
place to give orders equally to all the troops. 
The legati and tribunes were usually posted 
by him ; unless the former were ordered to 
command the wings, or the others some par- 
ticular part of the army. The centurion stood 
every man at the head of his century, to lead 
them up ; though sometimes, out of courage 
and honour, they exposed themselves in the 
van of the army, or were placed there for par- 
ticular reasons by the general : as Sallust re- 
ports of Catiline, that he posted all his choice 
centurions, with the evocati, and the flower of 
the common soldiers, in the front of the battle. 
But the primipili, or chief centurions, had the 
honour to stand with the tribunes near the 
general's person. The common soldiers were 
placed in several ranks, at the discretion of 
the centurions, according to their age, strength, 
and experience, every man having three feet 
square allowed him to manage his arms in ; 
and it was religiously observed in their disci- 
pline, never to abandon their ranks, or break 
their order upon any account. 

IX. But besides the common methods of 
drawing up a Roman army, which are suffi- 
ciently explained by every historian of any 
note ; there were several other very singular 
methods of forming their battle into odd 
shapes, according to the nature of the body 
they were to oppose. Of this kind was the 



62 



THE ROMAN 



cuneus, when the army was ranged in the 
figure of a wedge, the most proper to pierce 
and break the order of the enemy. This was 
otherwise called caput porcinum, which it in 
some measure resembled. And here I beg 
leave to observe, that this last name seems to 
confirm the conjecture of the Chevalier Fo- 
lard, who maintains that the cuneus was no 
other than the column, or a battalion drawn up 
with a small front and great depth. The tri- 
angular order he looks upon as childish and 
absurd, and such as never was nor could 
be practised with success, because of the ex- 
treme weakness of the angles. The authors, 
however, who give that form to the cuneus, 
have invented another order of battle in op- 
position to it, which they term the forfex. 
This was when the army was drawn up in the 
figure of a pair of shears, as it were on purpose 
to receive the cuneus, in case the enemy should 
make use of that disposition. For while he 
endeavoured to open, and as it were to cleave 
their squadrons with his wedge, by keeping 
their troops extended like the shears, and re- 
ceiving him in the middle, they not only hin- 
dered the damage designed to their own men, 
but commonly cut the adverse body in pieces. 
The globus was when the soldiers cast them- 
selves into a circular order, upon an appre- 
hension of being surrounded. Caesar, in the 
fifth book of his Commentaries, speaks of this 
disposition as very proper in cases of danger 
and extremity. The turris represented an ob- 
long square, after the fashion of a tower, with 
very few men in a file, and the ranks extended 
to a great length. This seems of very ancient 
original, as being mentioned in Homer. The 
last order I shall take notice of is the serra or 
saw ; when the first companies in the front of 
the army, beginning the engagement, some- 
times proceeded, and sometimes drew back ; 
so that by the help of a large fancy, one 
might find some resemblance between them 
and the teeth of that instrument. 

X. It was usual enough among the Ro- 
mans, to raise great cries, and to strike their 
swords against their bucklers, as they advanced 
to charge an enemy. This noise, joined to 
that of the trumpets, was very proper to sup- 
press in them, by a kind of stupefaction, all 
fear of danger, and to inspire them with a 
courage and boldness, that had no view but 
victory, and defied death. But though such 
shoutings were allowed, nay, even encouraged 



as useful, going towards the enemy, yet a deep 
silence was observed by the soldiery, when 
they were about to engage, that the orders of 
the officers, and the words of command, might 
be clearly heard, and punctually obeyed. It 
is observed that the Greeks went always si- 
lently to battle, alleging for it, that they had 
more to do than to say to their enemies. But 
the shoutmgs of which we speak, is in reality a 
kind of doing, as it stirs up the men, and often 
damps the enemy. The troops marched some- 
times softly and coolly to the charge, and some- 
times, when they approached the enemy, they 
sprung forward with impetuosity as fast as they 
could move. Great men have been divided 
in opinion upon these different methods of at- 
tacking. It seems however to be generally 
agreed, that where two armies engage in a 
plain field, a commander ought never to allow, 
much less order, his men to receive the charge, 
but still to meet the enemy in giving it. Pom- 
pey in the decisive battle of Pharsalia, by the 
advice of Triarius, commanded his soldiers to 
receive Caesar's assault, and to undergo the 
shock of his army, without removing from the 
place whereon they stood, as by this means 
Caesar's men would be disordered in their ad- 
vance, and Pompey's by not moving, keep 
their order. But Caesar himself observes upon 
it, that according to his judgment, the ad- 
vice was against all reason ; because there is 
a certain keenness and alacrity of spiiit na- 
turally planted in every man, who is inflamed 
with a desire to fight, and therefore no com- 
mander should repress or restrain it, but rather 
increase and set it forward. The event jus- 
tified Caesar's opinion, and showed that it was 
well-grounded. 

XI. Hitherto we have contented ourselves 
with general observations : but as it is impos- 
sible from these alone, to give any tolerable 
idea of the address and abiUty of a commander 
in a day of battle, because his conduct must 
vary according to circumstances ; I shall now 
beg leave to lay before the 'eader, an account 
of some celebrated actions of antiquity, taken 
from the descriptions of such historians, as be- 
ing themselves military men, have traced them 
with the utmost exactness, and distinctly ex- 
plained the reasons of the several steps taken. 
The first instance of this kind that we meet 
with in history, is the famous battle of Thym- 
bra, between Croesus and Cyrus, which trans- 
ferred the empire of Asia from the Assyrians 



ART OF WAR. 



63 



of Babylon to the Medes and Persians. 
Though this action does not so immediately 
and strictly regard the subject we are upon, as 
having no relation to the Roman history, I 
shall yet give a particular description of it 
here, not only because it is the first pitched 
battle, of which we have any full and circum- 
stantial account, but because Cyrus being 
looked upon as one of the greatest captains of 
antiquity, those of the profession may be glad 
to trace him in all his steps, through this im- 
portant engagement ; and the rather, as what 
we shall present them with on this subject, is 
taken from Xenophon, one of the greatest com- 
manders, as well as finest writers, of the age 
in which he lived. 

XII. In Cyrus's army the companies of foot 
consisted of a hundred men each, exclusive of 
the captain. Each company was subdivided 
into four parts, which consisted severally of 
four arid twenty men, not including the person 
who commanded the platoon. Each of these 
subdivisions was again divided into two files, 
consisting, in consequence, of twelve men. 
Every ten companies had a particular supe- 
rior officer to command them, who sufficiently 
answers to what we call a colonel. Over ten 
of these again was another superior com- 
mander, whom we shall term a brigadier. When 
Cyrus came at the head of the thirty thousand 
Persians, who had been sent to the aid of 
his uncle Cyaxares, he made a considerable 
change in the arms of his troops. Until then, 
two thirds of them made use only of javelins 
and bows, and therefore could not fight but at 
a distance from the enemy. Instead of these, 
Cyrus armed the greatest part of them with 
cuirasses, bucklers, and swords or battle-axes, 
and left only a few of his soldiers in light 
armour. The Persians did not know at that 
time what it was to fight on horseback. 
Cyrus, who was convinced that nothing was 
of so great importance towards the gaining of 
a battle as cavalry, was sensible of the great 
inconvenience he laboured under in that re- 
spect, and therefore took wise and early pre- 
cautions to remedy that evil. He succeeded 
in his design, and by little and little formed 
a body of Persian cavalry, which amounted to 
ten thousand men, and were the best troops 
in his army. 

XIII. Xenophon has not acquainted us 
with the precise number of troops on both 
sides, but as this may be in some sort collected 



by putting together certain scattered passages 
of our author, we shall endeavour to fix it in 
the best manner we can. Cyrus's army 
amounted in the whole to a hundred and 
ninety-six thousand men, horse and foot. 
Of these there were seventy thousand natural 
born Persians, viz. ten thousand cuirassiers of 
horse, twenty thousand cuirassiers of foot, 
twenty thousand pikemen, and twenty thou- 
sand light-armed soldiers. The rest of the 
army, to the number of one hundred and 
twenty-six thousand men, consisted of a hun- 
dred thousand Median, Armenian, and Ara- 
bian foot, and twenty-six thousand horse of 
the same nations. Besides these troops, Cyrus 
had three hundred chariots of war, armed with 
scythes, each chariot drawn by four horses 
abreast, covered with trappings that were shot- 
proof; as were also the horses of the Persian 
cuirassiers. He had likewise ordered a great 
number of chariots to be made of a larger size, 
upon each of which was placed a tower of 
about eighteen or twenty feet high, in which 
were lodged twenty archers. Each chariot 
was drawn upon wheels by sixteen oxen 
yoked in abreast. There was moreover a con- 
siderable number of camels, upon each of 
which were two Arabian archers, back to 
back ; so that one looked towards the head, and 
the other towards the tail of the camel. 

XIV. Croesus's army was above twice as 
numerous as that of Cyrus, amounting in all 
to four hundred and twenty thousand men, 
of which sixty thousand were cavalry. The 
troops consisted chiefly of Babylonians, Ly- 
dians, Phrygians, Cappadocians, of the na- 
tions about the Hellespont, and of Egyp- 
tians, to the number of three hundred and 
sixty thousand men. The Egyptians alone 
made a body of one hundred and twenty 
thousand. They had bucklers that covered 
them from head to foot, very long pikes, and 
short swords, but very broad. The rest of 
the army was made up of Cyprians, Cilicians, 
Lycaonians, Paphlagonians, Thracians, and 
lonians. The army in order of battle was 
ranged in one line, the infantry in the centre, 
and the cavalry on the two wings. All the 
troops, both foot and horse, were thirty men 
deep ; but the Egyptians, who, as we have 
taken notice, were a hundred and twenty 
thousand in number, and who were the prin- 
cipal strength of Croesus's infantry, in the 
centre of which they were posted, were di^ 



64 



THE ROMAN 



-vided into twelve large bocfies or square bat- 
talions, of ten thousand men each, which had 
a hundred men in front, and as many in depth, 
with an interval or space between every bat- 
talion, that they might act and fight independ- 
ent of, and without interfermg with one an- 
other. Croesus would gladly have persuaded 
them to range themselves in less depth, that 
he might make the wider front. For the 
armies being in an immense plam, which gave 
room for extending their wings to right and 
left, he was in hopes by this means of sur- 
rounding and hemming in the enemy. But 
he could not prevail with the Egyptiaiis to 
change the order of battle to which they had 
been accustomed. His army, as it was thus 
drawn out into one Une, took up near forty 
stadia, or five miles in length. 

XV. Araspes, who under pretence of dis- 
content had retired to Croesus's army, and had 
received particular orders from Cyrus, to ob- 
serve well the manner of that general's ranging 
his troops, returned to the Persian camp the 
day before the battle. Cyrus in drawing up 
his army, governed himself by the disposition 
• of the enemy, of which that young Median 
Nobleman had given him an exact account. 
The Persian troops had been generally used 
to engage four and twenty men deep, but 
Cyrus thought fit to change that disposition. 
It was necessary for him to form as wide a 
front as possible, without too much weaken- 
ing his phalanx, to prevent his army's being 
inclosed and hemmed in. His infantry was 
excellent, and most advantageously armed 
with cuirasses, partizans, battle-axes, and 
swords ; and provided they could join the 
enemy in close fight, there was but little 
reason to believe the Lydian phalanx, that 
were only armed with light bucklers and 
javelins, could support the charge. Cyrus 
therefore thinned the files of his infantry one 
half, and ranged them only twelve men deep. 
The cavalry was drawn out on the two wings, 
the right commanded by Chrysantes and the 
left by Hystaspes. The whole front of the 
army took up but thirty-two stadia, or four 
miles in extent, and consequently was at each 
end near four stadia, or half a mile short of 
the enemy's front. Behind the first line, at a 
little distance, Cyrus placed the spear men, 
and behind them the archers. Both the one 
and the other were covered by the soldiers in 
their front, over whose heads they could fling 



their javelins, and shoot their arrows at the 
enemy, 

XVI. Behind all these he formed another 
hne, to serve for the rear, which consisted of 
the flower of his army. Their business was 
to have their eyes upon those that were placed 
before them, to encourage those that did their 
duty, to sustain and threaten those that gave 
way, and even to kill those as traitors that 
persisted openly in flying ; by that means to 
keep the cowards in awe, and make them 
have as great a terror of the troops in the 
rear as they could possibly have of the enemy. 
Behind the army were placed those moving 
towers which I have already described. These 
formed a line equal and parallel to that of the 
army, and did not only serve to annoy the 
enemy by the perpetual discharges of the 
archers that were in them, but might likewise 
be looked upon as a kind of moveable forts or 
redoubts, under %vhich the Persian troops 
might rally, in case they were broken and 
pushed by the enemy. Just behind these 
towers were two other lines, which also were 
parallel and equal to the front of the army : 
the one was formed of the baggage, and the 
other of the chariots which carried the women, 
and such other persons as were unfit for 
service. To close all these lines, and to 
secure them from the insults of the enemy, 
Cyrus placed in the rear of all two thousand 
infantry, two thousand horse, and the troop 
of camels, which was pretty numerous. Cy- 
rus's design in forming two lines of the bag- 
gage was, not only to make his army appear 
the more numerous, but likewise to oblige the 
enemy, in case they were resolved to sur- 
round him, as he knew they intended, to 
make the longer circuit, and consequently to 
weaken their line, by stretching it out so far. 
We have still the Persian chariots of war, 
armed with scythes, to speak of. These were 
divided into three bodies of a hundred each. 
One of these bodies,commanded by Abradatas, 
king of Susiana, was placed in the front of 
the battle, and the other two upon the flanks 
of the army. 

XVII. When the two armies were in sight 
of each other, and the enemy had observed 
how much the front of theirs exceeded that 
of Cyrus, they made the centre of their army 
halt whilst the two wings advanced projecting 
to the right and left, with the design to 
inclose Cyrus's army, and begin their attack 



ART OF WAR. 



65 



on every side at the same time. This move- 
ment did not at all alarm Cyrus, because he 
expected it ; but observing that many of his 
officers, and even Abradates himself, dis- 
covered some uneasy apprehensions ; these 
troops disturb you, says he : believe me they 
will be the first routed, and to you Abradates 
I give that as a signal, for falling upon the 
enemy with your chariots. When the two 
detached bodies of the Lydians were suffi- 
ciently extended, Crossus gave the signal to 
his main body to march up directly to the 
front of the Persian army, whilst the two 
wings that were wheeling round upon their 
flanks, advanced on each side ; so that Cyrus's 
army was inclosed on three sides ; and, as 
Xenophon expresses it, looked like a small 
square drawn within a great one. In an in- 
stant, on the first signal Cyrus gave, his troops 
faced about on every side, keeping a profound 
silence in expectation of the event. The prince 
himself,at the head of some horse, briskly fol- 
lowed by a body of foot, fell upon the forces 
that were marching to attack his right flank, 
and put them in great disorder. The chariots 
then driving furiously upon the Lydians, com- 
pleted the defeat. In the same moment the 
troops of the left flank, knowing by the noise 
that Cyrus had begun the battle on the right, 
advanced to the enemy ; and immediately 
the squadron of camels was made to advance 
likewise, as Cyrus had ordered. The enemy's 
cavalry did not expect this, and their horses 
at a distance, as soon as they were sensible 
of the approach of those animals, whose smell 
they cannot endure, began to snort and prance, 
to run foul upon and overturn one another, 
throwing their riders, and treading them 
under their feel. Whilst they were in this 
confusion, a small body of horse, commanded 
by Artageses, pushed them very warmly to 
prevent their rallying ; and the chariots armed 
with the scythes falling furiously upon them, 
they were entirely routed, with a dreadful 
slaughter. 

XVIII. This being the signal which Cyrus 
had given Abradates for attacking the front 
of the enemy's army, he drove like lightning 
upon them with all his chariots. Their first 
rank was not able to stand so violent a 
charge, but gave way and were dispersed. 
Having broken and overthrown them, Abra- 
dates came up to the Egyptian battalions, 
which being covered with their bucklers, 
7 



and marching in such close order that the 
chariots had not room to pierce amongst 
them, gave him much more trouble, and would 
not have been broken had it not been for the 
violence of the horses, that trode upon them. 
It was a most dreadful spectacle to see the 
heaps of men and horses, overturned chariots, 
broken arms, and all the direful effects of the 
sharp scythes, which cut every thing in 
pieces that came in their way. But Abra- 
dates' chariot having the misfortune to be 
overturned, he and his men were killed, after 
they had signalized their valour in a very ex- 
traordinary maner. The Egyptians then, 
marching forward in close order and covered 
with their bucklers, obliged the Persian in- 
fantry to give way, and drove them beyond 
their fourth line, as far as to their machines. 
There the Egyptians met with a fresh storm 
of arrows and javelins, that were poured upon 
their heads from the rolling towers : and the 
battalions of the Persian rear-guard advancing 
sword in hand, hindered their archers and 
spearmen from retreating any farther, and 
obliged them to return to their charge. 

XIX. Cyrus in the meantime having put 
both the horse and foot to flight on the left 
of the Egyptians, did not amuse himself in 
pursuing the runaways, but pushing on di- 
rectly to the centre, had the mortification to 
find his Persian troops had been forced to 
give way ; and rightly judging that the only 
means to prevent the Egyptians from gaining 
farther ground would be to attack them behind, 
he did so, and fell upon their rear. The cavalry 
came up at the same time, and the enemy was 
pushed with great fury. The Egyptians be- 
ing attacked on all sides, faced about every 
way, and defended themselves with wonderful 
braver}'. Cyrus himself was in great danger ; 
his horse, which a soldier stabbed under the 
belly, sinking under him, he fell in the midst 
of his enemies. Here was an opportunity, 
says Xenophon, of seeing how important it is 
for a commander to have the affection of his 
soldiers. Officers and men, equally alarmed 
at the danger in which they saw their leader, 
ran headlong into the thick forest of pikes to 
rescue and save him. He quickly remounted 
another horse, and the battle became more 
bloody than ever. At length Cyrus admiring 
the valour of the Egyptians, and being con- 
cerned to see such brave men perish, offered 
them honourable conditions, if they would sur- 
K 



66 



THE ROMAN 



render, letting them know at the same time 
that all their allies had abandoned them. The 
Egyptians accepted the conditions, after which 
the Persians meeting with no farther opposi- 
tion, a total rout of the enemy ensued. 

XX. It is allowed that Cyrus's victory was 
chiefly owing to his Persian cavalry, which 
was a new establishment, and entirely the 
fruit of that prince's care and activity in form- 
ing his people, and perfecting them in a part 
of the military art, of which till his time they 
had been utterly ignorant. The chariots 
armed with scythes did good service, and the 
use of them was ever after retained among the 
Persians. The camels too were not unser- 
viceable in the battle, though Xenophon makes 
no great account of them, and observes, that 
in his time they made no other use of them, 
than for carrying the baggage. I shall not 
undertake here to enlarge upon Cyrus's merit. 
It is sufficient to observe, that in this affair 
we see all the qualities of a great general shine 
out in him. Before the battle, an admirable 
sagacity and foresight in discovering and dis- 
concerting the enemy's measures ; an infinite 
exactness in the detail of affairs, in taking care 
that his army should be provided with every 
thing necessary, and all his orders punctually 
obeyed at the time prefixed ; a wonderful ap- 
plication to gain the hearts of his soldiers, and 
to inspire them with confidence and ardour. 
In the heat of action, what a spirit and ac- 
tivity ! what a presence of mind in giving 
orders as occasion requires ! what courage and 
intrepidity, and at the same time what hu- 
manity towards the enemy, whose valour he 
respects, and whose blood he is unwilling to 
shed ! I have met with but one objection to 
the manner in which he drew up his troops in 
order of battle, namely, no troops to cover his 
flanks, to sustain his armed chariots, and to 
oppose the two bodies of troops which Croesus 
had detached to fall upon the flanks of his 
army. But it is very possible that such a cir- 
cumstance might escape Xenophon in describ- 
ing the battle ; though it must be owned, that 
the fall of Abradates, which was immediately 
followed by the attack of the Persian infantry, 
hardly leaves room for such a conjecture. 

XXI. I shall now present the reader with 
the description of two battles in which the 
Romans were concerned, those of Cannffi and 
Zama, distinguished by the importance of their 
consequences, and the abilities of the generals 



who commanded in them. Hannibal having 
defeated the Romans in there successive en- 
gagements, and desirous of bringing them to 
another general action, that by one decisive 
blow he might put an end to the war, removed 
his camp to the neighbourhood of Cannae, an 
open champaign country, and fit for cavalry 
to act in, in which he was greatly superior to 
the enemy. The Romans, headed by the con- 
suls Paulus ^milius and Varro, followed him 
thither, where after some disputes Paulus was 
obliged to give way to the obstinacy of his 
colleague, who was resolutely bent upon 
fighting. The two armies were very unequal 
as to number. There was in that of the Ro- 
mans, including the allies, four-score thousand 
foot, and something more than six thousand 
horse ; and in that of the Carthaginians, forty 
thousand foot, all well disciplined and inured 
to war, and ten thousand horse. Varro at 
day-break, having made the troops of the great 
camp pass the Aufidus, drew them up imme- 
diately in battle, after having joined them 
with those of the little camp. The whole in- 
fantry were upon one line, closer and of greater 
depth than usual. The cavalry was upon the 
two wings ; that of the Romans on the right, 
defended by the Aufidus ; and that of the allies 
on the left wing. The light-armed troops 
were advanced in the front of the battle to some 
distance, Paulus ^milius commanded the 
right wing of the Romans, Varro the left, and 
Ser\tilius Geminus, the consul of the preceding 
year,was in the centre. 

XXII. Hannibal immediately drew up his 
army in one line. He posted his Spanish and 
Gallic cavalry on the left, sustained by the 
Aufidus, to oppose the Roman horse ; and 
upon the same line, half his heavy-armed 
African infantry : then the Spanish and Gallic 
infantry, which properly formed the centre ; on 
their right, the other half of the African in- 
fantry ; and lastly the Numidian horse, who 
composed the right wing. The li^ht-armed 
troops were in the front, facing those of the 
Romans. Asdrubal had the left, Hanno the 
right ; Hannibal, having his brother with him, 
reserved the command of the centre to himself. 
The African troops might have been taken for 
a body of Romans, so much did they resemble 
them by their arms, which they had gained in 
the battles of Trebia and Thrasymenus, and 
which they now employed against those who 
had suffered them to be taken from them. 



ART OF WAR. 



67 



The Spaniards and Gauls had shields of the 
same form; but their swords were very dif- 
ferent. Those of the former were equally 
proper for cutting and thrusting, whereas those 
of the Gauls cut only with the edge, and at a 
certain distance. The soldiers of those two 
nations, especially the Gauls, had a dreadful 
aspect, in consequence of their extraordinary 
stature. The latter were naked from their 
belts upwards. The Spaniards wore linen 
habits, the extreme whiteness of which exalted 
by a border of a purple colour, made a sur- 
prisingly splendid appearance. Hannibal, 
who knew how to take his advantages as a 
great captain, forgot nothing that could con- 
duce to the victory. A wind peculiar to that 
region, called in the country vulturnus, blew 
always at a certain period. He took care to 
draw up in such a manner, that his army, 
facing the north, had it in their backs, and the 
enemy fronting the south, had it in their faces ; 
so that he was not in the least incommoded 
with it, whereas the Romans, whose eyes it 
filled with dust, scarce saw before them. From 
hence we may judge how far Hannibal carried 
his attention, which nothing seems to escape. 
XXIII. The two armies marched against 
each other, and began the chaige. After that 
of the light-armed soldiers on both sides, which 
was only a prelude, the action began by the 
two wings of the cavalry on the side of the 
Aufidus. Hannibal's left wing, which was an 
old corps, to whose valour he was principally 
indebted for his successes, attacked that of the 
Romans with so much force and violence, that 
they had never experienced the like. This 
charge was not made in the usual manner of 
attacks of cavalry, by sometimes falling back, 
and sometimes returning to the assault ; but 
in fighting man to man, and very near, be- 
cause they had not room enough to extend 
themselves, being pent up on one side of the 
river, and on the other by the infantry. The 
shock was furious, and equally sustained on 
both sides ; and whilst it was still doubtful to 
which side the victory would incline, the 
Roman horse, according to a custom usual 
enough in their corps, and which was some- 
times successful, but was now very ill ap- 
plied, dismounted and fought on foot. When 
Hannibal was informed of this, he cried out : 
I am as well pleased with them in that pos- 
ture, as I should be to have them all delivered 
up to me to be bound hand and foot. Accor- 



dingly, after having defended themselves with 
the utmost valour, most of them fell upon the 
spot. Asdrubal pursued those that fled, and 
made a great slaughter of them. 
,^XXIV. Whilst the horse was thus engaged, 
the infantry of both armies advanced also 
against each other. The battle began at first 
in the centre. As soon as Hannibal perceived 
that his left wing began to have the advantage, 
he made the Gauls and Spaniards move that 
were in the main body, and whom he com- 
manded in person. In proportion as he ad- 
vanced, he rounded his front in form of a half 
moon, with its convex side towards the 
enemy. At first the opposite centre of the 
Romans charged them. After some resistance 
the Spaniards and Gauls began to give way, 
and to lose ground. The rest of the Roman 
infantry also moved on in order to take them 
in flank. They fell back according to the 
orders they had received, continuing to fight, 
and regained the ground where they had at 
first been drawn up in battle. The Romans, 
seeing that the Spaniards and Gauls con- 
tinued to retreat, continued also to pursue 
them. Hannibal, well pleased to see every 
thing succeed according to his design, and 
perceiving the moment was come for acting 
with all his forces, gave orders, that his 
Africans should wheel to the right and left 
upon the Romans. These two bodies, which 
were fresh, well armed, and in good order, 
having wheeled about suddenly, towards the 
space or hollow, into which the Romans had 
thrown themselves in disorder and confu- 
sion, charged them on both sides with 
vigour, without giving them time to look 
about them, or leaving them ground to form 
themselves. 

XXV. In the mean time the Numidian 
cavalry on the right wing was engaged also 
with the enemy opposite to them, namely, the 
cavalry of the allies of the Romans. Though 
they did not distinguish themselves in this 
battle, and the advantage was equal on both 
sides, they were however very useful : for 
they found the enemies which they had in 
their front sufficient employment, to prevent 
them from having time to assist their own 
people. But when the left wing, where As- 
drubal commanded, had routed, as we have 
said, the whole horse of the right wing of the 
Romans, and had joined the Numidians, the 
cavalry of the allies did not wait to be attacked 



68 



THE ROMAN 



by them, but fled with the utmost precipita- 
tion. It is said, that Asdrubal then did a 
thing, which no less shows his prudence, 
than it contributed to the success of the bat- 
tle. As the Numidians were very numerous, 
and never did their duty better than when an 
enemy fled, he ordered them to pursue the 
Romans to prevent their rallying, and led on 
the Spanish and Gallic horse to the charge, 
to support the African infantry. Accordingly 
he fell upon the Roman foot in the rear, 
which being attacked at the same time in the 
flanks, and surrounded on all sides, was en- 
tirely cut to pieces, after having acted prodi- 
gies of valour. 

XXVI. The battle of Zama, between Han- 
nibal and Scipio, is one of the most memora- 
ble recorded in history ; the disposition on 
both sides being the masterpiece of two of the 
greatest generals that ever the world produced. 
Scipio drew up his troops in the following 
manner : — He posted the hastati in the front 
line, leaving intervals between the cohorts. 
In the second line he placed the principes, 
with their cohorts not behind the spaces of 
the first line, as was the custom of the Ro- 
mans, but behind the cohorts of that front 
line, in order to leave openings for the ele- 
phants of the enemy, which were very nume- 
rous. The triarii formed the third line, in the 
same order, and served as a body of reserve. 
He placed Lselius on the left wing, with the 
Italian cavalry, and Masinissa on the right, 
with his Numidians. In the spaces of the 
first line he placed the light-armed soldiers, 
and ordered them to begin the battle in such 
a manner, that if they could not sustain the 
charge of the elephants, they should retire ; 
such of them as were most speedy, behind the 
whole army, through the spaces that divided 
it in right lines ; and those who should find 
themselves too much pressed, through the 
spaces between the lines on the right and left, 
in order to leave those animals a passage, in 
which they would be exposed to the darts 
discharged upon them on all sides. As to Han- 
nibal, in order to give the enemy more terror, 
he placed in the front his fourscore elephants, 
a number which he never had before in any 
battle. In the first line he posted the auxiliary 
troops of the Ligurians and Gauls, with the 
Baleareans and Moors, who amounted in all to 
twelve thousand men. The second line, in 
which the principal force of the army consist- 



ed, was composed of Africans and Cartha- 
ginians. He posted the troops he had brought 
with him from Italy in the third line, and placed 
them above a stadium from the second line. 
The Numidian cavalry were upon the left 
v/ing, and the Carthaginian upon the right, 

XXVII. Every thing being ready for the 
battle, and the Numidian cavalry on both 
sides having long skirmished, Hannibal gave 
orders for the elephants to move against the 
enemy. The Romans immediately made the 
trumpets sound, and at the same time raised 
such great cries, that the elephants which ad- 
vanced against the right of the Romans, turned 
back, and put the Moors and Numidians that 
formed Hannibal's left into disorder. Masi- 
nissa seeing their confusion, easily put them 
entirely to the rout. The rest of the elephants 
advanced between the two armies into the 
plain, and fell upon the light armed Romans, a 
great number of whom they crushed to death, 
notwithstanding the continual shower of darts 
discharged upon them from all sides. At length 
being terrified, sorae of them ran through the ' 
spaces Scipio had prudently left, and others in 
their flight returned upon their own right 
wing, pursued by the Roman horse, who with 
their spears drove them quite out of the field 
of battle. Lffilius took this instant for charg- 
ing the Carthaginian cavalry, who turned about 
and fled full speed. He pursued them warmly, 
whilst Masinissa did the same on his side. 

XXVIII. The army of the Carthaginians 
was uncovered on the right and left by its 
cavalry. The infantry then on both sides ad- 
vanced slowly and in good order, except that 
which Hannibal had brought from Italy, 
which formed the third line, and continued in 
its first post. When they were near each 
other, the Romans raising great cries, accord- 
ing to their custom, and striking their swords 
upon their shields, charged the enemy with 
vigour. On the sides of the Carthaginians, 
the body of foreign troops that formed the 
front line, also raised great cries, but con- 
fused, and dissonant from each other, because 
they were of different nations. As they could 
use neither swords nor javelins, but fought 
hand to hand, the strangers at first had some 
advantage over the Romans by their agility 
and boldness, and wounded a great number. 
However, the latter having the superiority by 
their good order, and the nature of their arms, 
gained ground, supported by the second line, 



ART OF WAR. 



69 



who followed, and incessantly encouraged 
them to fight with valour ; whereas the stran- 
gers being neither followed nor assisted by the 
Carthaginians, whose inaction on the contrary 
intimidated them, lo^t courage, gave way, 
and believing themselves openly abandoned 
by their own troops, fell, in retiring, upon 
their second line, and attacked it in order to 
open themselves a passage. The latter found 
themselves obliged to defend their lives cou- 
rageously : so that the Carthaginians attacked 
by the strangers, contrary to their expecta- 
tion, saw they had two enemies to fight, their 
own troops and the Romans. Quite out of 
their senses, and in a manner transported with 
fury, they made a great slaughter of both, and 
put the hastati into disorder. Those who 
commanded the principes having made their 
troops advance, rallied them without diffi- 
culty. The greatest part of the strangers and 
Carthaginians fell in this place, partly cut in 
pieces by one another, and partly by the Ro- 
mans. Hannibal would not suffer those that 
fled to mingle with those who remained, lest 
full of terror as they were, and covered with 
wounds, they might induce disorder among 
those who had received no blow hitherto : he 
even ordered the front rank to present their 
pikes, which obliged them to retire along the 
wings into the plain. 

XXIX. The space between the two armies 
being then covered with blood, and with the 
dead, Scipio was in perplexity enough ; for he 
did not know how to make his troops move in 
good order, over that confused heap of arms 
and dead bodies, still bleeding and lying upon 
each other. He ordered the wounded men 
to be carried behind the army ; the retreat tc 
be sounded for the hastati, who were pursu- 
ing the enemy ; posted theai opposite to the 
centre of the Carthaginians in expectation of 
a new charge ; and made the principes and 
triaril advance on both wings. When they 
were upon the same front with the hastati, a 
new battle began between the two armies. 
The infantry alternately gave way, and re- 
turned to the charge with great courage and 
vigour. As number, resolution, and arms 
were equal on both sides, and they fought 
with such obstinacy that they fell in their 
posts rather than gave way, the fate of the 
battle was long doubtful, and it could not be 
conjectured which side would remain masters 
of the field. Things being in this state, Lae- 
7* 



lius and Masinissa, after having pursued the 
enemy's cavalry a considerable time, returned 
very opportunely for attacking the infantry 
in the rear. This last charge decided the 
victory. A great number of the Cartha- 
ginians were killed upon the field of battle, 
where they were surrounded on all sides. 
Many of them having dispersed in the plains 
round about, were cut off by the Roman 
cavalry that occupied all the country. The 
Carthaginians left above twenty thousand 
dead upon the spot, as well of their own 
citizens as allies. Almost as many were 
taken, with a hundred and thirty ensigns and 
standards, and eleven elephants. Hannibal 
escaped with a small number of horse to 
Adrumetum, after having tried, both before 
and during the battle, all possible means for 
obtaining the victory. The Romans lost only 
fifteen hundred men. 

XXX. Having thus given an account of 
some of the most memorable battles of anti- 
quity, explained the conduct of the generals, 
and laid open the reasons of that conduct ; I 
shall conclude this chapter with a few general 
remarks, tending still further to illustrate this 
great branch of war, and which in some mea- 
sure offer themselves in consequence of what 
has been already said. The first is, that 
though most nations had a certain fixed and 
particular form of giving battle, yet they 
never adhered to it so closely, as not to vary 
when circumstances required it. The draw- 
ing up an army to the very best advantage, is 
doubtless a great furtherance to the gaining 
of the victory. But the doing so depends 
much, not only on the wisdom and skill of 
the general, the nature of the ground, and 
the quality of his own forces, but also on those 
of his enemies, and on the disposition of him 
who commands them. Hence the greatest 
captains of older times, whose military know- 
ledge and practice the moderns so justly 
value, always acted herein according to their 
own judgment, without confining themselves 
to any standing rules. We have seen that 
Cyrus being to fight against Croesus in a large 
plain, where he found the enemy taking 
measures to surround him, drew up his men 
but twelve deep in file, whereas formerly the 
file was twenty-four deep. By this means he 
augmented the front of his army double, pre- 
vented his being too much over-winged by 
Croesus, and won the victory. It is observable 



70 



THE ROMAN 



too of Scipio at the battle of Zama, that he 
placed the battalions of his several lines di- 
rectly behind one another, and not facing 
the intervals of the lines before them, as was 
the common custom. His design in this was, 
to give free issue to the elephants, whose 
shock might otherwise have disordered his 
men, and rendered them incapable of making 
any resistance. Caesar, at the battle of Phar- 
salia against Pompey, quite altered the man- 
ner of the Roman embattling. For having 
found that Pompey exceedingly out-numbered 
him in horse, he covered one of his flanks 
with a little river, and drew all his cavalry to 
the other flank ; among the squadrons where- 
of he placed bodies of his best infantry, and 
there began the battle. By this means having 
all his horse in one wing, and those accom- 
panied with select legionary foot, he soon 
routed that half of Pompey 's horse which 
opposed all his, and then falling into the flanks 
and rear of his enemy, gained the victory, 

XXXI, The drawing up the army in seve- 
ral lines, as the nature of the ground, and the 
number of the forces would allow, is what 
was most peculiar to the Roman discipline, 
and has been found so consonant to reason and 
experience, that it is established as a standing 
maxim of war at this day. In effect these 
lines are so many armies ; and the second line 
being entire, though the first should be broken, 
often recovers the day ; especially if the se- 
cond line be at so just a distance from the 
first, as not to be disordered by it when over- 
thrown ; and also so near, that some battalions 
of the second line can come up timely enough 
to redress any beginnings of a breach in the 
first, without too much discomposing itself. 
It has likewise been often observed, that who- 
ever in a battle keeps together a body of men, 
that are not led to fight until all the enemy's 
squadrons have fought, rarely misses to carry 
away the victory ; and that he who has the 
last reserves, is the likeliest in the end to have 
the honour of the day. One signal illustration 
of this truth among many I shall instance. At 
the battle of Dreux in France, where the con- 
stable Montmorency, and Francis Duke of 
Guise, the greatest captains of that age, com- 
manded the royalists ; and Lewis, Prince of 
Conde, and the Admiral Chatillon the pro- 
testants ; the two last defeated all the forces 
they saw, took the constable prisoner, passed 
over the bellies of the Switzers, who made al- 



most a miraculous resistance, and concluded 
they had therefore won the victory. In the 
meanwhile the Duke of Guise, who led the 
left wing of the French king's army, either by 
design, as his enemies said, or as an act of 
high conduct, so covered his troops with the 
village of Blainville, and the trees and shrubs 
about it, that he was not so much as seen by 
the protestants : nor moved from thence, until 
the constable was taken prisoner, the Marshal 
de St. Andre killed, and all those forces which 
were considered by the Protestants as the 
whole army of the royalists, entirely routed, 
and so confusedly flying, that he was in no 
danger of having his squadrons disordered by 
the runaways of his own party. But then ad- 
vancing with his troops, which were entire, he 
soon turned the fortune of the day, took the 
Prince of Conde prisoner, and overthrew all that 
opposed him. For it is a tedious and difficult, 
if not an impossible task, to put into good order 
again an army that has newly fought, so as to 
bring it suddenly to renew the charge ; some be- 
ing busied about the pillage and prisoners they 
had taken, or are pursuing ; others being loth to 
return to new dangers ; and all in effect being 
so heated and disordered, that they do not, or 
will not hear the commands of their superiors. 
XXXII. One thing among the Romans 
particularly deserves our notice, and that is, 
that though they strove with incredible emu- 
lation to obtain the first posts in the army, yet 
that ambition once gratified, they did not dis- 
dain to accept of inferior offices after the high- 
er, and to serve under those over whom they 
had commanded. It is amazing to consider 
what a multitude of consular senators fell in 
the battle of Cannse. We have seen that Fa- 
bius, who had been thrice consul, and dictator, 
served as lieutenant under his own son ; and 
that the great Scipio accepted the same cha- 
racter from his brother. Nor are these to be 
considered as instances singular in their kind, 
for it was in reality the common practice. 
Hence it was always in the power of a Roman 
general, to have expert, vigilant, and valiant 
commanders, at the head of those several larger 
divisions, of which an army is usually com- 
posed in a day of battle: men of judgment, 
authority, and presence of mind, to remedy all 
disorders, and to improve all advantages in the 
critical moments, than which there is nothing 
of greater importance in general engagements, 
as the least delay or remissness is but too often 



ART OF WAR. 



71 



irreparable. I believe it will readily be al- 
lowed, that the most able and consummate 
general, neither is nor can be of himself suffi- 
cient to redress all disorders, and lay hold of 
all advantages in an instant, when armies are 
once engaged. The utmost he can do is, to 
choose well the field of battle, to draw up his 
army according thereto to most advantage, to 
give his general orders with prudence and 
foresight, and to give the best orders wherever 
he is in person ; but he cannot be everywhere, 
nor send his orders timely enough to every 
place to have them successfully obeyed. And 
therefore it is indisputably necessary, that he 
have under him expert chief officers, at the 
head of all the great divisions of the army, 
who may supply what is impossible for him 
singly to command. For he can be well 
obeyed to the time he sends his troops to the 
charge ; after that, those only who lead them, 
and are with them, can actuate them according 
to the general orders, or as the occasion re- 
quires ; which those under him must have the 
judgment to lay hold of as it were in the 
twinkling of an eye, so short are the moments 
to acquire the victory ! 

XXXIII. The placing the best men in the 
wings of an army, is very ancient, and seldom 
has been omitted, but to the loss of those who 
were guilty of such an omission. The reason 
is, that the troops on the wings are not wedged 
in, as the troops in the main battle are ; but 
are at liberty to take all advantages, which 
accident, the good conduct of the commander 
in chief, or the ill conduct of the enemy, 
throw in their way : nor can a general so 
much as rationally hope to fall into the flank 
and rear of his enemy, but by attacking one 
of his wings ; because he cannot over-wing 
him, but only by falling upon one of his out- 
ward flanks. Hence an 'able commander 
chooses always to begin the battle on that 
side where he judges himself the strongest, 
and the enemy the weakest ; advancing with 
those troops as expeditiously as he can, whilst 
the rest of the army moves as slowly as they 
may. For if this first impression be success- 
ful, he may fall into the flank and part of the 
rear of the enemy, while the residue of the 
whole army is marching to attack them in 
front : but then the motion of the army must 
be quicker, as soon as ever they see that the 
advanced wing is successful. Such was the 
conduct of Epaminondas, at the famous battle 



of Leuctra and Mantinea. Such too was the 
method followed by Julius Caesar, when he 
fought against Ariovistus and the Germans. 
Hannibal, so justly celebrated for his skill ia 
drawing up an army, at the famous battle of 
Cannae, placed, as we have seen, all his best 
men in his two wings, and his worst men in 
the centre ; whereby, when the Romans came 
to the charge, who had placed their choicest 
men in their main battle, they soon pierced 
into the body of Hannibal's army, which was 
the very thing he designed they should do ; 
for then with his two wings, in which were 
the flower of all his troops, he immediately 
wheeled upon the Romans, and totally de- 
feated them. 

XXXIV. After the battle was fought, and 
the victory apparently won, the great danger 
was, as it still is, to pursue with too much 
ardour, without regard to what passed in the 
rest of the army. Hence that custom so in- 
violably observed among the Romans, of never 
suffering the legions to follow the chace, or 
break their ranks upon any occasion whatever. 
Only the horse, the light-armed men, and 
what soldiers were not of the legions, were 
sent upon this service ; and the pursuit was 
conducted with so much caution, that a cer- 
tain number of squadrons always followed in 
good order, ready to fall upon and break the 
enemy anew, should they rally and face about. 
How many victories seemingly won, have in 
an instant been lost, for want of care in these 
two particulars of such high concernment, 
which therefore ought never to be omitted. 
It is certain that nothing more encourages 
flying enemies to rally, and fight again, than 
the seeing a disorderly pursuit of them. For 
in such a pursuit, all the advantages of the 
prevailing party immediately vanish, if the 
chased do but turn about ; such an evidence 
of restored valour, too often daunting those 
who are to oppose it; nor can any thing more 
deter the flying party from such a step, than 
to see several bodies in good order following 
close behind them, and ready to make them 
repent of their confidence, should they venture 
upon any further opposition. And though 
brave officers will not cease pressing, promis- 
ing, and even threatening their men that fly, 
to face about; yet the private soldier, who 
sees those bodies ready to fall on, concludes 
it is safer to run than to resist, and therefore 
is too often deaf to all oratory or menaces of 



72 



THE ROMAN 



that nature : for when once terror has seized 
the minds of the troops, they hear no 
counsels but those which their own fears sug- 
gest. 



CHAP.VIII. 

OF THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF PLACES. 

I. What we have to offer upon this sub- 
ject falls naturally under three general heads. 
First, The manner of fortifying towns in use 
among the ancients. Secondly, The machines 
of war employed by them in sieges. Thirdly, 
The nature and conduct of an attack and de- 
fence. As to the first, how far soever we 
look back into antiquity, we find amongst the 
Greeks and Romans, cities fortified in a regu- 
lar manner, with their fosses, curtains, and 
towers. Vitruvius, in treating of the construc- 
tion of places of war in his time, says, that 
the towers ought to project beyond the walls, 
in order that when the enemy approaches, 
the defenders upon the right and left may 
take them in flank : that they ought to be round, 
and faced with many stones, because such as 
are square, are soon beat down by the ma- 
chines of war and battering rams, which easily 
break their angles : and that near the towers 
the wall should be cut within-side the breadth 
of the towers, and the ways broke in this man- 
ner only be joined and continued by beams 
laid upon the two extremities, without being 
made fast with iron, that in case the enemy 
should make himself master of any part of the 
wall, the besieged might remove this wooden 
bridge, and thereby prevent his passage to the 
other parts of the wall, and into the towers. 
The best towns of the ancients were situated 
upon eminences. They inclosed them some- 
times within two or three walls and ditches. 
Berosus cited by Josephus, informs us that 
Nebuchadnezzar fortified Babylon with a triple 
inclosure of brick walls, of a surprising strength 
and height. Polybius, speaking of Syringa, 
the capital of Hyrcania, which Antiochus be- 
sieged, says, that city was surrounded with 
three ditches, each forty-five feet broad, and 
twenty-two deep. Upon each side of these 
was a double intrerichment, and behind all, a 
\h strong wall. The city of Jerusalem, says Jo- 
sephus, was surrounded by a triple wall, ex- 
cept on the sides of the valleys, where there 
was but one, because they were inaccessible. 



To these they had added many other works, 
one of which, continues the historian, had it 
been completed, would have rendered the city 
impregnable. The stones of which it was 
built, were thirty feet long by fifteen broad, 
which made it so strong, that it was in a man- 
ner impossible to sap or shake it with machines. 
The whole was flanked with towers from space 
to space of extraordinary solidity, and built 
with wonderful art. 

II. The ancients did not generally support 
their walls on the inside with earth, in the man- 
ner of the tahis or slope, which made the at- 
tacks more dangerous. For though the ene- 
my had gained some footing upon them, he 
could not assure himself of taking the city. 
It was necessary to get dov/n, and to make use 
of the ladder by which he had mounted ; and 
that descent exposed the soldier to very great 
danger. Vitruvius however observes, that 
there is nothing renders a rampart so strong, 
as when the walls both of the curtain and 
towers are supported by earth. For then 
neither rams, mines, nor any other machines 
can shake them. The places of war of the an- 
cients were not always fortified with stone 
walls. They were sometimes inclosed within 
good ramparts of earth, of great firmness and 
solidity. The manner of coating them with turf 
was not unknown to them., nor the art of sup- 
porting the earth with strong fascines, made fast 
by stakes, and of arming the top of the rampart 
with a ruff or fraise of palisades, and the foot 
of the parapet, or pas de so?ms with another. 
They often planted palisades also in the ditch, 
to defend themselves against sudden attacks. 
They made walls also with beams crossed over 
one another, with spaces between them in 
manner of a chequer, the void parts of which 
they filled up with earth and stones. Such al- 
most were the walls of the city of Bourges, 
which Csesar, in the seventh book of his wars 
with the Gauls, describes as follows. The walls 
of Bourges, and almost all those of the country, 
were made of pieces of wood forty feet in length, 
laid along the earth, at the distance of two 
feet from each other, and crossed over by others 
of equal length and at equal distance, with 
their ends to the front of the wall. The spaces 
on the inside were filled up with earth and 
fascines, and on the outside with solid stones. 
He adds, that the work by this disposition 
was agreeable to the eye, and very strong ; 
because the wood was of great force against 
the ram, and the stones against fire : besides 



ART OF WAR 



73 



which, the thickness of the wall, which was 
generally forty feet, or the length of the beams, 
made it next to impossible either to make a 
breach in it, or throw it down in any manner. 

III. What I shall say in the sequel, when 
I come to explain the manner of attacking 
and defending places, will show more distinctly 
what kind of fortifications those of the ancients 
were. It is pretended that the moderns excel 
them very much in this point. But as the 
method of attack and defence is entirely dif- 
ferent, no just comparison can be made. The 
use of muskets, bombs, cannons, and other fire- 
arms since the invention of gunpowder, has 
occasioned many alterations in the way of 
conducting sieges, the duration of which has 
been very much abridged of late. But these 
changes are not so considerable as many ima- 
gine, and have added nothing either to the 
merit or capacity of generals. The moderns 
have imagined nothing that the ancients could 
use, and have not used. We have borrowed 
from them the breadth and depth of fosses, the 
thickness of walls, the towers to flank the cur- 
tains, the palisades, the intrenchments within 
the ramparts, and towers, the advantage of 
many flanks, in multiplying of which consists 
the chief improvement of modern fortification, 
and which fire-arms make the more easy to 
execute. These are the remarks of men of 
ability and judgment, who to a profound 
knowledge of the manner in which the an- 
cients made war, unite a perfect experience of 
the modern practice of it. 

IV. But let us now proceed to the machines 
made use of by the ancients in their sieges. 
The principal of these were, the tortoise, the 
catapulta, the balista, the ram, and moving 
towers. The tortoise was a machine com- 
posed of very strong and solid timber-work. 
The height of it, to the uppermost beam, 
which sustained the roof, was twelve feet. The 
base was square, and each of its fronts twenty- 
five feet. It was covered with a kind of 
quilted mattress made of raw hides, and pre- 
pared with different drugs, to prevent its being 
set on fire by combustibles. This heavy ma- 
chine was supported upon four wheels, and had 
the name of tortoise from its serving as a very 
strong covering and defence, against the enor- 
mous weight thrown down on it : those under 
it being safe in the same manner as a tortoise 
under her shell. It was used both to fill up 
the ditch, and for sapping. For the fining up 



of the ditch, it was necessary to join several 
of them together in a line, and very near one 
another. Diodorus Sirulus, speaking of the 
siege of Halicarnassus by Alexander the Great, 
says, that he first caused three tortoises to ap- 
proach, in order to fill up the ditch, and that 
afterwards he planted his rams upon the space 
filled up, to batter the wall. This machine is 
often mentioned by authors. There were, 
without doubt, tortoises of different forms and 
sizes. Some indeed are of opinion, that be- 
cause of its enormous weight, it could not be 
moved from place to place on wheels, but was 
pushed forwards on rollers. Under these roll- 
ers the way was laid v.'ith strong planks, to fa- 
cilitate its motion, and prevent its sinking into 
the ground, from whence it would have been 
very difficult to have removed it. The ancients 
have observed, that the roof had a thicker co- 
vering of hides, hurdles, sea-weed, «Scc. than 
the sides, as it was exposed to much greater 
shocks from the weight thrown upon it by 
the besieged. It had a door in front, which 
was drawn up by a chain as far as was neces- 
sary, and covered the soldiers at work in fill- 
ing up the ditch. 

v. The musculus, though very little under- 
stood by modern authors, who have repre- 
sented it variously, was undoubtedly a kind of 
tortoise, very low, and with a sharp roof. Such 
was that of CsEsar at the siege of Marseilles. 
It was sixty feet in length, and was moved 
forward to the walls upon rollers, where it was 
fixed over the part of the ditch filled up. The 
tower of brick which he built there, commu- 
nicated with this musculus and the trenches. 
Csesar says the planks of the roofs were co- 
vered with bricks and mortar, over which hides 
were laid to prevent the mortar from dissolv- 
ing by the water which the besieged might 
pour down upon it ; and to secure it from 
stones and fire, it was again covered over with 
thick quilted mattresses properly prepared. 
All this was hone under mantles, after which 
it was thrust forward on a sudden from the 
tower to the walls. Besides this, there was 
another kind of musculus, that was used for 
levelling the ground, and laying the planks on 
which the tortoises and moving towers were 
to advance to the ditch. They were like this, 
of greater length than breadth, and equal in 
breadth to the way they were to level. There 
were several other machines intended to covei 
the soldiers, called crates, plntei, 7'/;iea-, which 
L 



74 



THE ROMAN 



I shall not undertake to describe here, to 
avoid prolixity. They may be comprised in 
general under the name of mantles or sheds. 

VI. The catapulta and balista were intend- 
ed for discharging darts, arrows, and stones. 
They were of dLfferent sizes, and consequently 
produced more or less eflect. Some were 
used in battles, and might be called field- 
pieces : others were employed in sieges, which 
was the use most commonly made of them. 
The balistss must have been the heaviest and 
most ditficult to carry, because there was al- 
ways a greater number of catapultse in the 
armies. Livy, in his description of the siege 
of Carthage, says, that there were a hundred 
and twenty great, and more than two hundred 
small catapultae taken, with thirty-three great 
balistsE, and fifty-two small ones. Josephus 
mentions the same difference amongst the Ro- 
mans, who had three hundred catapultae, and 
forty balistffi, at the siege of Jerusalem. 
These machines had a force which it is not 
easy to comprehend, but which all good 
authors attest. Vegetius says, that the balis- 
te discharged darts with so much rapidity 
and violence, that nothing could resist their 
force. Athenius tells us, that Agesistratus 
made one of little more than two feet in length, 
which shot darts almost five hundred paces. 
These machines were not unlike our cross- 
bows. There were others of much greater 
force, which threw stones of three hundred 
weight, upwards of a hundred and twenty -five 
paces. We find surprising effects of them in 
Josephus, The darts of the catapults, he 
tells us, destroyed abundance of people. The 
stones from the haUstas beat down the battle- 
ments, and broke the angles of the towers ; 
nor was there any phalanx so deep, but one 
of these stones would sweep a whole file of it 
from one end to the other. Folard, in his 
Commentary upon Polybius, says their force 
was very near equal to that of artillery. 

YII. The ram was composed of a large long 
beam, armed at one end with iron in the form 
of a ram's head, and of the same bigness with 
the beam. This piece of wood was suspended 
by chains in zquilibrio, in order to be set in 
motion with the greater ease. A hundred 
men, more or less, worked it by main strength, 
to strike it against a wall or rampart, in order 
to beat them down after having shaken them 
by repeated blows. Care was taken to clothe 
this beam with wet leather, to prevent its be- 



ing set on fire. It was slung under a kind of 
moving tortoise or gallery, which covered 
more than half of it, in order to shelter those 
who worked the ram from the stones and darts 
of the besieged. The effects of this machine 
were prodigious. As it was one of those that 
did most hurt, many methods were contrived 
to render it useless. Fire was darted upon 
the roof that covered, and the timber that sup- 
ported it, in order to burn them with the ram. 
To deaden its blows, sacks of wool were let 
down against the place at which it was level- 
led. A machine was also made use of against 
it, called the wolf, by way of opposition to the 
ram, with which they endeavoured to grapple 
it, in order to draw it to themselves, or break 
it. Josephus relates a surprising action of a 
Jew, who at the siege of Jotophat, threw a 
stone of uncommon size upon the head of the 
ram with such violence, that he loosened it 
from the beam, and made it fall down. He 
leaped afterwards from the top of the wall to 
the bottom, took the head from the midst of 
the enemy, and carried it back with him. He 
received five arrows in his body ; and notwith. 
standing those wounds boldly kept his post, 
till, through loss of blood and strength, he fell 
from the wall, and the ram's head with him, 
with which he would never part. 

Till. The moving towers were made of an 
assemblage of beams and strong planks, not 
unlike a house. To secure them against the 
fires thrown by the besieged, they were covered 
with raw hides, or with pieces of cloth made 
of hair. Their height was in proportion to 
their base. They were sometimes thirty feet 
square, and sometimes forty or fifty. They 
were higher than the walls or even towers of 
the city. They were supported upon several 
wheels according to mechanic principles, by 
the means of which the machine was easily 
made to move, how great soever it might be. 
The town was in great danger, if this tower 
could approach the walls ; for it had stairs 
from one story to another, and included differ- 
ent methods of attack. At bottom it had a 
ram to batter the wall, and on the middle story 
a draw-bridge, made of two beams with rails 
of basket work, which let down easily upon 
the wall of the city, when within reach of it. 
The besiegers passed upon this bridge to make 
themselves masters of the wall. Upon the 
higher stories were soldiers armed with par- 
tizans and missive weapons, who kept a per- 



ART OF WAR. 



75 



petual discharge upon the works. When af- 
fairs were in this posture, a place seldom held 
out long : for what could those hope who had 
nothing to confide in but the height of their 
ramparts, when they saw others suddenly ap- 
pear which commanded them? The people 
of Namur demanded to capitulate, when Cae- 
sar's tower, of which they had made a jest 
whilst at a distance, was seen to move towards 
them very fast. They believed this a prodigy, 
says Caesar, and were astonished that men of 
our size should think of carrying so vast and 
heavy a machine to their walls. Their depu- 
ties observed, that the Romans were doubtless 
assisted by the gods in their wars, since they 
could make machines of so enormous a size 
advance so swiftly. It is indeed no wonder they 
were ' surprised, as they had neither seen nor 
heard of any such thing before, and as this 
tower seemed to advance by enchantment and 
of itself, the mechanic powers that moved i> 
being imperceptible to those of the place. 
These towers were sometimes surrounded "K-ith 
corridors or galleries at each story, to prevent 
their being set on fire ; and indeed nothing 
better could have been invented for this pur- 
pose, as the galleries were filled with troops 
armed with missive weapons, who made their 
discharges from behind the parapets, if we may 
so term them, and were always ready to pull 
out the darts of fire, and extinguish all other 
combustibles thrown against the tower : so 
that it was impossible for the fire to make the 
least progress, the remedy being always at 
hand. These corridors were built upon beams 
that projected five or six feet beyond the tower, 
several of which kind are still to be seen upon 
Trajan's column. 

IX. Having thus described the principal 
machines made use of by the ancients in 
sieges, I now proceed to the attack and de- 
fence of places, which I shall treat in as brief 
a manner as possible, confining myself to the 
most essential parts. When cities were ex- 
tremely strong and populous, they were sur- 
rounded with an intrenchment on the side 
next the town, and another on that towards 
the country. These were called lines of cir- 
cumvallation and contravallation. The be- 
siegers pitched their camp between these two 
lines. Those of contravallation were against 
the besieged city, the others against attempts 
from without When it was foreseen that the 
siege would be of long duration, it was often 



changed into a blockade, and then the two 
lines in question were solid walls of strong 
masonry, flanked with towers at proper dis- 
tances. There is a remarkable example of 
this at the siege of Plataea by the Lacedaemo- 
nians and Thebans, of which Thucydides 
has left us a very particular account. The 
two surrounding lines were composed of 
two walls sixteen feet distant, and the soldiers 
lay in that space, which was divided into 
quarters: so that it might have been taken 
for only one wall with high towers from dis- 
tance to distance. These towers occupied 
the whole interval, in order to enable the 
besiegers to defend themselves at the same 
time against those within and those without. 
The quarters of the soldiers could not be 
gone round without crossing the towers, and 
the top of the wall was skirted with a parapet 
of osier. There was a ditch on each side, the 
earth of which had been used to make bricks 
for the wall. In this manner Thucydides de- 
scribes these two surrounding walls. which were 
of no great circumference, the city being very 
small. This siege, or rather blockade, was 
very famous among the ancients, and the 
more on account of the surprising escape of 
the garrison, notwithstanding all these for- 
tifications. For this purpose they applied 
ladders to the inward wall. After they had 
got upon the platform, and seized the two 
adjoining towers, they drew up the ladders, and 
let them down on the other side of the out- 
ward wall, by woich they descended to the 
bottom, drawing up in line of battle as fast as 
they came down. In this manner, by the 
favour of a dark night, they got safe to 
Athens. 

X. The camp of the Roman army before 
Xumantia, took up a much greater extent of 
ground. That city was four and twenty 
stadia in circumference, that is to say a league. 
I Scipio, when he invested it, caused a line of 
j circumvallation to be drawn, which inclosed 
] more than twice the ground the city stood 
i upon. When this work was finished, another 
line was thrown up against the besieged, at 
I a reasonable distance from the first, composed 
of a rampart of eight feet thick by ten high, 
which was strengthened with strong paU- 
j sades. The whole was flanked with towers 
of a hundred feet from each other. It is not 
easy to comprehend in what manner the Ro- 
mans completed these immense works ; a 



76 



THE ROMAN 



line of circumvallation of more than two 
leagues in compass ! but nothing is more cer- 
tain than the fact. He also erected four posts 
on the banks of the river Duaera, contiguous 
to the lines : and contrived a stoccado or chain 
of floating beams, pierced through cross-wise 
w^ith long stakes pointed with iron, to prevent 
barks from entering, and divers from getting 
any intelligence of what was doing in the 
cam p. 

XI. Caesar's circumvallation before Alesia, 
was formed of fascines instead of turf, with its 
parapet and fraise made of large stakes, whose 
branches were cut in points, and burnt at the 
ends, like stag's horns. They seemed like 
wings at the foot of the parapet, or like the 
oars of a galley inclining downwards. Of the 
same nature are the fraises of the moderns, 
that are far from being so well imagined, and are 
smooth-pointed palisades, bending downwards 
to prevent scaling. The moderns fix them in 
the same manner at the bottom of the parapet, 
where they form a kind of cincture very 
agreeable to the eye. The battlements men- 
tioned by Cffisar were like the modern em- 
brazures for cannon. Here the archers were 
placed. Upon the parapet of the towers, field 
balistae were planted to flank the works. 
Towers were not always of wood, but some- 
times of earth covered with turf, or strength- 
ened with fascines. 1'hey were much higher 
than the rest of the intrenchment, and some- 
times had towers of wood raised upon them 
for battering the places that commanded the 
camp. Some authors have believed, that these 
intrenchments and works of the ancients in 
the field, were perpendicular ; but that opinion 
is very absurd. These had a platform with its 
tains, or slope, and sometimes banquettes, in 
the form of steps for ascending ; besides which, 
at the towers, they were ways made to go up. 
All this was indispensably necessary in Css- 
sar's lines, as they were very high, to prevent 
the earth from faUing away. 

Xn. Thus much for the two lines of cir- 
cumvallation. We proceed now to the ground 
inclosed between the two fosses, which is far 
the most curious part of this celebrated block- 
ade, and will be best explained in Caesar's 
own words. " As the soldiers were employed 
at the same time to fetch wood and provisions 
from fl considerable distance, and to work at 
the fortifications, and the enemy often sallied 
at several gates to interrupt them ; Caesar 



found it necessary to make some addition to 
his lines, that they might not require so many 
men to guard them. He therefore took trees 
of no great height, or large branches, which 
he caused to be made sharp at the ends, and 
running a trench of five feet deep before the 
lines, he ordered them to be put into it, and 
made fast at bottom, so that they could not be 
pulled up. This trench was again filled up 
in a such a manner that nothing but the tops 
of the branches appeared, of which the points 
must have run into those who should have 
endeavoured to pass them. As there were 
five rows of them interwoven in a manner with 
each other, they were unavoidable. In the 
front of these he caused pits of three feet 
deep to be dug, in the form of the quincunx. 
In those pits he fixed strong stakes, burnt and 
sharpened at the top, which rose only four 
inches above the level of the ground, into 
which they were planted three feet deeper 
than the pits for the sake of firmness. The 
pits were covered over with bushes to deceive 
the enemy. There were eight rows of them, 
at the distance of three feet from each other. 
In the front of all he sowed the whole space 
between the pits and the advanced ditch, 
with crows-feet of an extraordinary size, which 
the soldiers called spurs." The other line, to 
prevent succours from without, was entirely 
the same with this. 

XIII. Though trenches, oblique lines, 
mines, and other the like inventions, seem 
neither often nor clearly expressed in authors, 
we can hardly suppose with reason, that they 
were not in use amongst the Greeks and 
Romans. Is it probable, that with the ancients, 
whose generals, among their other excellent 
qualities, had in an imminent degree that of 
taking great care to spare the blood and lives 
of their soldiers, approaches were made in 
besieging without any precautions against the 
machines of the besieged, whose ramparts 
were so well provided, and defence so bloody 1 
Though there were no mention of this in any 
of the historians, who might possibly in the 
description of sieges omit this circumstance, 
as well known to all the world ; we should 
not conclude that such able generals either 
did not know, or neglected things, on the one 
side so important, and on the other so easy ; 
and which must naturally have entered the 
thoughts of every man, ever so little versed 
in attacking places. But several historian* 



ART OF WAR. 



77 



speak of them ; of which one shall suffice for 
all the rest : this is Polybius, where he relates 
the siege of the city Echinna by Philip. 
He concludes the description of it with these 
words : " To cover from the arrows of the 
besieged, as well those that went from the 
camp to the works, as those who returned 
from the works to the camp, trenches were 
drawn from the camp to the tortoises, and 
those trenches covered at top." Long before 
Philip, Demetrius Poliorcetes, had used the 
same method at the siege of Rhodes. Dio- 
tJorus Siculus tells us, that famous warrior 
caused tortoises, and galleries cut in the earth, 
or covered mines, to be made, for communi- 
cation with the batteries of rams ; and ordered 
a trench, with blinds over head, to cover and 
secure the troops, in going and coming from 
the towers and tortoises. The seamen and 
marines were appointed for this service : the 
work was four stadia in length, that is to say, 
five hundred paces. 

XIV. But though their approaches were 
not entirely like those of the moderns, nor so 
deep in the earth, the fire from our works 
being of a quite different nature from that of 
the catajmUx and bulistx, though surprisingly 
violent, yet it is certain from the above ac- 
counts, and others that might be produced in 
great number, that they went under cover 
from their camp to their batteries, and used 
more or less precaution, according to the 
strength and valour of the besieged, and the 
number of their machines, by which they 
regulated the form of their approaches or 
trenches. These were of two sorts. The 
first were composed of a blind of hurdles or 
strong fascines, placed on the side of each 
other, without any space between them ; so 
that they formed a kind of wall of five or six 
feet high, with loop-holes cut from space to 
space, between the fascmes or through the 
hurdles. To support this blind, it is supposed 
they planted forked pieces of wood in the 
ground, upon which long poles were laid 
cross-wise, with the fascines or hurdles made 
fast to them. The other kind of approaches 
was very different from the former, and con- 
sisted of several trenches or galleries of com- 
munication covered at top, drawn in a right 
line from the camp to the works, or to the 
parallels, not much unlike ours. The galleries 
of communication were cut ten or twelve feet 
broad in the earth. The workmen threw up 



the earth on both sides, which they supported 
with fascines, and covered the space with hur- 
dles and earth laid upon poles and rafters. 
The whole length of these galleries in the 
earth, they cut loop-poles through the sides 
and issues to go out at. On the sides of 
those covered trenches or communications were 
esplanades, or places of arms which extended 
the whole front of the attack. These places 
were spacious, and capable of containing a 
great body of troops in order of battle ; for 
here they were posted to support their towers, 
tortoises, batteries of rams, balistas, and cata- 
pultas, against the sallies of the besieged. 

XV. The first parallel trench, next the 
body of the place, was drawn along the side of 
the fosse, and served as a communication to 
the battering towers and tortoises of the be- 
siegers. This sort of communications to the 
moving towers were sometimes covered at top 
by a blind of hurdles and fascines ; because as 
they ran along the side of the counterscarp, 
they were exposed to the downright discharges 
of the towers and ramparts of the besieged. 
Loop-holes were cut in the sides of them, 
through which the besiegers battered without 
intermission the works. These covered Unes 
served besides for filling up the fosses, and 
had passages of communication with the bat- 
tering tortoises cut in them, which tortoises 
were pushed forward upon the part of the fosse 
filled. When the walls of a place were not 
high, these trenches were not covered with 
blinds, either at top or in front, but only with 
a parapet of the earth dug out of them, like 
those of the moderns. At some distance from 
this parallel another was cut behind it, which 
left a space between them of the nature of our 
esplanades or places of arms. Here the bat- 
teries of balistas and catapultas were erected, 
which differed only from ours in being higher. 
There was sometimes a third upon the same 
parallel line. These places of arms contained 
all the troops that guarded the works. The 
lines communicated by the galleries or trenches 
covered at top. 

XVI. It is certain therefore the use of 
trenches was well known to the ancients, with- 
out which they could have formed no siege. 
The trenches are often mentioned in authors 
by the Latin word aggeres, which does not al- 
ways signify cavaliers or platforms. The ca- 
valiers were mounts of earth, on which ma- 
chines were planted, and were thrown up in 



78 



THE ROMAN 



the following manner. The work was begun 
at a small distance from that side of the fosse 
next the country. It was carried on under the 
cover of mantles, or moving sheds, of consi- 
derable height, behind which the soldiers 
worked in security from the machine of the 
besieged. This sort of mantles or galleries 
were not always composed of hurdles and fas- 
cines, but of raw hides, mattresses, or of a cur- 
tain made of strong cables, the whole suspended 
between very high masts fixed in the ground, 
which broke the force of whatever was dis- 
charged against it. The work was continued 
to the height of these suspended curtains, 
which were raised in proportion with it. At 
the same time the void spaces of the platform 
were filled up with stones, earth, and other 
materials ; whilst some were employed in le- 
velling and beating down the earth, to make it 
firm, and capable of sustaining the weight of 
the towers and machines to be planted upon it. 
From these towers and batteries of balistas and 
catapultas, a hail of stones, arrows, and large 
darts were discharged upon the ramparts and 
works of the besieged. 

XYn. The terrace which Alexander the 
Great caused to be raised against the rock of 
Corisnse was very surprising. That rock, which 
was supposed impregnable, was two thousand 
five hundred paces high, and seven or eight 
hundred round. It was excessively steep on 
all sides, having only one path hewn out of 
the rock, by which no more than one man 
could ascend without difficulty. It was besides 
surrounded with a deep abyss, which served 
instead of a fosse, and which it was necessary 
lo fill up, in order to approach it. All these 
difficulties were not capable of discouraging 
Alexander, to whose valour and fortune no- 
thing appeared impossible. He began there- 
fore by ordering the high fir-trees, that sur- 
rounded the place in great numbers, to be cut 
down, in order to use them as stairs to descend 
into the fosse. His troops worked night and 
day in filling it up. Though the whole army 
were employed in their turns at this work, 
they could do no more than thirty feet a day, 
and something less a night, so difficult was 
the work. When it was more advanced, and 
began to come nearer the due height, they 
drove piles into both sides of the fosse at pro- 
per distances from each other, with beams laid 
across, in order to support the weight to be 
laid on it. They then formed a kind of floor 



or bridge of wicker and fascines, which they 
covered with earth to equal the height of the 
side of the fosse, so that the army could ad- 
vance on a way even with the rock. Till then 
the barbarians had derided the undertaking, 
beUeving it utterly impracticable : but when 
they saw themselves exposed to the darts of 
the enemy, who worked upon their terrace be- 
hind the mantles, they began to lose courage, 
demanded to capitulate, and soon after sur- 
rendered the rock to Alexjinder. 

XVni. The filling up of the fosses was 
not always so difficult as in this instance, but 
never failed to require great precautions and 
labour. The soldiers worked under cover in 
the tortoises, and other the like machines. The 
fosses were filled up with stones, the trunks 
of trees, and fascines, the whole mingled with 
earth. It was necessary that these works 
should be of great solidity, to bear the prodi- 
gious weight of the machines planted upon 
them, which would have made them fall in, 
if this kind of causeway had been composed 
only of fascines. If the fosses were full of 
water, they began by drawing it ofi", either en- 
tirely or in part, by difierent drains which they 
cut for that purpose. 

XIX. Whilst the works were carrying on, 
the besieged were not idle. They ran many 
mines under the fosse to the part of it filled up, 
in order to carry ofi" the earth, which they 
handed from man to man into the city. This 
hindered the work from advancing, the be- 
sieged carrying off as fast as the besiegers laid 
on. They used also another more effectual 
stratagem, which was to cut large cavities 
underneath the works of the enemy. After 
having removed some of the earth without its 
being discovered, they supported the rest with 
props or large beams, which they smeared over 
with grease and other combustibles. They 
then filled up the void space between the props 
with dry wood, and snch things as would soon- 
est bum, and set them on fire. Hence, when 
the props gave way, the whole fell into a kind 
of gulf, with the tortoises, battering rams, and 
the men employed in working them. 

XX. The besiegers used the same artifice 
to make the walls of places fall down. When 
Darius besieged Chalcedon, the waUs were so 
strong, and the place so well provided of all 
necessaries, that the inhabitants were in no 
pain about the siege. The king did not make 
any approaches to the walls, nor lay waste the 



ART OF WAR. 



79 



country ; he lay still, as if he expected a con- 
siderable reinforcement. But whilst the pec- 
pie of Chalcedon had no other thought than 
that of guarding their walls, he opened, at the 
distance of three quarters of a league from the 
city, a mine, which the Persians carried on as 
far as the market-place. They judged them- 
selves directly under it, from the roots of the 
olive-trees which they knew grew there. They 
then opened their mine, and entering by that 
passage, took the place, whilst the besieged 
were still employed in keeping guard upon 
the walls. In the same mannpr, A. Servilius 
the dictator took the city Fidense, having 
caused several false attacks to be made on dif- 
ferent sides, whilst a mine carried on as far i 
as the citadel, opened him a passage there for 
his troops. Another dictator, the celebrated 
Camillus, could not terminate the long siege 
of Veii but by this stratagem. He undertook 
to run a mine as far as the citadel of that place ; 
and that the work might not be discontinued, 
nor the troops discouraged by the length of it, 
he divided them into six brigades, who re- 
lieved each other every six hours. The work 
being carried on night and day, it extended at 
length to the citadel, and the city was taken. 
At the siege of Athens, by Sylla, it is asto- 
nishing to consider the mines and countermines 
used on both sides. The miners were not long 
before they met and fought furiously under 
ground. The Romans having cut their way 
as far as the wall, sapped a great part of it, 
and supported it in a manner in the air on 
props of wood, to which they set fire without 
loss of time. The wall fell suddenly into the 
fosse with an incredible noise and ruins, and 
all that were upon it perished. 

XXI. The mines from the camp to the in- 
side of a place were long used before the in- 
vention of sapping, and consisted at first in 
only running the mine from the camp to the 
wall, and from thence a considerable way into 
the place, underneath some large temple, or 
other great building little frequented in the 
night. When they came thither they cut a 
large space, which they propped up with large 
timbers. They then opened a passage of the 
whole breadth of this space, for entering the 
place in great numbers, whilst the soldiers ad- 
vanced into it through the mine, with the ut- 
most diligence. The other kind of mines for 
sapping the foundation of a wall, were opened 
very near the camp to avoid being discovered. 



and were carried under the fosse to the foot of 
the wall, when they were enlarged to the right 
and left foundations. This latter part was 
made very large, to receive the great number 
of workmen, and long in proportion to the ex- 
tent of the wall to be thrown down. This 
being done, they began to sap at bottom, and 
as the stones were pulled out, and the work 
advanced, they propped the superstructure 
with timbers four feet high, which were fixed 
under the bottom stones of the foundation. 
As soon as the work was finished, they laid 
faggots and other combustibles between the 
props ; and after they had set them on fire 
they quitted that part of the mine, and repassed 
the fosse, to avoid being stifled with the smoke ; 
besides which, there was reason to fear, that 
the wall in falling would break into the mine, 
and bury all under in its ruins. 

XXII. The ancients used several methods 
to defend themselves against the enemy after 
the breach was made. Sometimes, but not so 
frequently, they made use of trees cut down, 
which they extended along the whole front of 
the breach very near each other, in order that 
the branches might mingle together ; they tied 
the trunks very firmly to one another, so that 
it was impossible to separate these trees, which 
formed an impenetrable fence, behind which a 
multitude of soldiers were posted, armed with 
pikes and long partizans. Sometimes the 
breaches were made so suddenly, either by 
saps above, or under ground, or by the violent 
blows of the rams, that the besieged often 
found their works laid open when they least 
thought of it. They had recourse on such 
occasions to a very simple refuge, in order to 
gain time to look about them, and to intrench 
behind the breach. They threw down upon 
the ruins of the wall a prodigious quantity of 
dry wood, and other combustible matter, to 
which they set fire. This occasioned so vio- 
lent a flame, that it was impossible for the be- 
siegers to pass through it, or approach the 
breach. The garrison of Haliartus in Boeotia 
thought of this remedy against the Romans. 

XXIII. But the most useful method was to 
erect new walls behind the breaches, which 
are now called retirades, or retrenchments. 
These works generally were not parallel with 
the ruined walls, but described a kind of semi- 
circle towards the place, of which the two 
ends joined the two sides of the wall that re- 
mained whole. Thev did not omit to cut a 



80 



THE ROMAN ART OF WAR. 



Tery large deep ditch before this work, in or- 
der that the besiegers might be under the ne- 
cessity of attacking it with no less diiBculty, 
and all the machines employed against the 
strongest walls. Sylla having beat down great 
part of the walls of the pirxum with his bat- 
tering rams, caused the breach to be imme- 
diately attacked, where so furious a battle en- 
sued, that he was obliged to sound a retreat. 
The besieged, improving the opportunity this 
gave them, immediately ran a second wall be- 
hind the breach. Sylla perceiving it, made his 
machines advance to batter it, rightly judging, 
that being newly built, it could not resist their 
violence. The effect answered with no great 
difficulty, and he immediately ordered the as- 
sault to be given. The action was warm and 
vigorous, but he was at last repulsed with loss, 
and obliged to abandon his design. History 
abounds with examples of this kind. 

XXIV. Having thus given some account 
of the fortifications of the ancients, described 
the principal machines made use of by them in 
their sieges, and explained their conduct in 
the Attack and Defence of Places ; I might 
here, agreeably to what I have done in the 
chapter upon Battles, entertain the reader 
with a description of some of the most cele- 



brated sieges of antiquity, in order to give him 
the juster idea of this part of war. But as this 
would too much swell the Discourse, and is 
besides rather curious than useful, because of 
the great changes that have been introduced 
by the invention of artillery and gunpowder, 
I shall content myself with referring to the 
historians themselves, where these sieges are 
related at large. Thucydides, Polybius, Livy, 
and Josephus furnish abundant examples of 
this kind. The most curious and remarkable 
are those of Platsea by the Lacedaemonians 
and Thebans ; of Syracuse by the Athenians ; 
of Lilybaeum, Syracuse, Carthage, and Nu- 
mantia by the Romans ; but, above all, of Alesia 
by Julius Ca3sar, and of Jerusalem by Titus 
Vespasian. These two last are so minutely 
and circumstantially described ; the one by 
Caesar, who formed and conducted it; the 
other by Josephus, who was an eye-witness 
of all that passed, that whoever peruses them 
attentively will meet with every thing that is 
worth knowing upon this subject, and be 
enabled to form a clear and comprehensive 
judgment of the high degree of perfection to 
which the ancients, and in particular the Ro- 
mans, had carried this important branch of 
the Art of War. 



CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 



HIS WARS IN GAUL. 



BOOK I. 



8* 



M 



81 



THE ARGUMENT. 

I. Description and division of Gfaul.— U. Design by the Helvetians of invading it.— III. Preparations. — V. Dif- 
ficulties.— VH. March. — Vlll. Caesar's resolution to hinder it.— X. He attacks and defeats them at the river 
Arar. — XI. Their embassy to Caesar, and his answer. — ilV. Caesar reduced to great straits for want of corn; 
by the perfidy of Dumnorix the .Slduan ; whom nevertheless he pardons. — X^TI. Caesar defeats the Helvetians 
in a second battle. — XXI. They surrender, and are obliged to return to their own country. — XMl. The Gauls 
congratulate Caesar upon his victory. — \ \ 1 1 1 . And complain to him of the irruption of the Germans into Gaul, 
under Ariovistus.— XXTV. Caesar's embassy to Ariovistus.— XXVII. His answer.— XX Vlil. Caesar leads his 
army against Ariovistus. — XTY . The consternation that seizes his troops. — XX Xi. He animates them by a 
speech. — x \ XI TT. Interview between Caesar and Ariovistus. — XXXITI. Breaks oflF by the approach of the 
German cavalry. — x x x vilT. Perfidy and cruelty of Ariovistus. — XXXTX. Caesar and Ariovistus prepare for 
battle. — Manner of fighting in use among the German horse. — ^XLI. Caesar defeats the Germans with great 
slaughter, obliges them to pass the Rhine ; and by one battle puts an end to the war. 



C^SAR S COMMENTARIES 



HIS WARS IN GAUL. 



BOOK I. 



I. The whole country of Gaul is divided into 
three parts : of which the Belgians inhabit 
one ; the Aquitains another ; and a people 
called in their own language Celts, in ours 
Gauls, the third. These all differ from each 
other in their language, customs, and laws. 
The Gauls are divided from the Aquitains by 
the river Garonne, and by the Marne and the 
Seine from the Belgians. Of all these na- 
tions the Belgians are the most warlike : as 
being farthest removed from the culture and 
refinements of the province, and but little re- 
sorted to by merchants, who furnish the means 
of luxury and voluptuousness. They are also 
situated next to the Germans, who inhabit be- 
yond the Rhine, with whom they are conti- 
nually engaged in war. For this reason like- 
wise the Helvetians are distinguished by their 
bravery beyond the rest of the Gauls ; because 
they are almost constantly at war with the 
Germans, either for the defence of their own 
territories, or acting themselves as the ag- 
gressors. One of these divisions, that which 
we have said was possessed by the Gauls, 
begins at the river Rhine, and is bounded by 
the Garonne, the Ocean, and the territories of 
the Belgians. It touches also, towards the 
Helvetians and Sequani, upon the river Rhine, 
extending itself northward. The country of 
the Belgians, commencing from the remotest 
confines of Gaul, stretches as far as the lower 
Rhine, running all the way between the 
north and east. Aquitain extends from the 
Garonne to the Pyrenean mountains, and that 
part of the ocean which borders upon Spain. 
Its situation is north-west. 



II. Orgetorix was by far the richest and 
most illustrious of the Helvetians. This no- 
bleman, in the consulship of M. Messala and 
M. Piso, prompted by an aspiring ambition, 
formed a confederacy of the principal men of 
the state ; and persuaded the people to quit 
their country in a body, representing, " That 
as they surpassed all the nations around them 
in valour, it would be easy for them to gain 
the entire sovereignty of Gaul." He the 
sooner brought them into this design, because 
the Helvetians, by the nature of their situa- 
tion, are every where confined within very 
narrow territories : on one side by the Rhine, 
a broad and deep river, which separates their 
country from that of the Germans ; on the 
other by Mount Jura, a high ridge of hills, 
which runs between them and the Sequani ; 
lastly, by the Lake Lemanus, and the river 
Rhone, which is the boundary on the side of 
the Roman province. By this means it hap- 
pened, that they could not so easily enlarge 
their territories, or make conquests on the 
neighbouring states ; which, to men of a war- 
like spirit, and fond of fighting, was abundant 
cause of discontent: for being a numerous 
people, and of great fame for their bravery, 
they thought themselves much too strained in 
a country, which was but two hundred and 
forty miles in length, and about one hundred 
and eighty in breadth. 

III. Urged by these considerations, and still 
more by the authority and persuasions of Or- 
getorix, they resolved to provide every thing 
necessary for an expedition ; to buy up a 
great number of wagons and carriage-horses : 

83 



84 



CiESAR'S 



to form large magazines of corn, that they 
nught have sufBcient to supply them in their 
march ; to establish peace and amity with the 
neighbouring states. They imagined two 
years would be sufficient for these prepara- 
tions, and obliged themselves by a lavr to be- 
gin tlieir march on the third. The whole ma- 
nagement of this design was committed to 
Orgetorix, who undertook an embassy to the 
neighbouring states. On this occasion he 
persuaded Casticus, the son of Cataman- 
tales, of the nation of the Sequani, whose 
father had for many years enjoyed the sove- 
reignty over that people, and been styled friend 
and ally by the senate of Rome, to possess 
iiimself of the supreme authority in his own 
country, which his father had held before him. 
He likewise persuaded Dumnorix the iEduan, 
the brother of Divitiacus, who was at that time 
the leading man in his own state, and greatly 
beloved by the people, to attempt the same 
among the -■Eduans : and the more to secure 
him to his interest, gave him his daughter in 
marriage. He told them, " That they might 
with the greatest facility accomplish their 
designs ; as he was himself assured of attain- 
ing the supreme authority in his own state, 
which was without dispute the most powerful 
and considerable of all Gaul ; and would then 
employ his whole interest and forces, to esta- 
blish them in their respective sovereignties." 
Moved by these considerations, they recipro- 
cally bound themselves by a solemn oath ; 
not doubting, when they had once attained 
the chief sway in their several states, with the 
united forces of three such powerful and 
mighty nations, to render themselves masters 
of all Gaul. The Helvetians having notice 
of this design, obliged Orgetorix, according to 
the custom of their country, to answer to the 
charge brought against him in chains : and 
had he been found guilty, the law condemned 
him to be burnt alive. On the day appointed for 
his trial, he assembled all his slaves and do- 
mestics, amounting to ten thousand men ; and 
all his clients and debtors, of which the num- 
ber was very great : by their means he rescued 
himself out of the hands of his judges. While 
the people, provoked at this contempt of 
the laws, were preparing to support their 
authority by force, and the magistrates had 
assembled a great number of men for that 
purpose, Orgetorix died; nor are the Hel- 



vetians without suspicion of his having made 

away with himself. 

IV. After his death, the Helvetians still 
continued to prosecute, with the same dili- 
gence, the design they had formed of quitting 
their country. When they had completed 
their preparations, they set fire to all their 
towns, to the number of twelve; to their 
boroughs and villages, which amounted to 
four hundred ; and to their other private 
buildings. They likewise burnt all their 
corn, except what they had resolved to carry 
along with them ; that, having no hope of re- 
turning to their own country, they might be 
the more disposed to confront all dangers. 
Each man had orders to carry out with him 
provisions for three months. The Rauraci, 
Tulingians, and Latobrigians, neighbouring 
nations, being persuaded to follow the same 
counsel, likewise set fire to their towns and 
villages, and joined with them in the ex- 
pedition. The Boians too, who had formerly 
inhabited beyond the Rhine, and passing over 
into Noricum, had settled in that country, and 
possessed themselves of Noreia, its capital 
city, were associated into the design. 

V. There were only two ways by which 
they could march out of their own country. 
One through the territories of the Sequani, 
between Mount Jura and the Rhone, narrow 
and difficult, insomuch that in some places a 
single file of wagons could hardly pass. The 
impending mountain was besides very high 
and steep,; so that a Jiandful of joftn v?as suf- 
ficient to stop them. ) The other lay through 
our province, far easier and readier ; because 
the Rhone, which flows between the con- 
fines of the Helvetians and Allobrogians, a 
people lately subjected to the Romans, was 
in some places fordable ; and Geneva, a 
frontier town of the Allobrogians, adjoining 
to the territories of the Helvetians, had a 
bridge belonging to this last people. They 
therefore doubted not, either of persuading 
the Allobrogians, who as yet seemed to bear 
no great affection to the people of Rome, or 
at least of obliging them by force, to grant 
them a passage through their territories. Every 
thing being now ready for the expedition, 
they appointed a day for their general ren- 
dezvous on the banks of the Rhone. The 
day fixed on was the twenty-eighth of March, 
in the Consulship of L, Piso and A. Gabinius. 



COMMENTARIES. 



85 



VI. CsEsar having notice of these proceed- 
ings, and that it was the design of the Helve- 
tians to attempt a passage through the pro- 
vince, hastened his departure from Rome ; 
and posting by great journeys into farther 
Gaul, came to Geneva. He began with 
breaking down the bridge over the Rhone ; 
and as there was at that time but one Roman 
legion in Transalpine Gaul, he ordered great 
levies to be made throughout the whole pro- 
vince. The Helvetians being informed of 
j^s arrival, deputed several noblemen of the 
first rank, with Numcius and Verodoctius at 
their head, to wait upon him in the name of 
the stSfe, and represent, " That they meant 
not to offer the least injury to the Roman 
province ; that necessity alone had determined 
them to the design of passing through it, be- 
cause they had no other way by which to 
direct their march ; that they therefore en- 
treated they might have his permission for 
that purpose." But Caesar, bearing in mind 
that L. Cassius the consul had been slain, 
and his army routed, and made to pass under 
the yoke, by the Helvetians, did not think 
proper to grant their request. Neither could 
he persuade himself, that men so ill affected 
to the people of Rome, if permitted to pass 
through the province, would abstain from 
acts of hostility and violence. However, that 
he might gain time, till the troops he had or- 
dered to be raised could assemble, he told the 
ambassadors he would consider of their de- 
mand ; and that if they returned by the nine- 
teenth of April they should have his final an- 
swer. Meanwhile, with the legion he then 
had, and the soldiers that came in to him from 
all parts of the province, he ran a wall sixte.en 
feet high, and nineteen miles in length, with 
a ditch from the lake Lemanus, into which 
the Rhone discharges itself, to mount .Tura, 
which divides the territories of the Sequani 
from the Helvetians. This work finished, he 
raised redoubts from space to space, and 
manned them with troops, that if the enemy 
should attempt to force a passage, he might 
be in a condition to hinder them. When the 
day appointed came, and the ambassadors re- 
turned for an answer, he told them that he 
could not, consistent with the usage and be- 
haviour of the people of Rome on the like 
occasions, grant any troops a passage through 
the province : and should they attempt it by 



force, he let them see he was prepared to op- 
pose them. 

VH. The Helvetians, driven from 'his hope, 
endeavoured to force the passage of the river; 
some with boats coupled together, or floats, 
which they had prepared in great numbers : 
others by the fords of the Rhone, where was 
the least depth of water ; sometimes by day, 
but oftener in the night ; but being repulsed 
by the strength of the works, the concourse 
of the troops, and the discharge of darts, they 
at last abandoned the attempt. There was 
still one way left, through the territories of 
the Sequani, by which, however, without the 
consent of the natives, they could not march, 
because of the narrowness of the pass. As 
they were not able to prevail by their own 
application, they sent ambassadors to Dum- 
norix the ^duan, that through his interces- 
sion they might obtain this favour of the 
Sequani. Dumnorix by his popularity and 
generosity had great influence with the Se- 
quani, and was also well affected to the Hel- 
vetians, because from among them he had 
married the daughter of Grgetorix. Besides, 
urged by ambitious views, he was framing to 
himself schemes of power, and wanted to 
have as many slates as possible bound to him 
by oflices of kindness. He therefore charged 
himself with the negotiation, obtained for the 
Helvetians the liberty of passing through the 
territories of the Sequani, and engaged the 
two nations mutually to give hostages : the 
Sequani, not to molest the Helvetians in 
their march ; and the Helvetians, to pass 
without offering any insult or injury to the 
country. 

VIH. Caesar soon had intelligence of their 
march, and that they now designed to pass 
through the country of the Sequani and 
^duans into the territories of the Santones, 
which border upon those of the Tolosatians, 
a state that makes part of the Roman province. 
Should this happen, he foresaw many incon- 
veniences likely to arise, from the neighbour- 
hood of a warlike and disaffected people, in 
an open and plentiful country. For these 
reasons he gave the command of the new 
works he had raised to T. Labienus his 
lieutenant, and he himself hastened by great 
journeys into Italy. There he raised two 
legions, and drew three more, that were can- 
toned round Aquileia, out of their winter-quar- 



86 



CtESAR'S 



ters : and with these five legions, took the 
nearest way over the Alps into farther Gaul. 
The Centroncs, Graioceli, and Caturigians, 
seizing the higher ground, endeavoured to op- 
pose his march ; but having repulsed them in 
several encounters, he, in seven days after set- 
ting out from Ocelum, a city in the extreme 
confines of the nearer province, arrived among 
the Vocontians, whose territories lie within 
the farther province. Thence he led his army 
into the country of the Allobrogians ; and 
crossing their territories, entered upon the 
lands of the Segusians. These are the first on 
the other side the Ehone, beyond the bounda- 
ries of the Roman province. 

IX. The Helvetians had by this time 
marched their forces through the narrow pass 
of Mount Jura, and the territories of the Se- 
quani ; and were come into the country of the 
iEduans, plundering their lands. The ^du- 
ans, unable to defend themselves and posses- 
sions from the violence of their enemies, sent 
ambassadors to Cssar to request aid. They 
told him, « That such at all times had been 
their merit with the people of Rome, that they 
might challenge greater regard, than to have 
their lands laid waste, their children led into 
captivity, and their towns assaulted and taken, 
almost in the very sight of a Roman army." 
At the same time also the Ambarri, friends 
and allies of the ^duans, sent to inform him, 
" That compelled to abandon the open coun- 
try, they could hardly defend their towns from 
the rage of the enemy." The Allobrogians 
likewise, who had dwellings and possessions 
beyond the Rhone, fled to him for protection, 
and assured him, " That there was nothing 
left them but a naked and desolate country." 
Whereupon Ceesar, moved by these complaints 
and remonstrances, resolved not to wait till the 
fortunes of his allies should be consumed, and 
the Helvetians arrive in the territories of the 
Santones. 

X. The river Arar flows into the Rhone, 
through the confines of the ^Eduans and Se- 
quani, with a current incredibly smooth and 
gentle, insomuch that it is impossible to dis- 
tinguish by the eye, which way its waters 
glide. The Helvetians were at this time em- 
ployed in passing it on floats and a bridge of 
boats. When Ccesar was informed, by his 
spies, that three parts of their forces were got 
over the river, and that the fourth still re- 
mained on this side, he left the camp about 



midnight with three legions, and came up with 
the party of the enemy that had not yet passed. 
As he found them unprepared, and encumbered 
with their baggage, he attacked them imme- 
diately, and killed a great number on the spot. 
The rest fled and sheltered themselves in the 
nearest woods. This was called the Tigurine 
Canton, being one of the four into which the 
whole body of the Helvetians are divided. 
This very canton, in the memory of our fathers, 
marching out of their own territories, had van- 
quished and killed the Consul L. Cassius, an^^ 
obliged his army to pass under the yoke. 
Thus, whether by chance or the direction of 
the immortal gods, that part of the Helvetian 
state which had brought so signal a calamity 
upon tire Roman people, were the first to feel 
the weight of their resentment. In this Cae- 
sar avenged not only the public, but likewise 
his own domestic injuries : because in the 
same battle with Cassius, was slain also L. 
Piso, his lieutenant, the grandfather of L. 
Piso, Csesar's father-in-law. 

XI. After this battle, that he might come 
up with the remaining forces of the Helve- 
tians, he caused a bridge to be made across 
the Arar, and carried over his army. The 
Helvetians, dismayed at his sudden approach, 
as he had spent only one day in passing the 
river, which they had with the utmost difliiculty 
accomplished in twenty, sent an embassy to 
him, at the head of which was Divico, who 
had been general of the Helvetians in the war 
against Cassius. He addressed Csesar to this 
effect : " That if the people of Rome were 
disposed to conclude a peace with the Helve- 
tians, they would go and settle in whatever 
country Caesar should think fit to assign them ; 
but if they persisted in the design of making 
war, he would do well to call to mind the an- 
cient disgrace of the Roman people, and the 
valour of the Helvetic nation : that in having 
surprised one of the cantons, while the others, 
who had passed the river, could not return to 
succour it, there was no reason to be much 
elated on the advantage, nor to despise his 
enemies : that the Helvetians had learned of 
their ancestors, to depend more on courage 
than on cunning and ambushes ; and it there- 
fore imported him to beware, not to render the 
place where they were then posted, famous 
and memorable with posterity, by a new de- 
feat of the Roman people, and the destruction 
of their army." 



COMMENTARIES. 



87 



XII, To this Csesar replied : " That he 
therefore the less doubted of the issue, as he 
well knew all the circumstances of the affair 
to which the Helvetians referred ; and resented 
them the more strongly, as they had happened 
undeservedly to the Roman people ; that had 
they been conscious of any injury on their 
side, it would have been easy for them to have 
kept upon their guard ; but herein were they 
deceived, that neither did they know of any 
thing which might give them cause of fear, 
nor could they apprehend they had any thing 
to fear, without cause : that supposing him in- 
clined to overlook old injuries, could they e? 
pect he would also forget their late i#Bu 
attempting, against his will, to force a pas^ 
sage through the province, and laying waste 
the territories of the ^duans, Ambarri, and 
Allobrogians ■? That their boasting so inso- 
lently of their victory, and wandering that 
vengeance had been deferred so long, werp a 
new set of provocations. But they ought to 
remember, that the immortal gods were some- 
times wont to grant long impunity, and a great 
run of prosperity to men, whom they pursued 
with the punishment of their crimes, that by 
the sad reverse of their condition, vengeance 
might fall the heavier. Though these were 
just grounds of resentment, yet, if they would 
satisfy the ^duans and their allies for the 
ravages committed in their country, as likewise 
the Allobrogians, and give hostages for the 
performance of their promises, he was ready to 
conclude a peace with them." Divico re- 
plied, " That such were the institutions of 
the Helvetians, derived from their ancestors, 
that they had been accustomed to receive, 
not to give hostages ; and that nobody knew 
it better than the Romans." Having returned 
this answer, he departed. 

XIII. The next day they decamped. Cje- 
sar did the same ; and ordered all the cavalry, 
whom, to the number of four thousand, he 
had raised in the province, and drawn toge- 
ther from the ^duans and their allies, to go 
before, and observe the enemy's march. But 
pressing too close upon their rear, they were 
obliged to engage in a disadvantageous place, 
and lost a few men. The Helvetians, encour- 
aged by this success, as having, with no more 
than five hundred horse, repulsed so great a 
multitude, began to face us more boldly, and 
sometimes to sally from their rear, and attack 
our van. Caesar kept back his men from fight- 




ing ; thinking it sufficient for the present, to 
straiten the enemy's forages, and prevent their 
ravaging and plundering the country. In this 
manner the armies marched for fifteen days to- 
gether ; insomuch that between our van, and 
the rear of the Helvetians, the distance did 
not exceed five or six miles. 

XIV. In the meantime Caesar daily pressed 
the ^duans for the corn which they had 
promised in the name of the public. For, by 
reason of the coldness of the climate, (Gaul, as 
we have said, lying considerably to the north,) 
he was so far from finding the corn ripe in the 

that there was not even sufiicient for- 
,the horses. Neither could he make 
hose supplies which came to him by 
the way of the Arar, because the Helvetians 
had turned off from the river, and he was de- 
termined not to leave them. The JEduans 
put him off from day to day with fair speeches ; 
sometimes pretending that it was bought up, 
and ready to be sent ; sometimes, that it was 
actually on the way. But when he saw no 
end of these delays, and that the day approached 
for delivering out corn to the army, calling 
together their chiefs, of whom he had a great 
number in his camp ; among the rest Diviti- 
acus, and Liscus their supreme magistrate, 
who is styled Vergobret in the language of 
the country, and created yearly, with a power 
of life and death ; he severely inveighed against 
them : " That at a time when corn was nei- 
ther to be procured for money, nor had out of 
the fields, in so urgent a conjuncture, and while 
the enemy was so near, they had not taken 
care to supply him :" adding, " that as he had 
engaged in that war chiefly at their request, 
he had the greatest reason to complain of their 
abandoning him." 

XV. Upon this, Liscus, moved by Csesar's 
speech, thought proper to declare what he had 
hitherto concealed : " That there were some 
among them whose authority with the people 
was very great ; and who, though but private 
men, had yet more power than the magistrates 
themselves. That these, by artful and seditious 
speeches, alarmed the multitude, and persuaded 
them to keep back their corn ; insinuating, 
that if their own state could not obtain the so- 
vereignty of Gaul, it would be better for them 
to obey the Helvetians, Gauls like themselves, 
than the Romans ; there not being the least 
reason to question, but these last, after having 
subdued the Helvetians, would, along with 



CESAR'S 



. ay^|d|g''^ith( 



the rest of Gaul, deprive the .Eduaiis also of 
their liberty. That the very same men gave 
intelligence to the enemy of all the designs of 
the Romans, and whatsoever was transacted 
in their camp ; his authority not being suf- 
ficient to restrain them. Nay, that though 
compelled by necessity, he had now made a 
discovery of the whole matter to Caesar, he 
was not ignorant of the danger to which he 
exposed himself by such a conduct ; and had, 
for that reason, chosen to be silent, as long as 
he thought it consistent with the safety of the 
state." Cffisar perceived that Dumnorix, the 
brother of Divitiacus, was pointed at 
speech. But as he was unwilling 
matters should be debated in the pr 
so many witnesses, he speedily dismissed the 
council, retaining only Liscus. He then ques- 
tioned him apart on what he had just said, 
and was answered with greater courage and 
freedom. He put the same questions to others 
also in private, who all confirmed the truth of 
what had been told him : That Dumnorix was a 
man of an enterprising spirit, fond of revolu- 
tions, and in great favour with the people, be- 
cause of his liberality : that he had for many 
years farmed the customs, and other public re- 
venues of the JEduans, at a very low price ; 
no one daring to bid against him : that by this 
means he had considerably increased his es- 
tate, and was enabled to extend his bounty to 
all about him ; that he constantly kept a great 
number of horsemen in pay, who attended him 
wherever he went ; that his interest was not 
confined merely to his own country, but ex- 
tended likewise to the neighbouring states : 
that the better to support this interest, he had 
married his mother to a man of principal rank 
and authority among the Biturigians, had him- 
self taken a wife from among the Helvetians, 
and matched his sister and the rest of his kin- 
dred into other the most powerful states ; that 
he favoured and wished well to the Helve- 
tians, on the score of that alliance, and per- 
sonally hated Casar and the Romans, because 
by their arrival his power had been diminished, 
and Divitiacus his brother restored to his for- 
mer credit and authority : that should the Ro- 
mans be overthrown he was in great hopes of 
obtaining the sovereignty, by means of the 
Helvetians. On the contrary, should they 
prevail, he must not only give up these hopes, 
but even all expectation of retaining the in- 
fluence he had already acquired." Csesar like- 



wise found, upon inquiry, that in the last en 
gagement of the horse, Dumnorix, who com- 
manded the ^duan cavalry, was the first 
that fled, and by that flight struck a terror into 
the rest of the troops. 

XVI. These things appearing, and other 
undoubted circumstances concurring to height- 
en his suspicion ; that he had procured for the 
Helvetians a passage through the territories 
of the Sequani ; that he had effected an ex- 
change of hostages between the two nations ; 
that he had done all this not only without per- 
mission from him, or his own state, but even 
"without their knowledge and participation ; 
he'^was accused by the chief magistrate 

the ^duans : they seemed altogether a suf- 
ficient ground to Csesar, why he should either 
himself take cognizance of the matter, or order 
the state to proceed against him. One thing, 
however, still kept him in suspense ; the con- 
sideration of his brother Divitiacus, a man 0/ 
singular probity, justice, and moderation; a 
faithful ally of the Roman people, and on the 
foot of friendship with Csesar. That he might 
not therefore give offence to one for whom he 
had so great a value ; before he took any fur- 
ther step in the affair, he sent for Divitiacus ; 
and having removed the usual interpreters, ad- 
dressed him by C. Valerius Procillus, a prince 
of the province of Gaul, his intimate friend, in 
whom he reposed the greatest confidence. He 
put him in mind of what had been said of Dum- 
norix in his own presence in the council of the 
Gauls, and repeated the fresh complaints 
made to himself against him in private. He 
urged, and even requested, that without of- 
fence to him, he might either proceed against 
him himself, or order the state to take the mat- 
ter under consideration. Divitiacus, embracing 
Csesar with many tears, begged him not to 
take any severe resolution against his brother. 
« He was sensible," he told him, « of the truth 
of all that was alleged, and had himself more 
reason to be dissatisfied than any man : that at 
a time when his authority was great, both at 
home and in the other provinces of Gaul, and 
his brother but little considered on account of 
his youth, he had used his interest to bring 
him into credit ; that though Dumnorix had 
made use of that power acquired by his means 
to diminish his favour with the people, and 
even to urge on his ruin, he nevertheless still 
found himself swayed by his aflection, and 
a regard for the esteem of the public : that 



COMMENTARIES. 



89 



should his brother meet with any rigorous 
treatment from Caesar, while he himself pos- 
sessed so large a share of his favour, all men 
would believe it done with his consent, and 
the minds of the Gauls be for ever alienated 
from him." Caesar observing his concern, 
took him by the hand, comforted him, desired 
him to make an end of speaking, assured him, 
that such was his regard for him, he would 
for his sake overlook not only his own inju- 
ries, but even those of the republic. He then 
sent for Dumnorix, called him into his bro- 
ther's presence, declared the subjects of com- 
plaint he had against him, mentioned what he 
himself knew, what was laid to his charge by 
the state, and admonished him for the future 
to avoid all cause of suspicion ; adding, that 
he would forgive what was past, for the sake 
of his brother Divitiacus. He appointed, how- 
ever, some to have an eye over him, that he 
might be informed of his behaviour, and of 
those he conversed with. 

XVH. The same day, having learned, by 
his scouts, that the enemy had posted them- 
selves under a hill about eight miles from his 
camp, he sent out a party to view the ground, 
and examine the ascent of the hill. These re- 
porting it to be extremely easy, he detached 
T. Labienus, his lieutenant, about midnight, 
with two legions, and the same guides who 
had examined the ground the day before ; and 
having acquainted him with his design, or- 
dered him to get possession of the top of the 
hill. He himself set out three hours after, with 
the rest of the army, by the same route the 
Helvetians had taken, and sent all the cavalry 
before. P. Considius, an officer of reputation, 
who had served in the army of L. Sylla, and 
afterwards that of M. Crassus, advanced with 
a small party, to get intelligence. J. 
y XVni. At day-break when Labienus had 
i got possession of the top of the hill, and Cssar 
was within a mile and a half of the enemy's 
camp ; while they in the meantime, as he af- 
terwards learnt from his prisoners, knew 
nothing either of his, or Labienus's approach, 
Considius came galloping back, and assured 
Caesar, that the summit of the mountain was 
possessed by the enemy, and that he had seen 
the Gallic arms and ensigns there. Casar re- 
tired to a neighbouring hill, and drew up his 
men in order of battle. Labienus, whose in- 
structions were, not to engage the enemy till 
he saw the rest of the army approaching their 
9 



camp, that the attack might be made on all 
sides at the same time, having gained the top 
of the hill, waited the arrival of our men, with- 
out stirring from his post. At length, when 
the day was far spent, Csesar understood by 
his spies, that Labienus was in possession of 
the mountain, that the enemy had decamped, 
and that Considius, blinded by fear, had re- 
ported what he never saw. The rest of that 
day he followed the enemy at the usual distance, 
and encamped within three miles of them. 

XIX. The day after, as the time drew near 
for delivering out corn to the army, and as he 
was not above eighteen miles from Bibracte, 
the capjlt^l of the J3duans, where he hoped to 
find siigpient supplies for the subsistence of 
his troops, he quitted the pursuit of the Hel- 
vetians, and directed his march thither. The 
enemy, being informed of this motion by 
some deserters, who had belonged to the troop 
of L. Emilius, an officer of horse among the 
Gauls, and either ascribing it to fear in the 
Romans, the rather, because they had not at- 
tacked them the day before, though possessed 
of the higher ground ; or flattering themselves 
with the hopes of intercepting their provisions, 
all on a sudden changed their resolution, and 
instead of continuing their former march, be- 
gan to pursue and harass our rear. Caesar ob- 
serving this, retired to a neighbouring hill, and 
sent his cavalry to sustain the charge of the 
enemy. In the meantime he drew up his four 
veteran legions in three lines towards the mid- 
dle of the hill ; in such a manner, that the two 
legions newly raised in Cisalpine Gaul, and 
all the auxiUaries, were posted above them ; 
and the whole mountain was covered with his 
troops. He ordered all the baggage to be 
brought into one place, and committed it to 
the charge of those who stood on the upper 
part of the hill. The Helvetians following 
with all their forces, drew their carriages like-, 
wise into one place ; and having repulsed our 
cavalry, and formed themselves into a phalaiu', 
advanced in close order to attack our van. 

XX. Cffisar having first sent away his own 
horse, and afterwards those of all his officers, 
that by making the danger equal, no hope 
might remain but in victory, encouraged his 
men, and began the charge. The Romans, 
who fought with the advantage of the higher 
ground, pouring their darts upon the enemy 
from above, easily broke their phalanx ; and. 
then fell upon them sword in hand. Wha,(; 
N 



90 



C iE S A R ' S 



greatly encumbered the Gauls in this fight, 1 
was, that their targets being many of them 
pierced and pinned together by the javelins 
of the Romans, they could neither draw out 
the javelins, because forked at the extremity, 
nor act with agility in the battle, because de- 
prived in a manner of the use of their left arms : 
so that many, after long tossing their targets to 
and fro to no purpose to disengage them, chose 
rjther to throw them away, and expose them- 
selves without defence to the weapons of their 
enemies. At length, however, being over- 
powered with wounds, they began to give 
ground ; and observing a mountain at about a 
mile's distance, gradually retreated thither. 
Having gained the mountain, and our men 
pursuing theai, the Boians and Tulingians, 
who, to the number of fifteen thousand, co- 
vered their retreat, and served as a guard to 
their rear, falling upon the Romans in flank as 
they advanced, began to surround them. This 
being perceived by the Helvetians, who had 
retired to the mountain, they again returned 
upon us, and renewed the fight. The Ro- 
mans facing about, charged the enemy in 
three bodies ; their first and second line mak- 
ing head against those who had been forced 
to retreat, and their third sustaining the as- 
sault of the Boians and Tulingians. The 
battle was bloody, and continued for a long 
time doubtful ; but the enemy being at last 
obliged to give way, one part withdrew to- 
wards the hill whither they had before re- 
treated, and the rest sheltered themselves be- 
hind the carriages. During this whole ac- 
tion, though it lasted from one o'clock in the 
afternoon till evening, no man saw the back 
of an enemy. The fight was renewed with 
great obstinacy at the carriages, and continued 
till the night was far spent ; for the Gauls 
making use of their carts by way of a rampart, 
darted their javelins upon us from above ; 
and some thrusting their lances through the 
wheels of the wagons, wounded our men. 
After a long dispute, we at last got possession 
of their baggage and camp. A son and 
daughter of Orgetorix were found among the 
prisoners. Only a hundred and twenty thou- 
sand of the enemy survived this defeat ; who, 
retreating all that night, and continuing their 
march without intermission, arrived on the 
fourth day in the territories of the Lingones. 
The Romans meanwhile made no attempt to 
pursue them ; the care of their wounded, and 



of burying their dead, obliging them to con- 
tinue upon the spot three days. Caesar sent 
letters and messengers to the Lingones, not 
to furnish them with corn or other necessaries, 
if they would avoid drawing upon themselves 
the same treatment with the fugitives ; and 
after a repose of three days, set forward to 
pursue them with all his forces. 

XXI. The Helvetians, compelled by an 
extreme want of all things, sent ambassadors 
to him to treat about a surrender. These 
meeting him on the way, and throwing them- 
selves at his feet, in suppliant terms, and with 
many tears, begged for peace. Cssar gave 
them no express answer at that time ; only 
ordered the Helvetians to wait for him in the 
place where they then were, which they did 
accordingly. Upon his arrival, he demanded 
hostages, their arms, and the slaves who had 
deserted to their camp. As the execution of 
all this took up some time, about four thou- 
sand men of the canton called Urbigenus, 
either fearing punishment, should they deliver 
up their arms, or induced by the hopes of 
escaping, because in so great a multitude they 
fancied their flight might be concealed, nay, 
perhaps remain altogether unknown, stole out 
of the camp in the beginning of the night, 
and took the route of Germany and the Rhine. 
Caesar being informed of it, despatched orders 
to those through whose territories they must 
pass, to stop and send them back wherever 
they should be found, if they meant to acquit 
themselves of favouring their escape. He was 
obeyed, and the fugitive Urbigenians were 
treated as enemies. All the rest, upon deli- 
vering the hostages that were required of 
them, their arms, and the deserters, were ad- 
mitted to a surrender. The Helvetians, Tulin- 
gians and Latobrigians had orders to return 
to their own country, and rebuild the towns 
and villages they had burnt. And because 
having lost all their corn, they were utterly 
without the means of subsisting themselves, 
he gave it in charge to the AUobrogians to 
supply them. Caesar's design in this was, 
that the lands deserted by the Helvetians 
might not be left vacant, lest the Germans 
beyond the Rhine, drawn by the goodness of 
the soil, should be tempted to seize them, 
and thereby become neighbours to the AUo- 
brogians, and the Roman province in Gaul. 
The Boians, at the request of the JEduans, 
who esteemed them highly on account of their 



COMMENTARIES, 



91 



valour, were permitted to settle in their ter- 
ritories ; where they assigned them lands, 
and hy degrees admitted them to all the 
rights and privileges of natives. JA roll was 
found in the Helvetian camp, written in Greek 
characters, and brought to Csesar. It con- 
tained a list of all who had set out upon this 
expedition capable of bearing arms ; likewise 
of the children, women, and old men. By 
this it appeared, that the number of the Hel- 
vetians was two hundred and sixty-three 
thousand ; of the Tulingians, thirty-six thou- 
sand ; of the Latobrigians, fourteen thousand ; 
of the Rauraci, twenty-three thousand ; of the 
Boians, thirty-two thousand ; in all three 
hundred and sixty-eight thousand, of which 
ninety-two thousand were fit to bear arms. 
A review being made, by Ca;sar's command, 
of those that returned to their own country, 
the number was found to be a hundred and 
ten thousand. 

XXn. The war with the Helvetians being 
ended, ambassadors from all parts of Gaul, 
men of principal consideration in their several 
states, waited upon Caesar to congratulate 
his success. They told him : " That though 
they were sensible the people of Rome, in the 
war against the Helvetians, meant chiefly to 
avenge the injuries formerly received from 
that nation, yet had the event of it been highly 
advantageous to all Gaul ; because in a time 
of full prosperity, the Helvetians had left their 
territories with design to make war upon the 
other states ; that having brought them under 
subjection, they might choose themselves a 
habitation at pleasure, and render all the rest 
of the country tributary." They requested, 
" That they might have his permission to hold, 
by a day prefixed, a general assembly of all 
the provinces of Gaul ; there being some things 
they wanted to discuss and propose to him, 
which concerned the whole nation in com- 
mon." Leave being granted accordingly, 
they fixed the day for the assembly, and bound 
themselves by an oath, not to discover their 
deliberations to any, unless named for that 
purpose by general consent. 

XXHI. Upon the rising of the council, the 
same chiefs of the states as before, returned td 
Caesar, and begged to be admitted to confer 
with him, in private, of matters that regarded 
their own and the common safety. Their de- 
sire being granted, they all threw themselves 



at his feet, and with tears represented : " That 
it was of no less importance to them to have 
their present deliberations kept secret, than to 
succeed in the request they were going to 
make ; because, should any discovery happen, 
they were in danger of being exposed to the 
utmost cruelties." Divitiacus the ^duan 
spoke in the name of the rest. He told him : 
" That two factions divided all Gaul ; one 
headed by the ^duans, the other by the 
Averni ; that after a contention of many years 
between these for the superiority, the Averni 
and Sequani came at last to a resolution of 
calling in the Germans : that at first only fif- 
teen thousand had crossed the Rhine ; but be- 
ing a wild and savage people, and greatly 
liking the customs, manners, and plenteous 
country of the Gauls, others soon followed : 
insomuch that at present there were not less 
than a hundred and twenty thousand of them 
in Gaul : that the .^Eduans, and their allies, 
had frequently tried their strength against 
them in battle; but by a succession of de- 
feats had lost all their nobility, senate, and 
cavalry : that broken by these calamities and 
losses, though formerly they held the first 
sway in Gaul, both by their own valour, and 
the favour and friendship of the people of 
Rome, yet now they were reduced to the ne- 
cessity of sending their principal noblemen 
as hostages to the Sequani, and of obliging 
themselves by an oath, neither to demand 
their hostages back, nor implore the assistance 
of the Roman people,~nor refuse a perpetual 
submission to the dominion and authority of 
the Sequani : that he alone of all the ^duans 
had refused to take the oath, or give his chil- 
dren for hostages, and on that account had 
fled his country, and came to Rome to implore 
the assistance of the senate ; as being the only 
man in the state, whom neither obligation of 
oath, nor the restraint of hostages, withheld 
from such a step : that after all it had fared 
worse with the victorious Sequani, than with 
the vanquished ^duans ; because Ariovistus, 
king of the Germans, had seated himself in 
their territories, had seized a third of their 
^ands, the most fertile in all Gaul, and now 
ordered them to give up another third in behalf 
of the Harudes, who passed the Rhine a 
few months before, with twenty-four thousand 
men, and wanted a settlement and habitations : 
that in a few years all the native Gauls would 



92 



CESAR'S 



be driven from their territories, and all the Ger- 
mans transplant themselves over the Rhine, 
the climate being far superior to that of their 
own country, and the way of living not admit- 
ting a comparison : that Ariovistus, ever since 
the defeat of the Gauls at Amagetobria, had 
behaved with unheard-of tyranny and haugh- 
tiness, demanding the children of the first no- 
bility as hostages, and exercising all manner 
of cruelties upon them, if his orders were riot 
implicitly followed in every thing : that he was 
a man of a savage, passionate, and imperious 
character, whose government was no longer 
to be borne ; and unless some resource was 
found in Cssar and the people of Rome, the 
Gauls must all follow the example of the Hel- 
vetians, and like them abandon their coun- 
try, in order to find some other habitation and 
settlement, remote from the Germans, wher- 
ever fortune should point it out to them ; that 
were these complaints and representations to 
come to the knowledge of Ariovistus, he 
made no doubt of his inflicting the severest 
punishments upon all the hostages in his 
hands : but that it would be easy for Csesar, 
by his own authority, and that of the army 
he commanded ; by the fame of his late victory, 
and the terror of the Roman name ; to hin- 
der any more Germans from passing the Rhine, 
and to defend Gaul from the insults of Ario- 
vistus." 

XXIV. When Divitiacus had made an end 
of speaking, all who were present, with many 
tears, began to implore Caesar's aid. He ob- 
served that the Sequani alone did nothing of 
all this : but pensive, and with downcast looks, 
kept their eyes fixed upon the ground. Won- 
dering what might be the cause, he questioned 
them upon it. Still they made him no an- 
swer, but continued silent, as before, with the 
same air of dejection. When he had interro- 
gated them several times, without being able 
to obtain one word in return, Divitiacus the 
J3duan agained resumed the discourse, and 
observed : " That the condition of the Sequani 
was so much more deplorable and wretched 
than that of the rest of the Gauls, as they 
alone durst not, even in secret, complain of 
their wrongs, or apply any where for redress ; 
and no less dreaded the cruelty of Ariovistus, 
when absent, than if actually present before 
their eyes : that other states had it still in their 
power to escape by flight; but the Sequani, 
who had received him into their territories, 



and put him in possession of all their towns, 
were exposed, upon discovery, to every kind 
of torment." Caesar being made acquainted 
with those things, encouraged the Gauls, and 
promised to have a regard to their complaints. 
He told them : " That he was in great hopes 
Ariovistus, induced by his intercession, and 
the authority of the people of Rome, would 
put an end to his oppressions." Having 
returned this ansvper, he dismissed the as- 
sembly. 

XXV. Many urgent reasons occurred upon 
this occasion to Caesar, why he should consi- 
der seriously of the proposals of the Gauls, and 
redress the injuries of which they complained. 
He saw the ^duans, friends and allies of the 
people of Rome, held in subjection and ser- 
vitude by the Germans, and compelled to give 
hostages to Ariovistus, and the Sequani ; 
which in the present flourishing state of the 
Roman affairs, seemed highly dishonourable 
both to himself and the commonwealth. He 
saw it likewise of dangerous consequence, to 
suffer the Germans by little and little to trans- 
port themselves over the Rhine, and settle in 
great multitudes in Gaul. For that fierce and 
savage people, having once possessed them- 
selves of the whole country of Gaul, were but 
too likely, after the example of the 'J'eutones 
and Cimbri, to break into the Roman pro- 
vince, and thence advance to Italy itself; more 
especially as the Rhone was the only boun- 
dary by which the Sequani were divided from 
the territories of the republic. It therefore 
appeared necessary to provide without delay 
against these evils ; and the rather, because 
Ariovistus was become so insolent, and took 
so much upon him, that his conduct was no 
longer to be endured. 

XXVI. For these reasons he thought pro- 
per to send ambassadors to Ariovistus, to de- 
sire he would appoint a place for an interview, 
that they might discourse together about some 
public affairs of the highest importance to 
them both. Ariovistus replied : " That if he had 
wanted any thing of Caesar, he would himself 
have waited on him for that purpose ; and if 
Caesar had any thing to desire of him, he must 
likewise come in person to demand it ; that 
for his own part, he could neither venture into 
these provinces of Gaul where Caesar com- 
manded without an army, nor bring an army 
into the field without great trouble and ex- 
pense : that he besides wondered extremely. 



COMMENTARIES. 



03 



what business, either Caesar, or the people of 
Rome, could have in his division of Gaul, 
which belonged to him by right of conquest." 
This answer being reported to Csesar, he 
again sent an embassy to him to this effect : 
/ '< That since, notwithstanding the great obli- 
gations he lay under both to himself and the 
people of Rome, in having, during his consul- 
ship, been declared king and ally by the se- 
nate ; he yet manifested so little acknowledg- 
ment to either, as even to refuse an interview, 
and decline treating of affairs that regarded 
the common interest ; these were the parti- 
culars he required of him : First, not to bring 
any more Germans over the Rhine into Gaul. 
Secondly, to restore the hostages he had taken 
from the ^duans, and permit the Sequani like- 
wise to do the same. Lastly, to forbear all in- 
juries towards the ^duans, and neither make 
war upon them nor their allies. That his com- 
pliance with these conditions would establish 
a perpetual friendship and amity between him 
and the people of Rome. But if he refused 
conditions so just, as the senate had decreed 
in the consulship of M. Messala and M. Piso, 
that whoever had the charge of the province 
of Gaul, should, as far as was consistent with 
the interests of the commonwealth, defend the 
^^Jduans and the other allies of the people of 
Rome ; he thought himself bound not to over- 
look their just complaints." 

XXVII. To this Ariovistus replied : « That 
by the laws of war, the conqueror had a 
right to impose what terms he pleased upon 
the conquered : that in consequence of this, 
the people of Rome did not govern the van- 
quished by the prescriptions of another, but 
acco rding to their own pleasure : that if he 
did not intermeddle with the Roman con- 
quests, but left them to the free enjoyment of 
their rights, no more ought they to concern 
themselves in what regarded him. That the 
^duans having tried the fortune of war, had 
been overcome and rendered tributary, and it 
would be the highest injustice in Caesar to 
offer at diminishing his just revenues : that he 
was resolved not to part with the hostages 
the ^duans had put into his hands ; but 
would nevertheless engage, neither to make 
war upon them nor their allies, provided they 
observed the treaty he had made with them, 
and regularly paid the tribute agreed upon ; 
if otherwise, the title of friends and allies of 
the people of Rome would be found to stand 
9* 



them but in little stead : that as to Caesar's 
menace of not overlooking the complaints of 
the ^duans, he would have him to know, no 
one had ever entered into a war with Ariovistus, 
but to his own destruction : that he might 
when he pleased bring it to a trial, and would, 
he doubted not, soon be made sensible what 
the invincible Germans, trained up from their 
infancy in the exercise of arms, and who for 
fourteen years together had never slept under 
a roof, were capable of achieving." 

XXVIII. At the same time that Caesar re- 
ceived this answer, ambassadors also arrived 
from the ^duans and Treviri. From the 
^duans, to complain : " That the Harudes 
who had lately come over into Gaul, were 
plundering their territories ; insomuch, that 
even by their submissions and hostages they 
were not able to obtain peace of Ariovistus." 
From the Treviri, to inform him : " That a 
hundred cantons of the Suevians, headed by 
two brothers, Nassua and Cimberius, were 
arrived upon the banks of the Rhine, with de- 
sign to cross that river." Caesar, deeply af- 
fected with this intelligence, determined to 
undertake the war without delay, lest this 
new band of Suevians, joining the old 
forces of Ariovistus, should enable him to 
make a greater resistance. Having therefore 
with all diUgence provided for the subsistence 
of his army, he advanced towards him by great 
marches. 

XXIX. The third day he was informed 
that Ariovistus approached with all his forces 
to take possession of Vesontia, the capital of 
the Sequani : and that he had already got 
three days' march beyond his own territories. 
Caesar judged it by all means necessary to 
prevent him in this design, as the town itself 
was not only full of all sorts of warlike am- 
munition, but likewise strongly fortified by 
nature, and commodiously situated for carry- 
ing on the war. For the river Doux forming 
a circle round it, as if described with a pair 
of compasses, leaves only an interval of six 
hundred feet, which is also inaccessible by 
reason of a very high and steep mountain, 
whose roots are washed on each side by the 
river. This mountain is shut in with a wall, 
which, forming a citadel, joins it to the town. 
Hither Caesar marched day and night without 
intermission; and having possessed himself of 
the place, put a garrison into it. 

XXX. W^hile he tarried here a few days, 



94 



CiESAR'S 



tn settle the order of his convoys and supplies, 
the curiosity of our men, and the talk of the 
Gauls, (who proclaimed on all occasions the 
prodigious stature of the Germans, their in- 
vincible courage, and great skill in arms : in- 
somuch that in the frequent encounters with 
them they had found it impossible to with- 
stand their very looks,) spread such a sudden 
terror through the whole army, that they were 
not a little disturbed by the apprehensions it 
occasioned. This fear first began amongst the 
military tribunes, the officers of the allies, and 
others that had voluntarily followed Csesar 
from Rome; who being but little acquainted 
with military aifairs, lamented the great dan- 
ger to which they fancied themselves exposed. 
Some of these, upon various pretences, de- 
sired leave to return. Others, out of shame, 
and unwilling to incur the suspicion of cow- 
ardice, continued in the camp. But these 
last, incapable of putting on a cheerful coun- 
tenance, and at times even unable to suppress 
their tears, skulked in their tents, either be- 
moaning their fate, or discoursing with their 
companions upon the common danger. Wills 
were made all over the camp, and the con- 
sternation began to seize even those of more 
experience, the veteran soldiers, the centu- 
rions, and the officers of tne cavalry. Such 
among them as affected a greater show of re- 
solution, said it was not the enemy they 
feared, but the narrow passes and vast forests 



friendship, or that of the people of Rome. But 
if urged on by madness and rage, he was re- 
solved upon war, what, after all, had they to 
be afraid of? Or why should they distrust 
either their own bravery, or his care and con- 
duct ■? That they were to deal with enemies 
of whom trial had been already made in the 
memory of their fathers, when, by the victory 
of C. Marius over the Teutones and Cimbri, 
the army itself acquired no less glory than the 
general who commanded it : that trial had 
likewise been lately made of them in Italy in 
the servile war, when they had also the ad- 
vantage of being exercised in the Roman dis- 
cipline ; on which occasion it appeared, how 
much resolution and constancy were able to 
effect : since they had vanquished in the end 
those very enemies, armed and flushed with 
victory, whom at first they had without cause 
dreaded even unarmed. In fine, that they were 
the very same Germans, with whom the Hel- 
vetians had so often fought, not only in their 
own country, but in Germany itself, and for 
the most part came off victorious, though they 
had by no means been a match for our army : 
that if the defeat and flight of the Gauls gave 
uneasiness to any, these would readily find, 
upon inquiry, that Ariovistus confining him- 
self many months to his camp and fastnesses, 
and declining a general action, had thereby 
tired out the Gauls with the length of the war ; 
who despairing at last of a battle, and begin- 



that lay between them and Ariovistus, and /hing to disperse, were thereupon attacked and 
the difficulty there would be in furnishing th^ routed, rather by conduct and craft, than the 
army with provisions. Some even told Oajsar, superior valour of the Germans. But though a 
that when he gave orders for marching, the stratagem of this kind might take with rude and 
army, attentive to nothing but their fears, uncultivated people, yet could not even the Ger- 



would refuse to obey. 

XXXI. Caesar observing the general con- 
sternation, called a council of war ; and having 
summoned all the centurions of the army to be 
present, inveighed against them with great 
severity ; for presuming to inquire, or at all 
concern themselves, which way, or on what 
design they were to march. " Ariovistus,' he 
told them, " during his consulship, had ear- 
nestly sought the alliance of the Roman peo- 
ple. Why, therefore, should any one imagine, 
he would so rashly and hastily depart from his 
engagements ? That, on the contrary, he was 
himself firmly persuaded, that as soon as he 
came to know his demands, and the equal con- 
ditions he was about to propose to him, he 
would be very far from rejecting either his 



man himself hope that it would avail against a 
Roman army : that as to those who sheltered 
their cowardice under the pretence of narrow 
passes, and the difficulty of procuring provi- 
sions, he thought it argued no small presump- 
tion in them, either to betray such a distrust of 
their general's conduct, or offer to prescribe to 
him what he ought to do : that these things 
fell properly under his care : that the Sequani, 
Leuci, and Lingones were to furnish him with 
provisions : that the corn was now ripe in the 
fields ; and that themselves would soon be 
judges as to what regarded the ways. That 
the report of the army's refusing to obey him, 
gave him not the least disturbance ; because 
he very well knew, that no general had ever 
been so far slighted by his soldiers, whose ill 



COMMENTARIES. 



95 



success, avarice, or other crimes, had nut justly 
drawn tliat misfortune upon him : that in all 
these respects he fancied himself secure, as 
the whole course of his life would witness for 
his integrity, and his good fortune had shown 
itself in the war against the Helvetians : that 
he was therefore resolved to execute without 
delay, what he otherwise intended to have put 
off a little longer ; and would give orders for 
decamping the very next night, three hours 
before day, that ho might as soon as possible 
know, whether honour and a sense of duty, or 
an ignominious cowardice had the ascendant 
in his army : nay, that should all the rest of 
the troops abandon him, he would, neverthe- 
less, march with the tenth legion alone, of 
whose fidelity and courage he had no manner 
of doulit, and which would serve him for his 
Praetorian guard." Ca;sar had always princi- 
pally favoured this legion, and placed his chief 
confidence in it, on account of its valour. 

XXXII. This speech made a wonderful 
change upon the minds of all, and begot an 
uncommon alacrity and eagerness for the war. 
The tenth legion in particular, returned him 
thanks, by their tribunes, for the favourable opi- 
nion he bad expressed of them, and assured him 
of their readiness to follow him. Nor were the 
other legions less industrious, by their tribunes 
and principal centurions, to reconcile them- 
selves to Csesar ; protesting they had never 
either doubted or feared, nor ever imagined 
that it belonged to them, but to the general, 
to direct in matters of war. Having accepted 
of their submission, and informed himself, by 
means of Divitiacus, in whom of all the Gauls 
he most confided, that by taking a circuit of 
above forty miles, he might avoid the narrow 
passes, and lead his army through an open 
country, he set forward three hours after mid- 
night, as he had said ; and after a march of 
seven days successively, understood by his 
scouts, that he was within four and twenty 
miles of Ariovistus's camp. 

XXXIII. Ariovistus being informed of his 
arrival, sent ambassadors to acquaint him: 
" That he was now willing to accept of an in- 
terview, as they were now come nearer one 
another, and he believed it might be done with- 
out danger." Caesar did not decline the pro- 
posal, imagining he was now disposed to listen 
to reason, since he offered that of his own ac- 
cord, which he had before refused at his re- 
quest : neither was he without hope, that in 



regard of the benefits he had received, both 
from himself and the people of Rome, he 
would, upon knowing his demands, desist from 
his obstinacy. The fifth day after was ap- 
pointed for the interview. Meantime, as am- 
bassadors were continually passing and repas- 
sing, Ariovistus, under pretence that he was 
afraid of an ambuscade, demanded : " That Cae- 
sar should bring no infantry with him to the 
conference : that they should both come at- 
tended by their cavalry only : that otherwise he 
could not resolve, to give him a meeting." 
Cffisar, unwilling to drop the design of the in- 
terview, but neither caring to trust his safety 
to the Gauls, thought the best way was, to dis- 
mount all the Gallic cavalry, and give their 
horses to the soldiers of the tenth legion, who 
had the greatest share of his confidence ; that, 
in case of danger, he might have a guard on 
which he could rely. This being done ac- 
cordingly, one of the soldiers of that legion 
said pleasantly enough : " That Ca;sar had 
done even more than he had promised ; that he 
had only given them hopes of becoming his 
Praetorian guard ; and now he had raised them 
to the rank of horse." 

XXXIV. There was a large plain, and in 
the midst of it a rising ground of considerable 
height, equally distant from both camps. At 
this place, by appointment, the conference 
was held. Caesar stationed the legionary 
soldiers, whom he had brought with him, on 
the horses of the Gauls, two hundred paces 
from the mount. Ariovistus did the same 
with the German cavalry. The conversation 
was on horseback, each being accompanied by 
ten friends, or principal oflicers, for so Ario- 
vistus had desired. When they were come to 
the place, Caesar began, by putting him in mind 
of the favours he had received both from him- 
self and the people of Rome: "That he had 
been styled friend and ally by the senate ; that 
very considerable presents had been sent him ; 
that these honours, conferred by the Romans 
on very few, and only for signal services to the 
state, had yet been bestowed on him, not on 
account of any just claim on his side, but 
merely by the favour of Caesar, and the bounty 
of the senate." He told him likewise, " of 
the just and ancient alliance between the Ro- 
mans and the ^^duans; of the many honoura- 
ble decrees of the senate in their favour : that 
they had always held the first rank and autho- 
rity in Gaul, even before their alliance with 



I 



*v 



96 



CESAR'S 



Rome : that it was the constant maxim of the 
Roman people, not only to defend their friends 
and allies in the possession of their just rights, 
but likewise to study the enlargement of their 
honour, interest, and dignity ; that it could 
never therefore be supposed they would sub- 
mit to see them stripped of those privileges 
which had belonged to them before they were 
received into their friendship." In fine, he 
concluded with repeating the same demands 
which he had before made by his ambassadors : 
" That he would not make war upon the 
^duans or their allies ; that he would restore 
their hostages ; that if he could not oblige 
any of the Germans to repass the Rhine, at 
least he would suffer no more of them to come 
into Gaul." 

XXXV. Ariovistus spoke little to Csesar's 
demands, but enlarged greatly on his own vir- 
tues : " That he had crossed the Rhine, not of 
his own motion, but invited and entreated by 
the Gauls themselves ; that the great hopes 
and expectations they had given him had been 
his only inducement to quit his country and 
relations ; that he had settlements in Gaul as- 
signed by the Gauls themselves, hostages vo- 
luntarily sent, and a tribute in consequence of 
the rights of war, it being the constant prac- 
tice of conquerors to impose that mark of sub- 
jection on those they had subdued : that he 
had not made war upon the Gauls, but the 
Gauls upon him ; that though all their several 
states had united against him, and brought up 
their forces with design to crush him, he had 
yet found means to vanquish and disperse them 
in one battle ; that if they were again resolved 
to try the fortune of war, he was ready and 
prepared to receive them, but if they rather 
chose peace, it was unjust in them to refuse 
a tribute which they had hitherto voluntarily 
paid ; that the friendship of the people of 
Rome ought to be an honour and security to 
him, not a detriment, nor had he courted it in 
any other view ; but if by their alliance he 
must submit to lose his tributes and his right 
over the people he had subdued, he was no less 
willing to give it up, than he had been am- 
bitious to obtain it : that he had indeed 
brought over a multitude of Germans into 
Gaul, yet not with any design of disturbing 
the country, but merely for his own security, 
as appeared by his not coming but at the re- 
quest of the natives, and his not attacking them, 
but defending himself: that his arrival in Gaul i 



was prior to that of the Romans, whose army 
had never till that time passed the boundaries 
of their own province. What could they 
mean by coming into a country that belonged 
to him 1 Or why should they concern them- 
selves with a part of Gaul that was no less 
his property, than the province itself was that 
of the people of Rome 1 If it would not be al- 
lowable in him to make any attempt upon 
their possessions, neither could they without 
injustice, disturb him in the enjoyment of his 
rights. That as to the pretence of alliance 
between the Romans and ^duans, he was not 
a barbarian, nor so wholly a stranger to the 
affairs of the world as not to know, that neither 
had the ^duans assisted the Romans in the 
late war against the Allobrogians, nor re- 
ceived any assistance from them in their many 
conflicts with himself and the Sequani. That 
he ought to be jealous of Csesar's pretended 
regard to the iEduans, and had but too much 
reason to suspect that the continuance of the 
Roman army in Gaul could be with no other 
design than that of oppressing him. That if 
he did not therefore depart, and withdraw his 
troops out of those parts, he would no longer 
look upon him as a friend, but an enemy. 
That he was well assured, should he even slay 
him in battle, he should do a pleasure to many 
of the nobles and great men at Rome, who 
had explained themselves to him by couriers, 
and whose favour and friendship he might pro- 
cure by his death : but that if he would retire, 
and leave him in the undisturbed possession 
of Gaul, he would not only amply reward 
him, but engage, at his own cost and hazard, 
to put an end to any war Cssar should think 
fit to undertake." 

XXXVI. Many reasons were offered by 
Cffisar, in return to this speech, why he could 
not depart from his first demands : " That 
neither his own honour, nor that of the people 
of Rome, would suffer him to abandon allies, 
who had deserved so well of the common- 
wealth ; that it no way appeared to him 
wherein Ariovistus had a juster claim to the 
possession of Gaul than the Romans : that 
the Averni and Ruteni had been subdued by 
Q. Fabius Maximus, who yet contented with 
their submission, had neither reduced their 
country into a province, nor subjected it to a 
tribute : that if antiquity of title was to decide, 
the Romans had an undoubted right to the so- 
vereignty of Gaul : if, on the contrary, the 



COMMENTARIES, 



97 



decree of the senate was to take place, Gaul 
must remain free, and subject only to its own 
laws." 

XXXVII, Whilst these things passed at 
the interview, Caesar was informed that Ario- 
vistus's cavalry were drawing nearer the mount, 
and had even assaulted the Romans with 
stones and darts, Csesar immediately broke 
off the conference, retreated to his own men, 
and strictly charged them to forbear all acts 
of hostility towards the enemy. He did not 
fear the success of an action, with that chosen 
legion, against the German cavalry ; but he 
was willing to maintain a conduct perfectly 
clear, and not give the enemy the least handle 
to assert, that they had been treacherously 
drawn into an ambuscade by a pretended con- 
ference. When it was known in the camp, 
with what haughtiness Ariovistus had behaved 
at the interview ; that he had ordered the 
Romans to depart out of Gaul ; that his ca- 
valry had fallen upon Csesar's guard; and 
that an end had thereby been put to the con- 
ference, a much greater alacrity and desire of 
fighting spread themselves through the whole 
army. 

XXXVIII. Two days after, Ariovistus sent 
ambassadors to propose a renewal of the ne- 
gotiation begun; and that he would either 
again appoint a day for a conference, or de- 
pute some one to bring the treaty to a conclu- 
sion. Caesar saw no reason for granting a se- 
cond interview ; more especially when he con- 
sidered that the time before, the Germans 
could not be restrained from falling upon our 
men. Neither was he inclined to send any of 
his principal officers ; it seeming too great a 
venture, to expose them to the perfidy of these 
barbarians. He therefore cast his eye upon 
C Valerius Procillus, the son of C. Valerius 
Caburus, a young man of great merit and po- 
liteness, whose father had been made free of 
the city by C. Valerius Flaccus, His singu- 
lar integrity, and knowledge of the language 
of the Gauls, which Ariovistus, by reason of 
long stay in those parts, spoke readily, fitted 
him in a particular manner for this embassy : 
and as he was likewise one towards whom it 
would no way avail the Germans to use any 
treachery, he thought him less liable to an in- 
sult of that kind, M. Mettius was joined in 
commission with him, who was allied to Ario- 
vistus by the rights of hospitality. Their in- 
structions were, to hear the Germans' propo- 



sals, and carry back a report of them to Csesar. 
But no sooner were they arrived in Ariovistus's 
camp, than in presence of the whole army, call- 
ing out to know their business, and whether 
they were come as spies, he commanded them 
to be put in irons, without suffering them to 
make any reply. 

XXXIX. The same day he came forward 
with all his forces, and lodged himself under 
a hill, about six miles from our camp. The 
day after he went two miles beyond it, to cut 
off CfEsar's communication with the iEduans 
and Sequani, from whom he received all his 
provisions. Cajsar, for five days continually, 
drew up his men in order of battle before the 
camp, that if Ariovistus had a mind, he might 
not be without an opportunity of coming to 
an engagement. The Germans kept all that 
time within their lines ; only we had daily 
skirmishes with their cavalry, whose manner 
of fighting was this. They had about six 
thousand horse, who chose a like number out 
of the foot, each his man, and all remarka- 
ble for strength and agility. These conti- 
nually accompanied them in battle, and served 
them as a rear-guard, to which, when hard 
pressed, they might retire ; if the action be- 
came dangerous, they advanced to their 
relief : if any horseman was considerably 
wounded, and fell from his horse, they gathered 
round to defend him : if speed was required, 
either for a hasty pursuit, or sudden retreat, 
they were become so nimble and alert by conti- 
nual exercise, that laying hold of the manes 
of their horses, they could run as fast as they, 

XL. Caesar finding that Ariovistus declined 
a battle, thought it necessary to provide for 
the freedom of his convoys. With this view 
he marked out a place for a camp, six hundred 
paces beyond that of the enemy, whither he 
marched with his whole army drawn up in 
three lines. The first and second lines had 
orders to continue under arms, and the third 
to employ themselves in fortifying the camp. 
Ariovistus sent sixteen thousand light-armed 
foot, and all his horse, to alarm our men, and 
hinder the work. But Csesar remained firm 
to his first design, ordering the two Hues that 
continued under arms to keep off the enemy, 
and the third to go on with the intrench ments. 
The work being finished, he left two legions 
there, with part of the auxiliaries, and carried 
back the other four to his former camp. The 
next day he assembled all his troops from 
O 



98 



CtESAR'S 



both camps, drew them up according to cus- 
tom and offered the enemy battle ; but they 
still refusing to come to an engagement, he re- 
tired again about noon. Ariovistus then de- 
tached part of his forces to attack the lesser 
camp. A sharp conflict ensued, that lasted 
till night. At sun-set Ariovistus thought pro- 
per to sound a retreat, after many wounds 
given and received. Casar inquiring of the 
prisoners, why Ariovistus so obstinately re- 
fused an engagement, found, that it was the 
custom among the Germans, for the women 
to decide, by lots and divination, when it was 
proper to hazard a battle ; and that these had 
declared the army could not be victorious, if 
they fought before the new moon. 

XLI. The day after, Caesar having left a 
sufficient guard in his two camps, ranged all 
the auxiliary troops before the lesser camp, plac- 
ing them directly in view of the enemy for the 
greater show, because the number of legionary 
soldiers was but inconsiderable, compared with 
that of the Germans. Then advancing at the 
head of all his forces in three lines, he marched 
quite up to the enemy's camp. Upon this 
the Germans, compelled by necessity, appeared 
before the intrenchments, and having distri- 
buted their troops by nations, and disposed 
them at equal distances one from another, the 
Harudes, Marcomani, Tribocci, Vangiones, 
Nemetes, Sedusians, and Suevians, encompass- 
ed the whole army with a line of carriages, to 
take away all hopes of safety by flight. The 
women mounted upon these carriages, weeping 
and tearing their hair, conjured the soldiers, 
as they advanced to battle, not to suffer them 
to become slaves to the Romans. Caesar hav- 
ing appointed a lieutenant and questor to 
each legion, to serve as witnesses of every 
man's courage and behaviour, began the battle 
in person at the head of the right wing, 
observing the enemy to be weakest on that 
side. The signal being given, our men charged 
so briskly, and the enemy advanced so swiftly 
and suddenly to meet them, that the Romans 
not having time to throw their darts, betook 
themselves immediately to their swords : but 
the Germans quickly casting themselves into 
a phalanx, according to the custom of their 
country, sustained the shock with great firm- 
ness. Many of our soldiers leaped upon the 
phalanx, tore up the bucklers of the enemy with 
their hands, and wounded those that lay under 
them. Their left wing was soon routed and 
put to flight ; but on the right they had the 



advantage, and were like to overpower the Ro- 
mans by their number. Young Crassus, who 
commanded the cavalry, and was more at liberty 
than those immediately engaged in the fight, 
observing this, made the third line advance 
to support them. Upon this the battle was re- 
newed, and the enemy every where put to 
the rout ; nor did they cease their flight till 
they had reached the banks of the Rhine, 
about fifty miles distant from the place of 
combat. There only a few escaped, some by 
swimming, others by boats. Of this last num- 
ber was Ariovistus, who, embarking in a small 
vessel he found by the edge of the river, got 
safe to the other side : all the rest were cut to 
pieces in the pursuit, by our cavalry. Ario- 
vistus had two wives, one a Suevian, whom 
he had brought with him from Germany : the 
other a Norican, sister to King Vocian, whom 
he had married in Gaul : both perished in this 
flight. Of his two daughters, one was killed, 
the other taken prisoner. C. Valerius Pro- 
cillus, whom his keepers dragged after them in 
their flight, bound with a triple chain, fell in 
with Csesar in person as he was pursuing the 
German cavalry. Nor was the victory itself 
more grateful to that general, than his good 
fortune in recovering out of the hands of the 
enemy, a man the most distinguished for his 
probity of the whole province of Gaul, his in- 
timate and familiar friend ; and to find the joy 
and success of that day no way diminished or 
clouded by the loss of a person he so highly 
esteemed. Procillus told him, that lots had 
been thrice drawn in his own presence, to 
decide, whether he should be burnt alive upon 
the spot, or reserved for another time, and 
that the lot, three times favourable, had pre- 
served his life. Mettius was likewise recovered 
and brought. 

XLII. This battle being reported beyond 
the Rhine, the Suevians, who were advanced 
as far as the banks of that river, thought pro- 
per to return to their own country ; but re- 
treating in disorder and confusion, they were 
attacked by the Ubians, a people bordering 
upon the Rhine, and many of them cut to 
pieces. Caesar having in one campaign put 
an end to two very considerable wars, went 
into winter quarters somewhat sooner than the 
season of the year required. He distributed 
his army among the Sequani, left Labienus 
to command in his absence, and sent out him- 
self for Cisalpine Gaul, to preside in the as- 
sembly of the states. 



C^SAR S COMMENTARIES 



HIS WARS IN GAUL. 



BOOK II. 



jh 



99 



THE ARGUMENT. 

I. The confederacy of the Belgians against the people of Rome. — III. The Rhemi submit upon the approach of 
Cassar. — IV. And inform him of the strength and designs of the confederates. — Yl. Csesar passes the Axona 
with his army. — VII. Bibrax, a town belonging to the Rhemi, assaulted by the Belgians. — Vlli. Csesar relieves 
it, and obliges the Belgians to retire. — K. The armies drawn up on both sides, but without coming to an en- 
gagement. — XI. The Belgians, despairing of success, decamp and return home. — SII. Caesar attaclis their rear, 
and makes great slaughter. — XIII. He then marches against the Suessiones, and obliges them to submit. — 
XIV. — ^Advancing next into the country of the Bellovaci, lie pardons them at the intercession of Divitiacus. — 
XVT. — The Ambiani surrender, but the Nervians stand on their defence. — XXIII. They are defeated, however, 
in a long and bloody engagement, and almost all cut off. — XXIX. Csesar prepares to attack the Aluatici. — 
XXXI. They submit.— SXXin. — But falling treacherously upon the Romans during the night.— XXXIV. Are 
many of them cut to pieces, and the rest sold for slaves. 



too 



CiESARS COMMENTARIES 



HIS WARS IN GAUL. 



BOOK II 



I. In the winter, while Csesar was in hither 
Gaul, as we have intimated above, he was 
alarmed by frequent reports, which were also 
confirmed by letters from Labienus, that all 
the Belgians, who, as has been said, possessed 
one of the three divisions of Gaul, had joined 
in a league against the people of Rome, and 
ratified it by an exchange of hostage^! The 
causes of this confederacy were : First, their 
fear lest the Romans, having subdued all the 
rest of Gaul, should next turn their arms 
against them ; and then the persuasions and 
importunity of some among the Celtse, many 
of whom, as they had greatly disliked the neigh- 
bourhood of the Germans in Gaul, so were they 
no less displeased to see a Roman armj' take 
up winter-quarters and grow habitual in the 
country ; others, from a levity and inconstancy 
of temper, were fond of every project that 
tended to a revolution. In fine, some were 
influenced by ambitious views, it being usual 
in Gaul for such as were most powerful in their 
several states, and had men and money at com- 
mand, to exercise a kind of sovereignty over 
their fellow-subjects, which they foresaw would 
be greatly checked by the authority and credit 
of the Romans in Gaul. 

II. Cffisar, roused by these messages and 
reports, levied two new legions in hither Gaul, 
and early in the spring, sent Q. Pedius, his 
lieutenant, to conduct them over the Alps. 
Himself, as soon as there began to be forage 
in the fields, came to the army ; he commis- 
sioned the Senones, and other Gauls who 
bordered on the Belgians, to inform themselves 

10 



of the motions and designs of the confederates, 
and send him from time to time an exact ac- 
count. They all agreed in their reports, that 
they were levying troops, and drawing their 
forces to a general rendezvous ; whereupon, 
thinking he ought no longer to delay march- 
ing against them, and having settled the ne- 
cessary supplies for his army, he decamped, 
and in fifteen days arrived on the confines of 
the Belgians. 

III. As his approach was sudden, and much 
earlier than had been expected, the Rhemi, 
who, of all the Belgians, lay the nearest to 
Celtic Gaul, despatched Iccius and Autobri- 
gius, the two principal men of their state, to 
represent to Caesar : " That they put themselves 
and fortunes under the power and protection 
of the Romans, as having neither approved of 
the designs of the rest of the Belgians, nor 
had any share in their confederacy against the 
people of Rome : that on the contrary, they 
were ready to give hostages, to execute his 
commands, to receive him into their towns, 
and to furnish him with corn and other sup- 
plies for his army ; that indeed, the rest of the 
Belgians were all in arms, and that the Ger- 
mans on this side the Rhine had associated 
with them : nay, that so universal and preva- 
lent was the infatuation, the}' had not even 
been able to draw off the Suessiones, a people 
united to them by the nearest ties of blood and 
friendship, who were subject to the same laws, 
lived under the same form of government, and 
acknowledged but one common magistrate." 

IV. Csesar inquiring of the ambassadors 

101 



102 



CESAR'S 



what states had taken up arms, of what name 
and consideration, and M'hat forces they could 
bring into the field, found that the Belgians 
were for the most part Germans originally, 
who having formerly crossed the Rhine, had 
been drawn by the fertility of the country to 
settle in those parts, after driving out the an- 
cient inhabitants ; that in the late eruption of 
the Teutones and Cimbri, when all the other 
provinces of Gaul were overrun, they alone 
had ventured to stand upon their defence, nor 
suffered the barbarians to set foot in their ter- 
ritories : whence it happened, that presuming 
on so well known an instance of their bravery, 
they laid claim to great authority, and chal- 
■f lenged high military renown. As to their 
numbers, the Rhemi told him they could give 
him the most exact information, because in 
consequence of their affinity and neighbour- 
hood, they had opportunities of knowing what 
quota of men each particular state had promised 
to furnish in the common council of Belgium;^' 
" That the Bellovaci held 'the most distin- 
guished rank, as surpassing all the other states 
in prowess, authority, and number of forces ; 
that they were able to muster a hundred 
thousand fighting men, and had promised out 
of that number sixty thousand chosen troops, 
in consideration of which they demanded the 
whole administration of the war. That next 
to them in dignity were the Suessiones, a peo- 
ple bordering upon their own territories, and 
possessed of a very large and fruitful country, 
over which, even of late years, Divitiacus had 
been king, one of the most powerful princes of 
all Gaul, and who, besides his dominions in 
those parts, reigned also over Britain ; that 
their present sovereign was Galba, whose sin- 
gular prudence and justice had procured him, 
by the consent of all the confederates, the su- 
preme command in the war : that these had 
within their territories twelve fortified towns, 
and promised to bring into the field fifty thou- 
sand men : that the like number had been 
stipulated by the Nervians, who, inhabiting 
the remotest provinces of Gaul, were esteemed 
the most fierce and warlike of all the Belgian 
nations : that the Atrebatians were to furnish 
fifteen thousand, the Ambiani ten thousand, 
the Morini twenty-five thousand, the Mena- 
pians nine thousand, the Caletes ten thou- 
sand, the Velocassians and Veromanduans 
the like number ; the Atuatici twenty-nine 
thousand ; and the Condrusians, Eburones, 
(Jeresians, and Paeniani, all comprehended 



under the common name of Germans, forty 
thousand. 

V. Caesar exhorting the men of Rheims to 
continue firm in their alliance, and promising 
amply to reward their fidelity, ordered the 
whole body of their senate to repair to -his 
camp, and the soifs of their principal nobility 
to be brought him as hostages, all which was 
accordingly performed by the day appointee^ 
He then addressed himself to Divitiacus, the_ 
^IDduan, representing, in the warmest manner, 
of what consequence it was to the common 
cause, to divide the forces of the enemy, that 
he might not be reduced to the necessity of 
encountering so great a multitude at once. 
This he told him, might easily be effected, if 
the jEduans would march their forces into 
the territories of the Bellovaci, to plunder and 
lay waste the country. V/ith these instruc- 
tions he dismissed them. . 

VI. Meantime,*being informed by his scouts, 
and the people of Rheims, that all the forces 
of the Belgians were marching towards him 
in a body,(^d th|it they were even advanced 
within a few miles, he made all the haste he 
could to pass his army over the Axona, which 
divides the Rhemi from the rest of the Bel- 
gians, and encamped on the farther side of 
that river. By this situation he secured all 
behind him, covered one side of his camp 
with the river, and rendered the communica- 
tion with the Rhemi, and those other states, 
whence he expected to be supplied with pro- 
visions, safe and easy. Adjoining to his camp 
was a bridge over the river ; there he placed a 
strong guard, and left Q. Titurius Sabinus, his 
lieutenant, on the other side, with six cohorts. 
He then drew round his camp a ditch eighteen 
feet broa4, strengthened with a rampafft twelve 
feet high.\ 

Vn, The Belgians, in their m.arch, fell fu- 
riously upon Bibrax, a town belonging to the 
Rhemiy^out eight miles distant from Caesar's 
camp. Tha inhabitants, with great difficulty, 
held out against that day's assault. The man- 
ner of storming a town is the same among 
the Belgians as among the Gauls ; for having 
surrounded the walls with the whole body of 
their army, and by a continual discharge from 
their slings, cleared the ramparts, they ap- 
proach the gates under covert of their buck- 
lers, and undermine the walls. This was 
easy in the present case, because the multi- 
tude employed in throwing stones and darts 
was so great, that none of the garrison durst 



COMMENTARIES. 



103 



appear upon the walls. When night had put 
an end to the assault, Iccius, who then com- 
manded in the town, a man of principal rank 
and authority among the Rhemi, and one of 
those who had come ambassadors to Caesar to 
treat about a peace, despatched messengers to 
acquaint him, that unless he was speedily re- 
lieved, it would be impossible for him to hold 
out any longer. 

VIII. Hereupon Csesar, making use of 
those for guides who had come express to his 
camp from Iccius, detached about midnight a 
party of Cretan and Numidian archers, with 
some Balearean slingers, to the assistance of 
the garrison. Their arrival encouraged the 
besieged to stand upon their defence, and in- 
spired them with hopes of repulsing the ene- 
my, who now began to despair of success, 
when they heard that a reinforcement had en- 
tered the town. Wherefore, after a short stay 
before the place, having plundered all the 
country round about^ and burnt the houses 
and villages wherever they came, they 
marched in a body towards Caesar's camp, and 
posted themselves within two miles of his ar- 
my, inclosing a space of more than eight 
thousand paces in circumference, as near as 
could be computed from the smoke and fires 
of their camp, 

IX. Ca;sar at first resolved to avoid coming 
to a battle, as well on account of the numbers 
of the enemy, as the high opinion entertained 
of their courage. He suffered the horse, how- 
ever, to engage daily in small skirmishes, that 
he might the better judge of the valour of the 
Belgian troops, and the resolution and bravery 
of his own men. Finding that the Romans 
were nothing inferior to the enemy in courage, 
he resolved to wait for them before his camp ; 
the ground being very commodious, and as it 
were formed by nature for the reception of an 
army. For the hill on which the camp stood, 
rising with an easy ascent from the plain, was 
but just of a sufficient breadth on the side 
facing the enemy to receive the several lines 
of the army, drawn up in order of battle. On 
the right hand and on the left the descent was 
steep, whereby the mountain swelling in front, 
but gradually abating its declivity as you ad- 
vanced towards the bottom, came at last to a 
plain. Along each side of the hill Csesar dug 
a trench of about four hundred paces in length, 
and built forts at the extremities, where he 
placed engines to repulse the enemy, should 



they offer to attack him in flank, or endeavour, 
during the fighl, to surround him with their 
ninnbers. These dispositions being made, 
and having left the two new levied legions in 
his camp, as a body of reserve in case of need, 
he drew up the other six in order of battle. 
The Belgians likewise drew up their troops, 
and stood fronting our army. 

X. Between Caesar and the enemy there was 
a small morass. The Belgians waited to see 
if we would pass it ; our men, on the other 
hand, were ready in arms, that, should the 
enemy attempt to come over, they might fall 
upon them, and take advantage of their con- 
fusion. Meantime the cavalry on both sides 
engaged ; but as neither army would hazard 
the passage of the morass, Ctesar, who had the 
better in the skirmish of the horse, led back his 
men to their camp. The Belgians marched 
directly towards the Axona, which, as we have 
said, lay behind our camp, and having found a 
ford, endeavoured to pass over part of their 
army. Their design was, if possible, to make 
themselves masters of the fort where Q. Titu- 
rius commanded, and break down the bridge, 
or, should they fail in that attempt, to ravage 
and lay waste the territories of the Rhemi, 
whence our army was supplied with provi- 
sions. 

XI. Caesar being informed of these things 
by Titurius, crossed the bridge with his cav- 
alry, light-armed Numidians, archers, and 
slingers, and marched to attack the enemy. A 
very sharp conflict ensued ; for the Romans 
falling upon them while they were yet passing 
the river, and by reason of their disorder una- 
ble to defend themselves, slew great num- 
bers. The rest, who with undaunted courage 
advanced upon the bodies of their companions, 
were repulsed by the multitude of darts from 
our men ; and the cavalry surrounding those 
that were already got over, put them all to the 
sword. The Belgians being thus disappointed, 
both in their design upon Bibrax, and the 
passage of the Axona, finding too that provi- 
sions began to be scarce, and that our army 
could not be drawn to fight them at a disad- 
vantage, called a council of war. It was 
there judged most expedient to separate, anil 
return every man to his own country, with a 
resolution, however, to assemble from all parts, 
in defence of that state whose territories should 
be first invaded by the Romans : for tbey con- 
cluded it much safer to carry on the war at 



1 



104 



CAESAR'S 



home, where they might have provisions and 
every thing at command, than venture a battle 
within the confines of a foreign state. Tliese 
reasons were at the same time backed by a 
still more powerful consideration : for the Bel- 
lovaci having intelligence that Divitiacus and 
the ^duans were advancing towards their 
territories, could not be restrained from march- 
ing directly homewards, to defend their own 
country. 

"'^'"XII, This resolution being taken; about 
the second watch of the night, they left their 
camp with great noise and tumult, regarding 
neither the order of their march, nor the due 
subordination of command, but each man press- 
ing for the foremost rank, that he might get 
the sooner home, insomuch that their retreat 
had all the appearance of a precipitate flight. 
Csesar, who had immediate notice of this from 
his spies, apprehending some stratagem, be- 
cause he as yet knew nothing of the reason of 
their departure, would not stir out of his 
trenches. But early in the morning, upon 
more certain intelligence/ of their retreat, he 
detached all the cavalry, Imder Q. Pedius and 
L. Arunculeius Cotta, his lieutenants, to ha- 
rass and retard them in their march. T. La- 
bienus had orders to follow with three legions. 
These falling upon their rear, and pursuing 
them many miles, made a dreadful slaughter 
of the flying troops. Whilst the rear, upon 
finding themselves attacked, faced about, and 
valiantly sustained the charge of our men, the 
vanguard, as fancying themselves out of dan- 
ger, were not to be restrained either by neces- 
sity or the voice of their commanders, but 
upon hearing the alarm behind them, broke 
their ranks, and betook themselves to flight. 
Thus the Romans, with little or no loss on 
their side, continued the slaughter all the re- 
maining part of the day. About sunset, they 
gave over the pursuit, and, in obedience to the 
orders they had received, returned to their 
camp. 

XIII. The next day, before the enemy had 
time to rally, or recover out of their conster- 
nation, Caisar led his army into the territories 
of the Suessiones, which join to those of the 
Rhemi ; and after a long march reached 
Noviodunum. He was in hopes of carrying 
the town by assault, because he understood it 
was destitute of a garrison ; but as the ditch 
was broad, and the wall very high, the defen- 
dants, though few in number, withstood all his 



eflforts ; wherefore having fortified his camp, 
he began to provide engines, and get every 
thing in readiness for a siege. Meantime such 
of the Suessiones as had escaped the late 
slaughter, threw themselves during the night 
into the town. But Caesar advancing his pre- 
parations with great expedition, and approach- 
ing under cover of his mantlets to the very 
walls, where he cast up a mount, and planted 
his battering towers, the Gauls, astonished 
at the greatness of the works, as having never 
seen nor heard of any such before, and at the 
despatch wherewith they were carried on, sent 
deputies to treat about a surrender, and by 
the mediation of the Rhemi, obtained condi- 
tions of peace. 

XIV. Caesar having received the principal 
men of their state as hostages, amongst whom 
were the two sons of Galba, their king ; and 
obliged them to deliver up all their arms, ad- 
mitted the Suessiones to a surrender, and led 
his army against the Bellovaci. These, retir- 
ing with their eflfects into Bratuspantium, 
their capital city, and understanding that 
Caesar was advanced within five miles of the 
town, sent a deputation of all their old men, 
who came forth in venerable procession to meet 
him, signifying, by out-stretched hands, and in 
the most submissive terms, that they had put 
themselves under his power and protection, 
nor pretended to appear in arms against the 
people of Rome ; and when he approached still 
nearer the city, and encamped within view of 
the walls, the women and children from the 
ramparts, with extended arms, according to the 
custom of their country, besought the Romans 
for peace. 

\ir\ XV. Hereupon Divitiacus, who, after the 
retreat of the Belgian army, had dismissed 
the !3]duans and returned to Caesar's camp, 
interposed in their behalf, representing : " That 
the Bellovaci had always lived in strict friend- 
ship and alliance with the ^duans : that 
the artful insinuations of their chiefs, who 
misrepresented Caesar, as one that had enslaved 
the ^duan state, and held it under an igno- 
minious tyranny and oppression, had alone 
induced them to forsake their ancient allies, 
and take up arms against the people of Rome : 
that the authors of this advice, seeing its per- 
nicious effects, and the ruin they had brought 
upon their country, were retired into Britain : 
that not only the Bellovaci themselves, but 
the ^Eduans too, in their behalf, implored his 



COMMENTARIES. 



105 



clemency and forgiveness ; that in granting 
their request, he would greatly enlarge the 
credit and authority of the ^duans among the 
Belgian states; which was of so much the 
greater moment, as in all their wars they were 
wont to have recourse to them for assistance." 
Caesar, out of regard to Divitiacus and the 
-^duans, promised to grant them pardon and 
protection ; but as they were possessed of very 
extensive territories, and surpassed in power 
and number of forces all the other Belgian 
states, he demanded six hundred hostages. 

XVI. These being accordingly delivered, 
together with all their arms, Csesar left their 
city, and advanced into the country of the 
Ambiani ; who submitted immediately upon 
his approach. Adjoining to them were the 
Nervians ; of whose manners and genius 
Caesar inquiring, found ; " That they suffered 
no resort of merchants into their cities, nor 
would allow of the importation of wine, or 
other commodities tending to luxury ; as 
imagining that thereby the minds of men were 
enfeebled, and their martial fire and courage 
extinguished : that they were men of a war- 
like spirit ; but altogether unacquainted with 
the refinements of life ; that they continually 
inveighed against the rest of the Belgians, 
for ignominiously submitting to the Roman 
yoke, and abandoning the steady bravery of 
their ancestors. In fine, that they had openly 
declared their resolution, of neither sending 
ambassadors to Caesar, nor accepting any 
terms of peace." ! Caesar, after a march of three 
days across their territories, understood from 
some prisoners, « That he was now advanced 
within ten miles of the Sambre, on the other 
side of which the enemy had posted them- 
selves, and there waited the coming up of 
the Romans ; that they had been joined by 
the Atrebatians and Veromanduans, neigh- 
bouring nations, whom they had persuaded to 
take part in, and share the fortune of the war : 
that they expected also to be reinforced by 
the Atuatici, who were already on their 
march : and that all their women, and such as 
on account of their age were unfit to bear 
arms, had been conveyed to a place of safety, 
inaccessible by reason of the marshes that 
surrounded it." 

XVII. Caesar, upon this intelligence, sent 
his scouts and centurions before, to choose out 
a convenient place for his camp. Meantime, 
as many of the Belgians who had lately 

10* 



submitted, and also not a few Gauls, followed 
the Roman army, some of these, as was after- 
wards known from the prisoners, observing 
the order and disposition of our march, deserted 
in the night to the enemy, and informed them : 
" That the several legions were separated 
from one another, by a number of carriages 
posted between them : that they would there- 
fore have a favourable opportunity, as soon 
as the first legion was arrived in the camp, 
and while the rest wer6 yet a great way be- 
hind, of falling upon it encumbered with the 
baggage, and obtaining an easy victory ; by 
which, and the plunder of the carriages, they 
would strike such a terror through the whole 
army, as must necessarily draw after it a 
total defeat." /jThis advice was the more 
readily listened to, because of old, the Ner- 
vians, being very weak in horse, (nor even 
as yet have they greatly increased their 
strength this way, placing their whole con- 
fidence in their foot,) in order to secure them- 
selves against the inroads of the cavalry of 
the neighbouring nations, had every where 
fortified the country with barricadoes of 
young trees ; which being split in the middle, 
and bent down on both sides, the void spaces 
were so closely interwoven with brambles, 
thorns, and a multitude of boughs, issuing 
from the trees themselves, that they formed a 
fence not only impossible to be passed, but 
even to be seen through. As these, there- 
fore, must greatly impede and perplex the 
march of the Roman army, they thought the 
advice given them by the Belgians was by no 
means to be neglected. 

XVIII. The place chosen by our men for 
their camp was a hill, running with an even 
descent from the summit till it reached the 
banks of the Sambre. Directly opposite to 
this, on the farther side of the river, and at 
the distance of about two hundred paces, was 
another hill, of a like acclivity with the former, 
plain and open round the bottom, but covered 
on the top with woods, so thick that they 
hindered the prospect. Among these woods 
the enemy lay concealed, and only a few 
squadrons of horse appeared on the open ground 
by the river side, whose depth in that place 
did not exceed three feet. 

XIX. Caesar having sent the cavalry before, 
followed himself with the rest of the army. 
But the order and disposition of his march 
differed from the account given in to the ene- 

P 



106 



CESAR'S 



my by the Belgians. For knowing that the 
Nervians were near, he led up six legions, in 
front, ready equipped for battle, according to 
his usual custom. After them followed the 
baggage of the whole army ; and then the 
two new legions, who closed the march, and 
served as guard to the carriages. Meantime 
the Roman cavalry, with the slingers and 
archers, having passed the river, engaged the 
enemy's horse ; but as they retired from time 
to time into the woods, and again sallied upon 
our men, who durst not pursue them beyond 
the open ground ; the six legions that formed 
the van, coming up during these successive 
rencounters, began to intrench themselves. 
When the first line of our carriages appeare,d 
within sight of those that lay concealed in the 
woods, which was the time previously con- 
certed by the enemy for giving the onset, the 
Nervians, who stood ready drawn up within 
the thicket, and had mutually exhorted one 
another to a resolute behaviour, rushed sud- 
denly forward with all their forces, and fell 
furiously upon our cavalry. These being 
easily repulsed and broken, they ran down 
with incredible speed to the Sambre, inso- 
much, that at one and the same instant, they 
seemed to be in the woods, in the river, and 
charging our men on the other side. Nor 
were they less expeditious in mounting the 
hill, and attacking those who were employed 
in fortifying the camp. 

XX. Now had Csesar all the parts of a 
general upon his hands at once ; to erect the 
standard, which was the signal for the men to 
fly to arms ; to proclaim the battle by sound 
of trumpet ; to draw off the soldiers from 
the works ; to recall those that were gone to 
fetch materials for the rampart ; to draw up 
the army in order of battle ; to encourage his 
men ; and give the word of onset : in most of 
which he was prevented by the shortness of 
the time, and the sudden assault of the enemy. 
In this emergency, two things chiefly contri- 
buted to the preservation of the Romans : 
one, the ability and experience of the soldiers, 
who, practised in former battles, knew their 
duty and what was expedient in the present 
conjuncture, no less than the officers them- 
selves ; the other, the orders given by Caesar 
to his several lieutenants, not to quit the 
works, and the legions where they commanded, 
till the fortifications of the camp were finished. 
For these, upon seeing the danger, and sud- 



den approach of the enemy, waited not for 
new instructions from the general, but gave 
forth such orders, as their own prudence and 
the present necessity suggested. 

XXL Caesar, having made the necessary 
dispositions, ran to encourage his men ; and, 
as chance ordered it, fell in with the tenth 
legion. When exhorting them in few words 
to exert their wonted bravery, and manfully 
sustain the assault without terror or dismay, 
as he saw the enemy within reach of dart, he 
gave the signal to engage. Hastening thence 
to another quarter of the field, he found the 
battle already begun. So short was the time 
allowed us to prepare ourselves, and such the 
resolution and impetuosity of the Nervians in 
rushing to the encounter, that neither could 
the officers find leisure to regulate the ensigns, 
nor the soldiers to put on their helmets, or 
uncase their targets. Each man, as he arrived 
from the works, joined himself to the first 
standard that came in his way, that he might 
not lose that time in looking for his own 
company, which was to be employed in fight- 
ing the enemy. 

XXII. The army being drawn up, rather 
according to the nature of the place, the de- 
clivity of the hill, and the particular necessity 
of the time, than agreeable to order and the 
rules of war ; as the legions were forced to en- 
gage separately, some in one place, some in 
another, and the view of the fight was every 
where interrupted by the thick hedges de- 
scribed above ; it was not possible in these cir- 
cumstances, to distinguish, with any certainty, 
where to send the necessary supplies; how 
to provide against the exigencies of the field ; 
nor indeed for one man to have an eye to all 
the occurrences that called for notice and 
redress. In such an unequal situation of 
things, therefore, much room was left for 
the various events and interposition of for- 
tune. 

XXIIT. The soldiers of the ninth and 
tenth legions, who were upon the left of the 
army, having cast their darts, advanced 
against the Atrebatians, with whom it was 
their fortune to engage. These now weary, 
breathless, and overpowered with wounds, 
were quickly driven from the higher ground 
quite back to the Sambre, where the Romans, 
still pressing them sword in hand, slew great 
numbers as they endeavoured to pass the 
river. Nor did our men decUne pursuing 



COMMENTARIES. 



107 



them to the other side : but following too far, 
till they were drawn into a place of disadvan- 
tage, the enemy suddenly faced about, and 
renewed the charge ; yet were a second time 
obliged to betake themselves to flight. So 
likewise, in another quarter of the field, the 
eleventh and eighth legions, having over- 
thrown the Veromanduans, against whom 
they fought, drove them from the higher 
ground to the very banks of the river. 

XXIV. As by this means the front and 
left side of the Roman camp lay in a manner 
quite exposed, for the twelfth legion, and not 
far from that, the seventh were posted in the 
right wing ; the Nervians, headed by Boduog- 
natus, their king, advanced thither in a close 
body , and whilst one party endeavoured to 
surround the legions, by taking them in flank, 
the rest mounted the hill, in order to get pos- 
session of the camp. . At the same time our 
cavalry, with the light-armed infantry, who in 
the very beginning of the engagement had 
been repulsed and broken, as we have related 
above, returning to the camp, and meeting the 
enemy in front, again betook themselves to 
flight. The servants too of the army, who 
from the top of the hill had beheld our men 
victorious, and pursuing the enemy across the 
river, having sallied out for the sake of plun- 
der, when they now looked back, and saw the 
Nervians in possession of the camp, fled witli 
the utmost precipitation. This confusion was 
still more increased by the clamour and uproar 
of those that attended the carriages ; insomuch 
that the panic spreading on all sides, each 
man thought of providing for his safety by 
flight. The cavalry of Treves, who were in 
the highest esteem among the Gauls for their 
valour, and had been sent by the state to rein- 
force CsBsar's army, alarmed by these several 
appearances, when they saw our camp filled 
with multitudes of the enemy, the legions over- 
powered, and in a manner quite surrounded ; 
the horse, archers, slingers, and Numidians, 
routed, dispersed, and flying on all hands ; 
imagining all was lost, returned to their own 
country, and reported, that the Romans were 
utterly overthrown, and their camp and bag- 
gage in possession of the enemy. 

XXV. Csesar, having encouraged the tenth 
legion, hastened to the right wing of the army. 
He there found his men overpowered by the 
enemy ; the ensigns of the twelfth legion all 
crowded into one place, and the soldiers them- 



selves standing so close together, that they 
had not room to use their arms ; all the cen- 
turions of the fourth cohort slain, the standard- 
bearer killed, and the standard taken ; the 
centurions of the other coliorts almost all 
either killed or dangerously wounded ; among 
these P. Sextius Baculus, the first centurion 
of the legion, a man of great courage, so 
weakened by the multitude of his wounds, 
that he was hardly able to support himself; 
the rest discouraged and avoiding the fight, 
and some even running away, because aban- 
doned by the troops that were to sustain them ; 
the enemy pressing vigorously in front from 
the lower ground, and at the same time flank- 
ing the legions on either side with great fury : 
in a word, things reduced to the last extre- 
mity, and no body of reserve to restore the 
battle. Whereupon, snatching a buckler from 
a soldier, wlro stood in the rear of the legion, 
for he himself was come thither without one, 
and pressing to the front of the battle, he 
called the centurions by name, encouraged 
the rest, and commanded the soldiers to ad- 
vance the ensigns, and widen their ranks, that 
they might be the more at liberty to use their 
swords. His arrival inspiring the men with 
hope, and reviving their courage, as every one 
was ambitious of distinguishing himself in the 
presence of his general, and even in his greatest 
extremity^ redoubled his efforts, the progress 
of the enemy was a little checked, 

XXVI. Csesar observing that the seventh 
legion, which fought at some distance from 
the other, was likewise very much pressed by 
the enemy, commanded the military tribunes 
to draw the two legions together by degrees, 
and joining them back to back oppose the 
enemy with a double front. This being done ; 
as they were now in a condition to support 
each other, and no longer feared being sur- 
rounded, they began to make a more vigorous 
/opposition, and fight with greater courage. 
Meantime the two new legions that formed 
the rear of our army, and had been appointed 
to guard the baggage ; hearing of the battle, 
advanced with all possible speed, and were 
seen by the Nervians from the top of the hill ; 
and T. Labienus, who had made himself mas- 
ter of the enemy's camp, observing from the 
higher ground how matters went on our side, 
detached the tenth legion to our assistance. 
These understanding, by the flight of oui 
cavalry and servants, the distress we were in 



108 



CvESAR'S 



and the danger that threatened the camp, the 
legions, and the general, made all the haste 
they could to join us. 

XXVII. The arrival of this detachment 
produced so great a change in our favour, 
that many of the soldiers, who before lay op- 
pressed with wounds, now resuming courage, 
and supporting themselves with their shields, 
renewed the fight. Nay, the very servants of 
the camp, observing the consternation of the 
enemy, unarmed as they were, rushed amongst 
their armed battalions. The cavalry too, 
striving by extraordinary efforts of valour to 
wipe away the ignominy of their late flight, 
charged the enemy in all places where the 
void spaces between the legions suffered them 
to advance. Meantime the Nervians, though 
now reduced to the last extremity, exerted 
themselves with such determined courage, that 
their front ranks being cut off, those who stood 
behind mounted the bodies of the slain, and 
thence continued to maintain the fight; and 
when these too by their fall had raised a moun- 
tain of carcasses, such as remained ascending 

..febe-piIeTpoured their javelins upon us as from 
a rampart, and even returned the darts thrown 
at them by our men. Fame therefore deceived 
not, in proclaiming so loudly the bravery of a 
people, who thus adventured to cross a very 
broad river, climb the steepest banks, and rush 
upon an enemy possessed of all the advan- 
tages of ground : difficulties, which, though 
seemingly insurmountable, appeared yet as 
nothing to men of their resolution and mag- 
nanimity. 

XXVIII. The battle being ended, and the 
name and nation of the Nervians in a manner 
quite extinguished, the old men, who, with 
the women and children, as we have related 
alio re, had been conveyed into a place sur- 
rounded with bogs and marshes, hearing of 
this terrible overthrow, and judging that 
nothing would be able to stop the progress of 
the conquerors, or protect the conquered from 
their victorious arms, resolved, with the con- 

Y^' sent of all that survived the late disaster, to 
•/. send ambassadors to Caesar and surrender 
I themselves. These, in reciting the calamities 
of their country, represented, that of six hun- 
dred senators, there remained only three ; and 
that from sixty thousand fighting men, they 
were reduced to five hundred. Caesar, as a 
proof of his compassion towards this brave 
and unfortunate people, readily took them 



under his protection, allowing them free and 
full possession of their towns and territories, 
and strictly commanding all the neighbouring 
nations to abstain from injuries and wrongs. 

XXIX. The Atuatici, of whom mention 
has been made above, being upon their march 
with all their forces to join the Nervians, and 
hearing of their defeat, immediately returned 
home ; when abandoning all their other towns 
and castles, they conveyed themselves and 
their riches into a place of great strength, 
which nature had fortified with uncommon 
care ; for it was on every side surrounded with 
high rocks and precipices, having only one" 
avenue of about two hundred feet broad, that 
approached the town with a gentle rising. 
Here they raised a double wall of prodigious 
height, whereon, as a further security, they 
laid great numbers of huge stones, and strong 
pointed beams. This people were descended 
from the Teutones and Cimbri, who, in their 
march towards the Alps and Italy, left their 
heavy baggage on this side the Rhine, with a 
detachment of six thousand men to guard it. 
These, after the final overthrow of their coun- 
trymen, being for many years harassed and 
persecuted by the neighbouring states, some- 
times invading others, sometimes defending 
themselves, at last, with the consent of all the 
bordering nations, obtained peace, and chose 
this place for a habitation. 

XXX. On the first arrival of the Roman 
army, they made frequent sallies from the 
town, and engaged our men in small skir- 
mishes. But Caesar having drawn a line of 
contravallation, twelve feet high, fifteen miles 
in circumference, and every where well forti- 
fied with redoubts, they kept themselves within 
their walls. When we had now finished our 
approaches, cast up a mount, and were pre- 
paring a tower of assault behind the works, 
they began at first to deride us from the bat- 
tlements, and in reproachful language ask the 
meaning of that prodigious engine raised at 
such a distance ! With what hands or strength, 
men of our size and make, (for the Gauls, 
who are for the most part very tall, despise 
the small stature of the Romans,) could hope 
to bring forward so unwieldy a machine 
against their walls ■? 

XXXI. But when they saw it removed 
and approaching near the town, astonished 
at the new and unusual appearance, they 
sent ambassadors to Caesar to sue for peace. 



CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 



OF 



HIS WARS IN GAUL. 



BOOK III. 



Ill 



THE ARGUMENT. 

[. The Nantuates, Veragrians, and Seduni, fall unerpectedly upon Ser. Galba, Caesar's lieutenant.— III. But 
are overthrown with great slaughter. — VI. Galba leads back his legion into the country of the AUobrogians. 
— ^Vn. At the same time, the Venetians, and other states bordering upon the ocean, revolt. — IX. Cassar pre- 
pares to attack them, not without great difficulty.— S. He divides his army, and distributes it imo the se- 
veral provinces of Gaul.— Xn. The advantages of the Venetians, and the manner of their defence.— 5III. A 
description of their shipping, and its suitableness to the nature of the coast.— 5IV. Caesar finding it in vain 
to attack them by land, comes to a naval engagement with them, and gets the victory. — ^XVII. Meantime, Q- 
Titurius Sabinus, his lieutenant, by an artful stratagem, defeats the Unellians. — XXI. At the same time, P. 
Crassus, inAquitain, having vanquished the Sotiates, obliges them to submit. — XXFV. Together with several 
other states of the same province. — x xi x . Caesar attacks the Morini and Menapians with success ; but the 
season being far advanced, he is obliged to send his army into winter quarters. 



112 



CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 



HIS WARS IN GAUL. 



BOOK III 



I. CiESAR, upon his departure for Italy, sent 
Sergius Galba with the twelfth legion, and 
part of the cavalry, against the Nantuatcs, 
Veragrians and Seduni, whose territories ex- 
tended from the confines of the AUobrogians, 
the Lake Lemanus, and the river Rhone, all 
the way to the top of the Alps. His design 
in this expedition was to open a free passage 
over those mountains to the Roman merchants, 
who had hitherto travelled them with great 
danger, and subject to many grievous exac- 
tions. Galba, whose orders also were to put 
the legion into winter quarters in those parts, 
if he saw it necessary, after some successful 
encounters, and making himself master of 
several forts, was addressed by ambassadors 
from all nations round. Having settled the 
terms of peace, and received hostages for 
their fidelity, he resolved to quarter two co- 
horts among the Nantuates, and himself, with 
the other cohorts, to winter in a town of the 
Veragrians, called Octodurus. This town, 
which is situated in the midst of a valley, 
upon a plain of no great extent, is bounded 
on all sides by very high mountains. As it 
was divided into two parts by a river, he left 
one part to the Gauls, and assigned the 
other to his legion for their winter-quarters, 
commanding it to be fortified with a ditch and 
rampart. 

n. After many days spent here, and that 
orders had been given, for the bringing in of 
corn to supply the camp, he was suddenly 
informed by his spies, that the Gauls had 
abandoned in the night that part of the city 
allotted to them, and that the impending 
11 



mountains were covered with great multi- 
tudes of the Veragrians and Seduni. Many 
reasons conspired to induce the Gauls to this 
sudden resolution of renewing the war, and 
falling upon our men. First, the small num- 
ber of the Roman troops, who were therefore 
despised by the enemy, as not amounting in 
all to one legion : two entire cohorts having 
been detached, and even of those that re- 
mained with Galba, many being gone out in 
quest of provisions ; and then their persuasion, 
that by reason of the inequality of the ground, 
where it would be easy for them to pour upon 
us from the top of the mountains, and over- 
whelm us with their darts, our men would not 
be able to stand the very first assault. Add 
to all this, their inward regret at seeing 
their children torn from them under the name 
of hostages, and that they firmly believed it 
to be the design of the Romans, in seizing 
the summits of the mountains, not only to 
open a free passage over the Alps, but to se- 
cure to themselves the perpetual possession of 
those parts, and annex them to the adjoining 
province, 

HI. Upon this intelligence, Galba, who 
had neither completed the fortifications of his 
camp, nor laid in sufficient stores of corn and 
other provisions, as little apprehending an in- 
surrection of this kind, among a people that 
had submitted and given hostages, having 
speedily assembled a council of war, began 
to ask their advice in the present exigence. 
As the danger which threatened them was 
sudden and unexpected, and as they saw the 
mountains on every side covered with multi 
Q 113 



114 



CiESAR'S 



tudes of armed soldiers, insomuch that there 
was no room to hope, either for succours, or 
any convoys of provision, because the enemy 
were in possession of all the avenues to the 
camp ; some believing the case to be altoge- 
ther desperate, proposed to abandon the bag- 
gage, and attempt by a sally the recovery of 
their old quarters. But the greater number 
were for reserving this expedient to the last 
extremity, and in the meantime to wait the de- 
cision of fortune, and in the best manner they 
were able, defend the camp. 

IV. After a short space, and even before 
there was sufficient time for the putting in exe- 
cution what had been resolved on, the enemy, 
at a signal given, came rushing upon us from 
all parts, and began the assault by a shower 
of stones and darts. Our men at first made a 
brave and vigorous resistance, plying them 
with their javelins from the ramparts, whence 
not a single weapon was discharged in vain ; 
and as any part of the camp appeared hard 
pressed for want of men to defend it, thither 
they ran, and made head against the assailants. 
But in this the Gauls had greatly the advan- 
tage, that when fatigued with the length of 
the fight, they found themselves under a ne- 
cessity to retire, fresh men succeeded in their 
place, whereas on our side, by reason of the 
small number of troops, no resource of this 
kind was left ; so that not only such as were 
wearied with fighting were yet obliged to con- 
tinue in their posts, but we could not even per- 
mit the wounded to retire, or for a moment to 
abandon the charge. 

V. The battle had now lasted upwards of 
six hours without intermission, insomuch, that 
the Romans not only found their strength 
greatly exhausted, but even began to be in 
want of weapons, wherewith to annoy the 
enemy. The Gauls, on the other hand, urged 
the combat with greater fury than ever, and 
meeting with but a faint resistance, fell to de- 
molishing the rampart and filling up the ditch. 
All was giving way before them, when P. 
Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, 
the same, who, as we have related above, re- 
ceived so many wounds in the battle against 
the Nervians ; as likewise C. Volusenus, a 
military tribune, one equally distinguished for 
his conduct and bravery, came to Galba, and 
represented : That the only refuge now left, 
was by a sudden sally, to put all upon the 
issue of a bold attack. Accordingly, Galba, 



calling the centurions together, by them gave 
immediate notice to the soldiers to keep for 
some time only on the defensive, and having 
provided themselves with the weapons thrown 
at them by the enemy, and a little recovered 
their strength. Upon a signal given, to sally 
out of the camp, and place all their hopes of 
safety in their valour. These orders were ex- 
actly followed : and the Romans rushing fu- 
riously upon the enemy from all parts, neither 
gave them time to comprehend the meaning 
of so unexpected an attack, nor to recover out 
of the confusion into which it had thrown 
them. Thus fortune changing sides, they every 
where surrounded and put to the sword the 
Gauls, who had so lately entertained hopes 
of mastering our camp. Of thirty thousand 
armed troops, which number, as it appeared 
aftervvards, were present in this assault, more 
than ten thousand perished in the field. The 
rest fled in great terror and confusion, and 
were even forced to abandon the summits 
of the mountains. The Romans seeing the 
enemy entirely dispersed, and obliged every 
where to throw down their arms, quitted, 
the pursuit, and retired within their intrench- 
ments. 

VI. After this battle, Galba, unwilling a 
second time to expose himself to the incon- 
stancy of fortune, and besides, considering that 
he had met with an opposition he little expected, 
when he first resolved to winter in these parts ; 
above all, finding himself in great want of corn 
and forage, the next day set fire to the town, 
and began his march back into the province. 
As there was no enemy in the field to disturb 
or oppose him in his retreat, he brought the 
legion safe into the country of the Nantuates, 
and thence into the territories of the Allobro- 
gians, where he put them into winter quarters. 

VII. The insurrection being thus entirely 
quelled, CaBsar, for many reasons, believed 
that Gaul was now restored to a state of tran- 
quillity. The Belgians had been overcome, 
the Germans quelled, and the Seduni, and 
other inhabitants of the Alps, forced to submit. 
He therefore, in the beginning of winter, ven- 
tured upon a progress into Illyricum, from a 
desire he had to visit those nations, and ac- 
quaint himself with the country, when all on 
a sudden a new war broke out in Gaul. The 
occasion of it was as follows : the seventh le- 
gion, commanded by young Crassus, was quar- 
tered among the Andes, a people bordering 



COMMENTARIES. 



115 



upon the ocean. As there was great scarcity 
of corn in these parts, Crassus sent some of- 
ficers of the cavalry and military tribunes to 
solicit a supply from the neighbouring states. 
Of this number were T. Terrasidius, sent to 
the Eusubians, M. Trebius Gallus, to the Cu- 
riosolitoB, and Q. Velanius, and T. Sihus, to 
the Venetians. 

VIII. This last state is by far the most 
powerful and considerable of all the nations 
inhabiting along the sea coast ; and that not 
only on account of their vast shipping, where- 
with they drive a mighty traffic to Britain, 
and their skill and experience in naval affairs, 
in which they greatly surpass the other mari- 
time states ; but because lying upon a large 
and open coast, against which the sea rages 
with great violence, and where the havens, 
being few in number, are all subject to their 
jurisdiction ; they have most of the nations 
that trade in those seas tributaries to their state. 
Among them the revolt began, by detaining 
Silius and Velanius, as by this means they 
hoped to recover the hostages they had put 
into the hands of Crassus. The neighbouring 
states, moved by their authority and example, 
as the Gauls are in general very sudden and 
forward in their resolves, detained for the same 
reason Trebius and Terrasidius, and speedily 
despatching ambassadors from one to another, 
they, by their princes, entered into a confede- 
racy of acting in all things with common con- 
sent, and alike exposing themselves to the 
same issue of fortune, earnestly soliciting at the 
same time the other provinces, rather to stand 
up in defence of that liberty they had received 
of their ancestors, than tamely submit to the 
ignominious yoke of the Romans. All the 
nations upon the sea coast coming readily into 
this alliance, they jointly sent ambassadors to 
Crassus, to acquaint him : " That if he ex- 
pected to have his officers restored, he must 
first send them back their hostages." 

IX. Caesar having intelligence of these 
things from Crassus, and being then at a great 
distance from Gaul, ordered in the meantime, 
that a number of galleys should be built upon 
the Loire, a river which runs into the ocean ; 
and that mariners, rowers, and pilots should 
be drawn together from the province. These 
orders being executed with great despatch, he 
himself, as soon as the season of the year per- 
mitted, came to the army. The Venetians, and 
other states in alliance with them, having no- 



tice of his arrival, and reflecting at the same 
time upon the greatness of their crime, in de- 
taining and loading with irons ambassadors, a 
name ever looked upon amongst all nations 
as sacred and inviolable, began to make pre- 
parations proportioned to the danger that 
threatened them, more especially to provide 
themselves with all kinds of warlike stores, 
and that with so much the greater alacrity and 
confidence, as the nature and situation of the 
country gave them good hopes of being able to 
defend themselves. , They knew that the 
passes by land were every where cut asunder, 
by the many friths and arms of the ocean that 
run up in those parts ; and that the approach 
by sea was not less difficult, on account of the 
small number of harbours and the little know- 
ledge the Romans had of the coast. Neither 
did they imagine it possible for our army to 
continue long in that country, by reason of 
the great scarcity of corn ; and should even 
all these expectations deceive them, they had 
still a mighty confidence in the strength and 
number of their shipping. The Romans, they 
were sensible, had but a very inconsiderable 
fleet ; and were besides perfect strangers to 
the ports, islands, and shallows of the coast, 
where the chief weight of the war was like to 
fall. At the time they foresaw that our pilots, 
accustomed only to the navigation of the 
Mediterranean, a sea bounded and shut in on 
all sides by the continent, must needs find 
themselves greatly at a loss, when I hey came 
to enter the vast and open spaces of the wide 
Atlantic ocean. In consequence of these re- 
flections, and the resolutions formed upon 
them, they sat about fortifying their towns, 
and conveying all their corn into places of 
strength, ordering as man)"^ ships as could be 
got together to rendezvous in the Venetian 
ports; it appearing, that Caesar intended to 
begin the war by attacking that state. They 
likewise brought over to their alliance the 
Osismians, Lexovians, Nannetes, Ambiani, 
Merini, Diablintes, and Menapians, and des- 
patched ambassadors into Britain, which lies 
over against their coast, to solicit assistance 
from thence. 

X. All these difficulties before mentioned 
attended the prosecution of this war : but Cee- 
sar was urged by many considerations to un- 
dertake and carry it on with vigour : the in- 
sult offered to the commonwealth in detaining 
the Roman knights ; a revolt and insurrection, 



116 



CtESAR'S 



after submission, and hostages gi%'en ; the con- 
federacy of so manj' states : above all his fear, 
lest by neglecting to oppose these first com- 
motions, he should give encouragement to the 
other provinces of Gaul to follow the example. 
Reflecting, therefore, upon the genius and 
temper of the Gauls, fond of revolutions, an^ 
ever forward and ready to engage in new 
wars, and considering at the same time, that 
it was the natural bent and disposition of man- 
kind to aspire after liberty, and abhor the 
yoke of servitude, he determined, before the in- 
fection should spread wider, to divide his army, 
and distribute it into the several provinces of 
Gaul. 

XL Pursuant to this design, T. Labienus, 
his lieutenant, was sent with the cavalry to 
Treves, whose territory extends along the 
banks of the Rhine. To him he gave it in 
charge, to take a progress to Rheims, and the 
other Belgian states, in order to retain them 
in obedience, as likewise to oppose the Ger- 
mans, should they attempt by force the pas- 
sage of the river ; a report then prevailing, that 
they had been invited over by the Belgians. 
P. Crassus, with twelve legionary cohorts, 
and a great body of horse, had orders to march 
into Aquitain, to prevent the arrival of any 
supplies from that quarter, and the junction 
of the forces of so many powerful nations. 
Q. Titurius Sabinus, at the head of three le- 
gions, entered the country of the Unellians, 
Curiosolitse, and Lexovians, to find employ- 
ment for the troops that had been drawn to- 
gether in those parts. To young Brutus he 
gave the command of the fleet, and of all the 
vessels from Gaul, which he had ordered to be 
fitted out by the Santones, Pictones and other 
provinces that continued in obedience, strongly 
recommending to him at the same time, to use 
the greatest despatch, and sail with all expe- 
dition for the Venetian coast. He himself, at 
the head of the land army, set out upon his 
march thither. 

XII. The situation of most of the towns in 
those parts is such, that standing upon the 
edges of promontories, or upon points of land 
that run out into the sea, there is no ap- 
proaching them with an army at high water, 
which happens always twice in twelve hours. 
Neither is it possible for a fleet to draw near ; 
because, upon the recess of the tide, the ships 
would be in danger of being dashed against 
the shallows and banks of sand. Both these 



reasons therefore concurred to secure their 
towns from assault ; and if at any time, by 
the greatness of the works carried on against 
them, and huge artificial mounts, that served 
to prevent, the ingress of the sea, and were 
raised to a height nearly equalling their walls, 
they saw themselves reduced to an extremity, 
then, by bringing up their ships> of which 
thej' had always a great number in readiness, 
they easily found means to carry oif their ef- 
fects, and withdraw into the nearest towns, 
where they again defended themselves by the 
same advantages of situation as before. In 
this manner did they elude all Csesar's at- 
tempts during a great part of the summer, and 
that with so much the more success, because 
our fleet was kept back by tempests, and 
found the navigation extremely dangerous 
in that vast and boundless ocean, where the 
tides are great, and the havens both few in 
number, and at a considerable distance one 
from another. 

XIII. For the Venetian ships were built 
and fitted out in this manner : Their bottoms 
were somewhat flatter than ours, the better 
to adapt themselves to the shallows, and sus- 
tain without danger the regress of the tides. 
Their prows were very high and erect, as 
likewise their sterns, to bear the hugeness of 
the billows, and the violence of tempests. 
The body of the vessel was entirely of oak, to 
stand the shocks and assaults of that tempes- 
tuous ocean. The benches of the rowers were 
made of strong beams of about a foot in breadth, 
and fastened with iron nails an inch thick. 
Instead of cables, they secured their anchors 
with chains of iron ; and made use of skins, 
and a sort of pliant leather, by way of sails, 
either because they wanted canvass, and were 
ignorant of the art of making sail-cloth, or 
which is more probable, because they imagined 
that canvass sails were not so proper to bear 
the violence of tempests, the rage and fury 
of the winds, and to govern ships of that 
bulk and burthen. Between our fleet, and 
vessels of such a make, the nature of the en- 
counter was this ; that in agility, and a ready 
command of oars, we had indeed the advan- 
tage, but in other respects, regarding the 
situation of the coast, and the assaults of 
storms, all things ran very much in their 
favour; for neither could our ships injure 
them with our beaks, so great was their 
strength and firmness; nor could we easily 



COMMENTARIES. 



117 



throw in our darts, because of their height 
above us ; which also was the reason, that 
we found it extremely difficult to grapple tlie 
enemy, and bring them to close fight. Add 
to all this, that when the sea began to rage, 
and they were forced to submit to the plea- 
sure of the winds, they could both weather 
the storm better, and more securely trust them- 
selves among the shallows, as fearing nothing 
from the rocks and cliffs upon the recess of 
the tide. The Romans, on the other hand, 
had reason to be under a continual dread of 
these and such like etccidents. 

XIV. Caesar having taken many of their 
towns, and finding that he only fatigued his 
army to no purpose, because he could neither 
prevent the retreat of the enemy, nor force 
their garrisons to a surrender, resolved to wait 
the arrival of his fleet ; which being accord- 
ingly come up, was no sooner descried by the 
Venetians, than about two hundred and twenty 
of their best ships, well equipped for service, 
and furnished with all kind of weapons, stood 
out to sea, and drew up in order of battle, 
against us. Neither Brutus, who commanded 
the fleet, nor the centurions and military tri- 
bunes who had the charge of particular ves- 
sels, knew what course to take, or in what 
manner to conduct the fight ; for they were 
no strangers to the strength and firmness of 
the Venetian shipping, which rendered them 
proof against our beaks ; and when they had 
even raised turrets upon the decks, yet being 
still overtopped by the lofty sterns of the 
enemy, the Romans could not with any ad- 
vantage throw in their darts; whereas those 
sent by the Gauls, coming from above, de- 
scended with great violence on our men. In 
this exigence, a particular kind of instrument, 
used by the mariners, proved of signal service, 
in giving a favourable issue to the combat. 
They had provided themselves with long poles, 
armed at one end with long scythes, not unlike 
those made use of in attacking the walls of 
towns. With these they laid hold of the ene- 
my's tackle, and drawing off the galley by the 
extreme force of oars, cut asunder the ropes 
that fastened the sail-yards to the mast. These 
giving way, the sail-yards necessarily came 
down; insomuch, that as all the hopes and 
expectations of the Gauls depended entirely 
on their sails and rigging, by depriving them 
of this resource, we at the same time rendered 
their vessels wholly unserviceable. The rest 
11* 



depended altogether upon the valour of the 
troops, in which the Romans had greatly the 
advantage; and the rather, because they 
fought within view of Csesar and the whole 
army, so that not a single act of bravery could 
pass unobserved ; for all the adjoining hills 
and eminences which afforded a near prospect 
of the sea, were covered with our men. 

XV. The enemy's sail yards being, as we 
have said, cut down, and many of their ships 
singly surrounded by two or three of ours at 
a time, the Romans used their utmost endea- 
vours to board them ; which the Venetians 
observing, and that we had already made our- 
selves masters of a great part of their fleet, as 
they could fall upon no expedient to prevent 
so great a misfortune, they began to think of 
providing for their safety by flight. Accordingly 
they tacked about, in order to have the ad- 
vantage of the wind, when all of a sudden so 
dead a calm ensued, that not a vessel could 
stir out of its place : nor could any thing 
have fallen out more opportunely towards put- 
ting at once a final period to the war ; for the 
Romans attacking their ships one after ano- 
ther, took them with ease, insomuch, that of 
all that vast number that came out against us, 
but a very few, under favour of the night, es- 
caped to land, after a conflict that continued 
from nine in the morning till sun-set. 

XVI. This battle put an end to the war with 
the Venetians, and all the nations upon the 
sea coast. For as the entire body of their 
youth, and all those also of more advanced 
age, who were capable of serving their coun- 
try by their credit and counsels, were present 
in the action, and as they had likewise drawn 
together their whole naval strength ; such as 
survived this defeat, having neither any place 
of refuge whereunto to retire, nor means left 
of defending their towns, surrendered them- 
selves and their all to Caesar's mercy. But 
he thought it necessary to proceed against 
them with the greater severity, that he might 
impress upon the mind of the Gauls for the fu- 
ture, a more inviolable regard to the sacred 
character of ambassadors. Having therefore 
caused all their senators to be put to death, he 
ordered the rest to be sold for slaves. 

XVII. During these transactions against 
the Venetians, Q. Titurius Sabinus entered 
the territories of the Unellians, at the head of 
the troops put under his command by Csesar. 
Viridovix was invested with the supreme au- 



118 



CiESAR'S 



thority in these parts, and had been appointed 
general in chief by all the states concerned in 
the revolt : out of which he had drawn toge- 
ther a very numerous and powerful army. 
Nay, but a very few days before, the Aulerci, 
Eburovices, and Lexovians, having massacred 
their senate, because they refused to engage 
in the war, had shut their gates against the 
Romans, and joined themselves to Viridovix. 
Besides all this, he had very much strength- 
ened his army by the great numbers that 
flocked to him from all parts of Gaul ; men of 
desperate fortunes, or accustomed to live by 
robbery, whom the hopes of plunder, and love 
of war had drawn off from the daily labours 
of their calling and the cares of agriculture. 

XVIII. Sabinus kept close within his camp, 
which was situated in a manner every way 
advantageous, while Viridovix, who had posted 
himself at the distance of about two miles, 
daily drew out his men, and offered him bat- 
tle. This behaviour of the Roman general 
not only drew upon him the contempt of the 
enemy, but occasioned also some murmuring 
among his own troops, and filled the Gauls 
with so high a conceit of his fear, that they 
even adventured to come up to his very trench- 
es. The reason of his acting in this manner 
was, that he thought it not justifiable in a lieu- 
tenant, in the absence of the commander in 
chief, to hazard a battle with so superior an 
army, unless upon terms of evident advantage. 

XIX. Having confirmed them in this be- 
lief, that his reserve was the effect of fear, he 
made choice of a certain Gaul from among 
the auxiliaries, a man of address, and every 
way qualified for carrying on his design. Him 
he persuaded, by great rewards, and still greater 
promises, to go over to the enemy, instructing 
him at the same time in the part he was to 
act. This Gaul, coming to their camp as a 
deserter, laid before them the fear of the Ro- 
mans, and the extremities to which Csesar 
was reduced in the war against the Vene- 
tians ; nor did he fail to insinuate, that there 
was great reason to believe Sabinus intended 
the next night privately to draw off his army, 
and march to Csesar's assistance. No sooner 
was this heard by the Gauls, than they all 
cried out with one voice, that they ought not to 
lose so fair an occasion of success, but to go 
and attack the Roman camp. Many reasons 
concurred to fix them in this resolution. The 
reserve of Sabinus for some days past ; the in- 



telligence from the deserter, confirming their 
belief of his fear ; the want of provisions, of 
which they had taken no great care to lay in 
a sufficient stock ; the hopes conceived from 
the Venetian war ; and, in fine, that readiness 
with which men are apt to believe what falls 
in with their expectations and wishes. Urged 
by these considerations, Ihey would not suffer 
Viridovix and the rest of the general officers 
to dismiss the council before they had obtained 
their consent for the taking up of arms, and 
falling upon the Roman camp. The proposal 
being at last agreed to, they provided them- 
selves with fascines and hurdles, to fill up the 
ditch, and joyfully began their march, as to a 
certain victory. 

XX. The Roman camp stood upon an emi- 
nence, which rose with a gentle ascent, for 
the space of about a mile. Hither the Gauls 
advanced with so much haste, in order to come 
upon our troops unprepared, that by that time 
they were arrived, they had run themselves 
quite out of breath. Sabinus having encour- 
aged his men, whom he saw eager to engage, 
gave the word of onset. As the enemy were 
very much encumbered with the loads of fas- 
cines they had brought to fill up the ditch, he 
ordered a sudden sally from the two several 
gates of the camp, and so well did it succeed, 
by reason of the advantage of the ground, the 
inexperience and weariness of the Gauls, the 
bravery of the Roman troops, and their ability 
acquired in former battles, that the enemy 
could not sustain the very first charge of our 
men, but immediately betook themselves to 
flight. The Romans, who were fresh and vi- 
gorous, pursuing them under all these disad- 
vantages, put great numbers to the sword, and 
the rest being followed by the cavalry, very 
few escaped the slaughter. Thus at one and 
the same time, Sabinus had an account of the 
defeat of the Venetians by sea, and Csesar of 
the victory obtained by Sabinus at land. All 
the several states in those parts readily sub- 
mitted to Titurius : for as the Gauls are very 
prompt and forward to undertake a war, so 
are they of a disposition that easily relents, 
and gives way to the strokes of adversity, 

XXI. Much about the same time P. Cras- 
sus arrived in Aquitain, a country, which as 
we have before observed, for extent of terri- 
tory, and number of inhabitants, is deservedly 
counted a third part of Gaul. This general 
understanding that he was to conduct a war 



COMMENTARIES, 



119 



in those parts, where but a few years before 
L. Valerius Praeconinus had been slain, and 
his army put to the rout, and whence L. 
Manilius, the proconsul, had been driven with 
the loss of his baggage, soon became sensible 
that he must act with more than ordinary cir- 
cumspection and vigour. Having therefore 
made provision of corn, assembled his aux- 
iliary troops and cavalry, and strengthened his 
army with a choice body of volunteers, drawn 
together by name from Toulouse, Carcaso, and 
JVarbonne, which states make up that part of 
the Roman province that lies the nearest to 
Aquitain, he advanced with all his forces into 
the territories of the Sotiates. These, upon 
the first notice of his arrival, having levied a 
great army, and attacking him in his march 
with the whole body of their cavalry, in which 
their chief strength consisted, were neverthe- 
less repulsed and pursued by our men. But all 
on a sudden their infantry appearing in a val- 
ley, where they had been designedly placed in 
ambush, fell furiously upon the Romans, disor- 
dered with the pursuit, and renewed the fight. 

XXII. The battle was long and obstinate. 
For the Sotiates, proud of their former victo- 
ries, imagined that the fate of all Aquitain 
depended singly on their bravery. The Ro- 
mans, on the other hand, were ambitious of 
showing what they could achieve under a 
young leader, in the absence of their general, 
and unsupported by the rest of the legions. 
At length, however, the enemy, overpowered 
with wounds, betook themselves to flight, and 
a great slaughter ensuing, Crassua marched 
immediately and invested their capital, where 
meeting with a brave resistance, he was forced 
to make his approaches by towers and man- 
telets. The enemy sometimes sallying out, 
sometimes carrying on their mines to our very 
works, (in which kind of service the Aquitains 
are particularly skilful, as inhabiting a country 
that abounds in veins of copper,) when they 
saw that the diligence of the Romans enabled 
them to surmount all these difliculties, sent 
ambassadors to Crassus, and requested they 
might be admitted to a surrender : which be- 
ing accordingly agreed to, they, in obedience 
to his desire, delivered up their arms. 

XXIII. But while the Romans were wholly 
intent upon the execution of the treaty, Adia- 
tomus, who commanded in chief, endeavoured 
to escape on the other side of the town, with 
a body of six hundred sworn friends, who, 



in the language of the country, are called Sol- 
durians. Their condition and manner of life 
is this : To live in a jjcrfect community of 
goods with those to whom they have engaged 
themselves in friendship ; if any misfortune 
befalls them, to share in it, or make away with 
themselves ; nor is there a single instance of 
any one upon record, who, upon the death of 
him to whom he had vowed a friendship, re- 
fused to submit to the same fate. Adiatomus, 
as we have said, endeavouring to make his 
escape with his body of friends, and the alarm 
being given on that side of the works, the 
soldiers immediately ran to arms, when a furi- 
ous combat ensued, in which he was at last 
repulsed, and driven back into the town. He 
obtained, however, from Crassus, the same 
conditions of surrender as had been granted to 
the rest of the inhabitants. 

XXIV. Crassus having received their arms 
and hostages, led his troops into the territories 
of the Vocatians and Tarusatians. But now, 
the Gauls, roused by the unexpected progress 
of the Romans, who had in a few days after 
their arrival made themselves masters of a 
town strongly fortified both by art and nature, 
began to send ambassadors into all parts, to 
join in a mutual league, to ratify their engage- 
ments by an exchange of hostages, and to levy 
troops. Ambassadors were likewise despatched 
to all the states of hither Spain that bordered 
upon Aquitain, to solicit a supply of troops 
and leaders : upon whose arrival, they imme- 
diately took the field with great confidence, 
and a numerous and well appointed army. 
None were suffered to command but such as 
had served under Sertorius, and were there- 
fore accounted men of consummate ability 
and experience in the art of war. These, ac- 
cording to the custom of the Romans, made it 
their study to choose a camp to advantage, to 
secure themselves by lines and intrenchments, 
and to intercept our convoys. Crassus, per- 
ceiving their design, as his own army was not 
strong enough to admit of sending out detach- 
ments, and as the Gauls could upon all occa- 
sions employ numerous parties, possess thena- 
selves of the passes, and at the same time have 
a sufficient number of troops to guard the 
camp, by which means he foresaw he must 
soon be reduced to great straits for want of 
provisions, while the enemy would be every 
day growing more powerful, he, for all these 
reasons, resolved not to delay coming to an. 



120 



CESAR'S 



engagement. Having laid his design before 
a council of war, and finding them unanimous 
in their approbation of it, he appointed the 
next day for the engagement. 

XXV. Early in the morning he drew all 
his forces out of the camp, and disposing them 
in two lines, with the auxiliary troops in the 
centre, stood expecting what resolution the 
enemy would take. But the Gauls, though 
they believed they might safely hazard a battle, 
on account of their numbers, their former re- 
nown in war, and the handful of men they 
were to oppose; yet thought it would be still 
better, by seizing the passes, and intercepting 
our convoys, to secure the victory without ex- 
pense of blood : and should the want of pro- 
visions at length force the Romans to think 
of a retreat, they might then fall upon them, 
embarrassed in their march, encumbered with 
their baggage, and dejected by their misfor- 
tunes. This resolution being approved by 
all their leaders, they kept within their camp, 
though our men appeared before them in or- 
der of battle. 

XXVI. Crassus, perceiving their design, 
and that this delay served rather to abate the 
courage of the enemy, and add fresh spirits 
to his own men, among whom a universal 
cry arose, that he ought no longer to put off 
the engagement, but march directly to their 
camp ; having encouraged his troops, he re- 
solved to give way to their present ardour, 
and accordingly led them to the assault. 
There some were employed in filling up the 
ditch, others in driving the enemy with their 
darts from the works ; while the auxiliaries, 
in whom Crassus had no great confidence, 
yet that they might appear to have some share 
at least in the engagement, were appointed to 
carry stones and darts to them that fought, 
and to supply materials for raising the mount. 
At the same time the enemy fought with 
great constancy and resolution, and made no 
small havoc with their darts, which came 
upon us from above. During this warmth 
of opposition, the cavalry, having taken a 
compass round the camp, came and told Cras- 
sus that the intrenchments were not fortified 
with the same care in all parts, and that it 
would be easy to force an entrance by the 
postern gate. 

XXVII. Crassus, having exhorted the of- 
ficers of the cavalry to encourage their men 
by great rewards and promises, instructed 



them in the part they were to act. They, in 
consequence of the orders they had received, 
drawing out four cohorts, which, having been 
left to guard the camp, were quite fresh and 
fit for action, and fetching with them a large 
compass, that they might not be seen from 
the enemy's camp ; while the eyes and minds 
of all were intent upon the combat, fell 
suddenly upon that part of the intrenchments 
of v/hich we have spoken above ; and having 
forced their way through, were actually got 
within the camp before they were so much 
as seen by the enemy, or any apprehension 
entertained of what they were about. Upon 
this, a great uproar being heard on that side, 
our men redoubled their efforts, and, as always 
happens to troops animated with the hopes of 
victory, began to push the Gauls with greater 
fury than ever. The enemy, thus surrounded 
on all sides, and without hopes of retrieving 
their affairs, endeavoured to make their escape 
over the rampart, and save themselves by 
flight. But being pursued by the cavalry, who 
soon came up with them in these open and 
level plains ; of fifty thousand men that had 
been drawn together out of Spain and Aqui- 
tain, scarce a fourth part escaped ; nor did 
the horse return to the camp until very late 
in the evening, after they had quite tired them- 
selves with the slaughter. 

XXVIII. Upon the report of this defeat, 
the greatest part of Aquitain immediately 
submitted to Crassus, and of their own ac- 
cord sent him hostages. Of this number 
were the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Preciani, 
Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Garites, Ausci, 
Garumni, Siburzates, and Cocasates. Only 
a few nations, and those the most remote, 
relying on the season of the year, because the 
winter was at hand, neglected to take this 
step. 

XXIX. Much about the same time Caesar, 
though the summer was now almost spent, 
yet because all the rest of Gaul being sub- 
dued, the Morini and Menapians were still 
in arms, and had not sent ambassadors to treat 
about a peace, resolved to lead his army 
against them, hoping he should soon be able 
to put an end to that war. Their manner of 
opposing him was very different from that of 
the other Gauls. For, understanding that 
the most powerful nations, when it came to 
a battle, had always been overthrown and put 
to rout ; and inhabiting themselves m a 



COMMENTARIES. 



121 



country that abounded in woods and marshes, 
they retired thither with all their effects. 
Cffisar coming to the entrance of the wood, 
began to intrench himself: and although no 
enemy in the meantime appeared, yet no 
sooner had our men dispersed themselves in 
order to set about fortifying the camp, than on 
a sudden they came pouring upon us from all 
parts of the wood, and charged with great 
briskness. The Romans immediately flew to 
their arms, and drove them back with consi- 
derable slaughter; but adventuring a little too 
far into the wood lost some men. 

XXX. Caesar spent the remaining days in 
cutting down the wood ; and to screen his 
men from any sudden and unexpected attack, 
ordered the trees that had been felled to be 



placed on each side the army, that they 
might serve as a barricade against the at- 
tempts of the enemy. Having with incredi- 
ble despatch advanced a great way into the 
wood in a few days, insomuch that all their 
cattle and baggage fell into our hands, they 
themselves retired into the thicker and more 
covered spaces of the forest. The season 
growing bad, we were forced to intermit the 
work : and the rains soon became so violent 
and continual that the soldiers could no longer 
endure to lie in their tents. Wherefore Cae- 
sar, having laid waste their lands, and set fire 
to their towns and houses, led back his army, 
and disposed it into winter quarters among 
the Aulerci, Lexovians, and other states, whom 
he had last subdued. 



B 



CtESAR'S commeivtaries 



OF 



HIS WARS IN GAUL. 



BOOKIV. 



123 



THE ARGUMENT. 

L The TJsipetes and Tenchtheri, German nations expelled by the Suevians, come over into Gaul.— IL The 
manners and way of life of the Suevians.— m. And of the Ubians.— IV. The ITpipetes and Tenchtheri drive 
the Menapians from their habitations.— V. Caesar, knowing the wavering and unsettled temper of the Gauls, 
repairs early in the spring to the army. — VI. Embassy of the Germans to Cfesar, and his answer.— IX. An 
action between the cavalry, in which the Germans have the advantage.— X. But are afterwards driven from 
their camp with great slaughter. — XT IT. And pursued by Caesar, who makes a bridge over the Rhine for thai 
purpose.- XVI. Caesar lays waste the territories of the Sigambri.- X\TI. And having freed the Ubians from 
the servitude under which they lived, returns into Gaul.— X"^T:n. He then passes over into Britain.— XXH. 
And lands his army with great difficulty, the natives making a vigorous opposition. — XXIV. They are de- 
feated at length, and send ambassadors to sue for peace.— XXVI. Caesar's fleet almost entirely ruined by a 
storm, which induces the Britons to revolt.— XXIX. Their way of fighting from their chari'^ts.- XXX. which 
disconcerts the Romans at first— XXXI. But being again put to flight, they obtain peace.— XXXII. After which 
Caesar returns into Gaul. — x x x 1 1 1 . And marching against the Morini, whom the hope of plunder tempted to 
fell upon some of his detached parties, obliges them to submit. 



134 



CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 



HIS WARS IN GAUL. 



BOOK IV 



I. The following winter, being that in which 
Cn. Pompey and M. Crassus were consuls, 
the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, German nations, 
passed the Rhine in a. great body, not far 
from its mouth. The cause of their taking 
this step was, that being much exposed to the 
hostilities of the Suevians, they had for many 
years been harassed with continual wars, and 
hindered from cultivating their lands. 

II. The Suevians are by far the most war- 
like and considerable of all the German na- 
tions. They are said to be composed of a 
hundred cantons, each of which sends yearly 
into the field a thousand armed men. The 
rest, who continue in their several districts, 
employ themselves in cultivating their lands, 
that they may furnish a sufficient supply both 
for themselves and for the army. These 
again take up arms the following campaign, 
and are succeeded in the care of the lands by 
the troops that served the year before. Thus 
they live in the continual exercise both of 
agriculture and war. They allow of no such 
thing as property, or private possession in the 
distribution of their lands ; their residence, 
for the sake of tillage, being confined ta a 
single year. Corn is not much in use among 
them, because they prefer a milk or flesh diet, 
and are greatly addicted to hunting. Thus 
the quality of their food, tlaeir perpetual exer- 
cise, and free unconfined manner of life, (be- 
cause being from their childhood fettered by 
no rules of duty or education, they acknow- 
ledge no law but will and pleasure,) contribute 
to make them strong, and of an extraordinary 
stature. They have likewise accustomed 

" 12 



themselves, though inhabiting a climaie na- 
turally very cold, to bathe in their rivers, and 
clothe themselves only with skins, which, as 
they a^yt^ry^smaHj leave great part of their 
body quite uncovered. Merchants indeed 
resort to them, but rather to purchase their 
spoils taken in war, than import any goods 
into the country ; for even beasts of carriage, 
in which the Gauls take so much delight, 
that they are ready to purchase them at any 
price, are yet very little valued by the Ger- 
mans, when brought among them. And 
though those of their own country are both 
small and very ill shaped, yet by daily exer- 
cise they make them capable of all kinds of 
service. Their cavalry often dismount in 
time of action, to fight on foot ; and their 
horses are so trained, that they stir not from 
the place where they are left, but wait the 
return of their riders, who betake themselves 
to them again in case of necessity. Nothing 
is more dishonourable, in their account, or 
jnore opposite to their customs, than the use 
of horse-furniture ; and therefore, however few 
themselves, they scruple not to attack any 
number of their enemies whom they see so 
equipped. They suffer no wine to be imported 
into their territories, as imagining that it both 
enervates the mind, and unfits the body for 
exercise and labour. It is accounted much to 
the honour of the nation, to have the country 
for a great way round them waste and unin- 
habited ; for by this they think is intimated, 
that the united force of many states has been 
found insufficient to withstand their single 
valour. And hence it is, that on one side, 
12.5 



126 



CESAR'S 



the country is said to lie desolate for the space 
of six hundred miles. 

III. On the other side they are bounded by 
the Ubians, heretofore a flourishing and potent 
people, and somewhat more civilized than the 
other German nations ; because inhabiting 
along the banks of the Rhine, they are much 
resorted to by merchants ; and have besides, 
by bordering upon the states of Gaul, given 
into many of their customs. The Suevians 
having tried the strength of this people in many 
wars, and finding them too numerous and potent 
to be driven out of their territories, prevailed 
yet so far as to impose a tribute upon them, and 
very much reduce and weaken their power. 

IV. The Usipetes and Tenchtheri, of whom 
we have spoken above, were likewise engaged 
in this quarrel ; and after withstanding the 
power of the Suevians for many years, were 
nevertheless at length driven from their terri- 
tories. Having wandered over many regions 
of Germany during the space of three years, 
they arrived at last upon the banks of the 
Rhine, towards those parts inhabited by the 
Menapians, who had houses, lands, and villa- 
ges on both sides of the river. But alarmed 
at the approach of so prodigious a multitude, 
they abandoned all their habitations beyond 
the Rhine ; and having disposed their troops 
on this side the river, set themselves to oppose 
the passage of the Germans. These having 
tried every expedient ; and finding they could 
neither force the passage, because of their want 
of shipping ; nor steal over privately by rea- 
son of the guards kept by the Menapians, 
counterfeited a retreat into their own country, 
and after three days' march, suddenly turned 
back ; when their cavalry, recovering all this 
ground in the space of one night, easily over- 
powered the Menapians, little expecting or 
prepared for such a visit ; for having been ap- 
prized by their scouts of the departure of the 
Germans, they had returned, fearless of danger, 
to their habitations beyond the Rhine. These 
being all put to the sword, and their shipping 
seized before the Menapians on this side had 
intelligence of their approach, they passed 
the river ; and seizing all their towns and 
houses, supported themselves the rest of the 
winter with the provisions there found. 

V. Caesar being informed of these things, 
and dreading the levity of the Gauls, who are 
very changeable in their counsels, and fond 
of novelties: determined to trust nothing to 



their resolves. For it is the custom of that 
people to stop travellers even against their 
will, and inquire of them what they have 
heard or know relating to any affair ; and in 
their towns, upon the arrival of a foreign mer- 
chant, they gather round him in crowds, and 
oblige him to tell what country he comes from, 
and how things stood at his departure. Moved 
by these reports, they often enter upon the 
most important deliberations, and concert mea- 
sures they soon have cause to repent, as being 
founded wholly on vain rumours, and answers 
feigned for the most part designedly to please 
them. Cffisar, who was aware of this custom, 
fearing the war, if neglected, might become 
formidable, made all the haste he could to 
join the army. Upon his arrival he found, 
that things were fallen out exactly as he had 
foreseen. Some of the states of Gaul had sent 
ambassadors to the Germans, inviting them to 
leave the banks of the Rhine, and assuring 
them that all their demands should be readily 
complied with. The Germans, allured by 
these hopes, were already extending their in- 
cursions on all sides, and had penetrated into 
the territories of the Eburones and Condru- 
sians, both which nations are under the pro- 
tection of the Treviri. Gssar having assembled 
the chiefs of the Gauls, dissembled his know- 
ledge of their secret designs ; and endeavouring 
rather to win them over, and confirm them 
in their' alliance with the people of Rome, de- 
manded a certain number of cavalry of them, 
and prepared to march against the Germans. 

VI. Having provided himself with corn, and 
drawn together a select body of horse, he be- 
gan his march towards those parts where he 
understood the Germans then were. Vt^hen he 
was come within a few days ' journey of their 
camp, ambassadors arrived from them, who ad- 
dressed him to this effect : — " That the Ger- 
mans had no design of being the first to begin 
a war with the people of Rome ; but neither, 
if they were attacked, would they decline having 
recourse to arms : that it was the custom of 
their nation, handed down to them by their 
ancestors, rather to oppose the efforts of their 
enemies, than expect relief from remon- 
strances ; but thus far they were however 
willing to own, that it was against their incli- 
nation they were come into those parts, having 
been driven from their habitations ; that if 
the Romans were disposed to accept of their 
friendship, they might become very useful 



COMMENTARIES. 



127 



and serviceable allies, and would rest satisfied 
either with such lands as they should think 
proper to assign them, or in the quiet posses- 
sion of those they had already obtained by 
force of arms ; that they yielded in valour to 
the Suevians alone, for whom the immortal 
gods themselves were not an equal match ; but 
knew of no other nation under heaven able to 
resist the efforts of their bravery." Ctesar 
made such a reply as best suited his present 
views, but the conclusion of his speech wus to 
this purpose : — " That he could enter into no 
treaty of friendship with them so long as they 
continued in Gaul ; that men who had been 
unable to defend their own territories were not 
likely to gain countries by force from others ; 
that there were no uncultivated lands in Gaul, 
sufficient to satisfy so great a multitude, with- 
out invading the properties of others ; but that, 
if they pleased, they might incorporate them- 
selves with the Ubians, whose ambassadors 
were then in his camp, to complain of the in- 
juries of the Suevians, and request his aid 
against their encroachments ; this he promised 
to obtain for them of the Ubians." The am- 
bassadors replied, they would report this to their 
countrymen, and in three days return with an 
answer ; requesting in the meantime, that he 
would not advance with his army. But this 
Cffisar refused, as knowing, that a few days 
before they had sent a great body of cavalry 
over the Meuse, to forage and plunder in the 
territories of the Ambivariti. He therefore 
concluded, that they only waited the return 
of this party, and with that view were for in- 
terposing delays. 

VII. The Meuse rises in the mountains of 
Vause, in the territories of the Lingones, and 
receiving a certain branch of the Rhine, called 
the Vahal, forms with it the island of the Ba- 
tavians, about forescore miles below which it 
discharges itself into the sea. The Rhine it- 
self takes its rise in the territories of the Le- 
pontians, who inhabit the Alps ; and after a 
long and rapid course through the country of 
the Nantuates, Helvetians, Sequani, Medio- 
matrici, Treboci, and Treviri, divides itself, as 
it approaches nearer the sea, into several chan- 
nels, and forming a great number of very 
large islands, inhabited for the most part by 
fierce and savage nations, some of whom are 
reported to feed only on fish and the eggs of 
birds, it at last discharges itself into the ocean 
by many different mouths. 



VIII. Csesar being now only twelve miles 
distant from the enemy, was met upon his way 
by the ambassadors on the day appointed. 
They were very earnest in their requests that 
he would advance no farther; but not being 
able to prevail, entreated, that he would send 
to the cavalry, who made the advance-guard, 
to restrain them from beginning the fight ; 
and in the meantime permit them to send am- 
bassadors to the Ubians ; from whose senate 
and magistrates, if they could obtain the con- 
ditions offered them by Caesar, under the sanc- 
tion of a solemn oath, they declared themselves 
ready to accept them ; requiring only that he 
would allow them the space of three days to 
bring matters to a final issue. But Csesar, 
imagining all these proffers to have no other 
tendency than the delay of a few days, until 
their cavalry should arrive, told them, never- 
theless, that he would advance that day 
only four miles farther, for the sake of water ; 
but desired their chiefs to attend him the day 
after, that he might know their demands. 
Meantime he sent orders to the officers of the 
cavalry, who were gone before, not to attack 
the enemy ; and in case they should be attacked 
themselves, only to maintain their ground 
until he should come up with the rest of the 
army. 

IX. But the enemy, upon seeing our horse 
advance, whose number amounted to five thou- 
sand, whereas they themselves did not exceed 
eight hundred, by reason of the absence of those 
who had been sent to forage beyond the Meuse ; 
yet falling suddenly upon the Romans, who 
had no apprehension of their design, because 
they knew their ambassadors had been with 
Csesar a little before, and obtained a day's 
truce, they easily put them into disorder. And 
when our men, recovering a little, began to 
make resistance, they, according to custom, 
dismounted, and stabbing our horses under the 
belly, and by that means overthrowing many 
of the riders, in a very short time put the rest 
to flight ; and so great was the consternation, 
that they continued driving them before them, 
until at last they came within sight of the ar- 
my. In this skirmish we lost seventy four 
men, and among them Piso of Aquitain, a 
man of distinguished valour and illustrious de- 
scent, whose grandfather had been sovereign 
magistrate in his own state, and been honoured 
by the senate of Rome with the title of friend. 
This brave officer, seeing his brother surround* 



128 



CAESAR'S 



ed by the enemy, ran to his assistance, and 
rescued him ; but his own horse being wounded, 
and he overthrown, the enemy fell upon him, 
against whom nevertheless he made a brave 
resistance ; till at last, surrounded on all sides, 
he fell overpowered with wounds. Which his 
brother perceiving, who was by this time out 
of danger, and had got to a considerable dis- 
tance, setting spurs to his horse, he rushed 
among the thickest of the enemy, and was 
slain. 

X. After this battle, Csesar resolved neither 
to give audience to their ambassadors, nor 
admit them to terms of peace, seeing they had 
treacherously applied for a truce, and after- 
wards of their own accord broken it. He 
likewise considered, that it would be down- 
right madness to delay coming to an action 
until their army should be augmented, and 
their cavalry join them ; and the more so, 
because he was perfectly well acquainted with 
the levity of the Gauls, among whom they had 
already acquired a considerable reputation by 
this successful attack, and to whom it there- 
fore behoved him by no means to allow time 
to enter into measures against him. Upon all 
these accounts he determined to come to an 
engagement with the enemy as soon as possi- 
ble, and communicated his design to his ques- 
tor and lieutenants. A very lucky accident 
fell out to bring about Caesar's purpose ; for 
the day after, in the morning, the Germans, 
persisting in their treachery and dissimulation, 
came in great numbers to the camp : all their 
nobility and princes making part of their em- 
bassy. Their design was, as they pretended, 
to vindicate themselves in regard to what had 
happened the day before ; because, contrary 
to engagements made and come under at 
their own request, they had fallen upon our 
men ; but their real motive was to obtain if 
possible another insidious truce. CaBsar, over- 
joyed to have them thus in his power, ordered 
them to be secured, and immediately drew his 
forces out of the camp. The cavalry, whom 
he supposed terrified with the late engage- 
ment, were commanded to follow in the rear. 

XI. Having drawn up his army in three 
lines, and made a very expeditious march of 
eight miles, he appeared before the enemy's 
camp before they had the least apprehension 
of his design. All things conspiring to throw 
them into a sudden consternation, which was 
not a little increased by our unexpected ap- 



pearance, and the absence of their own of- 
ficers ; and hardly any time left them either 
to take counsel, or fly to arms, they were ut- 
terly at a loss what course to take, whether to 
draw out their forces and oppose the enemy, 
or content themselves with defending tht. 
camp, or in fine to seek for safety in flight. 
As this fear was evident from the tumult and 
uproar we perceived among them, our soldiers, 
instigated by the remembrance of their treache- 
rous behaviour the day before, broke into the 
camp. Such as could first provide them- 
selves with arms made a show of resistance, 
and for some time maintained the fight amidst 
the baggage and carriages. But the women 
and children (for the Germans had brought 
all their families and effects with them over 
the Rhine) betook themselves to flight on all 
sides. Cajsar sent the cavalry in pursuit of 
them. 

Xn. The Germans hearing the noise 
behind them, and seeing their wives and 
children put to the sword, threw down their 
arms, abandoned their ensigns, and fled out 
of the camp. Being arrived at the confluence 
of the Rhine and the Meuse, and finding it 
impossible to continue their flight any farther ; 
after a dreadful slaughter of those that pre- 
tended to make resistance, the rest threw 
themselves into the river ; where, what with 
fear, weariness, and the force of the current, 
they almost all perished. Thus our army, 
without the loss of a man, and with very few 
wounded, returned to their camp, having put 
an end to this formidable war, in which the 
number of the enemy amounted to four 
hundred and thirty thousand. Csesar of- 
fered those whom he had detained in his 
camp liberty to depart ; but they, dreading 
the resentment of the Gauls, whose lands 
they had laid waste, chose rather to continue 
with him, and obtained his consent for that 
purpose, 'j- 

Xni. The war with the Germans being 
ended, Csesar for many reasons resolved to 
carry his army over the Rhine. But what 
chiefly swayed with him was, that as he found 
the Germans were easily prevailed upon to 
transport their forces into Gaul, he thought it 
might be of no small service to alarm them 
upon their own account, by letting them see, 
that the Romans wanted neither ability nor 
resolution to pass the Rhine with an army. 
Add to all this, that the cavalry of the Usipetes 



COMMENTARIES, 



129 



and Tenchtheri, who as we have related above, 
had passed the Meuse for the sake of forage 
and plunder, and by that means escaped the 
disaster of the late fight, upon hearing of the 
defeat of their countrymen, had repassed the 
Rhine, retired into the territories of the Sicam- 
brians, and joined their forces to theirs. And 
upon Caesar's sending deputies to require, that 
these troops, which had presumed to make 
war upon him and the Gauls, might be deliv- 
ered up, he had received for answer : — " That 
, the Rhine was the boundary of the Roman 
'^ empire; that if he thought it unjustifiable in 
the Germans to pass over into Gaul without 
his leave, upon what pretence could he claim 
any power or authority beyond the Rhine V 

XIV. But the Ubians, who alone of all the 
nations beyond the Rhine had sent ambassa- 
dors to Cffisar, entered into an alliance with 
him, and given him hostages, earnestly en- 
treated him to come over to their assistance, 
they being very hard pressed by the Suevians : 
Or, if the affairs of the commonwealth would 
not allow of his being there in person, that he 
would only order his army to cross the Rhine, 
which would both be sufficient for their present 
support, and also secure them for the time to 
come. Because such was the reputation and 
opinion conceived of a Roman army, even 
amongst the remote German nations, from 
their defeating Ariovistus, and the success of 
the last battle, that their friendship and name 
would alone be a sufficient defence. They 
promised likewise a great number of ships for 
the transporting of the army." 

XV. Csesar, for all these reasons above- 
mentioned, determined to cross the Rhine. 
But to make use of shipping appeared to him 
neither safe, nor suitable to the dignity of the 
Roman name. Wherefore, although he under- 
stood that the making of a bridge would be 
attended with very great difficulties, on ac- 
count of the breadth, depth, and rapidity of 
the river, yet was he of opinion, that in this 
manner alone ought he to carry over his army, 
or lay aside the design altogether. The form 
therefore and contrivance of the bridge was 
thus : — two beams, each a foot and a half thick, 
sharpened a little toward the lower end, and of 
a length proportioned to the depth of the river, 
were joined together at the distance of about 
two feet. These were sunk into the river by 
engines, and afterwards strongly driven with 
rammers, not perpendicularly, but inclined ac- 

12* 



cording to the direction of the stream. Di- 
rectly opposite to these, at the distance of forty 
feet lower down, were placed two other beams 
joined together like the former, but sloping 
against the current of the river. These stakes 
were kept firm by a large beam, extended from 
one to the other, and which being two feet in 
thickness, exactly filled the interval of the 
two stakes, and was strongly fastened at either 
end with iron nails, so contrived, that the vio- 
lence of the stream served only to bind the 
work faster together. This being continued 
through the whole breadth of the river, he or- 
dered planks to be laid across, which for the 
greater convenience of passing, were further 
covered with hurdles. Towards the lower part 
of the stream other stakes were sunk in the 
form of buttresses, which supported the bridge 
against the violence of the current ; and above, 
at some distance, there were others ; that if 
trunks of trees or vessels should be sent down 
the river by the enemy, to destroy the work, 
the shock might be broken by these defences, 
and the bridge thereby secured from damage. 
XVI. The bridge being finished within ten 
days from the time they began to fetch the 
materials, Cajsar led over his army ; and leav- 
ing a strong guard on each side of the river, 
marched directly into the territories of the 
Sicambri. Meantime ambassadors arriving 
from several states to desire ;ieace, and court 
his alliance, he gave them a very favourable 
reception, and appointed them to send host- 
ages. The Sicambri, when they understood 
that the bridge was begun, by advice of the 
Usipetes and Tenchtheri, who had taken shel- 
ter among them, resolved upon a retreat, and 
having abandoned their territories, and carried 
off all their effects, withdrew into the neigh- 
bouring woods and deserts. 

XVII. Caesar, after a short stay in their 
country, having burned all their houses and 
villages, and cut down their corn, marched 
into the territories of the Ubians. As he had 
promised these last his assistance against the 
attempts of the Suevians, he understood from 
them that the Suevians, being informed by 
their spies, of the bridge built upon the Rhine, 
had, according to their custom, called a coun- 
cil, and despatched orders into all parts for 
the people to forsake their towns, and convey 
their wives, children, and effects into the 
woods, commanding, at the same time, that all 
such as were able to bear arms should meet 
8 



130 



CiESAR'S 



at the place of general rendezvous, which they 
had appointed towards the middle of the 
country, resolving there to wait the arrival of 
the Romans, and give them battle. Csesar, 
upon this intelligence, having accomplished all 
he intended in carrying his army over the 
Rhine, by spreading a universal terror among 
the Germans, taking vengeance of the Sicam- 
bri, and setting the Ubians at liberty, after a 
stay of only eighteen days beyond the Rhine, 
thinking he had done enough both for his own 
reputation and the service of the republic, 
led back his army into Gaul, and broke the 
bridge. 
^^'^ XVIII. Though but a small part of the 
if summer now remained, for in those regions, 
Gaul, stretching very much to the north, the 
•winters begin early, Csesar, nevertheless, re- 
solved to pass over into Britain, having cer- 
tain intelligence, that in all his wars with the 
Gauls, the enemies of the commonwealth had 
ever received assistance from thence. He in- 
deed foresaw, that the season of the year would 
not permit him to finish the war ; yet he thought 
it would be of no small advantage, if he should 
but take a view of the island, learn the nature 
of the inhabitants, and acquaint himself with 
the coast, harbours, and landing-places, to all 
which the Gauls were perfect strangers : for 
almost none but merchants resort to that island, 
nor have even any knowledge of the country 
except the sea coast, and the parts opposite to 
Gaul. Having therefore called together the 
merchants from all parts, they could neither 
inform him of the largeness of the island, nor 
what or how powerful the nations were that 
inhabited it, nor of their customs, art of war, 
or the harbours fit to receive large ships. For 
these reasons, before he embarked himself, he 
thought proper to send C. Volusenus with a 
galley, to get some knowledge of these things, 
commanding him, as soon as he had informed 
himself in what he wanted to know, to return 
with all expedition. He himself marched with 
his whole army into the territories of the Mo- 
rini, because thence was the nearest passage 
into Britain, Here he ordered a great many 
ships from the neighbouring ports to attend 
him, and the fleet he had made use of the year 
before in the Venetian war. 

XIX. Meanwhile the Britons, having notice 
of his design, by the merchants that resorted to 
their island, ambassadors from many of their 
states came to Caesar, with an offer of hosta- 



ges, and submission to the authority of the 
people of Rome. To these he gave a favoura- 
ble audience, and exhorted them to continue 
in the same mind, sent them back into their 
own country. Along with them he despatched 
Comius, whom he had constituted king of the 
Atrebatians, a man in who^e virtue, wisdom, 
and fidelity he greatly confided, and whose 
authority in the island was very considerable. 
To him he gave it in charge, to visit as many 
states as he could, and persuade them to enter 
into an alliance with the Romans, letting them 
know at the same time that Caesar designed as 
soon as possible to come over in person to their 
island. Volusenus having taken a view of the 
country, as far as was possible for one who had 
resolved not to quit his ship, or trust himself 
in the hands of the barbarians, returned on the 
fifth day and acquainted Caesar with his dis- 
coveries. 

XX. While Caesar continued in those parts, 
for the sake of getting ready his fleet, deputies 
arrived from almost all the cantons of the 
Morini, to excuse their late war with the 
people of Rome, as proceeding wholly from a 
national fierceness, and their ignorance of the 
Roman customs, promising likewise an entire 
submission for the future. This fell out very 
opportunely for Caesar, who was unwilling 
to leave any enemies behind him, nor would 
the season of the year have even allowed him 
to engage in a war ; besides, he judged it by no 
means proper so far to entangle himself in 
these trivial affairs, as to be obliged to post- 
pone the expedition into Britain. He there- 
fore ordered them to send him a great number 
of hostages, and upon their being delivered, 
received them into his alliance. ' Having got 
together about eighty transports, which he 
thought would be sufficient for the carrying 
over two legions,he distributed the galleys he 
had over and above to the questor, lieutenants, 
and ofl5cers of the cavalry. There were, be- 
sides, eighteen transports detained by contrary 
winds at a port about eight miles off, which he 
appointed to carry over the cavalry. The rest 
of the army, under the command of Q. Tituri- 
us Sabinus, and L. Arunculeius Cotta, were 
sent against the Menapians, and those cantons 
of the Morini which had not submitted. P. 
Sulpicius Rufus had the charge of the harbour 
where he embarked, with a strong garrison to 
maintain it. 

XXI. Things being in this manner settled. 



COMMENTARIES. 



131 



and the wind springing up fair, he weighed | the barbarians, and more easily governed and 

put in motion, to advance a little from the 
transports towards the shore, in order to set 
upon the enemy in flank, nnd by means of 
their engines, slings, and arrow.-;, tirive them to 
some distance. This proved of considerable 
service to our men, for what with the surprise 
occasioned by the make of our galleys, the 
motion of our oars, and the playing of the en- 
gines, the enemy were forced to halt, and in a 
little time began to give back. But our men 
still demurring to leap into the sea, chiefly be- 
cause of the depth of the water in those parts ; 
the standard-bearer of the tenth legion, having 
first invoked the gods for success, cried out 
aloud : " Follow me, fellow-soldiers, unless you 
will betray the Roman eagle into the hands of 
the enemy ; for my part, I am resolved to dis- 
charge my duty to Caesar and the common- 
wealth." Upon this he jumped into the sea, 
and advanced with the eagle against the ene- 
my : whereat, our men exhorting one another 
to prevent so signal a disgrace, all that were 
in the ship followed him, which being per- 
ceived by those in the nearest vessels, they 
also did the like, and boldly approached the 
enemy. 
/ Jtf> XXIV. The battle was obstinate on both 
sides ; but our men, as being neither able to 
keep their ranks, nor get firm footing, nor fol- 
low their respective standards, because leap- 
ing promiscuously from their ships, every one 
joined the first ensign he met, were thereby 
thrown into great confusion. The enemy, on 
the otherhand, being well acquainted with the 
shallows, when they saw our men advancing 
singly from the ships, spurred on their horses, 
and attacked them in that perplexity. In one 
place great numbers would gather round a 
handful of the Romans ; others falling upon 
them in flank, galled them mightily with their 
darts, which Caesar observing, ordered some 
small boats to be manned, and ply about with 
recruits. By this means the foremost ranks of 
our men having got firm footing, were followed 
by all the rest, when falling upon the enemy 
briskly, they were soon put to the rout. But 
as the cavalry were not yet arrived, we could 
not pursue or advance far into the island, 
which was the only thing wanting to render 
the victory complete. 

XXV. The enemy being thus vanquished 
in battle, no sooner got together after their 
defeat, than they despatched ambassadors to 



anchor about one in the morning, ordering the 
cavalry to embark at the other port, and fol- 
low him. But as these orders were executed 
but slowly, he himself, about ten in the morn- 
ing, reached the coast of Britain, where he 
saw all the cliflfs covered with the enemy's 
forces. The nature of the place was such, 
that the sea being bounded by steep moun- 
tains, the enemy might easily launch their ja- 
velins upon us from above. Not thinking this 
therefore a convenient landing-place, he re- 
solved to lie by till three in the afternoon, and 
wait the arrival of the rest of his fleet. Mean- 
while, having called the lieutenants and mili- 
tary tribunes together, he informed them of 
what he had learned from Volusenus, instructed 
them in the part they were to act, and par- 
ticularly exhorted them to do every thing with 
readiness, and at a signal given agreeable to 
the rules of military discipline, which in sea 
affairs especially required expedition and des- 
patch, because of all others the most changea- 
ble and uncertain. Having dismissed them, 
and finding both the wind and tide favourable, 
he made the signal for weighing anchor, and 
after sailing about eight miles farther stopped 
over against a plain and open shore. 

XXII. But the barbarians perceiving our 
design, sent their cavalry and chariots before, 
which they frequently make use of in battle, 
and following with the rest of their forces, en- 
deavoured to oppose our landing : and indeed 
we found the difficulty very great on many ac- 
counts ; for our ships being large, required a 
great depth of water ; and the soldiers, who 
were wholly unacquainted with the places, and 
had their hands embarrassed and loaden with 
a weight of armour, were at the same time to 
leap from the ships, stand breast high amidst 
the waves, and encounter the enemy, while 
they, fighting upon dry ground, or advancing 
only a little way into the water, having the 
free use of all their limbs, and in places which 
they perfectly knew, could boldly cast their 
darts, and spur on their horses, well inured to 
that kind of service. All these circumstances 
serving to spread a terror among our men, 
who were wholly strangers to this way of 
fighting, they pushed not the enemy with the 
same vigour and spirit as was usual for them in 
combats upon dry ground. 

XXIII. Csesar observing this, ordered some 
galleys, a kind of shipping less common with 



132 



CtESAR'S 



Cffisar to sue for peace, oflfering hostages, and 
an entire submission to his commands. Along 
with these ambassadors came Comius, the 
Atrebatian, whom Caesar, as we have related 
above, had sent before him into Britain. The 
natives seized him as soon as he landed, and 
though he was charged with a commission 
from Cffisar, threw him into irons. But upon 
their late defeat, they thought proper to send 
him back, throwing the blame of what had 
happened upon the multitude, and begged of 
(JjEsar to excuse a fault proceeding from ig- 
norance. CsBsar, after some complaints of 
their behaviour, in that having of their own 
accord sent ambassadors to the continent to 
sue for peace, they had yet without any rea- 
son begun a war against him, told them at last 
he would forgive their fault, and ordered them 
to send a certain number of hostages. Part 
were sent immediately, and the rest, as living 
at some distance, they promised to deliver in 
a few days. Meantime they disbanded their 
troops, and the several chiefs came to Caesar's 
camp, to manage their own concerns, and 
those of the states to which they belonged. 

XXVI. A peace being thus concluded four 
days after Csesar's arrival in Britain, the eigh- 
teen transports appointed to carry the cavalry, 
of whom we have spoken above, put to sea 
with a gentle gale. But when they had so 
near approached the coast as to be even with- 
in view of the camp, so violent a storm all on 
a sudden arose, that being unable to hold on 
their course, some were obliged to return to 
-the port whence they set out, and others 
driven to the lower end of the island, westward, 
not without great danger ; there they cast an- 
chor, but the waves, rising very high, so as 
to fill the ships with water, they were again in 
the night obliged to stand out to sea, and make 
for the continent of Gaul. That very night 
it happened to be full moon, when the tides 
upon the sea coast always rise highest, a thing 
at that time wholly unknown to the Romans. 
Thus at the one and the same time, the gal- 
leys which CsBsar made use of to transport his 
men, and which he had ordered to be drawn 
up on the strand, were filled with the tide, and 
the tempest fell furiously upon the transports 
that lay at anchor in the road : nor was it pos- 
sible for our men to attempt any thing for their 
preservation. Many of the ships being dashed 
to pieces, and the rest having lost their an- 



them altogether unfit for sailing, a general con- 
sternation spread itself through the camp, for 
there were no other ships to carry back the 
troops, nor any materials to repair those that 
had been disabled by the tempest. And as it 
had been all along CsBsar's design to winter 
in Gaul, he was wholly without corn to sub- 
sist the troops in those parts. 
K^XXVII. All this being known to the Bri- 
tish chiefs, who after the battle had repaired 
to Caesar's camp, to perform the conditions of 
the treaty, they began to hold conferences 
among themselves; and as they plainly saw 
that the Romans were destitute both of caval- 
ry, shipping, and corn, and easily judged, from 
the smallness of the camp, that the number of 
their troops was but inconsiderable ; in which 
notion they were the more confirmed, because 
Caesar having brought over the legions with- 
out baggage, had occasion to inclose but a 
small spot of ground ; they thought this a 
convenient opportunity for taking up arms, 
and, by intercepting the Roman convoys, to 
protract the affair till winter ; being confidently 
persuaded, that by defeating these troops, or 
cutting off their return, they should effectually 
put a stop to all future attempts upon Britain. 
Having therefore entered into a joint confede- 
racy, they by degrees left the camp, and be- 
gan to drav? the islanders together : but Caesar, 
though he was not yet apprized of their de- 
sign, yet guessing in part at their intentions, 
by the disaster which had befallen his fleet, 
and the delays formed in relation to the hos- 
tages, determined to provide against all events. 
He therefore had corn daily brought into his 
camp, and ordered the timber of the ships that 
had been most damaged to be made use of in 
repairing the rest, sending to Gaul for what 
other materials he wanted. As the soldiers 
were indefatigable in this service, his fleet was 
soon in a condition to sail, having lost only 
twelve ships. 

XXVni. During these transactions, the 
seventh legion being sent out to forage, ac- 
cording to custom, as part were employed in 
cutting down the corn, and part in carrying it 
to the camp, without suspicion of attack, news 
were brought to Caesar, that a greater cloud 
of dust than ordinary was seen on that side 
where the legion was. Caesar, supecting how 
matters went, marched with the cohorts that 
were upon guard, ordering two others to suc- 



chors, tackle, and rigging, which rendered i ceed in their room, and all the soldiers in the 



COMMENTARIES 



133 



camp to arm and follow him as soon as possi- 
ble. When he was advanced a little way from 
the camp, he saw his men overpowered by 
the enemy, and with great difficulty able to 
sustain the fight, being driven into a small 
compass, and exposed on every side to the 
darts of their adversaries. For as the harvest 
was gathered in every where else, and only 
one field left, the enemy, suspecting that our 
men would come thither to forage, had hid 
themselves during the night in the woods, 
and waiting till our men had quitted their arms, 
and dispersed themselves to fall a reaping, they 
suddenly attacked them, killed some, put the 
rest into disorder, and began to surround them 
with their horses and chariots. 

XXIX. Their way of fighting with their 
chariots is this : first, they drive their chariots 
on all sides, and throw their darts, insomuch, 
that by the very terror of the horsea, and noise 
of the wheels, they often break the ranks of 
the enemy. When they have forced their 
way into the midst of the cavalry, they quit 
their chariots, and fight on foot : meantime 
the drivers retire a little from the combat, 
and place themselves in such a manner as 
to favour the retreat of their countrymen, 
should they be overpowered by the enemy. 
Thus in action they perform the part both of 
nimble horsemen, and stable infantry ; and by 
continual exercise and use have arrived at 
that expertness, that in the most steep and 
difficult places they can stop their horses upon 
a full stretch, turn them which way they 
please, run along the pole, rest on the harness, 
and throw themselves back into their chariots 
with incredible dexterity. 

XXX. Our men being astonished and con- 
founded with this new way of fighting, Ctesar 
came very timely to their relief; for upon his 
approach the enemy made a stand, and the 
Romans began to recover from their fear. 
This satisfied Csesar for the present, who not 
thinking it a proper season to provoke the en- 
emy, and bring on a general engagement, 
stood facing them for some time, and then led 
back the legions to the camp. The continual 
rains that followed for some days after, both 
kept the Romans within their intrenchments, 
and withheld the enemy from attacking us. 
Meantime the Britons despatched messengers 
into all parts, to make known to their coun- 
trymen the small number oi the Roman .troops, 
and the favourable opportunity they had of 



making immense spoils, and freeing their coun- 
try for ever from all future invasions, by storm- 
ing the enemy's camp. Having by this means 
got together a great body of infantry and cav- 
alry, they drew towards our intrenchments. 

XXXI. Caesar, though he foresaw that 
the enemy, if beaten, would in the same man- 
ner as before escape the danger by flight ; yet 
having got about thirty horse, whom Comius, 
the Atrebatian, had brought over with him 
from Gaul, he drew up the legions in order 
of battle before the camp ; and falling upon the 
Britons, who were not able to sustain the 
shock of our men, soon put them to flight. 
The Romans pursuing them as long as their 
strength would permit, made a terrible slaugh- 
ter, and setting fire to their houses and vil- 
lages a great way round, returned to the 
camp. 

XXXII. The same day ambassadors came 
from the enemy to Caesar, to sue for peace. 
Csesar doubled the number of hostages he had 
before imposed upon them, and ordered them 
to be sent over to him into Gaul, because the 
equinox coming on, and his ships being leaky, 
he thought it not prudent to put off his return 
till winter. A fair wind offering, he set sail 
a little after midnight, and arrived safe in Gaul. 
Two of his transports not being able to reach 
the same port with the rest, were driven into 
a haven a little lower in the country. 

— XXXIII. In these two vessels were about 
three hundred soldiers, who having landed, 
and being upon their march to the camp, the 
Morini, who had submitted to Csesar upon his 
setting out for Britain, drawn by the hopes of 
plunder, surrounded them at first with only a 
few men, and ordered them to lay down their 
arms under pain of being put to the sword. 
But they, casting themselves into an orb, stood 
upon their defence, when all on a sudden six 
thousand more of the enemy appeared, roused 
by the noise of the combatants. Csesar having 
notice of what passed, sent all his cavalry to 
the assistance of the Romans : meanwhile our 
men withstood all the attacks of the enemy, 
and bravely maintained the fight for upwards 
of six hours, having slain great numbers of the 
Morini, while on their side only a few were 
wounded ; but no sooner did our cavalry ap- 
pear, than the enemy, throwing down their 
arms, betook themselves to flight, and were 
almost all slain in the pursuit. ^^^> 

XXXIV. The day after, Csesar sent T. 



134 



CiESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 



Labienus with the legions returned out of 
firitain, against the rebellious Morini, who 
being deprived, by the drought, of the benefit 
of their marshes, which had served them for 
shelter the year before, almost all fell into his 
power. Meantime, Q. Titurius, and L, Cotta, 
who had been sent against the Menapians, 
having laid waste their territories with fire 
and sword, and plundered their habitations, 



returned to CiEsar, not being able to come up 
with the Menapians themselves, who had re- 
tired into impenetrable forests. Caesar quar- 
tered all his troops among the Belgians. Only 
two of the British states sent hostages into 
Gaul, the rest neglecting to perform the con- 
ditions of the treaty. For these successes a 
thanksgiving of twenty days was decreed by 
the senate. 



C^SAR'8 COMMENTARIES 



OF 



HIS WARS IN GAUL. 



BOOK V. 



186 



THE ARGUMENT. 

I. Csesar, leaving orders with his lieutenants in Gaul to build a fie^t, sets out for Italy and niyricum, where he 
puts a stop to the incursions of the Pirustse.— II. Returning thengf'into Gaul, he marches against the Treviri, 
and quiets the disturbances in that province.— IV. Dumnorix withdrawing from the Roman camp with the 
^duan cavalry, is pursued and slain.— VII. Csesar passes over into Britain.— VIII. And forces the enemy 
from the woods in which they had taken shelter.- IX. But understanding that his fleet had suffered greatly 
by a storm, he quits the pursuit of the Britons, repairs liis fleet, fortifies his camp, and then returns against 
the enemy.— X. A description of Britain, and its inhabitants.- XI. Csesar defeats the Britons in various en- 
coimters.- XIV. Passes the Thames.— XIX. Returns into Gaul.— XX. And because of the great scarcity of 
corn, distributes his legions among the several states. — ^XXI. Tasgetius slain among the Carnutes.— XXII. 
Ambiorix and Cativulcus excite several states to revolt.- XXJii. Ambiorix by an artful speech persuades 
Titurius to quit his camp, and attacking him in his march, cuts him off with his whole party.- XXX. Being 
afterwards joined by the Nervians, he falls upon Cicero's camp.— XXXV. The noble emulation of Pulfio 
and Varenus.— XXXVn. Csesar marches to Cicero's relief —XLI. The Gauls quit the siege, and advance 
to meet him.— XLII. Caesar defeats them in battle.— XLIV. And, to prevent their continual revolts, resolves 
to pass the winter in Gaul.— XL V. The Senones, Treviri, and other states, bear the Roman yoke with im- 
patience.— XL VII. Indutiomarus attacks Labienus's camp.— XLIX. But being slain in the attempt, the Gauls 
separate, and tranquillity is in a great measure restored. 



136 



CiESAR S COMMENTARIES 



HIS WARS IN GAUL 



BOOK V 



I. In the consulship of Lucius Domitius, and 
Appius Claudius, Caesar leaving his winter 
quarters to go into Italy, as was his yearly cus- 
tom, gave orders to his lieutenants, who had 
the charge of the legions, to build as many 
ships as possible during the winter, and to re- 
pair such as were old. He prescribed the 
form and manner of building, ordering them 
to be somewhat lower than was usual in the 
Mediterranean, for the convenienpe of em- 
barking and landing his men, which he judged 
the more necessary, as he had observed, that 
by reason of the frequent returns of the tide, 
there was less depth of water upon the British 
coast. He likewise commanded them to be 
built broader than ordinary, that they might 
receive the greater number of horses and car- 
riages, and to be contrived for lightness and 
expedition, to which the lowness of their decks 
greatly contributed. He sent to Spain for the 
materials necessary in building and equipping 
them ; and having finished the diet of Cisal- 
pine Gaul, set out for Illyricum, upon advice, 
that the Pirustae were laying waste the pro- 
vince by their incursions. When he arrived 
there, he ordered the several states to furnish 
their contingents, and appointed a place of 
general rendezvous. 'J'he report of this no 
sooner spread among the Pirustae, than they 
sent ambassadors to inform him, that nothing 
had been done against the province by public 
authority, and that they were ready to make 
what satisfaction he required. Caesar, pleased 
with their submission, ordered them to bring 
him hostages, and named the day by which 
they were to be delivered, threatening them 
13 



with a fierce war in case of disobedience. 
These being accordingly brought by the day 
prefixed, he appointed arbitrators between the 
contending states, to estimate the damages, 
and determine what reparation was to be 
made. 

II. Having despatched these affairs, and 
held a general diet of the province, he returned 
again into Cisalpine Gaul, and thence went to 
the army. Upon his arrival, he visited all the 
quarters of the legions, and found, that by the 
singular diligence of the soldiers, notwith- 
standing the greatest scarcity of materials, no 
less than six hundred transports, such as we 
have described above, and twenty-eight gal- 
leys, were in such forwardness, that in a few 
days they would be ready to be launched. 
Having praised his soldiers, and those whom 
he had set over the works, he gave them what 
further instructions he thought necessary, and 
ordered the whole fleet to rendezvous at port 
Itius, whence he knew lay the most commo- 
dious passage to Britain, it being there not above 
thirty miles distant from the continent. Leav- 
ing what soldiers he thought necessary for this 
purpose, he advanced at the head of four le- 
gions, without baggage, and eight hundred 
horse, into the country of the Treviri, because 
they neither appeared at the general diets of 
Gaul, nor submitted to the orders of the com-' 
monwealth ; and were, besides, reported to be 
soliciting the Germans beyond the Rhine. 

III. This state is by far the most powerful 
of all Gaul in horse ; they have likewise a 
very strong and numerous infantry ; and as we 
have before observed, bordered upon the 

T 137 



138 



CiESAR'S 



Rhine. Two of their principal men, Indutio- 
marus and Cingetorix, were at this time con- 
petitors for the supreme authority. Cingeto- 
rix, as soon as he heard of the arrival of Caesar 
and the legions, came to him, and assured him, 
that he and all his party would continue firm 
to their duty, and never abandon the interest 
of the Romans : at the same time, he informed 
him of all that had passed among the Treviri. 
But Indutiomarus drawing together great 
numbers of horse and foot, and securing such 
as were unable to bear arms, in the forest of 
Arden, which extends from the Rhine quite 
across the country of Treves, to the terri- 
tories of the Rhemi, resolved to try the for- 
tune of war. But soon after, as several of the 
leading men of the state, partly out of attach- 
ment to Cingetorix, partly terrified by the ap- 
proach of the Roman army, came to Caesar to 
solicit in their own behalf, since they found 
themselves incapable of effectually serving 
their country, Indutiomarus fearing a uni- 
versal defection, sent likewise ambassadors to 
him to acquaint him, " That he had chosen to 
stay at home, and forbear coming to the Ro- 
man camp, with no other view but to keep the 
state in its duty, lest, in the absence of the no- 
bility, the people might have been drawn in- 
to some rash step : that the whole country was 
now at his command, and he ready, with Cae- 
sar's permission, to attend him in person, and 
put his own concerns, as well as those of the 
state, under his protection." Though Cassar 
well understood the reason of his present sub- 
mission, and by what considerations he had 
been deterred from the prosecution of his first 
design, yet unwilling to waste the whole sum- 
mer in the country of Treves, when every thing 
was in readiness for his expedition into Britain, 
he ordered Indutiomarus to attend him with two 
hundred hostages. These being accordingly 
brought, and among them the son, and all the 
nearest relations of Indutiomarus, whom he 
had specified by name, Cajsar encouraged and 
exhorted him to continue firm in his duty. 
Nevertheless, assembling all the principal men 
of Treves, he reconciled them one after ano- 
ther to Cingetorix, as well on account of his 
singular merit, as because be thought it of the 
greatest importance to establish thoroughly 
the authority of a man, of whose steady and in- 
violable attachment he had such convincing 
proof. Indutiomarus highly resented this pro- 



ceeding, which tended so much to the diminu- 
tion of his power ; and as he had all along 
been an enemy to the Romans, this new af- 
front provoked him still more. 

IV. These aflfairs being settled, Caesar ar- 
rived with his legions at the port of Itius. 
There he found, that about forty of his ships, 
built in the country of the Belgians, having 
been attacked by a storm, and disabled from 
continuing their voyage, had been obliged to 
put back. The rest were all equipped and 
rigged, ready to obey the first signal. All the 
cavalry of Gaul, about four thousand in num- 
ber, and the prime nobility of the several states, 
met him likewise, by order, at this place. His 
design was, to leave only a few of these nobles 
behind him in Gaul, on whose fidelity he could 
rely, and to take the rest with him to Britain 
as hostages, the better to prevent any commo- 
tions during his absence. 

V. Dumnorix, the ^duan, of whom we 
have spoken above, was one of those that at- 
tended him on this occasion. Him in parti- 
cular he resolved to carry along with him, as 
he knew him to be a lover of novelties, ambi- 
tious, enterprising, and of great interest and 
authority among the Gauls. Besides all this, 
he had publicly said in an assembly of the 
iEduans, that Caesar had invested him with 
the sovereignty of their state ; which resolu- 
tion, though by no means pleasing to the 
^duans, they yet durst not send ambassadors 
to Caesar, either to oppose or get reversed; 
nor was Cajsar otherwise informed of the mat- 
ter, but by those whom he had placed about 
Dumnorix, to have an eye over his conduct. 
Dumnorix, at first, earnestly petitioned to be 
left in Gaul, sometimes pretending he was 
unused to sailing, and afraid of the sea, some- 
times urging religious engagements, which re- 
quired him to stay at home. But finding all 
his endeavours to no purpose, he began to so- 
licit the chiefs of the Gauls, discoursing them 
apart, and advising them not to leave the con- 
tinent. The more to awaken their fears, he 
told them : « That Caesar had his particular 
reasons for carrying with him all the nobility 
of Gaul ; because not daring to despatch 
them in their own country, he was in hopes 
of finding a favourable opportunity to execute 
his cruel purpose in Britain." He therefore 
exhorted them to join in a mutual alliance, 
and oblige themselves by a solemn oath, to 



COMMENTARIES 



139 



pursue with common consent such measures 
as should appear necessary for the preserva- 
tion of Gaul. 

VI. Though Csesar was fully informed of 
these practices, yet in consideration of his 
singular regard for the ^duans, he contented 
himself with endeavouring to check and tra- 
verse his designs, determined, notwithstand- 
ing, to continue inflexible, and at all hazards 
prevent any misfortune to himself and the 
commonwealth, from a spirit, which he found 
every day growing more hardy and intrepid. 
Being therefore detained in this place about 
five and twenty days, during which the north- 
west wind, very common on that coast, hin- 
dered him from sailing, he studied by the 
ways of gentleness and persuasion, to keep 
Dumnorix in his duty, without neglecting 
however to watch all his motions. At last, 
the wind springing up fair, he ordered the 
horse and foot to embark. As this uni- 
versally engaged the attention of the camp, 
Dumnorix unknown to CiEsar, drew off the 
^duan cavalry, and began his march home- 
ward. Coesar being informed of it, imme- 
diately put a stop to the embarkation, and 
postponing every other consideration, ordered 
out a strong party of horse to pursue and bring 
him back. If he made resistance, or refused 
to obey, they had orders to kill him ; for he 
judged, that a man who slighted his personal 
authority, Would not pay any great regard to 
his commands in his absence. When they 
had overtaken him, he refused to return, and 
defending himself sword in hand, implored 
the assistance of his followers, often calling 
out, that he was free, and the subject of a free 
state. The Romans, according to the orders they 
had received, surrounded and slew him, upon 
which all the ^duan cavalry returned to CaBsar, 

VII. This affair concluded, and Labienus 
being left in Gaul with three legions, and 
two thousand horse to defend the port, pro- 
vide corn, have an eye upon the transactions 
of the continent, and take measures accord- 
ingly. Caesar weighed anchor about sun-set 
with five legions, and the same number of 
horse he had left with Labienus, and advanc- 
ing with a gentle south wind, continued his 
course till midnight, when he found himself 
becalmed ; but the tide still driving him on, 
at day-break he saw Britain on his left. 
When again following the return of the tide, 
he rowed with all his might, to reach that | 



part of the island which he had marked out 
the summer before, as most convenient for 
landing; and on this occasion the diligence of 
the soldiers cannot be enough commended, 
who, labouring incessantly on the oar, urged 
the transports and ships of burden so swiftly, 
that they equalled the course of the galleys. 
The whole fleet reached the coast of Britain 
about noon ; nor did any enemy appear in 
view. But as Caesar afterwards understood 
from the prisoners, though a great army of , 
Britons had repaired to the coast, yet terrified 
by the vast number of ships, which, together 
with those of the last year's expedition, and 
such as had been fitted out by particular per- 
sons for their own use, amounted to upwards 
of eight hundred, they retired hastily from 
the shore, and hid themselves behind the 
mountains. 

VIII. Caesar having landed his army, and 
chosen a proper place for his camp, as soon 
as he understood from the prisoners where 
the enemy's forces lay, leaving ten cohorts 
upon the coast, together with three hundred 
horse, to guard the fleet, he set out about 
midnight in quest of the enemy, being under 
the less concern for his ships, because he had 
left them at anchor upon a smooth and open 
shore, under the charge of Q. Atrius. After 
a march of twelve Irows, during the night, he 
came within sight of the enemy, who, having 
posted themselves behind a river, with their 
cavalry and chariots, attacked us from the 
higher ground, in order to oppose our pas- 
sage ; but being repulsed by our horse, they 
retreated towards the woods, into a place 
strongly fenced both by nature and art, and 
which, in all probability, had been fortified 
before on occasion of some domestic war ; for 
all the avenues were secured by strong bar- 
ricadoes of felled trees. They never sallied 
out of the wood but in small parties, thinking 
it enough to defend the entrance against our 
men. But the soldiers of the seventh legion 
advancing under cover of their shields, and 
having cast up a mount, forced the intrench- 
ments with little loss, and obliged the enemy 
to abandon the wood. Caesar forbid all pur- 
suit, both because he was unacquainted with 
the nature of the country, and the day being 
far spent, he resolved to employ the rest of 
it in fortifying the camp. 

IX. Early the next morning he divided his 
troops, both horse and foot, into three bodies, 



140 



CESAR'S 



and sent them out in pursuit of the enemy. 
They were advanced but a little way, and just 
come within sight of the rear of the Britons, 
when a party of horse from Atrius came to 
Caesar, and informed him, " That a dreadful 
storm arising the night before, had fallen vio- 
lently upon the fleet, and driven almost all the 
ships ashore ; that neither anchors nor cables, 
nor all the address of the mariners and pilots, 
had been able to resist the fury of the tempest, 
which had done unspeakable damage to the 
fleet, by reason of the ships running foul of 
one another." Caesar, upon this intelligence, 
recalls his legions and cavalry, commanding 
them to give over their pursuit. He himself 
returns to his ships, and finds every thing ac- 
cording to the reports and letters he had re- 
ceived, forty of them being entirely destroyed, 
and the rest so damaged, that they were hard- 
ly repairable. He therefore set all the carpen- 
ters of the army to work, and wrote for others 
to Gaul, ordering Labienus at the same time, 
with the legions under his command, to build 
what ships he could. He thought it likewise 
safest, though a work of great labour and dif- 
ficulty, to draw all his ships on shore, and in- 
close them within the fortifications of his camp. 
Ten days were spent in the service, during 
which the soldiers had no intermission of fa- 
tigue, not even in the night. The ships being 
in this manner secured, and the camp strongly 
fortified, he left the same troops to guard it as 
before, and returned to the place where he had 
quitted the pursuit of the enemy. Upon his 
arrival he found the forces of the Britons con- 
siderably increased. The chief command and 
administration of the war, was, by common 
consent, conferred upon Cassibelanus, whose 
territories were divided from the maritime 
states by the Thames, a river eighty miles dis- 
tant from the sea. This prince had hitherto 
been engaged in almost continual wars with 
his neighbours ; but the terror of our arrival 
making the Britons unite among themselves, 
they intrusted him with the whole conduct of 
the war. 

X. The inland parts of Britain are inhabit- 
ed by those, whom fame reports to be the na- 
tives of the soil. The sea coast is peopled 
with the Belgians, drawn thither by the love 
of war and plunder. These last, passing over 
from different parts and settling in the country, 
still retain the names of the several states j 
whence they are descended. The island is 



well peopled, full of houses, built after the 
manner of the Gauls, and abounds in cattle. 
They use brass money, and iron rings of a 
certain weight. The provinces remote from 
the sea produce tin, and those upon the coast 
iron ; but the latter in no great quantity. Their 
brass is all imported. All kinds of wood grow 
here the same as in Gaul, except the fir and 
beech-tree. They think it unlawful to feed 
upon hares, pullets, or geese ; yet they breed 
them up for their diversion and pleasure. 
The climate is more temperate than in Gaul, 
and the cold less intense. The island is trian- 
gular, one of its sides facing Gaul. The ex- 
tremity towards Kent, whence is the nearest 
passage to Gaul, lies eastward: the other 
stretches south-west. This side extends about 
five hundred miles. Another side looks to- 
wards Spain, westward. Over against this 
lies Ireland, an island esteemed not above 
half as large as Britain, and separated from 
it by an interval equal to that between Britain 
and Gaul. In this interval lies the isle of 
Mona, besides several other lesser islands, of 
which some write, that in the time of the win- 
ter solstice, they have night for thirty days to- 
gether. We could make out nothing of this 
upon inquiry, only discovered by means of our 
hour-glasses, that the nights were shorter than 
in Gaul. The length of this side is computed 
at seven hundred miles. The last side faces 
the north-east, and is fronted by no part of the 
continent, only towards one of its extremities 
it seems to eye chiefly the German coast. It 
is thought to extend in length about eight 
hundred miles. Thus the whole island takes 
in a circuit of two thousand miles. The in- 
habitants of Kent, which lies wholly on the 
sea coast, are the most civilized of all the 
Britons, and differ but little in their manner 
from the Gauls. The greater part of those 
within the country never sow their lands, but 
live on flesh and milk, and go clad in skins. 
All the Britons in general paint themselves 
with woad, which gives a bluish cast to the 
skin, and makes them look dreadful in battle. 
They are long haired : and shave all the rest 
of the body except the head and upper lip. 
Ten or twelve of them live together, having 
their wives in common, especially brothers, 
or parents and children amongst themselves ; 
but the issue is always ascribed to him who 
first espoused the mother. 

XI. The enemy's horse, supported by their 



COMMENTARIES. 



141 



chariots, vigorously charged our cavalry on 
their march, yet we everywhere had the bettor, 
and drove them to their own woods and hills ; 
but after making great slaughter, venturing to 
continue the pursuit too far, we lost some men. 
Some time after, sallying unexpectedly from 
the woods, and falling suddenly upon our 
men while employed in fortifying their camp, 
a sharp conflict ensued between them and the 
advanced guard. Caesar sent two cohorts to 
their assistance, whom the Britons charging 
in separate parties, so surprised with their new 
manner of fighting, that they broke through, 
routed them, and returned without loss. Q. 
Laberius Durus, a military tribune, was slain 
on this occasion ; but some fresh cohorts com- 
ing up, the Britons were at last repulsed. 

XII. By this action which happened within 
view of the camp, and of which the whole 
army were spectators, it evidently appeared, 
that our heavy armed legions, who could 
neither pursue those that retired, nor durst 
venture to forsake their standards, were by no 
means a fit match for such an enemy : nor 
could even the cavalry engage without great 
danger, it being usual for the Britons to coun- 
terfeit a retreat, until they had drawn them a 
considerable way from the legions, when sud- 
denly quitting their chariots, they charged 
them on foot, and by this unequal manner of 
fighting, made it alike dangerous to pursue or 
retire. Add to all this, that they never fought 
in a body, but in small parties, and with con- 
siderable intervals between. 'J'liey had like- 
wise their detachments so placed, as easily to 
protect their flying troops, and send fresh sup- 
plies where needful. 

XIII. The next day they stationed them- 
selves among the hills, at a distance from our 
camp, and appeared only in small bodies, nor 
seemed so forward to skirmish with our cavalry 
as the day before. But about noon, Caesar 
ordering out three legions to forage, with all 
the cavalry, under the command of C. Tre- 
bonius, his lieutenant, they fell suddenly upon 
the foragers on all sides, and even attacked the 
legions and standards. Our men vigorously 
returning the charge, repulsed them, and the 
cavalry finding themselves supported by the 
foot, continued the pursuit till they had utterly 
broken them ; insomuch, that great numbers 
being slain, they could neither find an oppor- 
tunity to rally, descend from their chariots, or 
face about to make resistance. After this defeat 

13* 



the auxiliary troops, which had come in from 
all parts, relumed severally to their own homes ; 
nor did the enemy, from this time, appear any 
more against us with their whole forces. 

XIV. Caesar perceiving their design, marched 
towards the Thames, to penetrate into the king- 
dom of Cassibelanus. This river is fordable 
only in one place, and that not without great 
difficulty. When he arrived, he saw the enemy 
drawn up in great numbers on the other side. 
They had likewise secured the banks with sharp 
stakes, and driven many of the same kind into 
the bottom of the river, yet so as to be covered 
by the water. Caesar having intelligence of this, 
from the prisoners and deserters, sent the caval- 
ry before, ordering the legions to follow close 
after, which they did with so much expedition 
and briskness, though nothing but their heads 
were above the v^-ater, that the enemy, unable 
to sustain their charge, quitted the banks, and 
betook themselves to flight. 

XV. Cassibelanus, as vve have before inti- 
mated, finding himself unable to keep the field, 
disbanded all his other forces ; and retaining 
only four thousand chariots, watched our mo- 
tions, always keeping at some distance from 
us, and sheltering himself in woods and inac- 
cessible places, whither he had likewise made 
such of the inhabitants, with their cattle, retire, 
as lay upon our route: and if at any time our 
cavalry ventured upon a freer excursion into 
the fields, to plunder and lay waste the country ; 
as he was perfectly acquainted with all the 
roads and defiles, he would sally from the 
woods with some of the chariots, and fall upon 
our men, dispersed and in disorder. These 
frequent alarms obliged us to be much upon 
our guard ; nor would Caesar suffer the cavalry 
to remove to any distance from the legions, or 
to pillage and destroy the country, unless 
where the foot was at hand to sustain them. 

XVI. Meantime the Trinobantes, one of the 
most powerful states in those parts, send am- 
bassadors to Caesar. Of this state was Man- 
dubratius, who had fled for protection to Caesar 
in Gaul, that he might avoid the fate of his 
father Imanuentius, whom Cassibelanus had 
put to death. The ambassadors promised obe- 
dience and submission in the name of the pro- 
vince : and withal entreated him to defend 
Mandubratius against the violence of Cassi- 
belanus, and restore him to the government of 
their state. Caesar ordered them to deliver 
forty hostages, and furnish his army with corn ; 



142 



CiESAR'S 



sending back at the same time Mandubratius. 
They yielded to his demands without delay, 
sent the appointed number of hostages, and 
supplied him with corn. 

XVII. The protection granted to the Trino- 
bantes, securing them from the insults of the 
soldiers ; the Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancal- 
ites, Bibroci, and Cassi send ambassadors to 
Caesar, and submit. From them he had intelli- 
gence, that he was not far from the capital of 
Cassibelanus, which was situated amidst woods 
and marshes, and whither great numbers of 
men and cattle were retired. A town among 
the Britons is nothing more than a thick wood, 
fortified with a ditch and rampart, to serve as 
a place of retreat against the incursions of their 
enemies. Thither he marched with his legions ; 
and though the place appeared to be extremely 
strong, both by art and nature, he nevertheless 
resolved to attack it in two several quarters. 
The enemy, after a short stand, were obliged 
at last to give way, and retire by another part 
of the wood. Vast numbers of cattle were 
found in the place ; and many of the Britons 
were either made prisoners, or lost their lives 
in the pursuit. 
k, XVIII. W^hile these things passed beyond 
the Thames, Cassibelanus despatched messen- 
gers to Kent, which, as we have before ob- 
served, was situated along the sea coast. This 
country was then under the government of 
four kings, Cingetorix, Carnilius, Taximagu- 
lus, and Segonax, who had orders to draw all 
their forces together, and fall suddenly upon 
the naval camp of the Romans. But our men 
sallying upon them as they approached, made 
great slaughter of their troops, took Cingeto- 
rix, one of their leaders, prisoner, and returned 
safe to the camp. Cassibelanus, upon the 
news of this battle, discouraged by so many 
losses, the devastation of his territories, and 
above all, the revolt of the provinces, sent am- 
bassadors to Caesar to sue for peace, by the 
mediation of Comius of Arras. 

XIX. Caesar designing to pass the winter in 
Gaul because of the frequent commotions in 
that country ; and reflecting that but a small 
part of the summer remained, during which it 
would be easy to protract the war : demanded 
hostages, and appointed the yearly tribute 
which Britain was to pay to the Romans. At 
the same time he strictly charged Cassibelanus 
to oifer no injury to Mandubratius or the 
Trinobantes. Having received the hostages. 



he led his troops back to the sea-side, where 
he found his fleet repaired. Orders were im- 
mediately given to launch it ; and because the 
number of prisoners was exceeding great, and 
several ships had been destroyed by the tem- 
pest, he resolved to carry over his men at two 
embarkations. Happily it so fell out, notwith- 
standing the great number of ships, and their 
frequent passing and repassing, that not one 
perished either this or the preceding year, 
which had any soldiers on board : whereas 
those sent empty to him from the continent, 
as well the ships concerned in the first em- 
barkation, as others built afterwards by Labie- 
nus, to the number of sixty, were almost all 
driven back or lost. Caesar having waited for 
them a considerable time to no purpose, and 
fearing to lose the proper season for sailing, as 
the time of the equinox drew near, chose to 
stow his men on board the few ships he had ; 
and taking the opportunity of an extraordinary 
calm, set sail about ten at night, and by day- 
break brought his whole fleet safe to the con- 
tinent of Gaul. 

XX. Having laid up his fleet, and held a 
general assembly of the Gauls at Samarobriva ; 
as the crop had been very indifferent this year, 
by reason of the great droughts, he was oblig- 
ed to quarter his legions otherwise than in for- 
mer winters, and canton them one by one in 
the several provinces of Gaul. One legion he 
quartered on the Morini, under the command 
of C. Fabius ; another among the Nervians, 
under Q. Cicero ; a third with the ^duans, 
under L. Roscius ; and a fourth in the country 
of the Rhemi, on the borders of the Treviri, 
under Labienus. Three were sent into Bel- 
gium, over whom he appointed three com- 
manders; M. Crassus, his questor, L. Muna- 
tius Plancus, and C. Trebonius. The eighth 
and last, which Caesar had newly raised on the 
other side of the Po, was sent, together with 
five cohorts, among the Eburones, between the 
Rhine and the Meuse, where Ambiorix and 
Cativulcus reigned. At the head of this 
body were two commanders, Q. Titurius Sa- 
binus, and :L. Arunculeius Cotta. By this 
distribution of his legions, he thought he had 
found an easy remedy against the scarcity of 
corn ; and yet they all lay within the com- 
pass of a hundred miles, except that under L. 
Roscius, for which he was in no pain, as being 
quartered in a very quiet and friendly country. 
He resolved however not to leave Gaul till he 



nA 



COMMENTARIES. 



143 



had received advice from all his lieutenants, 
and was assured that their quarters were esta- 
blished, fortified, and secured. 

XXI. Among the Carnutes lived Tasgetius, 
a man of distinguished birth, and whose an- 
cestors had been possessed of the sovereignty 
in that state. Csesar had restored him to the 
dignity of his forefathers, in consideration of 
his virtue and aflfection to him, and the many 
signal services he had done him in all his wars. 
It was now the third year of his reign, when 
his enemies, many of whom were of his own 
state, conspiring against him, openly assassi- 
nated him. The affair was laid before Ccesar; 
who fearing lest the great number concerned 
in the plot might draw the state into a revolt, 
ordered L. Plancus, with a legion from Bel- 
gium, to march speedily into the country of the 
Carnutes, fix his winter quarters, in that pro- 
vince, and seizing all who had been concerned 
in the murder of Tasgetius, send them pri- 
soners to him. Meantime he was informed 
by his lieutenants and questors to whom he 
had committed the care of the legions, that they 
were severally arrived at their appointed quar. 
ters, and had fortified themselves in them. 
( XXII. About fifteen days after the arrival 
of the legions in their winter quarters, a sud- 
den insurrection and revolt broke out among 
the Eburones, by the secret practice of Am- 
biorix and Cativulcus. These two princes had 
been to meet Sabinus and Cotta on their 
frontiers, and in a friendly manner had sup- 
plied them with corn : but now, instigated by 
Indutiomarus of Treves, they excited their 
people to take up arms : and having surprised 
some soldiers that were gone to cut wood, 
came with a great body of troops to attack the 
Roman camp. Our men immediately flew to 
arms, ascended the ramparts, and sending out 
a detachment of Spanish horse, put their cav- 
alry to rout. Upon this, despairing of success, 
they drew off their men from the attack ; and, 
according to their custom, demanded a con- 
ference ; pretending they had something to say, 
which concerned the common interest, and 
might serve to put an end to their present 
differences. 

XXIII. Accordingly C. Arpinius, a Roman 
knight, the friend of Q, Titurius, and Q. Ju- 
nius of Spain, who had frequently before been 
sent by Caesar to Ambiorix, were deputed to 
treat. Ambiorix addressed them in words to 
this effect : « That he had in no sort forgot 



the many obligations he lay under to Cajsar. 
who had freed him from the tribute he had 
been wont to pay the Atuatici ; and who had 
restored him his son and nephew, whom that 
people, after receiving them as hostages, had 
treated as slaves : that the hostilities he had 
just committed were not the effect of his own 
private animosity to the Romans, but in con- 
sequence of a resolution of the state ; where 
the government was of such a nature, that the 
people had as much power over him, as he 
over the people : that even the state itself had 
been in a manner forced into this war, by a 
sudden confederacy of all Gaul : that he could 
appeal to his own weakness for the truth of 
what he said, being not so very unskilled in 
affairs as to imagine, that the forces of the 
Eburones were a match for the power of the 
Romans ; that it was a project formed by all 
the states of Gaul in common, who had agreed 
to storm in one day, the very day on which he 
spoke, all the quarters of the Roman army ; so 
that no one might be able to succour another : 
that it was not easy for Gauls to resist the im- 
portunity of those of their own nation, espe- 
cially in a proposal to act in concert for the re- 
covery of their liberty ; but that, after having 
performed what the common voice of his coun- 
try demanded, he thought he might now listen 
to that of gratitude : that he found himself 
compelled by his attachment to Csesar, and by 
his friendship for Sabinus, to give notice of 
the extreme danger to which the legion was 
exposed : that a great body of Germans had 
actually passed the Rhine, and would be there 
in two days at furthest : that Sabinus and 
Cotta were to consider, whether it would not 
be proper to retire with their troops, before the 
neighbouring states could be apprized of their 
design ; and go and join Labienus, or Cicero, 
who were neither of them distant much above 
fifty miles. That as far as regarded iiimself, 
he engaged by all that was sacred to secure 
their retreat through his territories ; and under- 
took it the more readily, as he should thereby 
not only discharge his duty to his country, iti 
delivering it from the inconvenience of winter- 
ing the Romans, but at the same time mani- 
fest his gratitude to Cajsar." Having made 
this speech, he withdrew. 
^ XXIV. Arpinius and Junius reported what 
they had heard to the lieutenants; who, alarmed 
at the suddenness of the thing, thought the 
information not to be neglected, though it came 



144 



CAESAR'S 



from an enemy : nor were they a little moved 
by this consideration, that it appeared to them 
altogether incredible, that the Eburones, a 
weak and inconsiderable state, should of their 
own accord presume to take up arms against 
the Romans. They therefore laid the matter 
before a council of war, where a warm debate 
arose. L. Arunculeius, with a great number 
of military tribunes, and centurions of the first 
rank, were against undertaking any thing has- 
tily, or quitting their winter quarters, before 
they had received orders to that purpose from 
Cffisar. They alleged : " That having strongly 
fortified their camp, they were able to defend 
themselves, even against all the forces of the 
Germans : that the late attempt of the Gauls 
was a sufficient proof of this, whom they had 
not only withstood with courage, but repulsed 
with loss : that they had provisions in abund- 
ance, and might therefore securely wait the 
arrival of relief from Csesar and the neigh- 
bouring legions : in fine, that nothing could 
be more dishonourable, or argued greater want 
of judgment, than in affairs of the highest mo- 
ment, to take measures upon the information 
of an enemy." Titurius, on the other hand, 
exclaimed ; " That it would be then too late 
to think of retiring, when the enemy, in greater 
numbers, and strengthened by the accession 
of the Germans, should come up against them ; 
or when the quarters next them should have 
received some signal check : that the time for 
deliberation was short : that Cassar, he made 
no question, was gone into Italy, it not be- 
ing likely that either the Carnutes would 
have formed the design of assassinating Tas- 
getius, or the Eburones in so contemptuous a 
manner assaulted the Roman camp, had they 
not been assured of his departure : that the 
information of an enemy weighed not with 
him, but the real circumstance of things. The 
Rhine was not far off. The Germans were 
much exasperated by the death of Ariovistus, 
and their late frequent defeats. Gaul burned 
with impatience to throw off the Roman yoke, 
avenge the many losses they had sustained, 
and recover their former glory in war, of which 
now scarce a shadow remained. In short, who 
could imagine that Ambiorix, without a cer- 
tainty of being supported, would have em- 
barked in so dangerous an enterprise 1 That 
his opinion was in all respects safe ; because, 
if no such confederacy had been formed, they 
had nothing to apprehend in marching to the 



nearest legion ; if, on the contrary, all Gaul 
and Germany were united, expedition alone 
could save them from destruction : whereas, 
by following the advice of Cotta and those 
who were against a retreat, though the dan- 
ger perhaps might not prove immediate, yet 
were they sure in the end of perishing by 
famine." The dispute continued for some }P 
time ; Cotta, and the principal officers, strongly 
opposing the march of the troops. At last Sa- 
binus raising his voice, that he might be heard 
by the soldiers without : " Be it so then, (says 
he,) since you seem so resolved : I am not he 
among you who is most afraid of death. But, 
if any misfortune happens, those who hear me 
will know whom to blame. In two days,did 
not you oppose it, we might easily reach the 
quarters next us ; and there, in conjunction 
with our fellow-soldiers, confront the common 
danger ; whereas, by keeping the troops sepa- 
rate and at a distance, you reduce them to the 
necessity of perishing by sword or famine." 

XXV. The council was then going to rise : OS 
but the officer's, surrounding their generals, 
conjured them not to put all to hazard by their 
dissension and obstinacy. They told them, 

" That whatever resolution was taken, whether 
to go or stay, the danger was by ,no means 
great, provided they acted with union among 
themselves ; but their disagreement threatened 
the troops with inevitable destruction." The 
debate continued till midnight : when at length 
Cotta, vanquished by importunity, yielded to 
the opinion of Sabinus. Orders were given 
for marching by break of day. The remainder 
of the night was none of it employed in sleep ; 
each man being taken up in choosing what 
things to carry along with him, and what of 
his winter necessaries to leave behind. In 
short, they did every thing to make their stay 
more dangerous ; and by their fatigue and 
want of rest, incapacitate themselves for a 
vigorous defence upon their march. At 
day-break they left their camp, not like men 
acting by the advice of an enemy, but as if 
Ambiorix had been their particular friend ; 
marching in a very extended column, and fol- 
lowed by a great train of baggage. 

XXVI. The enemy judging from the hurry 
and motion in the camp,that the Romans intend- 
ed to leave it, placed themselves in ambuscade 
in two bodies in a wood ; where, well sheltered 
and covered from view, they waited, at about 
two miles distance, their arrival ; and when 



COMMENTARIES 



145 



the greatest part of the army had entered a I 
large valley, suddenly appearing on both sides 
of it, they attacked them at the same time in 
front and rear, and obliged them to fight in a 
place of great disadvantage. 

XXVII. Then at length Titurius, like 
one who had neglected all the necessary pre- 
cautions, unable to hide his concern, ran up 
and down among the troops, and began to dis- 
pose them in order of battle, but with an air 
so timid and disconcerted, that it appeared he 
had no hopes of success ; as happens for the 
most part to those who leave all to the last mo- 
ment of execution. But Cotta, who had fore- 
seen that this might happen, and had there- 
fore opposed the departure of the troops, 
omitted nothing in his power for the common 
safety ; calling to and encouraging the men 
like an able general, and at the same time 
fighting with the bravery of a common soldier ; 
and, because the great length of the column 
rendered it difficult for the lieutenants to re- 
medy all disorders, and repair expeditiously 
enough to the places where their presence was 
necessary, orders were given to quit the de- 
fence of the baggage, and form into an orb. 
This disposition, though not improper in these 
circumstances, was nevertheless attended with 
very unhappy consequences ; for being consi- 
dered as the effect of terror and despair, it dis- 
couraged our men, and augmented the confi- 
dence of the enemy. Besides, as unavoida- 
bly happens on such occasions, many of the 
soldiers quitting their ensigns, hastened to 
fetch from the baggage what they had most of 
value, and filled all parts with uproar and 
lamentation. 

XXVIII, The Gauls meanwhile conducted 
themselves with great prudence : their offi- 
cers proclaimed through the ranks « That not 
a man should stir from his post ; that the 
booty was theirs, and every thing belonging 
to the Romans must certainly fall into their 
hands ; but that all depended upon securing 
the victory." Our men were not inferior to 
the enemy, either in valour, number, or way 
of fighting. Though they had neither gene- 
ral, nor fortune on their side, they hoped still 
by their bravery to surmount all difficulties ; 
and whenever any of the cohorts sallied out, 
so as to join the enemy, hand to hand, a con- 
siderable slaughter of the Gauls ensued. This 
being perceived by Ambiorix, he ordered his 
men to cast their darts at a distance, to avoid 



a close fight, retire before the Romans when- 
ever they advanced, and pursue them as they 
returned to their standards : in which way of 
fighting they were become so expert, by the 
lightnees of their arms, and daily exercise, that ^ 
it was impossible to do them any hurt. These - 
orders were exactly followed ; insomuch that 
when any cohort left the orb, and came for- 
ward to attack the enemy, they retreated and 
dispersed in a moment : meanwhile it uncovered 
its own flanks, and exposed them to the darts 
on either side. The danger was still greater 
when they returned ; for then not only the 
troops that stood next them, but those who had 
retired before them, surrounded and charged 
them on all hands. If, on the contrary, they 
chose to continue in their post, neither could 
their valour any thing avail them, nor was it 
possible for men standing so close together, to 
avoid the darts of so great a multitude. And 
yet, notwithstanding all these disadvantages, 
and the many wounds they had received, they 
still maintained their ground ; and though 
much of the day was now spent, the fight 
having continued from sun-rise till two in the 
afternoon, they did nothing in all that time 
unworthy the dignity of the Roman name. At 
length T. Balventius, who the year before had 
been made first centurion of a legion, a man 
of distinguished courage, and great authority 
among the troops, had both his thighs pierced 
with a dart. Q. Lucanius, an officer of the 
same rank, endeavouring to rescue his son, 
whom he saw surrounded by the enemy, was 
killed after a brave resistance. And L. Cotta, 
the lieutenant, encouraging the several co- 
horts and companies, received a blow on the 
mouth from a sling. 

XXIX. So many misfortunes quite dispi- 
rited Titurius ; who perceiving Ambiorix at a 
distance animating his troops, sent Cn. Pom^ 
pey, his interpreter, to beg quarters for him^ 
self and his soldiers. Ambiorix replied, « That 
he was ready to grant him a conference if he 
desired it. That he hoped to prevail with the 
multitude to spare the Romans ; and that as 
to Sabinus himself, he gave his word no hurt 
should be done him." Sabinus communicated 
this answer to Cotta, proposing that they 
should leave the battle, and go and confer 
with Ambiorix, from whom he was in hopes 
of obtaining quarter both for themselves 
and their men. Cotta absolutely refused to 
treat with an armed enemy, and persisted in 
U 



146 



C xE S A R ' S 



that resolution. Sabinus ordered the mihtary 
tribunes and principal centurions that were 
about his person to follow him, and when he 
drew near to Ambiorix, being commanded to 
lay down his arms, obeyed ; charging those 
that were with him to do the same. Mean- 
while, as they were treating about the condi- 
tions, x\mbiorix spinning out the deliberations 
on purpose, he was by degrees surrounded and 
slain. Then the Gauls, according to their 
custom, raising a shout, and calling out vic- 
tory, charged our troops with great fury, and 
put them into disorder. L. Cotta, fighting 
manfully, was slain, with the greatest part 
of the soldiers. The rest retreated to the camp 
they had quitted in the morning ; of whom L. 
Petrosidius, the standard-bearer, finding him- 
self sore pressed by the enemy, threw the eagle 
within the intrenchments, and was killed 
fighting bravely before the camp. Those that 
remained, with much ado, sustained the at- 
tack till night ; but finding themselves with- 
out hope, they killed one another to the last 
man. A few who escaped out of the fight, 
got by different ways to Labienus's camp, and 
brought him the news of this sad event, 

XXX. Ambiorix, elated with this victory, 
marched immediately at the head o his cav- 
alry into the country of the Atuatici, which 
bordered upon his territories ; and travelling 
day and night without intermission, left orders 
for the infantry to follow him. Having in- 
formed them of his success and roused them to 
arms, he the next day arrived among the Ner- 
vians, and urged them not to lose the favoura- 
ble opportunity of freeing themselves for ever 
from the yoke of slavery, and avenging the 
injuries they had received from the Komans. 
He told them, " That two of their lieutenants 
had been slain, and a great part of their army 
cut to pieces : that it would be an easy matter 
suddenly to attack and destroy the legion 
quartered in their country under Cicero : and 
that he was himself ready to assist them 
in the enterprise." By this speech he easily 
drew in the Nervians. 

XXXI. Accordingly, having forthwith de- 
spatched messengers to the Centrones, Grudii, 
Levaci, Pleumosians, and Gorduni, who are 
all subject to their state, they assembled what 
forces they could, and came unexpectedly upon 
Cicero's quarters, who as yet had heard no- 
thing of the fate of Titurius. Here likewise 
it unavoidably fell out, that the soldiers sent 



to cut wood for firing and the fortifications of 
the camp, were intercepted by the sudden ar- 
rival of their cavalry. Having put all these 
to the sword, the Eburones, Atuatici, and 
Nervians, with their allies and tributaries, 
amounting to a formidable army, came and at- 
tacked the camp.' Our men immediately flew 
to arms, ascended the rampart, and with great 
difficulty sustained the day's assault ; for the 
enemy placed all their hopes in despatch, and 
firmly believed that if they came off conquer- 
ors on this occasion, they could not fail of 
victory every where else. iQ 

XXXn. Cicero's first care was to write to 
Caesar, promising the messengers great re- 
wards if they carried his letters safe. But as 
all the ways were beset by the enemy's troops, 
his couriers were continually intercepted. 
Meanwhile of the materials brought for forti- 
fying the camp a hundred and twenty towers 
were built, during the night, with incredible 
despatch, and the works about the rampart 
completed. Next day the enemy, with a much 
greater force than before, attacked the camp, 
filled the ditch, but were again repulsed by 
our men. This continued for several days to- 
gether. The night was wholly employed in 
repairing the breaches made by day, insomuch 
that neither the sick nor wounded were per- 
mitted to rest. Whatever might be of use 
to resist the next day's assault, was prepared 
with great diligence during the night. Stakes 
were hardened in the fire, palisades planted 
in great numbers, towers raised upon all parts 
of the rampart, and the whole strengthened 
with a parapet and battlements. Cicero him- 
self, though much out of order, would take no 
rest, even during the night ; so that the soldiers 
were obliged to force him from time to time to 
take some repose. 

XXXHI. Meantime such of the Nervian^^ 
chiefs and leaders, as had any intimacy or 
friendship with Cicero, desired a conference. 
This being agreed to, they addressed him in 
the same strain as Ambiorix had before used 
towards Sabinus : " That all Gaul was in arms : 
that the Germans had passed the Rhine : that 
Csesar and the rest of the troops were besieged 
in their winter quarters." They told him 
likewise of the fate of Sabinus ; and, to gain 
credit, produced Ambiorix ; adding, « That it 
was in vain to expect relief from those who 
were themselves in the utmost distress : that 
they meant not however any injury to Cicero 



COMMENTARIES. 



147 



and the people of Rome, but merely to prevent 
their wintering in the country, and establish- 
ing that practice into a custom : that he was 
therefore at liberty to leave his quarters with- 
out molestation and retire in safetj^ where he 
pleased.'' To this Cicero only answered : 
" That it was not usual with the people of 
Rome to accept conditions from an armed 
enemy : but if they would lay down their arms, 
he promised to interpose his mediation, and 
permit them to send ambassadors to Csesar, 
from whose justice they might reasonably ex- 
. pect redress." 
^ XXXIV. The Nervians, driven from this 
hope, surrounded the camp with a line, whose 
rampart was eleven feet high, and ditch fif- 
teen feet deep. They had learned something 
of this in former wars with Ccesar, and the 
prisoners they had made gave the further in- 
structions. But being unprovided of the tools 
necessary in this kind of service, they were 
obliged to cut the turf with their swords, dig 
up the earth with their hands, and carry it in 
their cloaks. And hence it will be easy to form 
some judgment of their number; for in less 
than three hours they completed a line of fif- 
teen miles in circuit. The following days were 
employed in raising towers, proportioned to 
the height of our rampart, and in preparing 
scythes, and wooden galleries, in which they 
were again assisted b)' the prisoners. 

XXXV. On the seventh day of the attack, 
a very high wind arising, they began to throw 
red hot balls of clay, and burning javelins upon 
the barracks of the Romans, which, after the 
manner of the Gauls, were thatched with straw. 
These soon took fire, and the flames were in a 
moment spread by the wind into all parts of 
the camp. The enemy falling on with a mighty 
shout, as if already secured of victory, ad- 
vanced their towers and galleries, and prepared 
to scale the rampart. But such was the con- 
stancy and presence of mind of the soldiers, that 
though the flames surrounded them on every 
side, and they were oppressed with the multi- 
tude of the enemy's darts; though they saw 
their huts, their baggage, and their whole for- 
tunes in a blaze ; yet not only did they con- 
tinue firm in their posts, but scarce a man of- 
fered so much as to look behind him ; so in- 
tent were they on fighting and repelling the 
enemy. This was much the hardest day for 
our troops : but had nevertheless this fortunate 
issue, that far the greatest number of tlie en- 



emy were on that day wounded or slaiii ; for 
as they had crowded close up to the rampart, 
those behind prevented the front ranks from 
retiring. The flames abating by degrees, and 
the enemy having brought forward one of 
their towers to the very foot of the rampart, 
the centurions of the third cohort drew off 
their men a little, beckoning to the Gauls, 
and challenging them to enter : but as not a 
man would run the hazard, they attacked them 
on all sides with stones, drove them from the 
tower, and set it on fire. 

XXXVI. In this legion were two centu- 
rions of distinguished valour, T. Pulfio, and 
L. Varenus, who stood fair for being raised 
to the first rank of their order. These were 
perpetually disputing with one another the 
pre-eminence in courage, and at every year's 
promotion contended with great eagerness for 
precedence. In the heat of the attack before 
the rampart, Pulfio addressing Varenus, 
« What hinders you now, (says he,) or what 
more glorious opportunity would you desire of 
signalizing your bravery ? This, this is the daj' 
for determining the controversy between us." 
At these words he sallied out of the camp, 
and rushed amidst the thickest of the Gauls. 
Nor did Varenus decline the challenge ; but 
thinking his honour at stake, followed at some 
distance. Pulfio darted his javelin at the 
enemy, and transfixed a Gaul that was coming 
forward to engage him : who falling dead of 
the wound, the multitude advanced to cover 
him with their shields, and all poured their 
darts upon Pulfio, giving him no time to re- 
tire. A javelin pierced his shield, and stuck 
fast in his belt. This accident entangling 
his right hand, prevented him drawing his 
sword, and gave the enemy time to surround 
him. Varenus, his rival, flew to his assis- 
tance, and endeavoured to rescue him. Im- 
mediately the multitude quitting Pulfio, as 
fancying the dart had despatched him, all 
turned upon Varenus. He met them with his 
sword drawn, charged them hand to hand, and 
having laid one dead at his feet, drove back 
the rest; but, pursuing with too much eager- 
ness, stept into a hole, and fell down. Pulfio 
in his turn hastened to extricate him ; and 
both together, after having slain a multitude 
of the Gauls and acquired infinite applause, 
retired unhurt within the intrenchments. Thus 
fortune gave such a turn to the dispute, that 
each owed his life to his adversary ; nor was 



148 



CiESAR'S 



it possible to decide, to which of them the 
prize of valour was due. 
.-^ XXXVII, As the defence every day be- 
1 came more difficult and hazardous, chiefly by 
the great multitude of killed and wounded, 
which considerably lessened the number of de- 
fendants, Cicero sent letter upon letter to in- 
form Caesar of his danger. Many of these 
couriers falling into the enemy's hands, were 
tortured to death within view of our soldiers. 
There was at that time in the Roman camp a 
Nervian of distinction, by name Vertico, who 
in the beginning of the siege had fled to Cicero, 
and given ample proofs of his fidelity. This man, 
by the hopes of liberty, and a promise of great 
rewards, engaged one of his slaves to carry a 
letter to Csesar, Having concealed it in his 
javelin, and passed through the camp of the 
Gauls without suspicion, as being himself of 
that nation, he arrived safe at Ccesar's quarters, 
who by this means was informed of the danger 
^ of Cicero and the legion, 
^ XXXVIII. Cajsar, receiving the letter 
about five in the afternoon, immediately des- 
patched a messenger to M, Crassus, who was 
quartered among the Bellovaci, twenty-five 
miles oflf, ordering him to draw out his legion 
at midnight, and march with all the expedition 
he could to join him, Crassus, according to 
his orders, came along with the courier. He 
sent likewise to C, Fabius, directing him to 
lead his legion into the country of the Atre- 
batians, which lay in the way to Cicero. He 
wrote to Labienus, if it could be done with 
safety, to meet him upon the frontiers of the 
Nervians, He himself in the meantime assem- 
bled about four hundred horse from the 
nearest garrisons, resolving not to wait for 
the rest of the army, which lay at too great a 
distance, 

XXXIX, At nine in the morning he had 
notice from his scouts of the arrival of Cras- 
sus, That day he marched twenty miles, 
leaving Crassus with a legion at Samarobriva, 
where he had deposited the baggage, hostages, 
public papers, and had all the provisions which 
had been laid up for the winter, Fabius, in 
consequence of his instructions, having made 
all the haste he could, met him with his le- 
gion, Labienus, who had been informed of 
the death of Sabinus, and the destruction of 
the troops under his command, and who saw 
all the forces of Treves advancing against him, 
fearing lest, if he should quit his quarters, 



the enemy might construe it as a flight, and 
that it would be impossible for him to sustain 
their attack, especially as they were flushed 
with their late success, wrote to Caesar in- 
forming him of the danger that would attend 
the quitting his camp, of the disaster that hap- 
pened among the Eburones; and that all the 
forces of the Treviri, both horse and foot, were 
encamped within three miles of him. V^ 

XL. Caesar approving his reasons, though 
he thereby found himself reduced from three 
to two legions, was yet sensible that all de- 
pended upon expedition. He makes forced 
marches ; and reaching the territories of the 
Nervians, learned from some prisoners the 
state of the siege and the danger the legion 
was in. Immediately he engages a Gaulish 
horseman, by the promise of great rewards, to 
carry a letter to Cicero. It was wrote in 
Greek characters, that if it fell into the ene- 
my's hands, it might not be intelligible to 
them. The messenger had orders, in case he 
found it impracticable to penetrate himself 
into the Roman camp, to tic the letter to a 
javelin, and throw it in. In this letter Ca;sar 
sent Cicero word that he was already on the 
march to relieve him, and would be up very 
soon : exhorting him in the meantime, to de- 
fend himself with his wonted bravery. The 
Gaul, dreading a discovery, threw the letter into 
the camp as had been ordered ; but the javeiln 
by accident sticking in a tower, remained 
there two days unperceived. On the third, a 
soldier saw it, took it down, and brought it to 
Cicero, who immediately read it in full as- 
sembly, and diff'used the common joy through 
the whole camp. On the same time they 
perceived the smoke of the villages fired by 
Caesar in his march, which put the arrival of 



the succours beyond all doubt. 



U' 



XLI. The Gauls having notice of it also by 
their scouts, thought proper to quit the siege ; 
and go to meet Caesar, Their army consisted 
of about sixty thousand men, Cicero, now at 
liberty, applied again to Vertico for the slave 
spoken of above ; and having admonished 
him to use the utmost diligence and circum- 
spection, despatched him with a letter to 
Caesar, informing him that the enemy had 
raised the siege, and were advancing against 
him with all their forces. Caesar received the 
letter about midnight, communicated the con- 
tents to his army, and exhorted them to meet 
the enemy with courage. Next day he de- 



COMMENTARIES. 



149 



camped early, and after a march of about four 
miles, discovered the Gauls on the other side 
of a large valley, with a river in front. It was 
dangerous to engage so great a force upon 
unequal ground. Knowing therefore that the 
siege of Cicero's camp was raised, and having 
no longer any reason to be in a hurry, he en- 
camped in the most convenient spot he could 
find, and completed his intrenchments. His 
army consisting of no more than seven thou- 
sand men, without baggage, required at best 
but a very small camp ; yet he purposely con- 
tracted it as much as possible, to inspire the 
enemy with the greater contempt of him. 
Meantime, sending out scouts on all sides, he 
endeavoured to find where he might cross the 
valley with most safety. 

XLII. The rest of the day passed in slight 
skirmishes between the cavalry near the 
brook ; but the main body of the army on 
both sides kept within their lines : the Gauls, 
in expectation of more forces, which were not 
yet come up; Caesar, that by pretending fear, 
he might draw the enemy on this side the 
valley, and engage them before his camp ; or, 
if that could not be effected, that having dis- 
covered the passes, he might be enabled to 
cross the valley and rivulet with less danger. 
Early next morning the enemy's cavalry coming 
up to our camp, charged our horse ; who by 
Caesar's orders, purposely gave ground, and 
retired behind the works. At the same time 
he caused the ramparts to be raised higher, 
the gates to be barricaded, and cautioned the 
soldiers, in the execution of these orders, to 
run up and down tumultuously, and affect an 
air of timidity and concern. The enemy, in- 
vited by all these appearances, crossed the 
valley, and drew up in a very disadvantageous 
post. Our men meanwhile retiring from the 
rampart, they approached still nearer, cast 
their darts on all sides within the trenches, 
and sent heralds round the camp to proclaim, 
that if any of the Gauls or Romans had a mind 
to come over to them, they should be at liberty 
to do so till nine o'clock, after which no quarter 
would be granted. Nay, so far did they carry 
their contempt, that thinking they could not 
break in by the gates, (which to deceive them, 
were stopped up with single rows of turf,) 
some began to scale the rampart, others to fill 
up the ditch. But then, Csesar, sallying by 
_ all the gates at once, and charging them briskly 
with his cavalry, put them so precipitately to 
14 



flight, that not a man offered to make the 
least resistance. Great numbers of them 
were slain, and the rest obliged to throw down 
their arms. .'- -v 

XLIII. Not caring to pursue them far, on 
account of the woods and marshes that lay in 
his way ; and finding that considerable execu- 
tion had been done upon the spot, he the 
same day joined Cicero with all his forces ; 
where, beholding the towers, galleries, and 
other works of the Gauls, he could not help 
being struck with admiration. He then re- 
viewed Cicero's legion, and found that not 
a tenth man had escaped without wounds, 
which gave him a just idea of the greatness 
of the danger to which they had been ex- 
posed, and of the vigorous defence they had 
made. He bestowed great commendations 
on the legion, and its commander; and ad- 
dressed himself to the military tribunes by 
name ; of whose valour Cicero made honour- 
able mention. He learned particularly from 
the prisoners all the circumstances of the 
unhappy affair of Sabinus and Cotta : and 
calling the soldiers together next day, gave 
them an account of the whole transaction, 
comforted them, confirmed their courage, and 
told them, that a disaster occasioned by the 
imprudence and rashness of the lieutenant, 
ought to give them the less disturbance ; 
as by the favour of the immortal gods, and 
their valour, vengeance had followed so sud- 
denly, that neither had the joy of the ene- 
my for the victory continued any time, nor 
their grief for the loss remained long without 



allay. 

XLIV. Meantime the report of Caesar's 
victory flew with incredible speed, through the 
country of the Rhemi, to Labienus. For 
though he lay at the distance of fifty miles 
from Cicero's camp, whither Caesar did not 
arrive till past three in the afternoon, yet be- 
fore midnight a shout was raised at the gates 
of his camp ; by which the Rhemi signified 
to him Cfesar's victory, and their own con- 
gratulation on that success. The report of 
this being carried to the Treviri, Indutiomarus, 
who the next day had determined to attack 
Labienus's camp, made off in the night, and 
retired with all his forces into his own coun- 
try. Caesar sent back Fabius with his legion 
to his former quarters, resolving to winter 
himself near Samarobriva, with three legions, 
distributed in three different cantonments ; and 



h% 



150 



CtESAR'S 



as all Gaul was in motion, to continue with 
the army in person. For the defeat and death 
of Sabinus spreading every where, almost all 
the states of Gaul were meditating a revolt ; 
and with this view sent messengers and depu- 
ties into all parts, to concert measures, and 
contrive where to begin the war. Nay, they 
held assemblies by night in desert places ; inso- 
much, that during the whole winter, scarce a 
day passed, but Ceesar had intelligence of some 
new resolves or insurrections of the Gauls. 
Among the rest, L. Roscius, his lieutenant, 
who commanded the thirteenth legion, sent 
him word that great numbers of Gauls from 
the several states of Armorica, had assembled 
to attack him, and advanced within eight miles 
of his camp ; but upon hearing of Csesar's vic- 
tory, had separated so hastily, that their re- 
treat had all the appearance of a flight. 

XLV. But Cffisar summoning the principal 
noblemen of every state to attend him ; partly 
by menaces, making them sensible he was no 
stranger to their designs ; partly by exhorta- 
tions, found means to keep the greatest part 
of Gaul in its duty. The Senones, however, 
a potent state, and of great authority among 
the Gauls, formed the design of publicly assas- 
sinating Cavarinus, whom Csesar had given 
them for a king ; whose brother, Moritasgus, 
had held the sovereignty at Ceesar's arrival in 
Gaul, and whose ancestors had long been in 
possession of the same dignity. But he having 
intelligence of the plot, thought proper to fly ; 
whereupon, pursuing him to the very frontiers, 
they drove him from his palace and throne : 
and sending ambassadors to Caesar to justify 
their conduct, upon his ordering their whole 
senate to repair to him, they refused to sub- 
mit. So powerful was this example amongst 
the barbarians, that some at last were found 
of courage enough to begin the war ; and so 
great a change did it produce in the inclina- 
tions of all, that except the ^duans and Rhe- 
mi, who had been always particularly distin- 
guished and favoured by Csesar ; the first, on 
account of their ancient and inviolable fidelity 
to the people of Rome ; the last, for their late 
services in the Gallic war ; scarce was there 
a single state in all Gaul that did not incur 
suspicion. Nor is this, in truth, so much to 
be wondered at ; as for many other reasons, 
so particularly for this : that a people famed 
above all nations for their military virtues, 



could not with patience bear to see themselves 
so far stripped of their former renown, as to be 
forced to submit to the yoke of the Romans. ^£ 

XL VI. Indutiomarus and the Treviri ceased'^ 
not, during the whole winter, to send ambas- 
sadors over the Rhine ; soliciting the German 
states ; ofTering them money ; and urging, 
that a great part of our army having already 
been cut off, much the least considerable re- 
mained. But no part of that country could 
be persuaded to come into their designs : be- 
cause having twice before tried their fortune 
with the Romans, in the war with Ariovistus, 
and in the defeat of the Tenchtheri, they were 
resolved, the}' told them, to run no more haz- 
ards. Indutiomarus, disappointed of this hope, 
was no less active in drawing forces together, 
soliciting recruits from the neighbouring states, 
providing horses, and encouraging even out- 
laws and convicts, by the promise of great re- 
wards, to engage in his service. And so great 
an authority had he by this means acquired in 
Gaul, that ambassadors flocked from all parts, 
some publicly, others in a private manner, to 
request his protection and friendship. ^t 

XL VII. Finding himself thus voluntarily '^ 
applied to ; on one side, by the Senones and 
Carnutes, impelled by a consciousness of the 
guilt they had incurred ; on the other, by the 
Nervians and Atuatici, who were preparing 
for a war with the Romans ; and that if he 
once took the field, forces would not be want- 
ing ; he called an assembly of the states in arms. 
This, according to the custom of the Gauls, 
implies an actual commencement of war ; and, 
by a standing law, obliges all their youth to 
appear at the diet, in arms ; in which they are 
so extremely strict, that whosoever has the 
misfortune to come last, is put to death in sight 
of the multitude, with all manner of torments. 
In this assembly, Cingetorix, the head of the 
opposite faction, and son-in-law of Indutio- 
marus, who, as we have related above, had de- 
clared for Caesar, and still continued firm to 
him, was proclaimed a public enemy, and his 
estate confiscated. After which Indutiomarus 
acquainted the council, that the Senones, Car- 
nutes, and several other states of Gaul had 
solicited his assistance ; that he accordingly 
intended to join his forces with theirs, taking 
his route through the territories of the Rhe- 
mi, and giving up their lands to be plundered ; 
but that before he began his march, he 



COMMENTARIES. 



151 



was desirous of mastering the camp of Labie- 
nus. To that end he gave the necessary di- 
rections. 

l\ XL VIII. Labienus, whose camp, both by 
the nature of the ground, and the fortifications 
he had added, was extremely strong, feared no- 
thing, either for himself or the legion ; but 
nevertheless was intent how he might give 
the enemy some considerable blow. Having 
there been informed by Cingetorix and his ad- 
herents, of the speech made by Indutiomarus 
in the council of Gaul, he sent deputies to the 
neighbouring states, solicited cavalry from all 
parts, and appointed them a day of rendezvous. 
Meantime Indutiomarus, with all his cavalry, 
appeared almost every day within sight of the 
camp ; one while to examine its situation ; 
another, to intimidate Labienus, or invite him 
to a conference. On these occasions, it was 
usual for the enemy to cast their darts over 
the rampart. Labienus kept his men within 
the works, and used all the methods he could 
think of to make the Gauls believe he was 
afraid of them. 

>^ XLIX. Indutiomarus approaching the 
trenches every day with greater contempt than 
before, Labienus received into his camp, by 
night, all the cavalry he had sent for from the 
neighbouring states ; and was so careful to re- 
strain his men within their lines, by guards 
planted at all the outlets, that it was impossi- 



ble for the Treviri to get intelligence of the 
reinforcement he had received. Meantime 
Indutiomarus, according to custom, came up 
to the camp, and continued there the greater 
part of the day. The cavalry discharged 
their darts over the rampart, and in oppro- 
brious language challenged our men to fight. 
The Romans making no answer, they retired 
towards night, but dispersed and without or- 
der. Then Labienus, ordering a sudden sally 
with all the cavalry, strictly cautioned and 
charged his men, that as soon as they had put 
the Gauls to flight, (which happened accord- 
ing to his expectation,) they should all single 
out Indutiomarus, nor offer to wound a man 
of the enemy, till they saw him slain : for he 
was unwilling that any delay, occasioned by 
the slaughter of the rest, should give him an 
opportunity to escape. He promised great re- 
wards to the man that should kill him ; and 
sent the cohorts after to sustain the horse. 
The design succeeded ; for as all wore intent 
upon Indutiomarus alone, he was overtaken 
and slain in passing a river, and his head 
brought back to the camp. Our cavalry, in 
their return, put all to the sword that came in 
their way. Upon the news of this defeat, the 
forces of the Eburones and Nervians returned 
home, and Gaul was somewhat quieter the 
rest of the winter. 



CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 



OF 



HIS WARS IN GAUL 



BOOK VI. 



14* 



153 



THE ARGUMENT. 

I. Caesar, apprehending greater commotions in Gaul, augments his forces.— II. He reduces the Nervians by a 
sudden invasion. — ^III. And admits the Senones, Caruutes, and Menapians to a surrender. — VI. Labienus, 
pretending fear, suddenly attacks and routs the Treviri. — IK. Csesar passes the Rhine a second time.— X. 
The Suevians prepare to oppose the Romans.— SI. The manners oflhe Gauls and Germans described.— XII. 
The ^duans and Sequani at the head of two opposite factions in Gaul. The Sequani declining in power, 
tlie Rhemi substitute themselves in their place.— XIII. Description of the Druids.— XV. The religion of the 
Gauls.— XVI. The Gaulsand Germans differ much asto their manners and customs.— XXIII. The Hercynian 
Forest.— XXIV. A bull with one horn.— XXV. Wild asses.— XXVI. Buffaloes.— XXVII. Csesar, fearing the 
want of provisions, repasses the Rhine, and marches against Ambiorix.— XXVIII. The great power of for- 
tune.— XXIX. Ambiorix disbands his troops, and counsels them to provide for their own safety.— XXX. Cae- 
sar divides his army, and marches in person in quest of Ambiorix.— XXXI. Is obliged to proceed with great 
circumspection in ravaging the country.— XXXII. The Sicambri cross the Rhine, and fall upon Cicero's camp. 
—XXXV. The astonishing bravery of Sextius Baculus upon this occasion.— XXXVII. The Romans sutler 
some loss.— XXXVni. The Germans at length relinquish the attack, and return home.— XL. Caesar lays 
waste the country of the Eburones. Ambiorix narrowly escapes being taken.— XLI. Caesar returns to Italy. 



164 



CJESAR'S COMMENTARIES 



HIS WARS IN GAUL 



BOOK VI. 



I. C^sah, for many reasons, expecting greater 
commotions in Gaul, ordered his lieutenants, 
M. Silanus, C. Antistus Reginus, and T. Sex- 
lius, to levy troops. At the same time, he de- 
sired of Cn. Pompey, the proconsul, that since 
he was himself detained by public affairs at 
Rome, he would set on foot the legion he had 
enlisted in Cisalpine Gaul, during his consul- 
ship, and send it to him ; for he considered it 
as of the utmost importance towards securing 
a proper respect from the Gauls for the time 
to come, to give them such an idea of the power 
of Italy, as might convince them that it was not 
only able speedily to repair any losses sustained, 
but even to bring a greater force into the field. 
Friendship and the good of the commonwealth 
equally determined Pompey to yield to this re- 
quest ; and the levies being , completed with 
great diligence by the lieutenants, three new 
legions were formed and brought into Gaul 
before the end of winter. Thus having doubled 
the number of cohorts lost under Titurius, 
he soon made the enemy sensible both by his 
expedition and the strength of the reinforce- 
ment, of what they had to apprehend from the 
power and discipline of the Romans. 

II. Indutiomarus being slain, as we have 
related above, the Treviri conferred the com- 
mand on his relations. They persisted like- 
wise in soliciting the Germans, and making 
them offers of money. But not being able to 
prevail with those that lay nearest them, they 
applied to some of the more remote states ; and 
finding them inclined to treat, entered into a 
solemn engagement with them, giving hosta- 
ges for the security of the money stipulated. 



and associating Ambiorix into the confederacy. 
Caesar, informed of these things, and finding 
that he was threatened with war on all sides: 
that the Nervians, Atuatici, and Menapians, 
with all the Germans on this side the Rhine, 
were actually in arms ; that the Senoncs re- 
fused to attend him according to orders, and 
were tampering with the Carnutes and other 
neighbouring states ; and that the Treviri 
were soliciting the Germans by frequent em- 
bassies ; he judged it would be necessary to 
open the campaign early. Accordingly, with- 
out waiting till the winter was at an end, he 
drew together the four nearest legions, and 
fell unexpectedly into the territories of the 
Nervians, before they could either assemble 
in a body, or find means to save themselves by 
flight. Having carried off a great number of 
men and cattle, enriched his soldiers with the 
booty, and laid waste the country, he com- 
pelled them to submit and give hostages ; 
and then led back his legions to their winter- 
quarters. 

III. Early in the spring, having summoned 
a general assembly of Gaul, pursuant to his 
design ; as all the other states but the Senones, 
Carnutes, and Treviri, appeared, looking 
upon this as the beginning of a revolt, and 
willing to postpone every thing else, he ad- 
journed the diet to Paris. This city was upon 
the borders of the Senones, and had been 
united with them about an age before ; but was 
thought to have no share in their present re- 
volt. Having declared the adjournment to the 
assembly, he the same day set out with his 
legions against the Senones, and by great 



156 



CESAR'S 



marches reached their territories. Acco, who 
was at the head of the confederacy, hearing 
of his approach, ordered the multitude to shel- 
ter themselves in the towns ; but before that 
could be done, the Romans appeared. This 
obliged them to change their measures, and 
send deputies to Caesar, to implore forgiveness. 
They were seconded by the ^-Eduans, the old 
and faithful allies of the Romans, at whose re- 
quest Caesar readily pardoned them ; and the 
rather, because the summer being now come, 
he had no mind to spend the season for action 
in proceeding formally against the guilty. 
He ordered them to send a hundred hostages, 
whom he committed to the custody of the 
^duans. The Carnutes too, at the interces- 
sion of the Rhemi, under whose protection 
they were, having sent deputies and hostages, 
obtained the same conditions. Caesar then 
went to the assembly of the states, put an end 
to the diet, and ordered the Gauls to provide 
him cavalry. 

IV. Tranquillity being restored in these 
parts, Caesar turned all his thoughts to the 
management of the war with Ambiorix and 
the Treviri. He ordered Cavarinus to attend 
him with the cavalry of the Senones, to pre- 
vent any new commotions in his absence, 
either in consequence of the resentment of 
that prince, or the hatred he had incurred of 
the state. And having thus settled all things 
to his mind, as he knew Ambiorix was deter- 
mined not to hazard a battle, he set himself to 
watch his other designs. 

V, The Menapians, whose territories bor- 
der upon those of the Eburones, are secured 
by woods and morasses on every side ; and 
were the only people of Gaul, who had not 
sent ambassadors to Caesar to desire a peace. 
He knew Ambiorix was in good intelligence 
with them ; and that by means of the Treviri, 
he had also entered into an alliance with the 
Germans. He therefore thought it best to 
deprive him of these resources, before he at- 
tacked him in person ; lest despairing of being 
able to defend himself, he should either retire 
among the Menapians, or throw himself into 
the arms of the Germans beyond the Rhine. 
This resolution being taken, he sent the bag- 
gage of the whole army to Labienus, in the 
country of the Treviri, ordered him a reinforce- 
ment of two legions, and marched himself 
against the Menapians with five legions, who 
carried nothing with them but their arms. 



That nation trusting to their situation, instead 
of assembling forces, retreated to their woods 
and morasses, and carried all their effects 
along with them. Caesar divided his forces ; 
with C. Fabius his lieutenant, and M. Cras- 
sus his questor, and having speedily finished 
his bridges, entered their country in three bo- 
dies, set all their houses and villages on fire, 
and carried ofTsuch numbers of men and cattle, 
that the Menapians were at last constrained 
to sue for peace. He granted it on condition 
they sent him hostages, and engaged not to 
admit Ambiorix, or any one from him, into 
their territories ; threatening to treat them as 
enemies if they did. These things settled, he 
left Comius of Arras there, with a body of 
horse, to keep them in awe, and set out him- 
self against the 'J'reviri. 

VI. Whilst Caesar was thus employed, the 
Treviri, having drawn together a great num- 
ber of horse and foot, were preparing to attack 
the legion, which had wintered in their terri- 
tories, under Labienus. They were now ad- 
vanced within two days' march of the lieute- 
nant's camp, when they learned that he had 
received a reinforcement of two legions from 
Cffisar. Upon this, encamping at about fifteen 
miles' distance, they resolved to wait for the 
auxiliaries they expected from Germany. La- 
bienus, having intelligence of their design, and 
hoping their rashness might furnish him with 
an opportunity of fighting, left the baggage 
under a guard of five cohorts ; and with the 
twenty-five remaining, and all his cavalry, 
marched towards the enemy, and pitched his 
camp about a mile from them. 

VII. Between Labienus and the enemy was 
a river, with steep banks, and difficult to pass. 
And indeed neither was Labienus himself 
minded to try the passage, nor did he expect 
the enem.y would oflier at such an attempt. 
The hope of being joined by the auxiliaries 
grew stronger in the camp of the Gauls every 
day. Labienus declared publicly in a coun- 
cil of war, " That as the Germans were said 
to be upon the march, he was determined not 
to expose himself and the army to danger, but 
would decamp early next morning." This 
was soon carried to the enemy ; for as our cav- 
alry consisted mostly of Gauls, it was natural 
for some of them to favour their countrymen. 
Labienus, assembling the military tribunes and 
principal centurions during the night,laid before 
them his real design : and the better to betray 



COMMENTARIES. 



157 



the enemy into a suspicion of his being afraid, 
gave orders for decamping with more noise 
and tumult than was usual in a Roman army. 
By this means his march had all the appear- 
ance of a flight; and the enemy, whose camp 
was so very near, had notice of it before day- 
break from their spies. 

VIII. Scarce had our rear got without the 
trenches, when the Gauls encouraging one 
another not to lose a fair prej', or stay in ex- 
pectation of the Germans, at a time the Ro- 
mans were retreating in such a panic : and 
considering it as an indignity, with so great a 
superiority of forces, to forbear attacking a 
handful of men already put to flight and en- 
cumbered with their baggage, resolved to pass 
the river, and engage the Romans, notwith- 
standing the disadvantage of the ground. Jia- 
bienus, who had foreseen this, that he might 
draw them all over the river, continued the 
feint of his march, and went on quietly. Then 
sending the baggage a little before, and order- 
ing it to be placed upon a rising ground : — 
" Behold, fellow-soldiers," says he, " the op- 
portunity you so much desired : you have the 
enemy at a disadvantage, and in a place where 
they cannot sustain the onset : show only 
under my command the valour you have so 
often manifested to our general ; think him 
present and that he sees and observes you." 
At the same time he ordered them to face about, 
and form in line of battle ; and detaching a few 
troops of horse to guard the baggage, drew up 
the rest on the two wings. Our men gave a 
sudden shout, and threw their javelins. The 
enemy, contrary to their expectation, seeing 
those whom they imagined put to flight, 
marching against them with displayed l)aiiners. 
could not sustain the very first shock ; but be- 
taking themselves immediately to flif^ht, took 
refuge in the nearest woods. Labienus pur- 
suing with his cavalry, put many of the enemy 
to the sword, and took a groat number of pri- 
soners ; insomuch that within a few days the 
whole state was obliged to submit : for the 
Germans, who were coming to their assistance, 
upon hearing of their defeat, returned home. 
The relations of Indutiomarus, who had been 
the authors of the revolt, chose likewise to re- 
tire with them, and abandon their country. 
Cingetorix, who had always continued faith- 
ful to the Romans, was thereupon invested with 
the supreme authority. 

IX. Caesar after his arrival in Treves, from 



among the Menapiana, resolved for two rea- 
sons to pass the Rhine : one, because the Ger- 
mans had assisted the Treviri against the Ro- 
mans ; the other to deprive Ambiorix of a 
retreat into those parts. In consequence of 
this resolution, he set about making a bridge 
on the river, but somewhat higher up than be- 
fore. As the form and manner was known, 
the soldiers, by their extraordinary diligence, 
finished the work in a few days. Leaving a 
strong guard on the side of Treves, to prevent 
any sudden insurrection in that country, he 
carried over the rest of his army. The Ubians, 
who had before submitted and given hostages 
sent ambassadors to him to vindicate their 
conduct, and assure him, that they had nei- 
ther sent troops to the assistance of the Tre- 
viri, nor in any instance departed from their 
engagements. They urged and requested that 
he would spare their territories, and not, out 
of a general hatred to the Germans, involve 
the innocent in the punishment of the guilty. 
If he desired more hostages they told him they 
were ready to send them. Ctesar finding, upon 
inquiry, that the supplies had been sent by the 
Sucvians, accepted the submission of the Ubi- 
ans ; and preparing to march against the 
Suevians, informed himself of the ways and 
accesses to their country. 

X. A few days after, he had intelligence 
from the Ubians, that the Suevians were 
drawing their forces to a general rendezvous, 
and had sent orders to all the nations under 
their jurisdiction, to furnish their contingents 
of horse and foot. Upon this, having furnished 
himself with provisions, and chosen a proper 
place for his camp, he ordered the Ubians to 
retire into their towns, with their cattle and 
effects ; hoping that so unskilful and barbarous 
an enemy might easily be drawn, by the 
want of provisions, to fight in a place of dis- 
advantage. He further enjoined the Ubians 
to send spies into all parts, to learn the designs 
and motions of the Suevians, They readily 
complied ; and in a few days brought him 
back word, " That the Suevians, upon certain 
information of the arrival of the Roman ar- 
my, had retired to the remotest part of the 
country, with all their own forces, and those 
of their allies : that there they had resolved 
to wait the coming up of the Romans, at the 
entrance of a forest of immense extent, 
called Bacenis, which reached a great way 
into the country, and served as a barrier be- 



/I- 



158 



CESAR'S 



tween the Cherusci and Suevians, to prevent 
their mutual incursions." 

XI, On this occasion it may not be impro- 
per to say somewhat of the manners of the 
Gauls and Germans, and the difference of 
customs between these two nations. A spirit 
of faction prevails throughout Gaul, and that 
not only in their several states, districts, and 
villages, but almost in every private family. 
The men of greatest esteem and consideration 
among them, are commonly at the head of 
these factions, and give what turn they think 
proper to all public deliberations and counsels. 
This custom is of long standing, and seems 
designed to secure those of lower rank from 
the oppression of the powerful : for the leaders 
always take care to protect those of their party, 
otherwise they would soon lose all their au- 
thority. This equally obtains through the 
whole continent of Gaul, the provinces being 
in general divided into two factions. 

XII. When Cssar arrived in the country, 
the ^duans were at the head of one faction, 
and the Sequani of the other. These last be- 
ing the weaker, because the ^duans had long 
bore the greatest sway, and had a number of 
considerable states in their dependence, they 
united with Ariovistus and the Germans, whom 
by great presents and promises they drew over 
the Rhine to their assistance. This alliance 
made them so powerful, that having worsted 
their adversaries in several battles, and killed 
almost all their nobility, they forced the states 
dependent upon the ^duans to have recourse 
to them for protection ; obliged the ^duans 
themselves to give the children of their prin- 
cipal nobility as hostages, swear publicly not 
to attempt any thing against the Sequani, and 
resign up to their possession a part of their ter- 
ritories ; and by this means rendered them- 
selves in a manner sovereigns of all Gaul. 
Divitiacus, in this necessity, applied to the se- 
nate of Rome for relief, but without effect. 
Cffisar's arrival soon changed the face of af- 
fairs. The J^duan hostages were sent back, 
their former clients restored, and new ones pro- 
cured them by Caesar's interest ; it appearing, 
that such as were under their protection, en- 
joyed a more equal and milder lot : by all 
which, their fortune and authority being con- 
siderably enlarged, the Sequani were obliged 
to resign the sovereignty. The Rhemi suc- 
ceeded in their place ; and, as they were 
known to be in the same degree of favour with 



Ctesar, such as could not get over their old 
animosity to the ^duans, put themselves 
under their protection. The Rhemi were ex- 
tremely attentive to the interests of their clients, 
and thereby both preserved their old authority, 
and that which they had newly acquired. 
Such therefore was the then situation of Gaul, 
that the JSduans possessing indisputably the 
first rank, the Rhemi were next in considera- 
tion and dignity. 

XIII. Over all Gaul, there are only two 
orders of men, in any degree of honour and 
esteem : for the common people are little bet- 
ter than slaves, attempt nothing of themselves, 
and have no share in the public deliberations. 
As they are generally oppressed with debt, 
heavy tributes, or the exactions of their supe- 
riors, they make themselves vassals to the 
great, who exercise over them the same juris- 
diction as masters do over slaves. The two 
orders of men, with whom, as we have said, 
all authority and distinctions are lodged, are 
the Druids and nobles. The Druids preside 
in matters of religion, have the care of public 
and private sacrifices, and interpret the will of 
the gods. They have the direction and edu- 
cation of the youth, by whom they are held 
in great honour. In almost all controversies, 
whether public or private, the decision is left 
to them : and if any crime is committed, any 
murder perpetrated ; if any dispute arises 
touching an inheritance, or the limits of ad- 
joining estates ; in all such cases, they are the 
supreme judges. They decree rewards and 
punishments ; and if any one refuses to submit 
to their sentence, whether magistrate or private 
man, they interdict him the sacrifices. This 
is the greatest punishment that can be inflicted 
among the Gauls; because' such as are under 
this prohibition, are considered as impious and 
wicked : all men shun them, and decline their 
conversation and fellowship, lest they should 
suffer from the contagion of their misfortunes. 
They can neither have recourse to the law for 
justice, nor are capable of any public ofiice. 
The Druids are all under one chief, who pos- 
sesses the supreme authority in that body. 
Upon his death, if any one remarkably excels 
the rest, he succeeds ; but if there are several 
candidates of equal merit, the affair is deter- 
mined by plurality of suffrages. Sometimes 
they even have recourse to arms before the elec- 
tion can be brought to an issue. Once a year 
they assemble at a consecrated place in the terri- 



COMMENTARIES, 



159 



tories of the Carnutes, whose country is sup- 
posed to be in the middle of Gaul. Hither 
such as have any suits depending, flock from 
all parts, and submit implicitly to their decrees. 
Their institution is supposed to come originally 
from Britain, whence it passed into Gaul ; and 
even at this day, such as are desirous of being 
perfect in it, travel thither for instruction.! The 
Druids never go to war, are exempted from 
taxes and military service, and enjoy all man- 
ner of immunities. These mighty encourage- 
ments induce multitudes of their own accord 
to follow that profession ; and many are sent 
by their parents and relations. They are 
taught to repeat a great number of verses by 
heart, and often spend twenty years upon this 
institution ; for it is deemed unlawful to com- 
mit their statutes to writing ; though in other 
matters, whether public or private, they make 
use of Greek characters. They seem to me 
to follow this method for two reasons : to hide 
their mysteries from the knowledge of the vul- 
gar ; and to exercise the memory of their 
scholars, which would be apt to lie neglected, 
had they letters to trust to, as we find is often 
the case. It is one of their principal maxims 
that the soul never dies, but after death passes 
from one body to another ; which, they think, 
contributes greatly to exalt men's courage, by 
disarming death of its terrors. They teach 
likewise many things relating to the stars and 
their motions, the magnitude of the world and 
our earth, the nature of things, and the power 
and prerogatives of the immortal gods. 
' J XIV. The other order of men is the nobles, 
whose whole study and occupation is war. 
Before Csesar's arrival in Gaul, they were al- 
most every year at war either offensive or de- 
fensive ; and they judge of the power and 
quality of their nobles, by the vassals, and the 
number of men he keeps in his pay ; for they 
are the only marks of grandeur they make any 
account of. 

XV. The whole nation of the Gauls is ex- 
tremely addicted to superstition ; whence, in 
threatening distempers and the imminent dan- 
gers of war, they make no scruple to sacrifice 
men, or engage themselves by vow to such 
sacrifices ; in which they make use of the min- 
istry of the Druids : for it is a prevalent opin- 
ion among them, that nothing but the life of 
man can atone for the life of man ; insomuch 
that they have established even public sacri- 
fices of this kind. Some prepare huge Co- 



lossuses, of osier twigs, into which they put 
men alive, and setting fire to them, those with- 
in expire amidst the flames. They prefer for 
victims such as have been convicted of theft, 
robbery, or other cr"imes ; believing them the 
most acceptable to the gods : but when real 
criminals are wanting, the innocent are often 
made to suffer. '; Mercury is the chief deity 
with them : of him they have many images, 
account him the inventor of all arts, their 
guide and conductor in their journeys, and the 
patron of merchandise and gain. Next to him 
are Apollo and Mars, and Jupiter, and Mi- 
nerva. Their notions in regard to him are 
pretty much the same with those of other na- 
tions. Apollo is their god of physic ; Minerva 
of works and manufactures ; Jove holds the 
empire of heaven ; and Mars presides in war. 
To this last, when they resolve upon a battle, 
they commonly devote the spoil. If they 
prove victorious, they offer up ail the cattle 
taken, and set apart the rest of the plunder in 
a place appointed for that purpose : and it is 
common in many provinces, to see these monu- 
ments of offerings piled up in consecrated 
places. Nay, it rarely happens that any one 
shows so great a disregard of religion, as either 
to conceal the plunder, or pillage the public 
oblations ; and the severest punishments are 
inflicted upon such offenders. 

XVI. The Gauls fancy themselves to be 
descended from tlie god Pluto ; which, it 
seems, is an established tradition among the 
Druids. For this reason ihey compute the 
time by nights, not by days ; aad in the ob- 
servance of birth days, new moons, and the 
beginning of the year, always commence the 
celebration from the preceding night. In one 
custom they differ from almost all other na- 
tions ; that they never suffer their children to 
come openly into their presence, until they are 
of age to bear arms ; for the appearance of a 
son in public with his father, before he has 
reached the age of manhood, is accounted dis- 
honourable. 

XVII. Whatever fortune the woman brings, 
the husband is obliged to equal it with his own 
estate. This whole sum, with its annual pro- 
duct, is left untouched, and falls always to the 
share of the survivor. The men have power 
of life and death over their wives and children ; 
and when any father of a family of illustrious 
rank dies, his relations assemble, and upon 
the least ground of suspicion, put even his 



160 



C rE S A R ' S 



wives to the torture like slaves. If they are 
found guilty, iron and fire are employed to 
torment and destroy them. Their funerals are 
magnificent and sumptuous, according to their 
quality. Every thing that was dear to the 
deceased, even animals, are thrown into the 
pile : and formerly, such of their slaves and 
clients as they loved most, sacrificed them- 
selves at the funeral of their lord. 

XVIII. In their best regulated states, they 
nave a law, that whoever hears any thing re- 
lating to the public, whether by rumour or 
otherwise, shall give immediate notice to the 
magistrate, without imparting it to any one 
else ; for the nature of the people is such, that 
rash and inexperienced men, alarmed by false 
reports, are often hurried to the greatest extre- 
mities, and take upon them to determine in 
matters of the greatest consequence. The 
magistrates stifle things improper to be known, 
and only communicate to the multitude what 
they think needful for the service of the com- 
monwealth ; nor do the laws permit to speak 
of state affairs, except in public council. 

XIX. The Germans differ widely in their 
manners from the Gauls : for neither have they 
Druids to preside in religious affairs, nor do 
they trouble themselves about sacrifices. They 
acknowledge no gods but those that are ob- 
jects of sight, and by whose power they are 
apparently benefited ; the sun, the moon, fire. 
Of others they know nothing, not even by re- 
port. Their whole life is addicted to hunting 
and war; and from their infancy they are 
inured to fatigue and hardships. They esteem 
those Kiost, who continue longest strangers to 
women ; as imagining nothing contributes so 
much to stature, strength and vigour of body : 
but to have any commerce of this kind before 
the age of twenty is accounted in the highest 
degree ignominious. Nor is it possible to con- 
ceal an irregularity this way ; because they 
bathe promiscuously in rivers, and are clothed 
in skins, or short mantles of fur, which leave 
the greatest part of their bodies naked. 

XX. Agriculture is little regarded among 
them, as they live mostly on milk, cheese, and 
the flesh of animals. Nor has any man lands 
of his own, or distinguished by fixed bounda- 
ries. The magistrates, and those in authority, 
portion out yearly to every canton and family, 
such a quantity of land, and in what part of 
the country they think proper ; and the year 
following remove them to some other spot. 



iMany reasons are assigned for this practice ; 
lest seduced by habit and continuance, they 
should learn to prefer tillage to war ; lest a 
desire of enlarging their possessions should 
gain ground, and prompt the stronger to expel 
the weaker ; lest they should become curious 
in their buildings, in order to guard against 
the extremes of heat and cold ; lest avarice 
should get footing amongst them, whence 
spring factions and discords : in fine, to pre- 
serve contentment and equanimity among 
the people, when they find their possessions 
nothing inferior to those of the most powerful. 

XXI. It is accounted honourable for estates 
to have the country all around them lie waste 
and depopulated : for they think it an argu- 
ment of valour to expel their neighbours, and 
suffer none to settle near them ; at the same 
time that they are themselves all the safer, as 
having nothing to apprehend from sudden in- 
cursions. When a state is engaged in war, 
either offensive or defensive, they make choice 
of magistrates to preside in it, whom they arm 
with a power of life and death. In time of 
peace there are no public magistrates ; but 
the chiefs of the several provinces and clans 
administer justice, and decide differences 
within their respective limits. Robbery has 
nothing infamous in it, when committed with- 
out the territories of the state to which they 
belong : they even pretend that it serves to 
exercise their youth and prevent the growth 
of sloth. When any of their princes in this 
case offers himself publicly in council as a 
leader, such as approve of the expedition, 
rise up, profess themselves ready to follow 
him, and are applauded by the whole multi- 
tude. They who go back from their engage- 
ment are looked upon as traitors and deserters, 
and lose all esteem and credit for the time 
to come. The laws of hospitality are held 
inviolable among them. All that fly to them 
for refuge, on whatever account, are sure of 
protection and defence ; their houses are 
open to receive them, and they plentifully 
supply their wants. 

XXII. Formerly the Gauls exceeded the 
Germans in bravery, often made war upon 
them, and as they abounded in people beyond 
what the country could maintain, sent several 
colonies over the Rhine. Accordingly the more 
fertile places of Germany, in the neighbour- 
hood of the Hercynian forest, (which I find 
mentioned by Eratosthenes, and other Greek 



COMMENTARIES, 



161 



writers, under the name of Orcinia,) fell to 
the share of the Volcae, who settled in those 
parts, and have ever since kept possession. 
They are in the highest reputation for justice 
and bravery, and no less remarkable than the 
Germans for poverty, abstinence, and patience 
of fatigue, conforming exactly to their cus- 
toms, both in habit and way of living. But the 
neighbourhood of the Roman province, and an 
acquaintance with traffic, has introduced luxury 
and abundance among the Gauls, whence 
becoming by little and little an unequal match 
for the Germans, and being worsted in many 
battles, they no longer pretend to compare 
with them in valour. 

XXIIL The Hercynian forest, of which 
we have been just speaking, is about nine days, 
journey in breadth ; for as the Germans are 
ignorant of the use of measures, there is no 
other way of computing it. It begins from 
the confines of the Helvetians, Nemetes, and 
Rauraci ; and following directly the course of 
the Danube, extends to the territories of the 
Anartes and Dacians. Thence turning from 
the river to the left, it runs through a multi- 
tude of different regions ; and though there 
are many in the country, who have advanced 
six days' journey into this forest, yet no one 
pretends to have reached the extremity of it, 
or discovered how far it extends. Many dif- 
ferent species of animals, unknown in other 
countries, harbour here ; the most remarkable 
of which, and that best deserve to be men- 
tioned, are these. 

XXIV. There is a bull that nearly resembles 
a stag, with only one horn rising from the 
middle of his forehead, taller and straighter 
than those of our cattle, and which at top di- 
vides into many large branches. The males 
and females are shaped alike, and have horns 
the same in size. 

XXV. Here are likewise a kind of wild 
asses, shaped and spotted like goats, but of a 
larger size ; without horns, or joints in their 
legs, that never lie down to sleep, nor can 
raise themselves, if by any accident they are 
overthrown. They lean against trees, which 
serve to support them when they sleep. Hence 
the huntsmen, after having discovered their 
haunts, either loosen the roots of the trees, or 
saw them almost quite off; so that when the 
animal, according to custom, reclines against 
them, they immediately give way, and both 
iiH down together. 



XXVI, A third speeies of animak are the 
uri, nearly equalling the elephant in bulk ; 
but in colour, shape, and kind, resembling a 
bull. They are of uncommon strength and 
swiftness, and spare neither man nor beast that 
comes in their way. They are taken and slain 
by means of pits dug on purpose. This way 
of hunting is frequent among the youth, and 
serves to inure them to fatigue. They who 
kill the greatest number, and produce their 
horns in public, as a proof, are in high repu- 
tation with their countrymen. It is found 
impossible to tame them, or conquer their 
fierceness, though lakcnever so young. Their 
horns, both in largeness, figure, and kind, dif- 
fer much from those of our bulls. The na- 
tives preserve them with great care, tip their 
edges with silver, and use them instead of cups 
on their most solemn festivals, 

XXVII. Cffisar understanding from the 
Ubian scouts, that the Suevians were retired 
into their woods ; and fearing the want of pro- 
visions, because, as we have already observed, 
the Germans are but little addicted to agri^ 
culture, resolved not to advance any further. 
But to keep the enemy still under same aw® 
of his return, and prevent their sending suc- 
cours to Gaul, having repassed the Rhine, ho 
only broke down about two hundred feet of- 
his bridge, on the German side ; and to se- 
cure the rest, built at the extremity a tower 
of four stories, where he left a ganison of 
twelve cohorts, and strengthened tlu^ place 
with all manner of works. Young C. VoL- 
catius TuUus had the charge of the fort and 
garrison. He himself, as soon as the corn be- 
gan to be ripe, marched against Ambiorix ; 
taking his way through the forest of Ardea, 
which is much the largest in all Gaul, and 
reaches from the banks of the Rhine, and the 
confines of Treves, quite to the Nerviaiw, 
through a space of more than five hundred 
miles. L. Minucius Basilus was sent before, 
with all the cavalry, in hopes that the quick- 
ness of his march, and the opportunity of some 
lucky conjuncture, might enable him to do 
something considerable. He had orders to 
light no fires in his camp, the better to con- 
ceal his approach from the enemy ; and Ctcsar 
assured him, he would follow with all expe- 
dition. Basilus exactly followed his instruc- 
tions ; and coming suddenly and unexpectedly 
upon the Gauls, surprised great numbers of 
them in the field. Being informed by thea^ 
Y 



162 



C .E S A R ' S 



of the place whither Ambiurix had retired, 
with a few cavalry, he marched directly 
against him. 

XXVIII. But as fortune has a considerable 
share in all human concerns, so particularly 
in those of war. For as it was a very extra- 
ordinary chance, that he should thus come 
upon Ambiorix unprepared, and surprise him 
with his personal arrival, before he had the 
least notice of it from fame or report ; so was 
it an equal effect of fortune, that the Gaul 
himself, after having lost his arms, horses, 
and chariots, should yet find means to escape. 
This was principally owing to the situation 
of his house, which was surrounded with a 
wood ; it being customary among the Gauls, 
in order to avoid the heats, to build in the 
neighbourhood of woods and rivers. By this 
means his attendants and friends possessing 
themselves of a defile, sustained for a time the 
attack of our cavalry ; during which, one of 
his servants having provided him with a 
horse, he escaped into the woods. Thus 
fortune remarkably played her part, both in 
bringing him into the danger and delivering 
him out of it. 

XXIX. Ambiorix, after his escape, made 
no attempt to draw his forces together ; nor 
is it known whether he acted in this manner 
out of choice, as not thinking it safe to hazard 
a battle ; or because he thought he should 
not have sufficient time, being surprised by the 
sudden arrival of the cavalry, and believing 
that all the rest of the army followed. Des- 
patching, therefore, messengers privately 
through the country, he counselled every one 
to provide for his own safety ; upon which 
some took refuge in the forest of Arden, and 
some in the adjoining morasses. Those who 
lived upon the sea-coast, hid themselves in 
the islands formed by the tide at high water ; 
and many abandoning their country altogether, 
trusted themselves and their all to the faith 
of foreigners. Cativulcus, who, jointly with 
Ambiorix, was king of the Eburones, and had 
associated with him in all his designs, being 
of a very advanced age, and unable to bear 
the fatigues of war or flight, after many im- 
precations against Ambiorix, who had been 
the prime contriver of the revolt, poisoned 
himself with an extract of yew, a tree very 
common in Gaul and Germany. The Segni 
and Condrusi, originally German nations, 
whose territories lay between those of Treves 



and the Eburones, sent ambassadors to Cmsar, 
to entreat " That he would not consider them 
as enemies, nor look upon all the Germans on 
this side the Rhine as equally obnoxious : 
that they had harboured no thoughts of war, 
nor been any ways aiding to Ambiorix." Cae- 
sar finding it to be so by the answers of the 
prisoners, ordered them to deliver up such of 
the Eburones as had fled to them for refuge ; 
and promised, upon that condition, not to mo- 
lest their territories. «Xp^ 
^>LXXX. Then dividing Iiis army into three 
bodies, he sent all the baggage to Atuatuca, 
a castle situated almost in the heart of the 
country of the Eburones, where Titurius and 
Arunculeius had been quartered during the 
winter. This place he chose, as for other 
reasons, so likewise because the fortifications, 
raised the year before, were still entire, which 
would lessen the labour of his soldiers. He 
left the fourteenth legion to guard the bag- 
gage, being one of the three lately levied 
in Italy, and brought thence into Gaul. Q. 
Tullius Cicero had the charge both of the le- 
gion and fort, which was further strengthened 
with an additional guard of two hundred horse. 
The army being thus divided, he sent T. La- 
bienus, with three legions, towards the sea 
coast, and the provinces that border upon the 
Menapians; C. Trebonius, with a like number 
of legions, to lay waste the country adjoining 
to the Atuatici ; and resolved to march him- 
self with the other three towards the Scheld, 
which flows into the Meuse, and to the ex- 
tremities of the forest of Arden, whither he 
was informed Ambiorix had retired with a few- 
horse. He promised, at his departure, to re- 
turn in seven days ; the legion he had left in 
garrison being provided with corn only for 
that time : and exhorted Labienus and Trebo- 
nius, if they found it consistent with the public 
advantage, to return likewise with their le- 
gions within the same space ; that joining 
counsel together, and taking their measures 
from the conduct of the enemy, they might 
resolve where next to carry the war. 

XXXI. There was, as we have already 
observed, no formed body of troops, no garri- 
son, no fortified town to defend by arms ; but 
a multitude dispersed on all sides. Wherever 
a cave, or a thicket, or a morass offered them 
shelter, thither they retired. These places 
were well known to the natives ; and great 
care and caution was required on our part 



COMMENTARIES. 



163 



not for the security of the whole army, (which 
had no danger to fear whilst in a body, from 
enemies dispersed and full of terror ;) but for 
the preservation of each individual. And yet 
even this regarded not a little the whole army : 
for the desire of plunder drew many of the 
men to a great distance ; and the woods, full 
of defiles and hidden ways, hindered them from 
keeping together in a body. If Ccesar meant 
to terminate the war altogether, and extirpate 
this race of perfidious men, the soldiers must 
be divided into small parties, and detached on 
all sides. If, on the contrary, he kept his men 
together, as the rules of war and the Koman 
discipline required, the enemy were sheltered 
by their situation, nor wanted boldness to form 
ambuscades, and cut off stragglers. Amidst 
these diflSculties, all possible precautions were 
taken ; and although the soldiers were eagerly 
bent upon revenge, yet Ccesar chose rather 
not to push the enemy too far, than expose 
his men to danger. He therefore sent mes- 
sengers to the neighbouring states, inviting 
them all by the hopes of plunder, to join the 
destruction of the Eburones ; choosing rather 
to expose the lives of the Gauls in the woods, 
than of the legionary soldiers ; and hoping, by 
the multitude employed against them, totally 
to extirpate the name and memory of a state, 
whose revolt had rendered them so obnoxious. 
Accordingly great numbers flocked suddenly 
thither from all parts. 

XXXII. Thus were the Eburones attacked 
on all sides ; and the havoc continued till the 
seventh day, which Csesar had appointed for 
•^ — /returning to his camp and baggage. (It then 
/('evidently appeared what influence fortune has 
( vover war, and how many accidents spring from 
her interposition. The enemy being dispersed 
and full of terror, as we have related above, 
there remained no body of troops in the field, 
to give any the least ground of fear. A report 
spread among the Germans beyond the Rhine, 
that the territories of the Eburones were given 
up to plunder, and all without distinction in- 
vited to share the spoil. The Sicambri, who 
inhabit upon the Rhine, and had afforded a 
retreat to the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, as 
mentioned above, assembled immediately a 
body of two thousand horse, passed the river 
in barks about thirty miles below Caesar's 
bridge and fort, and advanced directly towards 
the territories of the Eburones. Many of those 



that fled, and had dispersed themselves up and 
down the country, fell into their hands ; as 
likewise abundance of cattle, of which the 
barbarians are extremely covetous. Allured 
by this success, they advanced farther. Neither 
woods nor morasses proved any obstacles to 
men, trained up from their infancy to wars and 
incursions. Inquiring of the prisoners con- 
cerning Caesar, they understood that he was a 
great way off, and had left the country with 
his whole army. One in particular addressing 
them : " Why, says he, do you lose time in 
pursuit of so slight and trifling a booty, when 
fortune oflTers one of so much greater valuel 
In three hours you may reach Atuatuca, where 
the Romans have deposited all their wealth. 
The garrison is hardly sufficient to line the 
rampart, much less to sally out of their in- 
trenchments." Urged by this hope, they left 
their present booty in a place of safety, and 
marched directly to Atuatuca, being conducted 
by tlie captive who had given them the in- 
formation. 

XXXIII. Cicero, who hitherto had kept his 
soldiers strictly within the camp, according to 
Caesar's orders, nor suffered so much as a ser- 
vant to straggle beyond the lines ; seeing the 
seventh day arrive, began to despair of Ca;sar's 
return, who, as he had heard, marched farther 
into the country, and had sent him no notice 
of his route. Wherefore, tired with the con- 
tinual murmurs of the soldiers, who complained 
of his patience, and told him they were kept 
like men besieged ; and not suspecting that 
any accident could befell him, within the small 
extent of three miles, especially as the eneiny, 
opposed by nine legions, and a very numerous 
cavalry, were in a manner totally dispersed 
and cut off; he sent out five cohorts to forage 
in an adjoining field, separated from the camp 
only by a single hill. A great many sick men 
had been left behind by Caesar, of whom about 
three hundred, that were now pretty well re- 
covered, joined the I'ttachment. T'hese were 
followed by almost all the servants of the camp, 
together with a vast number of carts and car- 
riage-horses. 

XXXIV. In that very instant, as fortune 
would have it, the German cavalry arrived ; 
and without discontinuing their course, en- 
deavoured to force an immediate entrance by 
the Decuman gate. As their march had been 
covered by a wood, they were not discovered 



IM 



CiESAU'S 



till they were just upon the camp ; insomuch 
that the sutlers, who kept their booths under 
the rampart, had not time to retire within the 
intrenchments. Our men were so surprised 
at this sudden and unexpected attack, that 
the cohort upon guard could scarce sustain the 
first onset. The enemy spread themselves on 
all sides to find a place of entrance. The 
Romans with difficulty defended the gates ; 
the rampart securing them every where else. 
The whole camp was in an uproar, every one 
inquiring of another the cause of the confusion ; 
nor could they determine which way to ad- 
vance the standards, or where to post thera- 
■selves. Some reported the camp was already 
taken ; others, that the Germans, having de- 
Tstroyed Cssar and his army, were come victo- 
rious, to storm their trenches. The greater 
number, full of imaginary fears, when they 
tJonsidered the place in which they were en- 
camped, called to mind the fate of Cotta and 
Titurius, who perished in that very fort. This 
universal consternation being perceived by the 
barbarians, confirmed them in the belief of 
"what the prisoners had told them, that there 
was scarce any garrison within to defend the 
camp. They renewed their endeavours to 
force the intrenchments, and mutually exhorted 
one another, not to let so fair a prize iescape 
■out of their hands. 

XXXV". Among the sick in garrison was 
P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first 
rank, of whom mention has been made in 
former battles, and who had not tasted food 
for five days. This officer, anxious for his own 
safety, and that of the legion, rushed unarmed 
out of his tent. He saw the enemy at hand, 
and the danger extreme. Snatching the first 
arms that ofiered, he posted himself in the 
gate of the camp. The centurions of the co- 
hort upon guard followed the example, and for 
a while sustained the enemy's charge. Sex- 
tiiis expired under a number of wounds, and 
•was with difficulty carried off by the soldiers. 
This^hort delay give the rest time to resume 
their courage ; so far at least, as to mount the 
rampart, and make a show of defending them- 
sdves. 

XXXVI. Meantims our foragers return- 
ing, heard the noise at the camp. The cavalry 
advancing before, were soon apprized of the 
danger. Here was no fortification to shelter 
the frighted troops. The new levies, inex- 
perienced in matters of war, fixed their eyes 



upon the tribunes and centurions, waiting their 
orders. Not a man was found so hardy and 
resolute as not to be disturbed by so unexpected 
an accident. The Germans perceiving our 
ensigns at a distance, gave over the attack of 
the camp, imagining at first that it was Caesar 
and the legions, which the prisoners had in- 
formed them were marched farther into the 
country. But soon observing how few they 
were, they surrounded and fell upon them on 
all sides, 

XXXVH. The servants of the camp fled 
to the nearest rising ground ; whence being 
immediately driven, they threw themselves 
amongst the ranks of the cohorts, and thereby 
increased their terror. Some were for drawing 
up in form of a wedge, and forcing their way 
through the enemy : for as the camp was so 
very near, they imagined, that if some fell, the 
rest at least must escape. Others were for 
retiring to an eminence, and all sharing there 
the same fate. The veteran soldiers, who had 
marched but with the detachment, could by 
no means relish this proposal : wherefore mu- 
tually encouraging one another, and being led 
by C. Trebonius, a Roman knight, under whose 
command they were, they broke through the 
midst of the enemy, and all to a man arrived 
safe in the camp. The servants and cavalry, 
following them, and seconding their retreat, 
were likewise, by their bravery, preserved. 
But the troops who had retired to the hill, 
being inexperienced in military aflfairs, could 
neither persist in the resolution they had 
taken of defending themselves from the higher 
ground, nor imitate that brisk and vigorous 
effort which they saw had been so serviceable 
to their companions : but endeavouring to gain 
the camp, quitted the advantage of their situa- 
tion. The centurions, some of whom had been 
selected from veteran legions, and on account 
of their bravery promoted to higher stations 
among the new levies, fought resolutely to 
maintain the glory they had acquired, and en- 
deavoured to sell their hves as dear as they 
could. Their valour obliging the enemy to 
fall back a little, part of the troops, contrary 
to expectation, reached the camp. The rest 
were surrounded and cut to pieces by the bar- 
barians. 

XXXVni. The Germans, despairing to 
carry the camp, as they saw our men now pre- 
pared to defend the works, repassed the Rhine 
with the booty they had deposited in the woods. 



COMMENTARIES. 



165 



But so great was the terror of the Romans even 
after their retreat, that C. Volusenus arriving 
in the camp the same night with the cavalry, 
could not persuade them that Csesar and the 
army were safe. For the fear had taken so 
thorough a possession of their minds, that, as 
if bereft of understanding, they persisted in be- 
lieving the infantry was wholly destroyed, 
and that the cavalry alone had escaped : it 
seeming to them altogether incredible, that the 
Germans would have dared to attack the camp, 
had no misfortune befallen the Roman army. 
But Caesar's arrival soon put an end to their 
fears. 

XXXIX. Upon his return, being informed 
of what had happened, he only complained of 
the sending out the cohorts to forage: observ- 
ing, " That in war nothing ought to be left to 
fortune, whose power appeared evidently in 
the sudden arrival of the enemy, and much 
more in their coming up unperceived to the 
very gates of the camp." But nothing in this 
whole affair appeared to him more wonderful, 
than that the Germans, having crossed the 
Rhine with design to plunder the territories of 
Ambiorix, should, by falling upon the Roman 
camp, do him a most acceptable service. 

XL. Csesar marched a second time to ha- 
rass the enemy, and having drawn a great 
number of troops together from the neigh- 
bouring states, sent them into all parts upon 
this service. All the houses and villages were 
set on fire ; the plunder was universal ; the 
vast number of men and horses not only de- 
stroyed great quantities of corn, but the rains 



and advanced seasons made havoc of all that 
was left ; insomuch that if any of the enemy 
escaped for the present, it seemed yet likely, 
that after the retreat of the army, they must 
perish by famine. As the cavalry were divided 
into many parties, they often came to places 
where the prisoners not only informed them 
they had seen Ambiorix flying, but that he 
could even yet be scarce out of view. The 
hope of coming up with him made them leave 
nothing unattempted, as imagining they would 
thereby gain the highest favour with Cjesar, 
whose good fortune wanted only this to ren- 
der it complete. But all their endeavours were 
fruitless ; for he still found means to hide him- 
self in the woods and morasses ; whence re- 
moving privately in the night, he escaped 
into other regions, accompanied with only four 
horsemen, in whom alone he durst confide. 

XLI. CsEsar, having destroyed the whole 
country, led back his army into the territories 
of the Rhemi, with the loss of only two cohorts. 
There he summoned a general assembly of 
Gaul, to examine into the affair of the Sen- 
ones and Carnutes : and having passed a se- 
vere sentence against Acco, the contriver of 
the revolt, ordered him to be executed on the 
spot. Some fearing a like fate, fled ; whom 
having banished by a decree of the diet, he 
quartered two legions in Treves, two among 
the Lingones, and the remaining six at Agen- 
dicum, in the country of the Senones. And 
having provided the army with corn, he went, 
pursuant to his design, into Italy, to hold the 
assemblies of Cisalpine Gaul. 



16» 



CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 



OF 



HIS WARS IN GAUL 



BOOK VII. 



167 



THE ARGUMENT. 

I. The Gauls concert measures for renewing the war. — ^11. The Carnutes massacre a number of Roman citizens 
at Genabum.— VI. Vercingetorix excites his followers to a revolt, and by the consent of many nations is de- 
clared generalissimo of the league.— Vlll. Caesar suddenly invades Auvergne.— X. Vercingetorix invests 
Gergovia, whither he is followed by Csesar. — XI. Csesar makes himself master of Vellaunodunum and Gena- 
bum.— XII. Vercingetorix quits the siege of Gergovia. Czesar possesses himself of Noviodunum, puts Vercin- 
getorix's cavalry to flight, and invests Avaricum.— 5111. By advice of Vercingetorix, the Biturigians set fire 
to their towns, that they may not furnish subsistence to the Romans. — XVI. Csesar in great straits for want 
of corn. — XVII. The two armies near each other, but without coming to a battle. — XIX. Vercingetorix, ac- 
cused of treason, clears himself —XXI. Csesar continues the siege of Avaricum.— XXII. The construction of 
the walls of towns among the Gauls. — XXIU. Avaricum, after a resolute defence, is at last taken by storm. — 
XXVUI. Vercingetorix consoles his men by a speech. — XXIX. And prepares with greater force to renew the 

^ar. XXX. Csesar quits the intestine divisions of the ^duans.— XXXII. Sets out upon his march towards 

Auvergne.— XXXm. Passes the AUier by a feint.— XXXIV. And arriving before Gergovia, seizes an emi- 
nence near the town.— XXXV. The .aiduans form the design of a revolt from the Romans.— XXXVIII. But 
by Ceesar's prudence and diligence, are in some measure prevented.— XLI. Caesar carries threeof the ene- 
my's camps before Gergovia.— XLIV. The Romans pressing the attack too far, are repulsed with great slaugh- 
ter.— XIIX. Caesar reprehends the temerity of his soldiers.- L. And resolves to retire into the country of the 
.Eduans.— LIV. Labienus, after a successful expedition against the Parisians, returns to Caesar with all his 

forces. LVII. The revolt of the .Slduans followed by that of almost all Gaul.— LVIII. Preparation for war. 

— LIX. The GaulSjUnder the conduct of Vercingetorix, attack Caesar in the territory of the Lingones.— LXI. 
But are routed with great slaughter.— LXII. Caesar pursues them as far as Alesia.— LXin. Description of 
that town.— LXIV. The Gauls defeated in an engagement between the cavalry.- LXV. Vercingetorix sends 
away all his horse.— LXVI. Caesar surrounds Alesia with lines of circmiivallation and contravallation.— 
LXIX. The Grauls, drawing their forces together, endeavour to raise the siege.— LXXI. Critognatus's speech 
to the garrison of Alesia.— LXXII. The Gauls within and without the town prepare to attack the Romans. 
— LXXni. A battle of the horse, in which the Romans have the advantage.— LXXIV. The Gauls make several 
attempts upon the Roman lines, but are always repulsed with loss.— LXXX T . At length the Romans, sal- 
lying from the intrenchments, defeat the Gauls with great slaughter.— LXXXII. Alesia surrenders.— 
LXXXm. The .ffiduans and Arverni submit. Caesar sends his army into winter quarters. 



168 



CESAR'S CO 



ENTARIES 



HIS WARS IN GAUL 



BOOK VII, 



I. C^SAR having quieted the commotions in 
Gaul, went, as he designed, into Italy, to pre- 
side in the assembly of the states. There he 
was informed of the death of P. Clodius : and 
understanding further, that the senate had 
passed a decree, ordering all the youth of 
Italy to take up arms, he resolved to levy 
troops over the whole province. The report 
of this soon spread into farther Gaul : and the 
Gauls themselves, forward to encourage such 
rumours, added of their own accord what the 
case seemed to require : — " That Caesar was 
detained by a domestic sedition, and could 
not, while these disorders continued, come to 
head the army." Animated by this opportu- 
nity, they, who before lamented their subjec- 
tion to the Romans, now began with more 
freedom and boldness to enter upon measures 
of war. The leading men of the nation, con- 
certing private meetings among themselves, 
in woods and remote places, complained of 
the death of Acco ; remonstrated that such 
might one time or other be their own fate ; 
and after bemoaning the common fortune of 
their country, endeavoured by all manner of 
promises and rewards, to draw over some to 
begin the war, and with the hazard of their 
own lives, pave the way to the liberty of Gaul. 
But chiefly they thought it incumbent upon 
them, before their secret conferences should 
be discovered, to cut off Caesar's return to the 
army. This appeared abundantly easy ; be- 
cause neither would the legions, in the absence 
of their general, dare to quit their winter 
quarters : nor was it possible for the general 
to join the legions, without a body of troops 



to guard him. In fine, they concluded it was 
better to die bravely in the field, than not re- 
cover their former glory in war, and the lib- 
erty they had received from their ancestors. 

II. Such were the debates in the private 
councils of the Gauls : when the Carnutes, 
declaring their readiness to submit to any dan- 
ger for the common safety, otTered to be the 
first in taking up arms against the Romans. 
And because the present giving of hostages 
might endanger a too early discovery of their 
designs, they proposed, that the other states 
should bind themselves by a solemn oath, in 
presence of the military ensigns, which is the 
most sacred obligation among the Gauls, not 
to abandon them during the course of the war. 
This offer of the Carnutes was received with 
universal applause, the oath required was 
taken by all present : and the time for action 
being fixed, the assembly separated. 

III. When the appointed day came, the 
Carnutes, headed by Cotuatus and Conetod- 
unus, men of desperate resolution, flew, upon 
a signal given, to Genabum ; massacred the 
Roman citizens settled there on account of 
trade ; among the rest, C. Fusius Cotta, a 
Roman knight of eminence, whom Csesar had 
appointed to superintend the care of provi- 
sions ; and plundered their eflTects. The fame 
of this soon spread into all the provinces of 
Gaul. For when any thing singular and ex- 
traordinary happens, they publish it from place 
to place by outcries, which being successively 
repeated by men stationed on purpose, are car- 
ried with incredible expedition over the whole 
country. And thus it was on the present oc- 

Z 169 



170 



CiESAR'S 



casion. For what had been done at Genabum 
about sun-rise, was known before nine at night 
in the territories of the Averni, a distance of 
one hundred and sixty miles. 

VI. Fired by this example, Vercingetorix, 
the son of Celtillus,of the nation of the Aver- 
ni, a young nobleman of great power and in- 
terest, whose father had presided over Celtic 
Gaul, and for aiming at the sovereignty been 
put to death by his countrymen, calling his 
clients and followers together, easily persuaded 
them to a revolt. His design being discovered, 
the people immediately flew to arms ; and 
Gobanitio his uncle, with the other principal 
men of the state, dreading the consequences 
of so rash an enterprise, united all their au- 
thority against him, and expelled him the city 
Gergovia. Yet still he adhered to his former 
resolution, and assembling all the outlaws and 
fugitives he could find, engaged them in his 
service. Having by this means got together 
a body of troops, he brought all to whom he 
applied himself to fall in with his views ; 
pressed them to take up arms for the common 
liberty ; and finding his forces greatly in- 
creased, quickly drove those out of the ter- 
ritories of Auvergne, who had so lately ex- 
pelled him the city Gergovia. Upon this he 
was saluted king by his followers : and des- 
patching ambassadors into all parts, exhorted 
them to continue firm to the confederacy. The 
Senones, Parisians, Pictones, Cadurci, Tur- 
ones, Aulerci, Lemovices, Andes, and all the 
other nations bordering upon the ocean, readily 
came into the aUiance, and with unanimous 
consent declared him generalissimo of the 
league. Armed with this authority, he de- 
manded hostages of the several states ; ordered 
them to furnish a certain number of men im- 
mediately ; appointed what quantity of arms 
each was to prepare, with the time by which 
they must be in readiness ; and, above all, 
applied himself to have on foot a numerous 
cavalry. To the most extreme diligence, he 
joined an extreme rigour of command ; and by 
the severity of his punishments, obliged the 
irresolute to declare themselves : for in great 
faults the criminals, after having been tortured, 
were burned alive ; and for lighter offences, or- 
dering the ears of the guilty to be cut off, or 
one of their eyes put out, he sent them, thus 
mutilated, home, to serve as an example to the 
rest, and by the rigour of their sufferings to 
keep others in awe. 



V. Having, hy the terror of these punish, 
ments, speedily assembled an army, he sent Lu- 
terius of Quercy, a bold and enterprising man, 
with part of the forces, against the Eutheni ; 
and marched himself into the territories of the 
Biturigians. The Biturigians, upon his arri- 
val, despatched ambassadors to the ^duans, 
under whose protection they were, to demand 
succours against the enemy. The ySduans, by 
advice of the lieutenants Caesar had left with 
the army, ordered a supply of horse and foot to 
the assistance of the Biturigians. This body of 
troops, advancing to the banks of the Loire, 
which divides the Biturigians from the ^du- 
ans, halted there a few days ; and not daring to 
pass that river, returned again to their own 
country. The reason of this conduct, according 
to the report made to our lieutenants, was an 
apprehension of treachery from the Biturigians : 
for that people, as they pretended, had formed 
the design of surrounding them beyond the 
Loire, on one side with their own troops, on the 
other with those of Auvergne. Whether this 
was the real cause of their return, or whether 
they acted perfidiously in the affair, is what we 
have not been able to learn with certainty, and 
therefore cannot venture to affirm. The Bitu- 
rigians, on their departure, immediately joined 
the forces of the Averni. 

VL These things being reported to Caesar, 
in Italy ; as the troubles in Eome were in a 
great measure quieted by the care and vigi- 
lance of Pompey, he set out immediately for 
Transalpine Gaul. Upon his arrival there, 
he found it extremely difficult to resolve after 
what manner to rejoin the army. For should 
he order the legions to repair to the province, 
he foresaw they would be attacked on their 
march in his absence : and should he himself 
proceed to the quarters of the legions, he was 
not without apprehensions of danger, even 
from those states that seemingly continued 
faithful to the Romans. 

VII. In the meantime, Luterius of Quercy, 
who had been sent into the territories of the 
Rutheni, brought over that state to the alli- 
ance of the Averni ; advancing thence among 
the Nitobrigians and Gabali, he received host- 
ages from both nations, and having got to- 
gether a numerous body of troops, drew to- 
wards Narbonne, to attack the Roman pro- 
vince on that side. Caesar being informed of 
his design, thought it first and principally in- 
cumbent upon him, to provide for the security 



COMMENTARIES. 



171 



of the province. With this view he flev? to 
Narbonne ; confirmed the wavering and timo- 
rous ; placed garrisons in the towns of the 
Rutheni subject to the Romans ; also in those 
of the Volscians, Tolosatians, and other states 
bordering upon the enemy : and having thus 
taken effectual measures against Luterius, 
ordered part of the provincial forces, with the 
recruits he had brought from Italy, to rendez- 
vous upon the frontiers of the Helvians, whose 
territories adjoin to those of the Averni. 

VIII. These dispositions being made, and 
Luterius checked and forced to retire, because 
he did not think it advisable to venture among 
the Roman garrisons, Csesar advanced into 
the country of the Helvians. Although the 
mountains of the Sevennes, which separate the 
Helvians from Auvergne, by the great depth 
of the snow in that extreme rigorous season, 
threatened to obstruct his march ; yet having 
cleared away the snow, which lay to the depth 
of six feet, and, with infinite labour to the 
soldiers, opened a passage over the mountains, 
he at length reached the confines of the Averni. 
As they were altogether unprepared, regard- 
ing the Sevennes as an impenetrable barrier, 
impassable at that season even to single men, 
he ordered the cavalry to spread themselves 
on all sides, and strike as universal a terror 
into the enemy as possible. Fame and mes- 
sengers from the state soon informed Vercin- 
getorix of the disaster befallen his country. 
All the Averni gathered round him in a body, 
and with looks full of dismay, conjured him 
to regard their fortunes, and not abandon them 
to the ravages of the Roman army ; more es- 
pecially, as he now saw the whole war pointed 
against them. Vercingetorix, moved by their 
entreaties, put his army upon the march, and 
quitting the territories of the Biturigians, 
drew towards Auvergne. 

IX. This Caesar had foreseen ; and after a 
stay of two days in those parts, set out under 
pretence of fetching a reinforcement. He 
left young Brutus to command in his absence ; 
charged him to disperse the cavalry as wide 
as he could ; and promised to return, if possi- 
ble, within three days. Then deceiving the 
Romans themselves, that he might the better 
impose upon the Gauls, he posted by great 
journeys to Vienne. There he found the new 
levied cavalry whom he had sent thither some 
time before ; and travelling day and night 
without intermission, through the country of 



the ^duans, to prevent, by his expedition, 
any designs they might form agaii..^!; him, he at 
length reached the confines of the Lingones, 
where two of his legions wintered. Thence 
sending immediately to the rest, he drew them 
altogether into a body, before the Averni could 
be apprized of his arrival. 

X. Vercingetorix, upon notice of this, led 
back his army into the territories of the Bituri- 
gians ; and marching thence, resolved to invest 
Gergovia, a town belonging to the Boii, where 
they had been settled by Ctesar after the de- 
feat of the Helvetians, and made subject to the 
^duan state. This step greatly perplexed 
the Roman general: if he continued encamped 
with his legion in one place during the rest 
of the winter, and abandoned the subjects of 
the ^duans to the attempts of the enemy, he 
had reason to apprehend that the Gauls, seeing 
him afl'ord no protection to his friends, would 
universally give in to a revolt ; if, on the con- 
trary, he took the field early, he risked the 
want of provision and forage, by the great 
difficulty of procuring convoys. Resolving 
however, at all hazards, not to submit to an 
affront, that must for ever alienate the hearts 
of his allies, he pressingly enjoined the ^Eduans 
to be very careful in supplying him with pro- 
visions : and despatching messengers to the 
Boii, to inform them of his approach, exhorted 
them to continue firm to their duty, and sus- 
tain with courage the assaults of the enemy. 
Meanwhile leaving two legions and the bag- 
gage of the whole army at Agendicum, he set 
out upon his march to their relief. 

XI. Arriving the next day before Vellauno- 
dunum, a city of the Senones, that he might 
leave no enemy behind him capable of obstruct- 
ing his convoys, he resolved to besiege it, and 
in two days completed his circumvallation. On 
the third, deputies came from the town to treat 
about a surrender ; when, ordering them to de- 
liver up their arms, horses, and six hundred 
hostages, he left C. Trebonius, one of his 
lieutenants, to cause the articles to be put in 
execution ; and continuing his march with 
all diligence, advanced towards Genabum. 
The Carnutes, to whom this city belonged, 
were drawing troops together for its defence ; 
imagining that the siege of Vellaunodunum, 
of which they had just then received intelli- 
gence, would be a work of some time. Csesar 
reached the place in two days, encamped before 
it, and finding it began to be late, deferred the 



172 



CtESAR'S 



assault till next morning. Meanwhile he 
gave the necessary orders to his men ; and 
because the town had a bridge over the Loire, 
by which the inhabitants might endeavour to 
escape in the night, he obliged two legions to 
continue under arms. A little before mid- 
night, the Genabians, as he had foreseen, stole 
silently out of the city, and began to pass the 
river. Notice being given of this by his 
spies, he set fire to the gates, introduced the 
legions whom he had kept in readiness for 
that purpose, and took possession of the place. 
Very few of the enemy escaped on this occa- 
sion ; because the narrowness of the bridge 
and passages obstructed the flight of the mul- 
titude. Caesar ordered the town to be plun- 
dered and burnt, distributing the spoil among 
the soldiers : and crossing the Loire with his 
whole army, advanced into the territories of 
the Biturigians. 

XIL Vercingetorix, upon notice of his ap- 
proach, quitted the siege of Gergovia, and 
marched directly to meet him. Cssar, mean- 
while, had sat down before Noviodunum, a 
city of the Biturigians, that lay upon his route. 
The inhabitants sending deputies to the camp, 
to implore forgiveness and safety, that he might 
the sooner accomplish his designs, in which 
expedition had hitherto availed him so much, 
he ordered them to deliver up their arms, 
horses, and a certain number of hostages. 
Part of the hostages had been already sent ; 
the other articles of the treaty were upon the 
point of execution ; and even some centurions 
and soldiers had entered the place, to search 
for arms and horses, when the enemy's cavalry, 
who were a little advanced before the rest of 
the army, appeared at a distance. Immedi- 
ately the besieged, upon this prospect of relief 
setting up a shout, flew to arms, shut the 
gates, and manned the walls. The centurions 
in the town, judging from the noise among the 
Gauls, that they had some new project in view, 
posted themselves, with their swords drawn, 
at the gates ; and getting all their men to- 
gether, retreated without loss to the camp. 
Csesar ordering the cavalry to advance, fell 
upon the enemy's horse ; and finding his troops 
hard pressed, sustained them with some squad- 
rons of Germans, whom, to the number of 
about four hundred, he had all along retained 
in his service. The Gauls, unable to stand 
their charge, at length betook themselves to 
flight, and were driven, with great slaughter, 



to the main body of their army. Upon this 
the people of Noviodunum, terrified anew by 
the defeat of their friends, seized all who had 
been instrumental in breaking the capitulation, 
sent them prisoners to Csesar's camp, and 
delivered up the town. These affairs des- 
patched, Csesar directed his march towards 
Avaricum. As this was the strongest and 
most considerable city of the Biturigians, and 
situate in the finest part of the country, he 
easily persuaded himself, that by the reduction 
of it, he should bring the whole nation under 
subjection. 

^^XlIL Vercingetorix, after so many suc- 
cessive losses, at Vellaunodunum, Genabum, 
Noviodunum, calling a general council of his 
followers, represented : " That it was neces- 
sary to resolve upon a very different plan of 
war, from that which hitherto had been pur- 
sued ; and above all things make it their en- 
deavour to intercept the Roman convoys and 
foragers : that this was both a sure and prac- 
ticable scheme, as they themselves abounded 
in horse, and the season of the year greatly 
favoured the design : that the ground as yet 
affording no produce, the enemy must una- 
voidably disperse themselves in the villages 
for subsistence, and give them daily opportu- 
nities of cutting them off by means of their 
cavalry. That where life and liberty were at 
stake, property and private possession ought 
to be neglected : that therefore the best resolu- 
tion they could take was, to set all their houses 
and villages on fire, from the territories of the 
Boii, to wherever the Eomans might extend 
their quarters for the sake of forage : that they 
themselves had no reason to apprehend scar- 
city, as they would be plentifully supplied by 
those states, whose territories should become 
the seat of the war ; whereas the enemy must 
be either reduced to the necessity of starving, 
or making distant and dangerous excursions 
from their camp ; that it equally answered the 
purpose of the Gauls, to cut the Roman army 
to pieces, or seize upon their baggage and 
convoys; because, without these last, it would 
be impossible for them to carry on the war : 
that they ought to set fire even to the towns 
themselves, which were not strong enough by 
art or nature, to be perfectly secure against 
all danger ; as by this mearis they would nei- 
ther become places of retreat to their own 
men, to screen them from military service ; 
nor contribute to the support of the Romans 



COMMENTARIES. 



173 



by the supplies and plunder they might fur- 
nish. In fine, that though these things were 
indeed grievous and terrible, they ought yet 
to esteem it still more terrible and grievous, 
to see their wives and children dragged into 
captivity, and themselves exposed to slaugh- 
ter, which was the unavoidable lot of the van- 
quished." 

XIV. This proposal being approved by all, 
upwards of twenty cities of the Biturigians 
were burnt in one day. The like was done 
in other states. Nothing but conflagrations 
were to be seen over the whole country. And 
though the natives bore this desolation with 
extreme regret, they nevertheless consoled 
themselves with the hope, that an approaching 
and certain victory would soon enable them 
to recover their losses. A debate arising in 
council about Avaricum, whether it would be 
proper to defend or set it on fire, the Bituri- 
gians, falling prostrate at the feet of the rest 
of the Gauls, implored : " That they might 
not be obliged to burn, with their own hands, 
one of the finest cities of all Gaul, which was 
both the ornament and security of their state ; 
more especially as the town itself, almost 
wholly surrounded by a river and morass, and 
affording but one very narrow approach, was, 
from the nature of its situation, capable of an 
easy defence." Their request prevailed ; 
Vercingetorix, though he at first opposed, 
afterwards coming into the design ; partly 
moved by the entreaties of the Biturigians, 
partly by the compassion of the multitude. A 
chosen garrison was immediately put into the 
place. 

XV. Vercingetorix followed Csesar by easy 
marches, and chose for his camp a place sur- 
rounded with woods and marshes, about fifteen 
miles distant from Avaricum. There he had 
hourly intelligence by his scouts, of all that 
passed before the town ; and sent his orders 
from time to time to the garrison. Meanwhile 
he strictly watched our convoys and foragers ; 
set upon our dispersed parties, who were 
obliged to fetch provisions from a great dis- 
tance ; and, in spite of all endeavours to pre- 
vent it, by choosing such times and routes, as 
were most likely to deceive his vigilance, very 
much incommoded them by his attacks. 

XVI. Caesar encamping on that side of 
the town, where the intermission of the river 
and morass formed, as we have said, a narrow 
approach ; began to raise a mount, bring for- 

61 



ward his battering engines, and prepare two 
towers of assault ; without troubling himself 
about lines of circumvallation, which the na- 
ture of the ground rendered impossible. Mean- 
while he was continually soliciting the ^du- 
ans and Boii for corn : but received no great 
supplies from either ; partly occasioned by the 
negligence of the ^duans, who were not 
hearty in the affair ; partly by the want of 
ability in the Boii, who possessing only a small 
and inconsiderable territory, soon consumed 
all the produce of their own lands. But though 
the army laboured under the greatest scarcity 
of corn, through the inability of the Boii, the 
want of inclination in the ^duans, and the 
universal devastation of the country ; though 
they were even for many days altogether with- 
out bread, and had nothing to appease their 
extreme hunger, but the cattle brought from 
distant villages ; yet not an expression was 
heard over the whole camp, unworthy the ma- 
jesty of the Roman name, or the glory they 
had acquired by former victories. Nay, when 
Cffisar visited the different quarters of the le- 
gions in person, and offered to raise the siege, 
if they found the famine insupportable, they 
all with one voice requested him not to do it, 
adding : " That during the many years they 
had served under him, they never yet had met 
with any check or undertaken aught in which 
they had not succeeded : that they could not 
but look upon it as inglorious, to relinquish a 
siege they had once begun ; and had rather 
undergo the greatest hardships, than not re- 
venge the blood of the Roman citizens, perfi- 
diously massacred by the Gauls, at Genabum." 
The same they said to the centurions and 
military tribunes, entreating them to report 
their sentiments to Caesar. 

XVII. And now the towers began to ap- 
proach the wall ; when Caesar was informed 
by some prisoners, that Vercingetorix having 
consumed all the forage round him, had re- 
moved his camp nearer to Avaricum, and was 
gone himself at the head of the cavalry, and 
the light-armed troops accustomed to fight in 
their intervals, to form an ambuscade for the 
Romans in a place where it was supposed 
they would come next day to forage. Upon 
this intelligence, setting out about mid- 
night in great silence, he arrived next morn- 
ing at the enemy's camp. But they, having 
had timely notice of his approach by their 
scouts, instantly conveyed their baggage and 



174 



CiESAR'S 



carriages into a thick wood, and drew up in 
order of battle upon an open hill. Caesar then 
ordered all the baggage to be brought toge- 
ther into one place, and the soldiers to prepare 
for an engagement. 

XVIII. The hill itself where the enemy 
stood rising all the way with an easy ascent, 
was almost wholly surrounded by a morass, 
difficult and dangerous to be passed though not 
above fifty feet over. Here the Gauls, confiding 
in the strength of their post, and having broke 
down all the bridges over the morass, appeared 
with an air of resolution. They had formed 
themselves into different bodies, according to 
their several states ; and planting select detach- 
ments at all the avenues and fords, waited with 
determined courage, that if the Romans should 
attempt to force their way through, they might 
fall upon them from the higher ground, while 
entangled in the mud. To attend only to the 
nearness of the two armies, they seemed as if 
ready to fight us on even terms ; but, when the 
advantage of their situation was considered, 
all this ostentation of bravery was easily dis- 
cerned to be mere show and pretence. Never- 
theless, the Romans, fall of indignation, that 
the enemy should dare to face them with so 
small a space between, loudly demanded to be 
led to battle. Caesar checked their ardour for 
the present, and endeavoured to make them 
sensible, that in attacking an army so strongly 
posted, the victory must cost extremely dear, 
and be attended with the loss of many brave 
men. To this he told them he was the more 
averse, because, finding them prepared to face 
every kind of danger for his glory, he thought 
he could not be too tender of the lives of those 
who merited so highly at his hands. Having 
by this speech consoled the soldiers, he led 
them back the same day to their camp, and 
applied himself wholly to the carrying on of 
the siege. 

XIX. Vercingetorix, upon his return to the 
camp, was accused by the army of treason. 
The removal of his quarters nearer to those of 
the enemy ; his departure at the head of all 
the cavalry ; his leaving so many troops with- 
out a commander in chief: and the opportune 
and speedy arrival of the Romans during his 
absence : all these, they said, could not easily 
happen by chance, or without design ; and 
give great reason to believe, that he had rather 
owe the sovereignty of Gaul to Caesar's 
grant, than to the favour and free choice of 



his countrymen. To this charge he replied ; 
" That the removal of his camp was occasioned 
by the want of forage, and done at their own 
express desire : that he had lodged himself 
nearer to the Romans, on account of the ad- 
vantage of the ground, which secured him 
against all attacks ; that cavalry were by no 
means wanted in a morass, but might have 
been extremely serviceable in the place to 
which he had carried them ; that he purposely 
forebore naming a commander in chief at his 
departure, lest the impatience of the multitude 
should have forced him upon a battle ; to 
which he perceived they were all strongly in- 
clined, through a certain weakness and effemi- 
nacy of mind, that rendered them incapable of 
long fatigue ; that whether accident or intelli- 
gence brought the Romans to their camp, they 
ought to thank, in the one case, fortune, in the 
other, the informer, for giving them an oppor- 
tunity of discovering from the higher ground 
the inconsiderable number, and despising the 
feeble efforts of the enemy ; who, not daring to 
hazard an engagement, ignominiously retreated 
to their camp ; that for his part, he scorned 
treacherously to hold an authority of Caesar, 
which he hoped soon to merit by a victory, al- 
ready in a manner assured, both to himself and 
the rest of the Gauls : that he was willing even 
to resign the command, if they thought the 
honour done to him by that distinction too 
great for the advantages procured by his con- 
duct. And," added he, " to convince you of 
the ti'uth and sincerity of my words, hear the 
Roman soldiers themselves." He then produced 
some slaves, whom he had made prisoners a 
few days before in foraging, and by severity and 
hard usage brought to his purpose. These, ac- 
cording to the lesson taught them beforehand, 
declared : " That they were legionary soldiers : 
that urged by hunger, they had privately sto- 
len out of the camp, to search for corn and 
cattle in the fields : that the whole army la- 
boured under the like scarcity, and was reduced 
to so weak a condition, as no longer to be 
capable of supporting fatigue : that the general 
had therefore resolved, if the town held out 
three days longer, to draw off his men from 
the siege." " Such (said Vercingetorix) are the 
services you receive from the man whom you 
have not scrupled to charge with treason. To 
him it is owing, that without drawing a sword, 
you see a powerful and victorious army almost 
wholly destroyed by famine ; and effectual 



COMMENTARIES. 



175 



care taken, that, when necessity compels them 
to seek refuge in a shameful flight, no state 
shall receive them into its territories." 

XX. The whole multitude set up a shout ; 
and striking, as their manner was, their lances 
against their swords, to denote their approba- 
tion of the speaker, declared Vcrcingetorix a 
consummate general, whose fidelity ought not 
to be questioned, and whose conduct deserved 
the highest praises. They decreed that ten 
thousand men, chosen out of all the troops, 
should be sent to reinforce the garrison of 
Avaricum ; it seeming too hazardous to rely 
upon the Biturigians alone for the defence of 
a place, whose preservation, they imagined, 
would necessarily give them the superiority in 
the war. 

XXI. And indeed, though the siege was 
carried on by our men with incredible bravery, 
yet were all their efforts in a great measure 
rendered ineffectual, by the address and con- 
trivances of the Gauls. For they are a people 
of singular ingenuity, extremely quick of ap- 
prehension, and very happy in imitating what 
they see practised. They not only turned 
aside our hooks with ropes, and after having 
seized them, drew them into the town with 
engines ; but likewise set themselves to under- 
mine the mount : in which they the more suc- 
ceeded, because the country abounding with 
iron mines, they are perfectly skilled in that 
whole art. At the same time they raised 
towers on all parts of the wall, covered them 
carefully with raw hides ; and continuing their 
sallies day and night, either set fire to the 
mount, or fell upon the workmen. In pro- 
portion as our towers increased in height, by 
the continual addition to the mount, in like 
manner did they advance their towers upon 
their walls, by raising one story perpetually 
over another; and. counterworking our mines 
•with the utmost diligence, they either filled 
them up with great stones, or poured melted 
pitch into them, or repulsed the miners with 
long stakes, burnt and sharpened at the 
end ; all which very much retarded the ap- 
proaches, and kept us at a distance from the 
place. 

XXII. The fortified towns among the 
Gauls have their walls mostly built in the 
following manner: — Long massy beams of 
wood are placed upon the ground, at the 
equal distance of two feet one from another, 
and so as to constitute by their length the 



thickness of the wall. These being again 
crossed over by others, which serve to bind 
them together, have their intervals on the 
inside filled up with earth, and on the outside 
with large stones. The first course thus com- 
pleted and firmly joined, a second is laid over 
it ; which allowing the same openings between 
the beams, rests them not immediately upon 
those of the order below, but dispose them 
artfully above their intervals, and connects 
them, as before, with interjacent earth and 
stones. In this manner the work is carried 
on to a proper height, and pleases the eye by 
its uniform variety, the alternate courses of 
stones and beams running in even lines, ac- 
cording to their several orders. Nor is it less 
adapted to security and defence. For the 
stones are proof against fire, and the whole 
mass is impenetrable to the ram ; because 
being strongly bound together by continual 
beams, to a depth of forty feet, it can neither 
be disjointed nor thrown down. 

XXIII. Such were the obstacles we met 
with in the siege. But the soldiers, though 
obliged to struggle during the whole time, 
with cold, dirt, and perpetual rains ; yet by 
dint of labour, overcame all difficutties, and 
at the end of twenty -five days, had raised a 
mount three hundred and thirty feet broad, 
and eighty feet high. When it was brought 
almost close to the walls, Cajsar, according to 
custom, attending the works, and encouraging 
the soldiers to labour without intermission, a 
little before midnight it was observed to 
smoke, the enemy having undermined and 
fired it. At the same time they raised a 
mighty shout, and sallying vigorously by two 
several gates, attacked the works on both 
sides. Some threw lighted torches and dry 
wood from the walls upon the mount, others 
pitch and all sorts of combustibles; so that it 
was hard to determine on which side to make 
head against the enemy, or where first to apply 
redress. But as Cassar kept always two le- 
gions upon guard in the trenches, besides 
great numbers employed in the works, who 
relieved one another by turns; his troops were 
soon in a condition, some to oppose those that 
sallied from the town, others to draw off the 
towers, and make openings in the mount ; 
whilst the whole multitude ran to extinguish 
the flames. 

XXIV. The fight continued with great 
obstinacy during the remaining part of the 



176 



CiESAR'S 



night ; the enemy still entertained hopes of 
victory ; and persisted with the more firmness, 
as they saw the mantles that covered the 
towers burnt down, and the Romans unable 
to rescue them for want of shelter. At the 
same time fresh troops were continually sent 
to supply the place of those that were fatigued ; 
the besieged believing, that the safety of 
Gaul entirely depended upon the issue of 
that critical moment. And here I cannot 
forbear mentioning a remarkable instance of 
intrepidity, to which I was myself a witness 
on this occasion, A certain Gaul, posted be- 
fore the gate of the city, threw into the fire 
balls of pitch and tallow, to feed it. This man 
being exposed to the discharge of a Roman 
battery, was struck through the side with a 
dart, and expired. Another striding over his 
body, immediately took his place. He also 
was killed in the same manner, A third 
succeeded : to the third a fourth, nor was this 
dangerous post left vacant till the fire of 
the mount being extinguished, and the enemy 
repulsed on all sides, an end was put to the 
conflict, 

XXX, The Gauls having tried all methods 
of defence, and finding that none of thera 
succeeded, consulted next day about leaving 
the town, in concert with, and even by the 
order of Vercingetorix. This they hoped 
easily to effect in the night, as that general's 
camp was not far off, and the morass between 
them and the Romans would serve to cover 
their retreat. Night came, and the besieged 
were preparing to put their design in execu- 
tion ; when suddenly the women running out 
into the street, and casting themselves at 
their husbands' feet, conjured them with many 
tears, not to abandon to the fury of an en- 
raged enemy, them and their common chil- 
dren, whom nature and weakness rendered in- 
capable of flight. But finding their entreaties 
ineffectual, (for in extreme danger fear often 
excludes compassion,) they began to set up 
a loud cry, and inform the Romans of the 
intended flight. This alarmed the garrison, 
who, apprehending the passages would be 
seized by our horse, desisted from their resolu- 
tion, 

XXVI, Next day Caesar brought forward 
the tower, and gave the necessary directions 
about the works. A heavy rain chancing 
just then to fall, he thought it a favourable 
opportunity for effecting his design ; as he 



observed the wall to be less strictly guarded. 
Wherefore ordering the soldiers to abate a 
little of their vigour, and having instructed 
them in what manner to proceed, he exhorted 
the legions, who advanced under cover of the 
machines, to seize at last the fruits of a victory 
acquired by so many toils. Then promising 
rewards to those who should first scale the 
town, he gave the signal of attack. The 
Romans rushed suddenly upon the enemy 
from all parts, and in a moment possessed 
themselves of the walls. 

XXVII. The Gauls terrified at this new 
manner of assault, and driven from their 
towers and battlements, drew up triangle- 
wise in the squares and open places, that on 
whatever side our men should come to attack 
them, they might face in order of battle. But, 
observing that we still kept upon the walls, 
and were endeavouring to get possession of 
their whole circuit, they began to fear they 
should have no outlet to escape by ; and 
throwing down their arms, ran tumultuously 
to the farthest part of the town. There 
many fell within the city, the narrowness of 
the gates obstructing their flight; others were 
slain by the cavalry without the walls , nor 
did any one for the present think of plunder. 
The Romans, eager to revenge the massacre 
at Genabum, and exasperated by the obstinate 
defence of the place, spared neither old men, 
women, nor children ; insomuch that of all 
that multitude, amounting to about forty 
thousand, scarce eight hundred, who had quit- 
ted the town on the first alarm, escaped safe 
to Vercingetorix's camp. They arrived there 
late in the night, and were received in great 
silence ; for Vercingetorix, fearing lest their 
entrance in a body, and the compassion it 
would naturally raise among the troops, might 
occasion some tumult in the camp, had sent 
out his friends, and the principal noblemen of 
each province, to meet them by the way, and 
conduct them separately to the quarters of 
their several states, 

XXVIII. Next day having called a council, 
he consoled and exhorted the troops, not to 
be too much disheartened, or cast down by 
their late misfortune : " That the Romans had 
not overcome by bravery, or in the field ; but 
by their address and skill in sieges, with which 
part of war the Gauls were less acquainted : 
that it was deceiving themselves to hope for 
success in every measure they might think to 



COMMENTARIES. 



177 



pursue : that himself, as they all knew, had 
never advised the defence of Avaricum, and 
could not but impute the present disaster to 
the imprudence of the Biturigians, and the 
too easy compliance of the rest : that he hoped, 
however, soon to compensate it by superior 
advantages, as he was using his utmost en- 
deavours to bring over the other stales which 
had hitherto refused their concurrence, and 
to join one general confederacy of all Gaul, 
against whose united strength, not the whole 
earth would be able to prevail : that he had 
even in a great measure effected his design, 
and in the meantime only required of them, 
for the sake of the common safety, that they 
would set about fortifying their camp, the 
better to secure them from the sudden attacks 
of the enemy." This speech was not unplcas- 
ing to the Gauls : and the rather, as not- 
withstanding so great a blow, Vercingetorix 
seemed to have lost nothing of his courage : 
neither withdrawing from public view, nor 
shunning the sight of the multitude. They 
even began to entertain a higher opinion of 
his prudence and foresight, as from the first he 
had advised the burning of Avaricum, and at 
last sent orders to abandon it. And thus, bad 
success, which usually sinks the reputation of 
a commander served only to augment his 
credit, and give him greater authority among 
the troops. At the same time they were full 
of hopes, from the assurances he had given 
them, of seeing the other states accede to the 
alliance. And now, for the first time, the 
Gauls set about fortifying their camp ; being 
so humbled by their late misfortune, that 
though naturally impatient of fatigue, they 
resolved to refuse no labour imposed upon 
them by their general. 

XXIX. Nor was Vercingetorix less active 
on his side to bring over the other provinces 
of Gaul to the confederacy, endeavouring to 
gain the leading men in each by presents 
and promises. For this purpose he made 
choice of fit agents, who by their address, or 
particular ties of friendship, were most likely 
to influence those to whom they were sent. 
He provided arms and clothing for the troops 
that had escaped from Avaricum : and to re- 
pair the loss sustained by the taking of that 
place, gave orders to the several states, to 
furnish a certain number of men, and send them 
to the camp by a day prefixed. At the same 
time he commanded all the archers, of which 
16* 



there were great numbers in Gaul, to be 
sought out and brought to the army. By these 
measures he soon replaced the men whom he 
lost at the siege of Avaricum. Meanwhile 
Theutomatus, the son of Ollovico, and king of 
the Nitobrigians, whose father had been styled 
friend and ally by the senate of Rome, came 
and joined him with a great body of horse, 
which he had raised in his own territories, and 
in the province of Aquitain. 

XXX. Caesar finding great plenty of corn 
and other provisions at Avaricum, stayed there 
several days to refresh his men, after the fa- 
tigue and scarcity they had so lately under- 
gone. Winter was now drawing towards a 
period; and, as the season itself invited him 
to take the field, he resolved to march against 
the enemy, either to draw them out of the 
woods and marshes, or besiege them in their 
fastnesses. While he was full of these 
thoughts, deputies arrived from the aEduans, 
to beg his interposition and authority, for set- 
tling the differences of their state. " Every 
thing there," they told him, " thieatened an 
intestine war. For whereas it had all along 
been the custom to be governed by a single 
magistrate, who possessed the supreme power 
for the space of one year ; they had now two 
disputing for that title, each pretending his 
election was according to law : that the one 
was Convictolitanis, an illustrious and popular 
young nobleman ; the other Cotus, of an an- 
cient family, great authority, and powerful re- 
lations, whose brother Videliacus had exer- 
cised the same office the year before : that the 
whole state was in arms, the senate divided, 
and each party backed by their clients among 
the people ; nor had they any other hopes 
of escaping a civil war, but in his care and 
timely endeavours to put an end to the con- 
troversy." 

XXXr. Although Cajsar was sensible it 
would greatly prejudice his affairs, to quit the 
pursuit of the war, and the enemy ; yet re- 
flecting on the mischiefs that often arise from 
divisions, and desirous if possible to prevent 
so powerful a state, in strict amity with tho 
people of Rome, and which he had always in a 
particular manner cherished and befriended, 
from having recourse to the method of vio- 
lence and arms, which might drive the party 
that least confided in his friendship, to seek 
the assistance of Vercingetorix ; he resolved 
to make it his first care, to put a stop to the 
2 A 



178 



C iE S A R ' S 



progress of these disorders. And because, by 
the constitution of the ^Eduans, it was not 
lawful for the supreme magistrate to pass be- 
yond the limits of the state ; that he might 
not seem to detract from their privileges, he 
resolved to go in person thither, and summoned 
the senate and two candidates to meet him at 
Decise. The assembly was very numerous ; 
when finding upon inquiry, that Cotus had 
been declared chief magistrate by his own 
brother, in presence of only a few electors 
privately called together, without regard to 
time or place, and even contrary to the express 
laws of the state, which forbid two of the same 
family, while yet both alive, either to hold the 
supreme dignity, or feo much as sit together in 
the senate ; he obliged him to resign in fa- 
vour of Convictolitanis, who, upon the expira- 
tion of the office of the preceding magistrate, 
had been elected, in all the forms, by the 
priests. 

XXXII. This sentence being passed ; and 
having exhorted the ^duans to lay aside 
their quarrels and divisions, and apply them- 
selves solely to the business of the present 
war ; to expect with confidence the full re- 
compense of their services, as soon as the re- 
duction of Gaul was completed ; and to send 
him immediately all their cavalry, with ten 
thousand foot, to form a chain of posts for the 
security of his convoys ; he divided his army 
into two parts. Four legions, under the con- 
duct of Labienus, were sent against the Se- 
nones and Parisians, Six, headed by himself 
in person, marched along the banks of the 
Allier, towards the territories of the Averni, 
with design to invest Gergovia. Part of the 
cavalry followed the route of Labienus ; part 
remained with Csesar. Vercingetorix having 
notice of this,, broke down all the bridges upon 
the AUier, and began his march on the other 
side of the river. 

XXXIII. As both armies were continually 
in view, encamped almost over against each 
other, and the enemy's scouts so stationed, 
that it was impossible for the Romans to make 
a bridge for carrying over their forces ; Caesar 
began to be uneasy lest he should be hin- 
dered the greatest part of the summer by the 
river ; because the Allier is seldom fordable 
till towards autumn. To prevejit this incon- 
venience, he encamped in a place full of 
woods, over against one of those bridges 
which Vercingetorix had caused to be broken 



down; and remaining there privately next day, 
with a good body of troops, formed by draught- 
ing every fourth cohort, that the number of 
legions might still appear complete ; he sent 
forward the rest of the army with all the bag- 
gage as usual, ordering them to march as far 
as they could. When by the time of the 
day, he judged they might be arrived at the 
place of their encampment, he set about re- 
building the bridge, making use of the old piles, 
whose lower part the enemy had left standing. 
Having soon completed the work, marched 
over the troops he had with him, and chosen a 
proper place for his camp, he recalled the rest 
of the forces. Vercingetorix, upon intelligence 
of this, advanced before by long marches, that 
he might not be obliged to fight against his 
will. 

XXXIV. Caesar, after five days' march, 
came before Gergovia, where he had a slight 
engagement with the enemy's horse ; and, 
having taken a view of the place, which he 
found situated upon a very high mountain, all 
whose approaches were extremely difficult, he 
not only despaired of reducing it by storm, but 
resolved even to forbear investing it until he 
had secured the necessary supplies for his 
army. Vercingetorix meanwhile was encamped 
near the town upon the hill, where he had 
disposed the forces of the several states around 
him, in different divisions, separated from one 
another by moderate intervals. As his army 
possessed all the summits of the mountain, 
whence there was any prospect into the plains 
below, they made a very formidable appear- 
ance. Every morning by day-break, the 
chiefs of each state, who composed his council, 
assembled in his tent, to advise with him, or 
receive his orders : nor did he suffer a single 
day to pass without detaching some cavalry, 
intermixed with archers, to skirmish with the 
Romans, that he might make trial of the spirit 
and courage of his men. There was a rising 
ground, that joined to the foot of the moun- 
tain on which the town stood, excellently well 
fortified by nature, as being very steep on all 
sides, and of extreme difficult access. This 
hill, though of such importance to the enemy, 
that by our getting possession of it, we could 
in a great measure deprive them of water and 
forage, was yet but very indiflferently guarded. 
Cfflsar therefore leaving his camp about mid- 
night, before any assistance could arrive from 
the town, dislodged the enemy, seized the hill 



COMMENTARIES, 



179 



and having placed two legions upon it to de- 
fend it, drew a double ditch, twelve feet deep, 
from the greater to the lesser camp, that the 
soldiers might pass and repass in safety, even 
single and without a guard. 

XXXV. While things were in this posture 
before Gergovia, Convictolitanis the ^duan, 
to whom, as we have related above, Cjesar 
had adjudged the supreme magistracy, being 
strongly sohcited by the Averni, and at length 
gained over by their money, addressed him- 
self to some young nobleman, the chief of 
whom were Litavicus and his brothers, of the 
most distinguished family of the province. 
With these he shared the reward he had re- 
ceived, and exhorted them to consider : " That 
they were subjects of a free state, and born to 
command : that liberty and victory were re- 
tarded by the ^duans alone, whose authority 
restrained the other states, and whose concur- 
rence in the common cause would take from 
the Romans all possibility of supporting them- 
selves in Gaul : that though he was himself 
under some obligation to Caesar, at least so 
far as a just and equitable decision deserved 
that name, he thought he owed still more to 
his country, and could see no reason why the 
^duans should rather have recourse to the 
Roman general, in what regarded their laws 
and customs, than the Romans in the like 
case to the ^duans." The representations 
of the magistrate, and the rewards he bestowed, 
soon prevailed ; they even offered to become 
the chief conductors of the enterprise ; and 
nothing was wanting but to consult of pro- 
per means for accomplishing the design, as it 
was easily foreseen that the state would not be 
induced without great difficulty to engage in 
so dangerous a war. At last it was agreed, 
that Litavicus should have the command of 
the ten thousand foot appointed to join Ceesar; 
that he should begin his march ; that his 
brothers should be sent before to the Roman 
camp ; and that the rest of the project should 
be then executed, according to a plan pre- 
viously concerted among them. 

XXXVI. Litavicus having received the 
command of the army ; when A\e was within 
about thirty miles of Gergovia, suddenly called 
the troops together, and addressing them 
with tears : " Whither, fellow-soldiers," said 
he, " are we going 1 All our cavalry, all our 
nobility are slain. Eporedorix and Virdu- 
marus, men of the first quality in the state, 



being accused by the Romans of treason, are 
put to death without trial. Learn these things 
of those who have escaped this general mas- 
sacre ; for as to me, overwhelmed as I am with 
grief for the loss of my brothers and kinsmen, 
I have neither strength nor voice to utter our 
calamities." He then produced some whom 
he had beforehand instructed for that purpose, 
and who joining in the same story, told the 
multitude, " That the greatest part of the 
^duan cavalry had been put to the sword, 
under pretence of holding intelligence with 
the Averni ; and that themselves had escaped 
only in the crowd, by withdrawing during the 
general slaughter." Upon this the whole 
army called aloud to Litavicus, entreating 
him to provide for their safety. << As if," said 
he, " there was room for counsel ; or any 
choice left, but that of marching directly to 
Gergovia, and joining the Averni. Can we 
doubt, after so black an instance of Roman 
perfidy, but that they are already on their way 
to complete the massacre 1 Let us there- 
fore, if aught of spirit or courage remains in 
our breasts, revenge the death of our country- 
men, so undeservedly slain, and put these in- 
human spoilers to the sword." He then pre- 
sented some Roman citizens, who had taken 
the opportunity of their march, for conducting 
a large convoy of corn and provisions to the 
camp. Instantly the convoy was plundered, 
the Romans themselves put to death with the 
most cruel torments, and messengers des- 
patched through all the territories of the ^du- 
ans, to spread the same forgery of the massacre 
of their cavalry and princes, and thereby rouse, 
them to a like vengeance. 

XXXVII. Eporedorix the ^■Eduan, a young 
nobleman of distinguished birth, and great in- 
terest in the state ; as likewise Virdumarus, 
of equal age and authority, though not so 
well descended ; whom Caesar, upon the re- 
commendation of Diviaticus, had raised from 
a low condition to the highest dignities ; were 
both at this time in the Roman camp, having 
come along with the cavalry, at Caesar's ex- 
press desire. Between these two was a com- 
petition for greatness ; and in the late dispute 
about the magistracy, the one had declared 
warm.ly for Convictolitanis, the other for 
Cotus. Eporedorix getting notice of Lita- 
vicus's design, came about midnight to Caesar's 
tent, discovered the whole plot, and entreated 
him to obviate the mischievous counsels of a 



180 



CiESAR'S 



few young noblemen, and not suffer the state to 
fall off from the alliance of the Romans, 
which he foresaw must happen, should so 
many thousand men once join the enemy. 
For it was by no means probable, that either 
their own relations would neglect their safety, 
or the state itself make light of so great a part 
of its forces. 

XXXVIII. This piece of intelligence gave 
Caesar extreme concern, because he had always 
manifested a particular regard to the JEduans. 
He therefore drew out immediately four legions 
without baggage, together with all the cav- 
alry ; and because the affair seemed to depend 
wholly upon despatch, would not even take 
time to contract his camp, but left C. Fabius, 
his lieutenant, with two legions, to defend it 
against the enemy. Finding that Litavicus's 
brothers, whom he ordered to be seized, had 
some time before gone over to Vercingetorix, 
he began his march, exhorting the soldiers to 
bear the fatigue cheerfully in so pressing a 
conjuncture. They followed with great alac- 
rity, and advancing about five and twenty miles 
from Gergovia, came at last within sight of the 
j3Sduans. Csesar immediately detached the 
cavalry against them, to retard and stop their 
march : but with strict charge to abstain from 
bloodshed. He ordered Eporedorix and Vir- 
dumarus, whom they believed slain, to ride up 
and down among the squadrons, and call to 
their countrymen. As they were soon known, 
and Litavicus's forgery thereby discovered, the 
^duans stretched out their hands, made signs 
of submission, and throwing down their arms, 
began to beg their lives. Litavicus with his 
clients, who, by the customs of the Gauls, can- 
not without infamy abandon their patrons, 
even in the greatest extremities of fortune, es- 
caped safe to Gergovia. 

XXXIX. Csesar having despatched messen- 
gers to the ^duans, to inform them that his 
lenity and regard for their state, had prevailed 
with him to spare troops, whom by the right 
of war he might have put to the sword ; after 
allowing the army three hours' rest during the 
night, marched back to Gergovia. About 
half way he was met by a party of horse, sent 
by Fabius, to give him notice of the danger that 
threatened his camp. They told him, " That 
the enemy had attacked it with all their forces, 
and by sending continual supplies of fresh 
men, were like in the end to overpower the 
Romans, whose fatigue admitted of no relax- 
ation, because the vast extent of ground they 



had to defend, obUged them to be perpetually 
upon the rampart : that the multitude of ar- 
rows and darts discharged by the Gauls, had 
wounded many of the soldiers, notwithstand- 
ing the protection received from the engines, 
which yet had been of good service in beating| 
off the assailants : that Fabius, upon the retreat 
of the enemy, had closed up all the gates of 
the camp but two, carried a breastwork quite 
round the rampart, and made preparation for 
sustaining a like assault the next day." CaBsar 
informed of these things, hastened his march 
with all diligence, and seconded by the usual 
ardour of the troops, arrived in the camp be- 
fore sun-rise. 

XL. While these things passed at Gergovia, 
the JSduans, upon receipt of the first des- 
patches from Litavicus, staid not for confirma- 
tion of the report ; but prompted, partly by 
avarice, partly by revenge, and many by a na- 
tive rashness, to which the Gauls in general are 
extremely addicted, being ready to catch up 
every flying rumour as a certain truth, flew 
immediately to arms, plundered the Roman 
citizens of their effects, slaughtered their per- 
sons, or dragged them into servitude. Convic- 
tolitanis fomented to the utmost this fury, 
which had already taken but too fast hold of 
the multitude ; that by plunging them into some 
desperate act of violence, he might render a re- 
treat the more difficult and shameful. At his 
instigation, they obliged M. Aristius, a military 
tribune, who was upon his way to join the ar- 
my, to quit Cabillonum, promising not to mo- 
lest him in his journey. The same they did 
by several Roman merchants, who stopped there 
on account of traffic ; and attacking them treach- 
erously on the road, stripped them of their 
baggage, invested day and night those that 
made resistance ; and many being killed on 
both sides, drew together a great number of 
men to effect their design. Meanwhile coming 
to understand, that all their troops were in 
Caesar's power : they ran to Aristius, assured 
him that nothing had been done by public au- 
thority, ordered informations to be brought 
against those who had been concerned in pil- 
laging the Romans, confiscated the estates of 
Litavicus and his brothers, and sent ambassa- 
dors to Caesar to excuse what happened. 
All this they did with a view to the recovery 
of their troops : but conscious of guilt ; loth 
to part with the plunder, in which great num- 
bers had shared ; and dreading the punish 
ment so gross an outrage deserved ; they be- 



COMMENTARIES. 



181 



gan privately to concert measures of war, and 
by their ambassadors solicited other states to 
join them. Though Casar was not ignorant 
of these practices, he spoke with the greatest 
mildness to the ^duan deputies, assuring 
them of the continuance of his favour, and 
that he would not consider as the crime of the 
whole nation, what was owing only to the im- 
prudence and levity of the multitude. Appre- 
hending, however, a universal revolt of Gaul, 
and that he might be surrounded by the forces 
of all the states at once, he began to think of 
retiring to Gergovia, and drawing his whole 
army again into a body ; yet in such a manner, 
that a retreat occasioned by the fear of an in- 
surrection, might not carry with it the appear- 
ance of a flight. 

XLI. While he was full of these thoughts, 
an opportunity seemed to offer of acting 
against the enemy with success. For coming 
into the lesser camp, to take a view of the 
works, he observed a hill, that for some days 
before was scarce to be seen for the multitudes 
that covered it, now quite naked and destitute 
of troops. Wondering what might be the 
cause, he inquired of the deserters, who flocked 
daily in great numbers to the Roman camp. 
They all agreed with our scouts, that the back 
of the hill was almost an even ground, but nar- 
row and woody in that part, where the passage 
lay to the other side of the town : that the en- 
emy were mightily afraid of losing this post, 
because the Romans, who had already pos- 
sessed themselves of one hill, by seizing the 
other likewise, would in a manner quite sur- 
round them ; and being masters of all the out- 
lets, might entirely cut off their forage: that 
Vercingetorix had therefore drawn all his forces 
on that side, with design to fortify the passage. 
XLII. Caesar, upon this intelligence, des- 
patched some squadrons of cavalry thither 
about midnight, ordering them to ride up and 
down the place, with as much noise as pos- 
sible. At day-break he drew a great number 
of mules and carriage horses out of the camp, 
sent away their usual harness, and furnishing 
the grooms and wagoners with helmets, that 
they might resemble horsemen, commanded 
them to march quite round the hill. With 
these he joined a few cavalry, who, for the 
greater show, were to expatiate a little more 
freely ; and the whole detachment had orders 
to move towards the same parts, taking a very 
large circuit. All these dispositions were seen 



from the town, which commanded a full view 
of the Roman camp, though the distance was 
too great to distinguish objects with certainty. 
At the same time Caesar, the more effectually 
to deceive the enemy, detached a legion to- 
wards the same eminence, and when it was ad- 
vanced a little way, stationed it at the foot of 
the hill, affecting to conceal it in the woods. 
This increased the jealousy of the Gauls, to 
such a degree, that they immediately carried 
all their forces thither to defend the post. Cae- 
sar seeing their intrenchments abandoned, 
made his soldiers cover the military ensigns and 
standards, and file off in small parties from the 
greater to the lesser camp, that they might not 
be perceived from the town. He then opened 
his design to his lieutenants, whom he had ap- 
pointed to command the several legions, coun- 
selling them above all things to moderate the 
ardour of the soldiers, that the hope of plun- 
der, or desire of fighting, might not carry them 
too far. He represented particularly the dis- 
advantage of the ground, against which there 
was no security but in despatch ; and told 
them, that it was not a regular attack, but a 
sudden onset, to be pursued no farther than 
opportunity served. These precautions taken, 
he gave the signal to engage, and at the same 
time detached the iEduans by another ascent, 
to charge the enemy on the right. 

XLin. The wall of the town, had no breaks 
or hollows intervened, was about twelve hun- [/ 
dred paces distant from the plain below, meas- 
uring in a direct line from the foot of the 
mountain. The circuit the troops were 
obliged to take, to moderate the steepness of 
the ascent, added still to this space upon the 
march. Half way up the hill, as near as the 
nature of the ground would allow, the Gauls 
had run a wall of large stones six feet high, 
the better to defend themselves against our 
attacks. All between this and the plain was 
left quite void of troops by the enemy ; but 
the upper part of the hill, to the very walls of 
the town, was crowded with the camps of their , 
several states. The signal being given, the 
Romans immediately mounted the hill, scaled 
the outward wall, and possessed themselves of 
three of the enemy's camps. Such too was 
the expedition wherewith they carried them, 
that coming suddenly upon Theutomatus 
king of the Nitobrigians, as he was reposing 
himself in his tent about noon, he very nar- 
rowly escaped being taken ; for he was obliged 



182 



CiESAR'S 



to fly away half naked, and had his horse 
wounded under him. 

XLIV. Csesar having succeeded as far as 
his design required, ordered a retreat to be 
sounded ; and the tenth legion, which fought 
near his person, obeyed. The other legions, 
not hearing the signal, because separated from 
the general by a large valley, were yet com- 
manded to halt by the lieutenants and military 



of the ground : and the Eomans, already fa- 
tigued with the march and length of the com- 
bat, were little able to sustain the attack of 
fresh and vigorous troops. 

XL VI. Cffisar, observing the disadvantage 
of the ground, and the continual increase of 
the enemy's troops, began to be apprehensive 
about the event; and sending T. Sextius, 
his lieutenant, whom he had left to guard the 



tribunes, according to the instructions given j lesser camp, ordered him to bring forth the 
by Caesar in the beginning. , But elated with | cohorts with all expedition, and post them at 
the hopes of a speedy victory, the flight of the | the foot of the hill, upon the enemy's right ; 



enemy, and the remembrance of former suc- 
cesses, they thought nothing impracticable to 
their valour, nor desisted from the pursuit, till 
they had reached the very walls and gates of 
the town. Upon this a great cry arising from 
all parts, those that were farthest from the 
place of assault, terrified by the noise and tu- 
mult, and imagining the enemy already within 
the gates, quitted the town with precipitation. 
The women throwing their money and clothes 
from the walls, with naked breasts and ex- 
tended arms, conjured the Romans to spare 
their lives, and not, as at Avaricum, sacrifice 
all to their resentment, without distinction of 
age or sex. Some being let down by their 
hands from the wall, delivered themselves up 
to our soldiers. L. Fabius, a centurion of the 
eighth legion, was that day heard to say, that 
he had not yet forgot the plunder of Avari- 
cum, and was resolved no man should enter 
the place before him. Accordingly, having, 
with the assistance of three of his company, 
got upon the town wall, he helped them one 
after another to do the like. 

XLV. Meanwhile the troops, who, as we 
have related above, were gone to defend the 
post on the other side of the town ; incited by 
the cries of the combatants, and the continual 
accounts brought that the enemy had entered 
the place ; sending all the cavalry before to 
stop the progress of the Romans, advanced in 
mighty crowds to the attack. In proportion 
as they arrived, they drew up under the wall, 
and augmented the number of those who 
fought on their side. As they soon became 
formidable by their multitude, the women, who 
a little before had implored the compassion of 
the Romans, now began to encourage their 
own troops, showing their dishevelled hair, 
and producing their children, according to the 
custom of the Gauls. The contest was by no 
means equal, either in respect of numbers, or 



that if our men should give way, he might de- 
ter the Gauls from pursuing them. He him- 
self advancing a little with the tenth legion, 
waited the issue of the combat. 

XLVII. While the conflict was maintained 
with the utmost vigour on both sides ; the en- 
emy trusting to their post and numbers, the 
Romans to their courage ; suddenly the ^du- 
ans, whom Csesar had sent by another ascent 
on the right, to make a diversion, appeared on 
the flank of our men. As they were armed af- 
ter the manner of the Gauls, this sight greatly 
terrified the Romans ; and though they ex- 
tended their right arms in token of peace, yet 
still our men fancied it a stratagem to deceive 
them. At the same time L. Fabius the cen- 
turion, and those who had got upon the wall 
with him, being surrounded and slain, were 
thrown down by the enemy from the battle- 
ments. M. Petreius, a centurion of the same 
legion, who had endeavoured to force the gates, 
finding himself overpowered by the enemy, 
and despairing of safety because he was al- 
ready covered with wounds, turning to his 
soldiers that had followed him, said ; " As I 
find it impossible to preserve both myself and 
you, I will at least do my best to further your 
escape, whom I have brought into this danger 
through too eager a desire of glory. Take 
advantage therefore of the present opportu- 
nity." Then throwing himself upon the ene- 
my, he killed two, drove the rest from the 
gate, and seeing his men run to his assistance : 
" In vain," says he, " do you endeavour to 
preserve my life. My blood and strength for- 
sake me. Go therefore, while you may, and 
rejoin your legion." Continuing still to fight, 
he expired soon after, preserving his followers 
with the loss of his own life. 

XLVIII. Our men thus pressed on all 
sides, were at length driven from the place, 
with the loss of forty-six centurions ; but the 



COMMENTARIES 



183 



tenth legion, which had been posted a little 
more advantageously to cover their retreat, 
checked the impetuous pursuit of the Gauls : 
being sustained by the cohorts of the thirteenth 
legion, who had quitted the lesser camp 
under Sextius, and possessed themselves of 
an eminence. The legions having gained 
the plain, immediately halted, and faced about 
towards the enemy ; but Vercingetorix draw- 
ing off his troops from the foot of the hill, 
retired within his intrenchments. The 
Romans lost that day about seven hundred 
men. 

XLIX. Csesar assembling the army next 
day, severely blamed the temerity and avarice 
of the soldiers ; « That they had taken upon 
themselves to judge how far they were to pro- 
ceed, and what they were to undertake ; re- 
garding neither the signal to retreat, nor the 
orders of their officers. He explained the 
disadvantage of the ground, and reminded 
them of his own conduct at the siege of Ava- 
ricum, when having surprised the enemy with- 
out a general, and without cavalry, he had ra- 
ther chosen to give up a certain victory, than 
by attacking them in a difficult post, hazard an 
inconsiderable loss : that as much as he ad- 
mired the astonishing courage of men, whom 
neither the intrenchments of several camps, 
nor the height of the mountain, nor the walls 
of the town should check ; so much did he 
blame the licentiousness and arrogance of 
soldiers, who thought they knew more than 
their general, and could see better than him 
the way to conquest : that he looked upon obe- 
dience and moderation in the pursuit of 
booty, as virtues no less essential to a good 
soldier, than valour and magnanimity." 
■ L. Having made this speech, and in the end 
exhorted his soldiers not to be discouraged by 
their late misfortune, nor ascribe that to the 
bravery of the enemy, which was entirely ow- 
ing to the disadvantage of the ground : as he 
still persisted in his design of retiring, he drew 
out his legions, and formed them in order of 
battle upon the plain. But Vercingetorix not 
thinking proper to descend ; after a small and 
successful skirmish between the cavalry, Csesar 
returned again to his camp. The like he did 
the following day: when thinking he had 
done enough to confirm the courage of his own 
men, and abate the pride of the Gauls, he de- 
camped towards the territories of the JEda- 
ans. As the enemy made no attempt to pur- 



sue him, he arrived the third day on the banks 
of the Allier, and having repaired the bridge, 
passed over with his whole army. 

LI. Here he was informed by Eporedorix 
and Virdumarus, that Litavicus was gone 
with all the cavalry to solicit the ^duans; and 
it would be therefore necessary for themselves 
to set out, in order to prevent his designs, and 
confirm the state in their attachment to the 
Romans. Though Ca;sar was by this time 
abundantly convinced of the perfidy of the 
^duans, and plainly foresaw that their depar- 
ture would only hasten their revolt, he yet did 
not think proper to detain them, that he might 
give no ground of offence, nor betray any sus- 
picion of distrust. At parting, he briefly enu- 
merated the services he had done the ^duans : 
" How low and depressed he had found them, 
shut up in their towns, deprived of their lands, 
without troops, tributaries to their enemies 
and obliged to submit to the ignominious de- 
mand of hostages : to what power and great- 
ness they were now raised by his favour, so as, 
not only to have recovered their former con- 
sideration in Gaul, but even to exceed in dig- 
nity and lustre all that appeared most flou- 
rishing in the ancient annals of their state." 
With this charge he dismissed them. 

LH. Noviodunum was a town belonging 
to the J3duans, advantageously situated upon 
the banks of the Loire. Here Csesar had 
lodged all the hostages of Gaul, his provisions, 
his military chest, and great part of his own 
and his army's baggage. Hither also he had 
sent many horses, brought up in Italy and 
Spain for the service of the war. When Epo- 
redorix and Virdumarus arrived at this place, 
and were informed of the disposition of the 
state : " That Litavicus had been received with 
great marks of favour at Bibracte, the capital 
city of the province ; that Convictohtanis, the 
chief magistrate, and almost all the senate, 
were gone thither to meet him : that ambas- 
sadors had been publicly sent to Vercingetorix, 
to conclude a treaty of peace and alliance;" 
they thought the present favourable opportu. 
nity was by no means to be neglected. Having 
therefore put the garrison of Noviodunum 
with all the Romans found in the place to 
the sword ; they divided the money and 
horses between them, ordered the hostages to 
be conducted to Bibracte ; and not thinking 
themselves strong enough to defend the town 
set it on fire, that it might not be of any ser- 



184 



CiESAR'S 



vice to the Komans. All the corn they could, 
in so short a time, they carried away in barks ; 
and burnt the rest, or threw it into the river. 
Then drawing together the forces of the 
neighbouring parts they lined the banks of the 
Loire with troops : and to strike greater terror, 
began to scour the country with their cavalry ; 
hoping to cut off Csesar's convoys, and oblige 
him, through want of provisions, to return into 
the Roman province. This appeared the 
easier, as the Loire was considerably swelled 
by the melting of the snow, and gave little room 
to think that it could be any where forded. 
\/ LIII. Upon advice of these proceedings, 
Caesar thought it necessary to use despatch ; 
and if he must build a bridge, endeavour to 
come to an action with the enemy, before they 
had drawn more forces together. For he did 
not even then think it necessary to return to 
the Roman province ; not only as the retreat 
itself would be inglorious, and the mountains 
of the Sevennes, and the badness of the ways, 
•were almost insuperable obstacles ; but chiefly, 
because he was extremely desirous to rejoin 
Labienus, and the legions under his command. 
Wherefore marching day and night with the 
utmost diligence, contrary to all men's expec- 
tation, he arrived upon the banks of the Loire ; 
and his cavalry very opportunely finding a 
ford, which however took the soldiers up to 
the shoulders, he placed the horse higher up 
to break the force of the stream, and carried 
over his army without loss ; the enemy being 
so terrified by his boldness, that they forsook 
the banks. As he found a great deal of corn 
and cattle in the fields, the army was plenti- 
fully supplied, and he directed his march to- 
wards the country of the Senones. 

LIV. Whilst Caesar was thus employed, La- 
bienus leaving the levies which had lately ar- 
rived from Italy.at Agendicum, to guard the 
baggage, marched with four legions to Lutetia, 
a city of the Parisians, situated in an island 
of the Seine. Upon notice of his approach, 
the enemy drew a great army together from the 
neighbouring states. The chief command was 
given to Camulogenus, an Aulercian, who 
though in a very advanced age, was yet urged 
to accept of that honour, on account of his 
singular knowledge in the art of war. This 
general observing there was a large morass, 
whose waters ran into the Seine, and obstructed 
all the passages round about, encamped there, 
to hinder the Romans from passing the river. 



Labienus at first endeavoured to force a pas- 
sage, filling up the morass with hurdles and 
mould, to give firm footing to the army. But 
finding the attempt too difficult, he privately 
quitted his camp about midnight, and re- 
turned towards Melodunum. This city be- 
longs to the Senones, and is also situated in 
an island of the Seine, as we before said of Lu- 
tetia. He found there about fifty boats, which 
he speedily drew together, and manned them 
with his soldiers. The inhabitants terrified at 
this new manner of attack, and being too few 
to defend the place because the greater part 
of them had joined the army of Camulogenus, 
yielded upon the first summons. Having re- 
paired the bridge which the enemy had cut 
down some days before, he crossed the Seine 
there ; and following the course of the river, 
marched back towards Lutetia. The enemy 
having intelligence of this, by thos& who es- 
caped from Melodunum, set fire to Lutetia, 
broke down its bridges, and covering them- 
selves with the morass, encamped on the op- 
posite bank of the Seine, over against La- 
bienus. 

LV. It was now known that Caesar had 
departed from Gergovia. The revolt of the 
^duans, and the universal insurrection of 
Gaul, were every where spread abroad by the 
voice of fame. The Gauls on all occasions 
gave out, that Caesar finding his march ob- 
structed by the Loire, and being reduced to 
great straits for want of corn, had been forced 
to take the route of the Roman province. At 
the same time the Bellovaci, naturally prone 
to throw off the yoke, upon hearing of the 
defection of the jEduans, began to raise forces, 
and openly prepare for war. Labienus per- 
ceiving so great a change in the posture of 
aflTairs, soon saw the necessity of pursuing 
other measures ; and that it was not now 
his business to make conquests, or give the 
enemy battle, but to secure his retreat to 
Agendicum. On the one side he was pressed 
by the Bellovaci, reputed the most warlike 
people of all Gaul ; on the other by Ca- 
mulogenus, with a numerous and well ap- 
pointed army. Add to all this, the baggage 
of the troops, and the detachment appointed 
to guard it, were separated from the legions 
by a great river. So many difficulties sur- 
rounding him at once, he saw no way to ex- 
tricate himself but by his valour and presence 
of mind. 



^ 



COMMENTARIES. 



185 



LVI. Accordingly in the evening he called 
a council of war; and having exhorted the 
officers to execute his orders with vigour and 
despatch, distributed the fifty boats he had 
brought from Melodunum to as many Roman 
knights, commanding them to fall down the 
river about nine at night, without noise, four 
miles below Lutetia, and there wait his 
coming. Five cohorts, such as appeared 
least fit for service, were left to guard the 
camp. The other five of the same legion, 
with all the baggage, had orders to march up 
the river at midnight, with much tumult and 
bustle, which was further increased by means 
of some small barks sent the same way, that 
made a mighty noise with their oars. He 
himself setting out soon after, with three 
legions, advanced silently to the boats that 
waited for him. There he surprised the ene- 
my's scouts, who were stationed along the 
river, and had been prevented by a sudden 
storm from discerning his approach. The 
whole army was quickly carried over by the 
care and diligence of the Roman knights, to 
whom that affair had been given in charge. 
Almost at the same instant the enemy had 
notice, that an unusual tumult was heard in 
the Roman camp ; that a strong detachment 
had marched up the river, on which side like- 
wise a great noise of oars was heard ; and that 
a little below they were passing the river in 
boats. This intelligence made the Gauls con- 
clude, that the legions, alarmed at the revolt 
of the iEduans, were endeavouring to cross 
the Seine in three different places, for which 
reason they likewise divided their army into 
three bodies. For leaving one party to guard 
the passage over against our camp, and de- 
taching another towards Metiosedum, with 
orders to advance to the place where the 
boats had stopped, they marched with the 
rest of their forces against La'bienus.'' By 
day-break our troops had passed the river, 
and the enemy's army appeared in view, La- 
bienus exhorting his men to remember their 
wonted bravery, the many victories they had 
gained, and even to fancy themselves in the 
immediate presence of Csesar, under whose 
conduct they had so often been successful, gave 
the signal of battle. At the very first charge, 
the seventh legion, which formed the right 
wing of the Roman army, broke the enemy's 
left and put it to rout. But the right wing 
of the Gauls, which was engaged with the 
17 



twelfth legion, and where Camulogenus was 
present in person to encourage his men, 
though the first ranks were destroyed by the 
Roman javelins, still maintained its ground 
with the utmost bravery, and seemed deter- 
mined to conquer. The dispute was long 
and dubious ; when the tribunes of the seventh 
legion, having notice how matters went, faced 
about, and attacked the enemy's rear. Even 
then not a man offered to fly ; but at last be- 
ing surrounded on all sides, they were cut to 
pieces with their general. The party left 
behind to watch our camp, hearing the noise 
of the battle, flew to the assistance of their 
countrymen, and posted themselves on a hill : 
but not being able to sustain the assault of 
the victorious Romans, they soon mingled 
with the rest of the fugitives, and were cut to 
pieces by the cavalry, those only excepted who 
sheltered themselves in the woods and moun- 
tains. After this victory, Labienus re- 
treated to Agendicum, where he had left 
the baggage of the whole army ; and from 
thence, with all his forces, went and joined 
Caesar. '■>' \ — '^ "j 

LVII. The revolt of the .lEduans gave new 
strength to the confederacy. Deputies were 
immediately despatched into all parts. In- 
terest, money, and authority were employed in 
their turns, to procure the concurrence of the 
states that still continued quiet. The hostages 
seized at Noviodunum, enabled the ^-Eduans 
to compel such as were refractory. They 
sent to require of Vercingetorix, that he would 
come and concert with them measures for 
carrying on the war ; and in particular in. 
sisted on being at the head of the league. 
But this demand meeting with opposition, a 
general assembly of Gaul was held at Bi- 
bracte, whither the deputies of all the con- 
federated nations repaired, and after taking 
the affair into consideration, confirmed Ver- 
cingetorix in the title of generalissimo. The 
Rhemi, Lingones, and Treviri were not pre- 
sent at this assembly ; the two first, because 
they had resolved to continue faithful to the 
Romans ; and the Treviri on account of their 
great distance, and the employment found 
them by the Germans ; which was the reason 
that they took no part at all in this war, nor 
lent their assistance to either side. The 
-.■Eduans were greatly mortified at seeing 
themselves excluded from the chief com- 
mand : they complained of this change io 
2 B 



186 



CiESAR'S 



their fortune, and began to regret the loss of 
Cffisar's favour. But as they were already 
too far engaged in the revolt, they durst 
not think of detaching themselves from the 
confederacy. It was not however without 
reluctance, that Eporedorix and Virdu- 
marus, two young noblemen of the greatest 
hopes, consented to take orders from Vercin- 
getorix. 

LVIII. As he was now invested with the 
supreme command, he enjoined the several 
states to send hostages, appointed a day for 
that purpose, and ordered all the cavalry, to 
the number of fifteen thousand, to assemble 
with the utmost expedition. He said, " He 
was sufficiently provided with infantry, as he 
had no mind to refer the decision of the war 
to fortune, or hazard an uncertain engage- 
ment ; but abounding in horse, judged it the 
easier and safer way, to intercept the Roman 
convoys and foragers : that in the meantime 
they must resolve to destroy their corn, set fire 
to their houses, and patiently submit to a 
present and private loss, which was to be re- 
warded with liberty and perpetual empire." 
Having thus settled the plan of the war, he 
commanded the ^duans and Segusians, who 
border upon the Roman pfovince, to raise ten 
thousand foot : to these he joined eight hun- 
dred horse, and put them under the conduct 
of Eporedorix's brother, with orders to attack 
the AUobrogians. At the same time he com- 
missioned the Gabali, and the nearest cantons 
of Auvergne, to make an irruption into the 
territories of the Helvians : and the Rutheni 
and Cadurci, into those of the Voles Areco- 
mici. He neglected not, however, by mes- 
sengers and private emissaries, to sound the 
disposition of the AUobrogians, whose minds 
he hoped were not yet thoroughly reconciled 
to the Roman yoke ; endeavouring to gain 
the leading men by presents, and the state 
by an offer of the sovereignty of the Roman 
province. 

LIX. To oppose all these attacks, two and 
twenty cohorts were drawn together, which 
L. Cfflsar, lieutenant-general, levied -in the 
province ; and with them prepared to make 
head on all sides. The Helvians venturing 
to come to an engagement with the enemy, 
were defeated, and forced to shelter them- 
selves in their walled towns, after having 
lost C. Valerius Donaturus, the son of Cab- 
arus, a man of principal rank in their state, 



and several other persons of distinction. The 
AUobrogians placing detachments at proper 
distances along the banks of the Rhone, 
guarded all the accesses to their country with 
great diligence and care. C£esar,as he found 
the enemy superior in cavalry, and that his 
communication with Italy and the province 
was cut off, so as to deprive him of all hopes 
of succour from that quarter, had recourse to 
the German nations beyond the Rhine, which 
he had subdued in the preceding campaigns^ 
and obtained from them a supply of horse, 
with some light-armed foot, accustomed to 
fight amongst them. Upon their arrival, per- 
ceiving that they were but indifferently 
mounted, he took the horses from the mili- 
tary tribunes, centurions, Roman Knights, and 
volunteers, and distributed them among the 
Germans. 

LX. Whilst these things passed, the ene- 
my's forces from Auvergne, and the cavalry 
of all the confederate states of Gaul, met at 
the general rendezvous, and formed a very 
numerous army. Csesar marching through 
the frontiers of the Lingones, into the country 
of the Sequani, to be the nearer at hand to 
succour the Roman province ; Vercingetorix 
lodged himself at about ten miles distance, in 
three several camps : and having assembled 
the officers of the cavalry, told them ; " That 
the season of victory was at length arrived, 
when they saw the Romans obliged to aban- 
don Gaul, and seek a retreat in the province : 
that this indeed served to secure liberty for the 
present, but was insufficient to future ease and 
tranquillity, as they would doubtless return 
with greater forces than before, and persist in 
the design of making war. It was therefore 
best to attadi them now, while they marched 
encumbered with their baggage. If the in- 
fantry faced about, in order to assist the 
horse, they would thereby be enabled to ad- 
vance ; but, if, as was more likely, they aban- 
doned the baggage, to provide for their own 
safety, they would be deprived of every con- 
venience, and return covered with ignominy 
and reproach : for as to the enemy's cavalry, 
it was not once to be imagined, that any of 
them would so much as stir from the body of 
the army. That to encourage them the more, 
and strike the greater terror into the enemy, 
he was resolved to have the whole army 
under arms before the camp." These words 
were followed by the acclamations of al! 



COMMENTARIES. 



187 



the cavalry, who proposed taking an oath 
never to return to their homes, nor visit their 
parents, wives, and children, if they did not 
twice pierce through the Roman army from 
one e«d to another. 

LXI. The proposal being approved, and the 
oath administered to all, Vercingetorix next 
day divided his cavalry into three bodies ; 
two of which appeared upon the flanks of 
the Roman army, while the third began to 
charge and harass it in front. Notice of this 
being given to Csesar, he also formed his horse 
in three divisions, ordering them to advance 
against the enemy. They made head on all 
sides at once, the infantry meanwhile con- 
tinuing quietly under arms, with the baggage 
placed in the centre. Wherever the Romans 
gave way, or appeared hard pressed by the 
enemy, thither Caesar sent detachments from 
the legions ; which both checked the progress 
of the Gauls, and confirmed the courage 
of our men, as they thus saw themselves 
sure of being supported. At last the Ger- 
mans on the right, having seized an emi- 
nence, drove the enemy before them, and pur- 
sued them with great slaughter as far as the 
river, where Vercingetorix was posted with 
the infantry. The rest of the Gauls perceiving 
the defeat of their countrymen, and apprehen- 
sive of being surrounded, betook themselves 
likewise to flight. A dreadful slaughter en- 
sued on all sides. Three ^duan noblemen 
of the first distinction were brought prisoners 
to Csesar ; Cotus, general of the cavalry, who, 
the year before, had been competitor with 
Convictolitanis for the supreme magistracy ; 
Cavarillus, who, after Litavicus's revolt, had 
been appointed to command the infantry : and 
Eporedorix, who was generalissimo of the 
jJiduan troops in the war against the Sequani, 
before Ctesar's arrival in Gaul. 

LXII. Vercingetorix, upon this total rout 
of the Gaulish cavalry, drew off his troops, 
whom he had formed in order of battle before 
the camp, and immediately retreated towards 
Alesia, a town belonging to the Mandubii, 
ordering the baggage to follow him with all 
expedition. Caesar leaving his on a neigh- 
bouring hill, under a guard of two legions, 
pursued the enemy as far as day would per- 
mit, cut three thousand of their rear to pieces, 
and arrived on the morrow before Alesia. 
After examining the situation of the town ; as 
he saw the enemy much daunted by the de- 



feat of their cavalry, which was the part of 
tfeeir strength in which they chiefly confided, 
he exhorted his soldiers not to be discouraged 
at the labour they must undergo, and resolved 
to invest the place. 

LXIII. The city of Alesia was situated on 
the top of a very high hill, so as not to be 
taken without a formal siege. The bottom 
of the hill was washed on the two sides by 
two rivers. Before the town was a plain, ex- 
tending about three miles in length ; but 
every where else a ridge of hills, whose sum- 
mits were nearly upon a level, ran round the 
place at a moderate distance. Under the 
walls, on the side facing the east, lay all the 
forces of the Gauls encamped ; who filled that 
whole space, and were defended by a ditch, 
and a rampart six feet high. The line of 
contravallatioi> begun by the Romans, took 
in a circuit of eleven miles. The camp was 
conveniently situated, and strengthened with 
three and twenty redoubts, in which sentinels 
were placed by day, to give notice of any 
sudden irruption, and a strong guard by night 
to defend them in case of assault. •"' 

LXIV. Whilst the Romans were employed 
in these works, Vercingetorix ventured on 
another engagement of the horse, in the plain 
between the hills, which, we have said, ex- 
tended about three miles in length. The con- 
test was sharply maintained on both sides ; 
but our men at length beginning to give 
ground, Caesar detached the Germans to their 
assistance, and drew up the legions in order of 
battle before the camp, that he might be ready 
to oppose any sudden irruption of the enemy's 
infantry. The sight of the legions revived 
the courage of our men : the enemy were put 
to flight ; and crowding upon one another in 
their retreat, so obstructed the gates of the 
camp, that it became in a manner impossible 
to enter. The Germans pursued them to their 
intrenchments, where a very great slaughter 
ensued. Some quitting their horses endea- 
vour to pass the ditch, and get over the ram- 
part. Csesar, perceiving their disorder, ' or- 
dered the legions, whom he had drawn out 
before the camp, to advance a little. This 
motion no less alarmed the Gauls within the 
rampart ; who believing the whole body of 
the Roman army was coming to attack them, 
sounded to arms. Some in their fright fled 
into the town ; upon which, Vercingetorix, 
fearing the camp would be abandoned, or- / 



188 



CiESAR'S 



dered the gates to be shut. At length the 
Germans, having slain great numbers of the 
enemy, and taken a multitude of horse, re- 
turned from the pursuit. 

LXV. Vercingetorix, before our line was 
completed, resolved to dismiss his cavalry by 
night. At parting he enjoined them, " To re- 
pair severally to their respective states, and 
assemble all the men capable of bearing arms. 
He set forth the many services he had done 
them, and conjured them not to neglect his 
safety, or abandon to the cruelty of the enemy, 
one who had deserved so well of the common 
liberty. He told them, that if they were re- 
miss in the execution of his orders, no less 
than eighty thousand chosen men must perish 
with him : that by computation, he had scarce 
corn for thirty days : and that even with the 
utmost economy it could be made to hold out 
but a very little longer." After giving these 
instructions, he dismissed them quietly about 
nine at night, on the side where the Roman 
line was not yet finished. He then ordered 
the people of the town to bring in all their 
corn, threatening them with death in case of 
disobedience. As there was a great number 
of cattle in the place, which had been driven 
thither by the Mandubians, he distributed 
them to the soldiers, man by man, resolving 
to deliver out the corn sparingly and by mea- 
surCb At the same time he made all his 
forces enter the town : and having thus settled 
the plan of his defence, waited for the ex- 
pected succours. 

LXVI. CsBsar having notice of these things 
from the prisoners and deserters, constructed 
his lines in the following manner. He made 
a ditch twenty feet wide, with perpendicular 
sides, giving it the same breadth at the bottom 
as at top. All the other works were four hun- 
dred feet farther off the town than this ditch. 
As his lines included so great a space, and 
therefore could not be alike guarded in all 
parts, he judged this precaution necessary, 
to secure them against sudden sallies by night, 
and screen the workmen from the enemy's 
darts by day. Observing this distance, he 
made two other ditches, fifteen feet broad, 
and as many deep ; and filled the innermost, 
which lay in a low and level ground, with 
water from the river. Behind these was a 
rampart of twelve feet high, strengthened with 
a parapet and battlements : and to prevent the 
.enemj' from getting over, a frieze ran along 



the foot of the parapet, made of long stakes, 
with their branches cut in points, and burnt at 
the end like a stag's horn. The whole work 
was flanked with redoubts, eighty feet distant 
one from another. 

' y LXVn. But as the soldiers were employed 
at the same time to fetch wood and provi- 
sions, and to work at the fortifications, which 
considerably lessened the number of troops 
left to defend the camp, many of them being 
at a distance on these services ; and as the 
Gauls, besides, often sallied at several gates, 
with design to interrupt the works ; for all 
these reasons, Cssar judged it necessary to 
make some addition to his lines, that they 
might not require so many men to guard them. 
He therefore took trees of no great height, or 
large branches, which he caused to be made 
sharp at the ends ; and running a trench of 
five feet deep before the lines, he ordered them 
to be put into it, and made fast at bottom, so 
that they could not be pulled up. This trench 
was again filled up in such a manner, that 
nothing but the branches of the head appeared, 
of which the points must have run into those 
who should have endeavoured to pass them. 
As there were five rows of them, interwoven 
in a manner with each other, they were una- 
voidable. The soldiers called them cippi. In 
the front of these he caused pits of three feet 
deep to be dug in form of the quincunx, and 
something narrower at bottom than at top. 
In these pits he fixed strong stakes, about the 
thickness of a man's thigh, burnt and sharpened 
at the top, which rose only four inches above 
the level of the ground, into which they were 
planted three feet deeper than the pits, for the 
sake of firmness. The pits were covered over 
with bushes to deceive the enemy. There 
were eight rows of them, at the distance of 
three feet from each other. They were called 
lilies, from the resemblance they bore to that 
flower. In the front of all, he sowed the 
whole space between the pits and the advanced 
ditch with crows-feet of an extraordinary size, 
which the soldiers called spurs. 

LXVIII. These works completed, he drew 
another line, of fourteen miles in compass, con- 
structed in the same manner as the former, 
and carried through the most even places he 
could find, to serve as a barrier against the 
enemy without ; that if the Gauls should at- 
tack the camp in his absence, they might not 
be able to surround it with the multitude of their 



COMMENTARIES. 



189 



troops, or charge with equal vigour in all parts. 
At the same time to prevent the danger his 
men might be exposed to, by being sent in 
quest of provisions and forage, he took care to 
lay in a sufficient stock of both for thirty days. 

LXIX. Whilst these things passed before 
Alesia, a general council being held of the prin- 
cipal noblemen of Gaul, it was not thought 
proper to assemble ail that were able to bear 
arms, as Vercingctorix desired, but to order 
each nation to furnish a contingent ; lest the 
confusion inseparable from so great a multi- 
tude, should bring on a scarcity of provisions, 
or render the observance of military discipline 
impracticable. The ^duans, with their vas- 
sals the Segusians, Ambivareti, Aulerci, Bran- 
novices, and Brannovii, were rated at thirty- 
<^ve thousand. A like number was demanded 
from the Averni, in conjunction with their de- 
pendants, the Cadurci, Gabali, and Velauni. 
The Senones, Sequani, and Biturigians, San- 
tones, Rutherni, and Carnutes, were ordered 
each to furnish twelve thousand ; the Bellovaci, 
ten thousand ; the Lemovices, the same num- 
ber ; the Pictones, Turoni, Parisians, and 
Suessiones, each eight thousand ; the Am- 
biani, Mediomatrici, Petrocorians, Nervians, 
Morini, Nitobrigians, and Aulerci Cenomani, 
each five thousand; the Atrebatians, four 
thousand ; the Bellocasians, Lexovians, and 
Aulerci Eburovices, each three thousand ; the 
Eauraci and Boii, thirty thousand ; the mari- 
time and Armorican states, of which number 
are the Curiosolites, Rhedones, Caletes, Osis- 
mians, Lemovices, Venetians, and Unellians, 
each six thousand. The Bellovaci alone re- 
fused to furnish the troops required, pretend- 
ing it was their design to wage an independent 
■war with the Romans, without being subject 
to the control of any one : however, at the re- 
quest of Comius, for .whom they had a great 
respect, they sent a body of two thousand men. 

LXX, This Comius, as we have related 
above, had been singularly faithful and ser- 
viceable to Csesar, in his Britannic expedition ; 
in consideration of which, his state had been 
exempted from all tribute, restored to the full 
enjoyment of its laws and privileges, and even 
enlarged, by having the country of the Morini 
added to its territories. But such was the pre- 
sent unanimity of the Gauls, in the design of 
vindicating their liberty, and recovering their 
wonted reputation in war, that neither benefits 
received, nor the strictest ties of friendship, 
17* 



could make any impression upon their minds ; 
but all with one consent flew to arms, and 
contributed largely to the support of the war. 
The country of the ^duans was the general 
rendezvous of the army, which amounted to 
eight thousand horse, and two hundred and 
forty thousand foot. Four commanders in 
chief were appointed ; Comius of Arras, Vir- 
dumarus and Eporedorix the ^duans, and 
Vergasillaunus of Auvergne, cousin-german to 
Vercingctorix. To these were added a select 
number of officers, chosen from among the 
several states, to serve by way of a council of 
war. The whole army advanced towards Ale- 
sia, full of courage and confidence, and satis- 
fied that the Romans would not sustain the 
very sight of so prodigious a multitude; es- 
pecially in an encounter attended with so much 
hazard, where they must be exposed to a vigo- 
rous sally from the town, at the same time 
that they saw themselves surrounded with such 
numbers of horse and foot. 

LXXI. Meanwhile the troops shut up in 
Alesia, having consumed all their provisions, 
finding the day appointed for the arrival of 
succours expired, and knowing nothing of what 
was transacted among the ^duans, summoned 
a council of war, to debate upon what was re- 
quisite in the present exigence. Various 
opinions were proposed : some advised a sur- 
render ; others were for sallying while yet 
their strength would permit : among the rest, 
Critognatus, a man of the first rank and 
authority in Auvergne, addressed the assembly 
in a speech, which for its singular and detest- 
able inhumanity, deserves a particular mention 
in this place. " I shall not," says he, " take 
notice of the opinion of those who endeavour 
to shelter an ignominious servitude, under the 
plausible name of a surrender ; such should 
neither be reckoned Gauls, nor suffered to 
come to this council. Let me rather apply 
myself to them who propose a general sally : 
for here, as all of you seem to think, we meet 
with something worthy of our ancient virtue. 
And yet I am not afraid to say, that it is at the 
bottom weakness, and not courage, that in- 
spires such thoughts, and renders us unable to 
support want a few days. It is easier to find 
those who will voluntarily rush on death, than 
such as can patiently endure pain. I shall not 
however, be against this proposal, which I con- 
fess has something generous in it, if only our 
own lives were at stake. But in this delibera- 



190 



CiESAR'S 



tion. u"0 nui#t kocp all Gaul in view, whom we ; yoke ot" slavery."' When all had ilelivcrcil 
have called to our assistance. How Avould it ] their opinions, a resolution was taken, that 
dispirit our relations and friends, to sec eighty j such as by ago or sickness were unlit for war, 
thousand of their countrymen slaughtered in should bo obliged to quit the town, and every 
one place, and be obliged to light in the midst expedient bo tried, rather than give into the 
of their dead bodies! Deprive not then of proposal of Critognatus: but if necessity urged, 
your assistance those, who, to save you, have and relief was long deferred, they determined 
exposed themselves to the greatest dangers ; ! upon submitting to his advice preferably to 
nor through an inconsiderate temerity, and ' peace or a surrender. The Mandubii, to 
mistaken valour, destroy at once all the ex- whom the city belonged, were driven thence 



pectations of Gaul, and plungo her into per- 
petual servitude. If the expected succours are 
not arrived exactly at the appointed time, 
ought you therefore to suspect the lidclity and 
constancy of your countrymen 1 And can y ou 
think that it is for amusement only, that the 
Romans kibour on those lines towards the 
country l Though you hear not from your 
friends, because all communication is hindered ; 
vet you may learn the approach of the succours 
from your enemies themselves ; who, through 
fear of them work day and night, without 
ceasing, on those fortitications. What then 
should I propose \ What hut to do as our 
ancestors did in the war with the Teutones 
and Cimbri, much less interesting than that 
•we are now engaged in. Compelled to shut 
themselves up in their towns, and reduced to 
a distress equal to that we now experience, 
rather than surrender to their enemies, they 
chose to sacritl^.'e to their subsistence the bodies 
of those whom age incapacitated for war. Had 
we no such precedent to follow, yet still I 
should esteem it glorious, in so noble a cause 
as that of liberty, to institute and give one to 
posterity. For where had we ever a war upon 
our hands like that we are now engaged in ? 



The Cimbri, after laying waste Gaul, and V'LXXni. Caesar, having disposed his whole 
spreading desolation through the whole coun- army on both sides the works, that in case of 



try, withdrew however their forces at length, 
and repaired to other regions, leaving us the 
full enjoyment of our laws, customs, lands, 
and liberties. But the Komans, instigated by 
envy, and jealous of a people so renowned 
and powerful in war, aim and intend nothing 
less than to establish themselves in our cities 
and territories, and reduce us to perpetual ser- 
vitude. This has ever been the object of all 
their wars. If you are unacquainted with what 
passes in ditlerent countries, cast your eyes 
upon the adjoining Gaul, which, reduced into 
the form of a province, stripped of its laws and 
privileges, and subjected to the arbitrary sway 
of the conqueror, groans under an endless 



with their wives and children. When they 
came to the Roman lines, they with tears pe- 
titioned to be received as slaves, and saved 
from perishing miserably by tamine. But 
Ca;sar having planted guards along the ram- 
part, refused to admit them into his camp. 

LXXII. Meanwhile Comius, and the other 
general officers, on whom the chief command 
had been conferred, arrived before Alesia with 
all their forces, and encamped on a hill with- 
out tho town, not above live hundred paces 
from tho Roman lines. The next day they 
drew out their cavalry, and covered the whole 
plain under the hill, which, as wo have already 
said, extended three miles in length. The 
infantjy were stationed at some distance on 
the heights, yet so as to lie concealed from the 
view of the Romans. As Alesia commanded 
a full prospect of the plain below, the succours 
were soon discovered by the besieged, who as- 
sembling in crowds, congratulated each other ; 
and testified a universal joy. Immediately 
they came forth with all their forces, posted 
themselves before the town, and having filled 
up the nearest ditch with earth and fascines, 
prepared for a vigorous sally, and every thing 
else that might happen. 



need, every soldier might know his post, and 
be ready to maintain it, ordered the cavalry to 
sally out upon the enemy, and begin the charge. 
The camp, running along a ridge of a rising 
ground, commanded a view of the plain on all 
sides ; and the soldiers, to a man, with deep 
attention, waited the issue of the combat. 
The Gauls had interspersed among the cavalry 
some archers and light-armed troops, to sustain i 
them in case of need, and check the impetu- 
osity of our horse. Several of the Romans 
being wovinded by these at the first charge, 
were obliged to quit the battle. The Gauls 
now believing they had the advantage, and 
seeing our men overpowered by numbers, set 



COMMENTARIES. 



191 



up a universal shout, an well within as with- 
out the place, to give new life to their troops. 
Ah the action passed in the view of both ar- 
mies, who were, of course, witnesses to the 
valour or cowardice of the combatants, the de- 
eire of applause, or fear of ignominy, sjmrred 
on each side to exert their utmost bravery. 
After a crmflict that lasted from noon till near 
sun-set, victory all the while continuing doubt- 
ful, the Germans, in cloise order, charged furi- 
ouisly the enemy on one side, and forced them 
to give ground. Their flight leaving the arch- 
ers exposed, they were all surrounded and cut 
to pieces. The Kucccf-s was equal in other 
parts of the field, where our men pursuing the 
runaways to their camp, gave them no time to 
rally. The troops who had quitted Alefda, 
despairing now almost of victory, turned dia- 
consolate to the town. 

LXXIV. After the inter%al of a day, which 
was wholly spent in providing a great num- 
ber of fascines, scaling ladders, and iron hooks ; 
the Gauls iBsuing from their camp at midnight, 
in great silence, attacked the lioman lines, on 
the side of the plain. They began with set- 
ting up a sudden shout, to advertise the be- 
sieged of their arrival ; threw their fascines into 
the ditch ; endeavoured by a discharge of 
stones, darts and arrows, to drive our men 
from the rampart ; and practised every thing 
necessary to render the storm successful. At 
the same time Vercingetorix, hearing their 
cries, sounded to arms, and led forth his men 
to the attack. The Romans, whose posts had 
been allotted them some days before, flew to 
the works, and with slings, darts, bullets, and 
engines, prepared on purpose, struck a terror 
into the assailants. As the parties could not 
see one another by reason of the darkness, 
many wounds were received on both sides, and 
a great number of darts discharged from the 
engines. But M. Antoniusand C. Trebonius, 
who commanded on the one side that waa most 
pressed by the enemy, took care to draw out 
parties from the more distant redoubts, and 
send them where their assbtance was chiefly 
wanted. 

LXXV. While the Gauls kept at a dis- 
tance from our lines, they did great execution 
by the multitude of their darts ; but in propor- 
tion as they approached, they either entangled 
themselves unawares among the caltrops, or 
tumbUng into the wells, were wounded by the 
pointed stakes, or were pierced by the darts 



discharged from the towers and rampart. After 
many wounds given and received ; finding, 
when day ap{>eared, that they had not forced 
any part of the lines, and fearing to be taken 
in flank \iy some troops that were sallying from 
the redoubts on the eminence, they retreated 
to their camp. Meanwhile the besieged, after 
much time Bftent in preparing for a sally, and 
filling up the advanced ditch, finding that their 
countrymen were retired, before they could 
so much as apyn'oach the works, returned into 
the town without eflecting any thing, 

LXXVI. The Gauls thus twice repulsed 
with great loss, consult what new measure they 
are to pursue : and advising with those who 
knew the ground, learned from them the 
strength and situation of the upper camp. 
North of the town was a hill of too great a com- 
pass to be taken into the circumvallation ; in- 
somuch that the Romans bad been obliged to 
post themselves on its ai^ccnt, in a very disad- 
vantageous situation, because their camp was 
commanded by its summit, C. Antistius Re- 
ginus, and C, Caninuis Rebilus, lieutenant- 
generals, guarded this quarter with two legions. 
The enemy's generals, after informing them- 
selves of the nature of the country by their 
scouts, selected five and fifty thousand of their 
best troops, concerted privately among them- 
selves the plan and manner of acting, appointed 
the time for the assault about noon, and as- 
signed the command of the detachment to Ver- 
gasillaunus of Auvergne, one of the four prin- 
cipal leaders, and a near relation of Vercinge- 
torix, Vergasillaunus leaving his camp in the 
evening, finished his march by day-break ; and 
concealing his troops behind a hill, ordered his 
soldiers to refresh themselves after the fatigue. 
As soon as it was noon, he approached the 
quarters of the two legions. At the same time 
the cavalry advanced into the plain, and the 
whole army drew out before the camp, 

LXXVII. Vercingetorix observing these 
motions from the citadel of Alesia, led forth 
his troops ; carrying along with him the fas- 
cines, long poles, covered galleries, hooks, and 
other instruments he had prepared for the as- 
sault. The fight was maintained on all sides 
at once ; nor did the Gauls leave any thing 
unattempted, but flocked continually to those 
parts of the works which appeared to be the 
weakest. The Roman forces having so many 
works to guard, were dispersed in difierent 
places, and scarce sufficed for the defence of 



192 



CESAR'S 



them all. What mostly contributed to disturb 
them was, the cries of the combatants behind, 
which informed them that their safety depended 
on the valour of others. For such is the con- 
stitution of the human mind, as always to 
aggrandize absent objects, and magnify the 
danger that is out of sight. 

LXXVIII. Cffisar chose a post from whence 
he could see every thing, and then sent rein- 
forcements where necessary. Both parties 
called to mind, that now was the time for 
making the greatest effort. The Gauls had 
no hopes of safety, but in forcing the Roman 
lines. Our men again were sensible, that 
if they came off victorious on this occasion, all 
their labours would be at an end. The chief 
stress of the battle lay at the higher fortifica- 
tions, where Vergasillaunus charged with his 
detachment ; because the small eminence, 
which commanded the declivity of the hill, 
gave the enemy great advantage. Some were 
employed in throwing darts ; others advanced 
to the attack, under cover of their shields ; 
fresh men still succeeding in the room of those 
that were fatigued. The earth they threw up 
against our lines not only enabled them to as- 
cend the rampart, but entirely frustrated the 
design of the works the Romans had made in 
the ground. In fine, our men had neither 
strength nor weapon left to make resistance. 

LXXrX. Caesar observing the danger they 
were in, sent Labienus, with six cohorts, to 
their assistance ; ordering him if he found 
himself unable to defend the works, to sally 
out upon the enemy ; yet this only in case of 
extremity. He himself went in person to the 
rest of the troops, exhorting them to bear up 
courageously under their present fatigue, and 
representing, that the fruit of all their former 
victories depended upon the issue of that cri- 
tical day and hour. The troops within the 
place, despairing to force the intrenchments 
on the side of the plain, because of the great 
strength of the works, attacked them in the 
more steep and difficult places, whither they 
brought all the instruments prepared for the 
assault. They soon drove our men from the 
towers, by a discharge of darts, levelled the 
way with earth and fascines, and began to cut 
down the rampart and breastwork with their 
hooks. 

LXXX. Caesar first sent young Brutus, 
with six cohorts ; after him, C. Fabius lieu- 
tenant-general, with seven more ; and, last of 



all, as the dispute grew very warm, marched 
himself in person at the head of the whole de- 
tachment. Having, by this means, restored 
the battle, and forced the enemy to retire, he 
hastened to the side where Labienus was en- 
gaged. He drew four cohorts from the near- 
est fort, ordered part of the cavalry to follow 
him, and charged the rest to take a circuit 
round the outward works, and fall upon the 
enemy's rear. Labienus finding that neither 
the rampart nor ditch were sufficient to stop 
the progress of the enemy, drew together about 
Ihirty-nine cohorts from the nearest forts, and 
sent to inform Csesar of his design. Caesar 
immediately quickened his march, that he 
might be present at the action. 

LXXXI. His arrival being known from 
the colour of his garments, by which he used 
to distinguish himself in the day of battle ; and 
the troops and cohorts he had ordered to fol- 
low him, appearing ; all which were easily 
discerned from the higher ground ; the enemy 
began the charge. A mighty shout was raised 
on both sides, which being catched by those 
on the rampart, was carried quite round the 
lines. Our men, having cast their darts, fell 
upon the Gauls sword in hand. At the same 
time the cavalry appeared unexpectedly in 
their rear ; fresh cohorts flocked continually 
to our assistance : the enemy took flight, and, 
in their retreat, were encountered by our horse : 
a dreadful slaughter ensued. Sedulius, chief 
and general of the Lemo vices, was slain on the 
spot ; Vergasillaunus of Auvergne, was made 
prisoner in the pursuit ; seventy -four colours 
were taken, and brought to Caesar ; and, out 
of so great a multitude, very few regained 
the Gaulish camp. The rout and slaughter 
being observed from the town, the besieged, 
despairing of success, drew off their troops from 
the attack. Instantly, upon the report of this 
disaster, the Gauls abandoned their camp ; 
and had not our troops been wearied out by the 
continual fatigue of the day, and the frequent 
reinforcements they were obliged to furnish, 
the enemy's whole army might have been ex- 
terminated. At midnight Caesar detached the 
cavalry to pursue them, who, falling in with 
their rear, slew some, and took a great number 
of prisoners. The rest escaped to their several 
habitations. 

LXXXIL Next day, Vercingetorix as- 
sembling a council, represented to the be- 
sieged : " That he had undertaken that war 



COMMENTARIES. 



193 



not from a motive of private interest, but to 
recover the common liberty of Gaul : and that 
since there was a necessity of yi^ding to for- 
tune, he was willing to become a victim for 
their safety, whether they should think proper 
to appease the anger of the conqueror by his 
death or to deliver him up alive." A deputation 
immediately waited on Caesar to receive his 
orders. ITe insisted on the surrender of their 
arms, and the delivering up of all their chiefs. 
Having accordingly seated himself at the head 
of his lines, before the camp, their leaders 
were brought, Vercingetorix delivered up, and 
their arms thrown into the ditch. Reserving 
the ^duans and Averni, as a means to re- 
cover those two potent nations, he divided the 
rest of the prisoners among his soldiers, giving 
to each one. 

LXXXIII. These affairs despatched, he 
marched into the territories of the ^duans, 
where he received the submission of their 
state. There he was addressed by the ambas- 
sadors of the Averni, who promised an entire ' 



obedience to his commands. He exacted a 
great number of hostages ; sent his legions in- 
to winter quarters ; and restored about twenty 
thousand captives to the ^duans and Averni. 
T. Labienus, with two legions and the cavalry, 
was quartered among the Sequani jointly with 
M. Sempronius Rutilus. C. Fabius, and L. 
Minutius Basilus, were ordered, with two le- 
gions, into the country of the Rhemi, to de- 
fend it against the attempts of the Bellovaci, 
their neighbours. C. Antistius Reginus had 
his station assigned him among the Ambiva- 
reti;T. Sextius among the Biturigians; and 
C. Caninius Rebilus among the Rutlieni; 
each with one legion, Q, Tullius Cicero, and 
P. Sulpicius, were placed at Cabillo and Ma- 
tisco upon the Arar, in the country of the 
^^duans, to have the care of provisions. He 
himself resolved to winter at Bibracte. The 
senate being informed of these things by Cs- 
sar s letters, a procession of twenty days was 
decreed. 



2 C 



PANSA'S CONTINUATION 



OF 



CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 



WARS IN GAUL 



BOOK VIII. 



THE ARGUMENT. 

Pansa's Preface.— I. The Gauls form a resolution to renew the war.— II. Caesar falls unexpectedly upon the 
Biturigians, and compels them to submit.— IV. He afterwards disperses the Carnutes by the terror of his 
arms. — V. The Bellovaci prepare for war. — VI. Their designs.— VII. Caesar endeavours to draw them to an 
engagement, by inspiring them with a contempt of his small numbers.— VIII. But as they carefully avoid a 
battle, he resolves to fortify his camp.— XI. The Bellovaci intercept the Roman foragers.- XII. Daily skir- 
mishes within view of the two camps.— XHI. — The Bellovaci artfully counterfeit a retreat.— XVI. And falling 
upon the Romans from an ambuscade, after an obstinate fight, are entirely dispersed.— XVII. The Bellovaci 
and other states submit. — XX. Csesar divides his army. — XXI. Caninius and Fabius relieve Duracius, besieged 
by Dumnacus in Limo.— XXIV. Caninius pursues Drapes and Luterius.— XXV. Pabius obliges the Carnutes 
and other slates to submit.— XXVI. Drapes and Luterius possess themselves of Uxellodunum.— XXVII. Ca- 
ninius invests the town. — XXVIII. Intercepts a convoy escorted by Luterius.— XXIX. Attacks and carries the 
camp of Drapes.— XXX. And joining the forces under Fabius, returns to the siege of Uxellodunum.— XXXI. 
Caesar repairs to the camp of Caninius. — XXXIII. And depriving the besieged of water, compels the town to 
snirrend er.— XXXVII. He sends his army into winter quarters.— XXXVIII. Comius defeated in an engage- 
ment of horse, surrenders to Antony.— XLI. The year following, Gaul being in perfect quiet, Caesar goes into 
Italy. — XLII. Where he is received with the highest demonstrations of respect.— XLIII. He returns to the 
army, where he learns Ihfc designs formed against him at Rome.— XL VI. And thereupon sets out again for 
Italy. 



196 



A CONTINUATION 

OF 



CESAR'S COMMEN 



OF 



TARIES i 



HIS WARS IN GAUL. 



BY A. HIRTIUS PANSA. 



BOOK VIII. 



In consequence of your repeated importunities, 
Balbus, I have at last been prevailed with 
to engage in a very delicate work ; fearing 
lest my dailj' refusals should be construed 
rather to flow from idleness, than any sense 
of the difficulty of the undertaking. I there- 
fore here present you with a continuation of 
Csesar's Commentaries of his Wars in Gaul, 
though not in any respect to be compared with 
what he himself wrote on the same subject, 
nor with the Memoirs of the civil war, which 
he likewise left behind him imperfect, and 
which I have in the same manner carried 
down from the transactions at Alexandria, to 
the end, I will not say of our civil dissensions, 
which are like to have no end, but of Caesar's 
life. I would have all who read these pieces, 
know with how much reluctance I engaged in 
this design ; that I may be the more easily 
acquitted of the charge of arrogance and folly, 
for presuming to insert my writings among 
those of Cffisar. If. is universally agreed, 
that the most elaborate compositions of 
others, fall far short of the elegance of these 
Commentaries. He indeed intended them 
only as memoirs for future historians ; but 
they are every where in such high esteem, as 
serves rather to discourage other writers, than 
furnish them for the attempt. This circum- 
stance the more commands our admiration, 
because while the rest of the world can judge 
only of the beauty and correctness of the 
work, we besides know with what ease and 
despatch it was composed. Caesar not only 
18 



possessed the talent of writing in the highest 
perfection, but was likewise best able to un- 
fold the reasons of those military operations of 
which he was himself the contriver and direc- 
tor. On the contrary, it was my misfortune 
to be present neither in the Alexandrian nor 
African wars ; and though I had many of the 
particulars relating to both from his own 
mouth, yet we give a very different attention 
to things, when we hear them only through 
an admiration of their novelty and greatness, 
and when with a view of transmitting them 
to posterity. But I forbear any further apolo- 
gies, lest in enumerating the reasons why my 
work ought not to be compared with that of 
Caesar, I fall under the suspicion of flattering 
myself, that in the judgment of some, it may 
not seem altogether unworthy of that honour. 
Adieu. 

I. Gaul being wholly reduced, Caesar was 
desirous that his troops might enjoy some 
repose during the winter, especially after so 
long and fatiguing a campaign, in which 
there had been no intermission from the toils 
of war ; but he soon understood, that several 
states were meditating a revolt, and contriving 
all at once to take up arms. The cause assigned 
for this conduct was not improbable ; for 
though the Gauls were by this time fully sen- 
sible, that it was impossible for them to resist 
the Roman army entire, by any forces they could 
bring into the field ; yet still they thought, that 
if many states revolted together, and set on foot 
197 



198 



PANSA'S 



as many different wars, the Romans would 
have neither time nor troops to subdue them 
all ; and that though some among them must 
be sufferers, their lot would be the more sup- 
portable, as the delay occasioned by that di- 
version, might procure the liberty of the whole 
nation. 

II. Caesar, to stifle this opinion in its birth, 
left M. Antony the questor to command in his 
winter quarters ; and setting out the last of 
December from Bibracte, with a guard of 
cavalry, went to the camp of the thirteenth 
legion, which he had placed among the 
Biturigians, not far from the territories of the 
^duans. To this he joined the eleventh 
legion, whose quarters lay nearest ; and leav- 
ing two cohorts to guard the baggage, 
marched with the rest of the army into the 
most fertile parts of the country of the 
Biturigians ; who having large territories, 
and abounding in towns, had not been awed 
by the presence of a single legion, from 
forming confederacies, and preparing for 
war. 

III. Csesar by his sudden and unexpected 
arrival, as was natural to suppose, found them 
unprepared and dispersed up and down the 
fields ; insomuch that they were easily sur- 
prised by the horse, before they could retreat 
into their towns. For he had expressly forbid 
setting fire to the houses, the usual sign of an 
invasion, that he might neither alarm the ene- 
my by the conflagration, nor expose himself to 
the want of corn and forage, if he should ad- 
vance far into the country. Having made 
many thousands of the Biturigians prisoners, 
such as could escape the first coming of the 
Romans, fled in great terror to the neighbour- 
ing states, relying either upon private friend- 
ship, or the ties of a mutual confederacy. But 
all was to no purpose : for Caesar, by great 
marches, soon reached their places of retreat, 
and making every province anxious for its 
own safety, left them no time to think of giving 
shelter to others. This diligence confirmed 
the well-aflTected in their duty, and obliged 
the wavering to hearken to conditions of 
peace. The like ofiers were made to the 
Biturigians ; who seeing that Caesar's cle- 
mency left the way still open to his friend- 
ship, and that the neighbouring states, upon 
delivery of hostages, had been pardoned and 
received into protection, resolved to follow the 
example. Csesar, to recompense the fatigue 



and labour of his soldiers, who, in the winter 
season, through difficult ways, and during the 
most intense colds, had followed him with in- 
credible patience and constancy ; promised 
a reward of two hundred sesterces to every 
private man, and two thousand to every centu- 
rion : and having sent back the legions to their 
winter quarters, returned again to Bibracte, 
after an absence of forty days. 

IV. Whilst he was there employed in the 
distribution of justice, ambassadors arrived 
from the Biturigians, to implore his assistance 
against the Carnutes, who were laying waste 
their country. Upon this intelligence, though 
he had not rested above eighteen days, he im- 
mediately sent for the sixth and fourteenth 
legions, which he had quartered along the 
Arar, for the convenience of provisions, as has 
been related in the foregoing book. With 
these two legions he marched against the Car- 
nutes ; who hearing of his approach, and 
dreading the same calamities which others had 
been made to suffer, abandoned their towns 
and villages, consisting mostly of little cottages 
run up in haste, to defend them from the cold, 
(for most of their cities had been destroyed in 
the late war,) and fled different ways. Caesar 
unwilling to expose his soldiers to the severity 
of the storms, which commonly rage with 
the greatest violence at that season, fixed his 
camp at Genabum ; and lodged his men, partly 
in the huts lately built by the Gauls, partly 
in the old houses, whose walls were still 
standing, and which he ordered to be thatched 
with straw, that t ey might afford the better 
shelter to the troops. But he sent the cav- 
alry and the auxiliary foot into all parts where 
he understood the enemy were retired ; nor 
without success ; for they commonly returned 
loaden with spoil. The Carnutes, distressed 
by the difficulty of the season, the sense of 
their danger, (because being driven from their 
habitations, they durst not continue long in 
any place for fear of our parties,) and finding 
no protection in the woods against the extreme 
severity of the weather ; were at length dis- 
persed on all sides with great loss, and scat- 
tered among the neighbouring states. 

V. Cfflsar thinking it suflScient in that diffi- 
cult season, to have dispersed the troops that 
began to assemble, and prevented their re- 
kindling the war ; and being likewise well 
assured, as far as human prudence could de- 
termine, that it would be impossible for them, 



COMMENTARIES. 



199 



during the ensuing summer, to raise up any 
very dangerous war ; left C. Trebonius, with 
the two legions he had brought along with 
him, to winter at Genabum. Meanwhile, 
understanding by frequent embassies from the 
Rhemi, that the Bellovaci, the most distin- 
guished for bravery of all the Belgian and 
Gallic nations, with some of the neighbouring 
states, under the conduct of Correus, general 
of the Bellovaci, and Comius the Atrebatian, 
were raising an army, and drawing their forces 
to a general rendezvous with design to invade 
the territories of the Suessiones, a people sub- 
ject to the jurisdiction of the Rhemi ; he 
thought that both honour and interest required 
him to undertake the defence of allies, who 
had deserved so well of the commonwealth. 
He therefore drew the eleventh legion again 
out of its winter quarters ; wrote to C. Fabius, 
to march the two legions under his command 
into the country of the Suessiones, and ordered 
Labienus to send one of those he was cliarged 
with. Thus, as far as the convenience of 
winter quarters, and the nature of the war 
would allow, he employed the legions alter- 
nately in expedition, giving himself, mean- 
while,no intermission from fatigue. 

VI. With these forces he marched against 
the Bellovaci, and encamping within their ter- 
ritories, dispersed his cavalry en all sides to 
make prisoners, from whom he might learn the 
enemy's designs. The horse, in consequence 
of this commission, brought him back word, 
that the lands and houses were in a manner 
quite abandoned, and that the few prisoners 
they had found, after a most diligent search, 
were not left to cultivate the ground, bat to 
serve as spies. Caesar inquiring of these, 
whither the Bellovaci were retired, and what 
might be their designs, xound . " That all of 
them capable of bearing arms, had assembled 
in one place, and been joined by the Anibians, 
Aulerci, Caletes, Vellocasiant, and Atreba- 
tians : that they had chosen for their camp, a 
rising ground, surrounded with a difficult 
morass, and disposed of their baggage in re- 
mote woods : that a great many of their chiefs 
were concerned in the war, but the principal 
authority rested in Correus, because he was 
known to bear an implacable hatred to the Ro- 
man name ; that a few days before, Comius had 
left the camp to solicit aid of the Germans, 
who were their nearest neighbours, and 
abounded in troops : that it had been resolved 



among the Bellovaci, with consent of all the 
generals, and at the earnest desire of the peo- 
ple, if Caesar came at the head of only three 
legions, as was reported, to offer him battle ; 
lest they should be afterwards obliged to fight 
upon harder and more unequal terms, when 
he had got his whole army together : but if he 
brought greater forces along with him, to con- 
tinue within their camp, intercept his corn and 
convoys, and cut off his forage ; which in that 
season of the year was extremely scarce, and 
very much dispersed." 

VII. These things being confirmed by the 
testimony of all the prisoners, CaBsar,who found 
their designs full of prudence, and remote 
from the usual temerity of barbarians, resolved 
by all manner of ways to draw them into a con- 
tempt of his numbers, that he might the more 
easily bring them to an engagement. He had 
with him the seventh, eighth, and ninth le- 
gions, all veterans of approved valour ; and 
though the eleventh was not of equal standing, 
nor had attained the same reputation of bra- 
very, they were yet chosen youth of great 
hopes, who had served under him eight cam- 
paigns. Calling therefore the army together, 
he laid before them the advices he had re- 
ceived, and exhorted the soldiers to preserve 
their wonted courage. At the same time, to 
draw the enemy to an engagement, by an ap- 
pearance of only three legions, he so contrived 
the order of his march, that disposing the 
seventh, eighth, and ninth legions, in front ; 
the baggage, which, as in a hasty expedition, 
was but moderate, behind them ; and the 
eleventh legion in the rear of all ; no more 
troops were in view, than what the 'Gauls 
themselves had determined to hazard an ac- 
tion against. The army, thus drawn up, formed 
a kind of square, and arrived before the ene- 
my's camp much sooner than expected. 

VIII. When the Gauls perceived the le- 
gions advancing suddenly against them in or- 
der of battle, with a steady pace, they altered 
the resolution which had been reported to Cae- 
sar ; and either fearing the success of the bat- 
tle, surprised at so sudden an approach, or 
willing to know our further designs, drew up 
before their camp, without descending from 
the higher ground. Caesar though desirous to 
come to an engagement, yet surprised at the 
multitude of the enemy, and reflecting on the 
advantage of their situation ; as being sepa- 
rated from him by a valley, still more con- 



200 



PANSA'S 



siderable for its depth than breadth ; contented 
himself for the present to encamp directly over 
against them. He threw up a rampart twelve 
feet high, strengthened by a proportionable 
breast-work ; and secured it by two ditches, 
each fifteen feet deep, with perpendicular 
sides. He likewise raised several turrets of 
three stories, and joined them to each other 
by galleries, having little parapets of osier be- 
fore, that the works might be defended by a 
double range of soldiers ; one of which fight- 
ing from the galleries, and secured by their 
height, would, with more boldness and advan- 
tage, launch their darts against the enemy ; 
the other, though nearer danger, and planted 
upon the rampart itself, were yet screened by 
the galleries from the impending darts. All 
the entrances to the camp were secured by 
strong gates, over which he placed very high 
towers. 

IX. He had a twofold design in these for- 
tifications : one, by the greatness of the works, 
to make the enemy believe him afraid, and 
thereby increase their presumption and confi- 
dence ; the other to enable him to defend his 
camp with a few troops, when it was necessary 
to go far in quest of corn and forage. Mean- 
time there happened frequent skirmishes be- 
tween the two camps, carried on for the most 
part with arrows at a distance, by reason of a 
morass that separated the combatants ; some- 
times indeed the auxiliary Gauls and Germans 
crossed the morass, and pursued the enemy : 
sometimes again the enemy having the advan- 
tage, passed in their turn, and drove back our 
men. And as we daily sent our parties to for- 
age, who were obliged to disperse, and scatter 
themselves from house to house over the whole 
country, it now and then fell out, as was una- 
voidable in these circumstances, that our fora- 
gers were surprised and cut to pieces by their 
detachments. These losses, though very in- 
considerable to us, as being mostly confined to 
some carriages and servants, yet strangely 
swelled the hopes of the barbarians ; and the 
more, as Comius, who had gone to fetch the 
German auxiliaries, was now returned with a 
body of horse. And though the number was 
not great, they not making in all above five 
hundred, the enemy were nevertheless might- 
ily encouraged by this supply. 

X. Csesar, after a stay of many days, find- 
ing that the enemy still kept within their camp, 
which was advantageously situated with a mo- 



rass in front ; and considering, at the same 
time, that he could neither force the intrench- 
ments without great loss, nor inclose them 
with works with so small an army, wrote to 
Trebonius, to send, with all diligence, for the 
thirteenth legion, which was quartered among 
the Biturigians, under the care of T. Sextius ; 
and with that, and the two legions under his 
own command, make what haste he could to 
join him. Meanwhile he detached the cavalry 
of Rheims, of the Lingones, and the other 
provinces of Gaul, of which he had great num- 
bers in his camp, to guard by turns the fora- 
gers, and protect them from the sudden in- 
cursions of the enemy. 

XI. This was done every day ; but custom, 
by degrees, relaxing their diligence, as fre- 
quently happens in things of long continuance ; 
the Bellovaci, who had observed the daily sta- 
tions of our horse, placed a chosen body of foot 
in ambush in a wood, and sent their cavalry 
thither next day, to draw our men into the 
snare, and then attack them, surrounded on 
every side. This ill fortune fell upon the cav- 
alry of Rheims, whose turn it was that day 
to guard the foragers : for these, suddenly dis- 
covering the enemy's cavalry, and despising 
their small numbers, pursued with such eager- 
ness, that they were at length surprised and 
surrounded by the foot. This threw them 
into confusion, and obliged them to retreat 
hastily with the loss of Vertiscus their gene- 
ral, and the chief man of their state : who, 
though so far advanced in years that he could 
hardly sit on horseback, yet, according to the 
custom of the Gauls, would neither decline the 
command on account of his age, nor suffer 
them to fight without him. The enemy were 
animated and encouraged by this success and 
the death of the chief and general of the 
Rhemi : our men on the other hand, were cau- 
tioned by their loss, carefully to examine the 
ground before they took their posts, and pur- 
sue a retreating enemy with more reserve. 

XII. Meanwhile the daily skirmishes be- 
tween the two camps, at the fords and passes 
of the morass, still continued. In one of these, 
the Germans, whom Caesar had brought from 
I beyond the Rhine, that they might fight in- 
termingled with the cavalry, boldly passing 
I the morass in a body, put all that made resis- 
I tance to the sword, and pursued the rest with 
great vigour. Fear not only seized those who 
I fought hand to hand, or were wounded at a 



COMMENTARIES. 



201 



distance ; but even the more remote parties, 
who were posted to sustain the others, shame- 
fully betook themselves to flight; and, being 
driven from height to height, ceased not to 
continue the route, until they had reached 
their very camp ; nay, some, quite confounded 
by their fear, fled a great way bej'ond it. Their 
danger spread so universal a terror among the 
troops, that it appeared hard to say, whether 
they were more apt to be elated by a trifling ad- 
vantage, or depressed by an inconsiderable loss. 

XIII. After a stay of many days in this 
camp ; upon information that C. Trebonius 
was approaching with the legions, the gen- 
erals of the Bellovaci, fearing a siege like that 
of Alesia, sent away by night all whom age 
or infirmities rendered unfit for service ; and 
along with them the baggage of the whole 
army. But before this confused and numer- 
ous train could be put in order, (for the Gauls 
even in their sudden expeditions, are always 
attended with a vast number of carriages,) day- 
light appeared ; and the enemy were obliged 
to draw up before their camp, to hinder the 
Romans from disturbing the march of their 
baggage. Caesar did not think proper to at- 
tack them in so advantageous a post, nor was he 
willing to remove his legions to such a distance, 
as might give them an opportunity of re- 
treating without danger. Observing therefore 
that the two camps were divided by a very 
dangerous morass, the difficulty of passing 
which might greatly retard the pursuit, and 
that beyond the morass there was an eminence, 
which in a manner commanded the enemy's 
camp, and was separated from it only by a 
small valley, he laid bridges over the morass, 
passed his legions, and quickly gained the sum- 
mit of the hill, which was secured on each 
side by the steepness of the ascent. Thence 
he marched his legioijs, in order of battle, to 
the extremes! ridge, and posted them in a 
place where his engines could play upon the 
enemy's battalions. 

XIV. The Gauls, confiding in the strength 
of their post, resolved not to decline a bat- 
tle if the Romans should attack them on 
the hill ; and not daring to make their troops 
file off, for fear of being charged when sepa- 
rated and in disorder, continued in the same 
posture. Caesar perceiving their obstinacy, 
kept twenty cohorts already drawn up ; and 
marking out a camp in the place where he 
then stood, ordered it to be fortified immedi- 

18^ 



ately. The works being finished, he drew up 
his legions before the rampart, and assigned 
the cavalry their several posts, where they were 
to wait, with their horses ready bridled. The 
Bellovaci seeing the Romans prepared for the 
pursuit, and finding it impossible to pass the 
night, or continue longer in that place without 
provisions, fell upon the following stratagem 
to secure their retreat. They collected and 
placed at the head of their line all the fascines 
in the camp, of which the number was very 
great, (for, as has been already observed, the 
Gauls commonly sit upon these, when drawn 
up in order of battle,) and towards night, upon 
a signal given, set fire to them all at once. 
The flame blazing out on a sudden, with great 
violence, covered their forces from the view ol 
the Romans ; and the Gauls laying hold of 
that opportunity retreated with the utmost dili- 
gence. 

XV. Though Caesar could not perceive 
the enemy's departure, because of the flames, 
yet suspecting that this was only a contrivance 
to cover their flight, he made the legions ad- 
vance, and detached the cavalry to pursue 
them. Meanwhile, apprehending an ambus- 
cade, and that the enemy might perhaps con- 
tinue in the same post, to draw our men into a 
place of disadvantage, he took care to follow 
slowly with the foot. The cavalry not daring 
to enter that thick column of flame and smoke, 
or if any had the courage to adventure it, be- 
ing unable to discern the very heads of their 
horses, thought proper to retire for fear of a 
surprise, and left the Bellovaci at full liberty 
to escape. Thus by a flight, which equally 
spoke their fear and address, they retreated 
ten miles without loss, and encamped in a place 
of great advantage. Thence, by frequent am- 
buscades of horse and foot, they often attacked 
and cut to pieces the Roman foragers. 

XVI. Caesar having received many losses 
of this kind, understood at last by a certain 
prisoner, that Correus, general of the Bello- 
vaci, had chosen six thousand of his best foot, 
and a thousand horse, to form an ambuscade 
in a place abounding in corn and grass, and 
where it was therefore presumed the Romans 
would come to forage. Upon this intelligence, 
he drew out a greater number of legionaries 
than usual ; sent the cavalry, who formed the 
ordinary guard of the foragers, before ; inter- 
mixed them with platoons of light-armed foot, 
and advanced himself as near as possible with 

2D 



202 



PANSA'S 



the legions. The enemy, who lay in ambush, 
having chosen for the place of action a plain 
of about a mile every way, and environed on 
all sides with thick woods, or a very deep riv- 
er, which enclosed it as in a toil, disposed 
their forces all around. Our men who knew 
their design, and advanced armed and resolved 
for battle, because the legions were behind to 
sustain them, entered the plain troop by troop. 
Upon their arrival, Correus thinking that now 
was the proper time for action, appeared first 
with a few of his men, and fell upon the near- 
est squadrons. Our men resolutely sustained 
the attack, nor flocked together in crowds, as 
frequently happens umong the cavalry on oc- 
casion of sudden surprise, when the very num- 
ber of combatants throws all into confusion. 
The squadrons fighting thus in good order, 
and preserving a proper distance, to prevent 
their being taken in flank ; suddenly the rest of 
the Gauls broke from the woods, and advanced 
to the aid of those who fought under Correus. 
The contest was carried on with great heat, 
and continued for a long time with equal ad- 
vantage on both sides : when at last the foot 
advancing slowly in order of battle from the 
woods, obliged our men to give way. Upon 
this the light-armed infantry, who, as we have 
observed, had been sent before the legions, 
marched up speedily to their assistance ; and 
placing themselves in the intervals of the squa- 
drons, continued the fight. The contest again 
became equal. At length, as was natural in 
an encounter of this kind, those who had sus- 
tained the first charge of the ambuscade, began 
for this very reason to have the superiority, 
because the enemy had gained no advantage 
over them. Meanwhile the legions approached, 
and both sides had notice at the same time 
that CsBsar was advancing with his forces in 
order of battle. Our troops, animated by this 
hope, redoubled their eSbrts ; lest by pushing 
the enemy too slowly, the legions should have 
time to come in for a share of the victory. The 
enemy, on the contrary, lost courage, and fled 
different ways. But in vain : for the very dif- 
ficulties of the ground, by which they hoped 
to have ensnared the Romans, served now to 
entangle themselves. Being at last vanquish- 
ed and repulsed, with the loss of the best part 
of their men, they fled in great terror whither 
chance directed ; some towards the woods, 
some towards the river. The Romans urged 



to the sword. Meanwhile Correus, whose 
resolution no misfortune could abate, would 
neither quit the fight, and retire to the woods, 
nor accept of any offers of quarter from our 
men; but fighting on to the last with invinci- 
ble courage, and wounding many of the vic- 
torious troops, constrained them at length to 
transfix him with their javelins. 

XVII. After this action, Cssar coming up 
just as the battle was ended, and naturally 
supposing that the enemy, upon intelligence 
of so considerable a defeat, would immediate- 
ly abandon their camp, which was not above 
eight miles distant from the place of slaugh- 
ter ; though he saw his march obstructed by 
the river, he passed it notwithstanding, and ad- 
vanced with his forces against them. But the 
Bellovaci, and the other states in their alli- 
ance, hearing of their disaster by some of the 
runaways, who though wounded, found means 
to escape under cover of the woods ; and find- 
ing that every thing was against them, their 
general slain, their cavalry and the flower of 
their infantry destroyed, and the Romans 
doubtless upon the march to attack them ; 
speedily assembling a council by sound of trum- 
pet, demanded, with great cries, that ambassa- 
dors and hostages might be sent to Csesar. 

XVIII. This proposal being approved by 
all, Comius the Atrebatian fled to the Ger- 
mans, whose assistance he had obtained in the 
war. The rest immediately despatched am- 
bassadors to Csesar, and requested ; " That he 
would regard their present sufferings as a suf- 
ficient punishment for their revolt ; since they 
were such, as his humanity and clemency 
would never have suffered him to inflict upon 
them, had he compelled them to submit entire, 
and without fighting ; that their power was ut- 
terly broken by the late defeat of their cavalry ; 
that several thousand of their best infantry 
were destroyed, scarcely enough being left to 
bring them news of the disaster ; that yet in so 
great a calamity, it was no small advantage to 
the Bellovaci, that Correus, the author of the 
war, who had stirred up the multitude to revolt, 
was killed : because while he lived, the head- 
strong populace would always have had more 
authority in the state than the senate." Their 
ambassadors having ended their speech, Cse- 
sar put them in mind ; " That the year before, 
the Bellovaci had, in conjunction with the 
other states of Gaul, taken up arms against 



the pursuit with great keenness, and put many the Romans ; that, of all the confederates, 



COMMENTARIES. 



203 



they hail persisted with the greatest obstinacy 
in their revolt nor been induced by the sub- 
mission of the rest to hearken to reason ; that 
nothing was easier than to lay the blame of 
their misconduct upon the dead ; but they 
would find it difficult to make him believe, 
that a single man could have so much influ- 
ence, as, in spite of the opposition of the no- 
bility and senate, and the efforts of all good 
men, to stir up and support a war, by the mere 
authority of the multitude ; that, however, he 
would be satisfied for the present with the 
punishment they had brought upon them- 
, selves." 
H XIX. Next night the deputies returned 
with Caesar's answer, and hostages were im- 
mediately sent to the Roman camp. The de- 
puties of the other states, who only waited the 
event of this treaty, immediately flocked to 
Caesar, gave hostages, and submitted to his 
commands. Comius alone would not hear of 
treating, from a particular distrust of the Ro- 
mans. For the year before, while Caesar was 
employed in the affairs of Cisalpine Gaul, La- 
bienus understanding that Comius was solicit- 
ing several states to rebel, and join in a con- 
federacy against the Romans, thought it might 
be allowed him to use perfidy towards the per- 
fidious. And because he expected to be re- 
fused, should he send for him to the camp ; that 
he might not by an unsuccessful attempt put 
him upon his guard, he employed C, Voluse- 
nus Quadratus to kill him, under pretence of 
an interview ; furnishing him with some chosen 
centurions for that purpose. When the inter- 
view began, and Volusenus, by way of signal, 
had taken Comius by the hand ; one of the 
centurions, as if surprised at a step so unusual, 

P attempted to kill him, but Comius's friends 
hastily interposing, he was prevented ; how- 
ever, the first blow wounded him severely on 
the head. Both sides immediately drew, not 
so much with a design to engage, as to retire ; 
our men because they believed Comius mortally 
wounded ; the Gauls, because discovering the 
intended treachery, they apprehended the 
danger to be greater than as yet appeared. 
From that time Comius determined never to 
be in the same place with any Roman. 

XX, CiEsar having thus subdued the most 
warlike nations of Gaul, and finding no state 
disposed to take up arms, or make resistance, 
but that only some few had left their towns 
and possessions, to avoid present subjection, 



resolved to divide his army into several bo- 
dies. M. Antony the questor, with the eleventh 
legion, had orders to continuu with him. C. 
Fabius was sent, at the head of twenty-five 
cohorts, into the remotest parts of Gaul ; be- 
cause he understood some states were in arms 
on that side, whom C. Caninius Rebilus, his 
lieutenant, who commanded in those provinces, 
was scarcely strong enough to oppose with 
only two legions. He then sent for T. La- 
bienus, and ordered the twelfth legion, which 
he commanded, into Gallia Togata, to pro- 
tect the Roman colonies there, that they might 
not suffer by the incursions of the barbarians, 
as had happened the year before to the Ter- 
gestini, whose territories had been plundered 
by a sudden and unexpected invasion. He 
himself marched to ravage and lay waste the 
territories of Ambiorix ; for finding it impossi- 
ble to lay hold on that perfidious Gaul, whose 
fear prompted him to fly continually before 
him, he thought it behoved him, in regard to 
his own dignity, so effectually to ruin the 
country, by destroying his towns, cattle, and 
subjects, as might render him odious to his 
followers, if any still remained, and deprive 
him of all hope of being restored to his pos- 
sessions. Having spread his legions and aux- 
iliaries over the whole country of Ambiorix, 
destroyed all with fire and sword, and either 
killed or made prisoners an infinite number of 
people, he despatched Labienus, with two le- 
gions, against the Treviri ; whose country, 
bordering upon Germany, and exercised in 
continual wars, differed little from the tem- 
per and fierceness of that nation ; nor ever 
submitted to his commands, unless enforced 
by the presence of an army. 

XXI. Meantime C. Caninius, lieutenant- 
general, understanding by letters and messen- 
gers from Duracius, who had always continued 
faithful to the Romans, even in the defection 
of many of his own state, that great numbers of 
the enemy were assembled in the territories 
of the Pictones ; marched towards the town 
of Limo. Upon his arrival there, having 
certain information from some prisoners, that 
Duracius was shut up and besieged in Limo, 
by a great army of Gauls, under the conduct 
of Dumnacus, general of the Andes, as he 
was not strong enough to attack the enemy, 
he encamped in a place of great advantage. 
Dumnacus, hearing of his approach, turned 
all his forces against the legions, and resolved 



204 



PANSA'S 



to invest the Roman camp. But after many 
days spent in the attack, and the loss of a 
great number of men, without any impression 
made upon the intrenchments, he returned 
again to the siege of Limo. 

XXII. At the same time, C. Fabius, having 
brought over many states to their duty, and 
confirmed their submission by receiving host- 
ages, upon intelUgence sent him by Caninius, 
of the posture of affairs among the Pictones, 
marched immediately to the assistance of 
Duracius. Dumnacus hearing of his arrival, 
and concluding himself lost, should he at the 
same time be obliged to make head against an 
enemy without, and sustain the efforts of the 
townsmen within, suddenly decamped with 
all his forces, resolving not to stop till he had 
got oil the other side of the Loire, which, by 
reason of its largeness, could not be passed 
without a bridge. Fabius, though he had 
neither as yet come within sight of the ene- 
my, nor joined forces with Caninius ; yet in- 
structed by those who were well acquainted 
with the Country, easily conjectured the route 
the Gauls would take. Wherefore directing 
his march towards the same bridge, he or- 
dered the cavalry to keep before the legions ; 
yet so, that without too much fatiguing their 
horses, they might return and encamp with 
them again at night. The cavalry followed 
the enemy as directed ; came up with their 
rear ; and attacking them flying, dismayed 
and encumbered with their baggage, killed 
great numbers, gained a considerable booty, 
and returned in triumph to the camp. 

XXIII. The night following, Fabius sent 
the cavalry before, with orders to engage the 
enemy, and keep the whole army employed, 
till he himself should come up with the 
legions. Q. Alius Varus, a prudent and ex- 
perienced officer, who had the charge of the 
detachment, desirous to execute the commands 
of his general with success, exhorted his men ; 
and coming up with the enemy, disposed some 
squadrons in the most convenient places, and 
engaged the Gauls with the rest. The enemy's 
cavalry made a resolutestand, being supported 
by their foot, who halting in a body, advanced 
to the assistance of their own men. The con- 
flict was sharp on both sides. For the Eo- 
mans, despising enemies whom they had over- 
come the day before, and remembering that 
the legions were coming up to join them ; 



partly ashamed to give way, partly eager to 
bring the battle to a speedy issue by their 
own valour alone, fought with great bravery 
against the enemy's foot. And the Gauls, 
who had no apprehension of the approach of 
more forces, because none other had appeared 
the day before, fancied they had now a favoura- 
ble opportunity of cutting off our cavalry. As 
the fight continued with great obstinacy for a 
considerable time, Dumnacus advanced with 
the foot, in battle array, to sustain the horse ; 
when suddenly the legions, marching in close 
order, appeared within view of the enemy. 
This sight discomposed the Gallic squadrons, 
and producing a universal confusion through 
the whole armj^, which spread even to the 
baggage and carriages, they with great up- 
roar and tumult betook themselves to a pre- 
cipitate flight. But our horse, who a little 
before had fought against an enemy who 
vigorously opposed them, now elated with the 
joy of victory, surrounded them with great 
cries, and urged the slaughter as far as the 
strength of their horses to pursue, and the 
vigour of their right hands to destroy, were 
able to bear them out. Upwards of twelve 
thousand perished on this occasion, partly in 
the battle, partly in the pursuit ; and the 
whole baggage was taken. 

XXIV. After this rout. Drapes, of the na- 
tion of the Senones, (who upon the first re- 
volt of Gaul had drawn together a band of 
desperate men, invited slaves to join him by 
the hopes of liberty, assembled all the fugi- 
tives he could find, received even public 
robbers into his service, and with that profli- 
gate crew intercepted the Roman convoys 
and baggage,) having rallied about five thou- 
sand runaways, directed his march towards 
the province; being joined by Luterius of 
Quercy, who as we have seen in the foregoing 
book, had attempted an invasion on that side 
at the first breaking out of the war. Caninius, 
having notice of this design, marched in pur- 
suit of them with two legions, to prevent any 
alarm in those parts, and hinder the province 
from falling a prey to the ravages of a desperate 
and needy crew. 

XXV. Fabius, with the rest of his army, 
marched against the Carnutes, and other 
states, whose forces had served under Dum- 
nacus, in the late action : for he made no doubt 
of finding them humbled by so great a bloW ; 



COMMENTARIES. 



205 



and was unwilling, by any delay, to give 
Dumnacus an opportunity of rousing them to 
a continuance of the war. In this expedition, 
Fabius had all the success he could desire ; 
the several states submitting immediately upon 
his approach. For the Carnutes, who though 
often harassed, had never yet made mention 
of peace, now surrendered, and gave hostages ; 
and the other states, inhabiting the more re- 
mote parts of Gaul, bordering upon the ocean, 
and known by the name of Armorica, influ- 
enced by their authority, and the arrival of 
Fabius and his legions, readily accepted the 
terms he offered them. Dumnacus, expelled his 
territories, and forced to wander and hide him- 
self in lurking holes, at length escaped into the 
farthest parts of Gaul. 

XXVI. But Drapes and Luterius, under- 
standing that Caninius was in pursuit of them 
with the legions ; and sensible that having an 
army at their heels, they could not, without 
certain destruction, make an irruption into the 
province, nor safely indulge themselves in the 
liberty of plundering and ravaging the coun- 
try ; halted in the territories of the Cadurci. 
As Luterius, during his prosperity, had borne 
considerable sway in the state, been always in 
great reputation with the multitude, as the au- 
thor of new and enterprising counsels : he seiz- 
ed upon Uxellodunum, a town strongly fortifi- 
ed by nature, which had formerly been under 
his patronage ; and prevailed with the inhabi- 
tants to join his and Drapes's forces. 

XXVII. Caninius soon arrived before the 
place, which he found surrounded on every 
side with steep rocks, so very difficult of access, 
that it was hardly possible for armed troops to 
ascend them even where there were no oppo- 
sers. But knowing that there was avast quan- 
tity of baggage in the town, which could not 
be conveyed away so privately as to escape the 
legions, much less the cavalry, he divided his 
army into three bodies ; and encamping on 
three remarkable eminences, resolved gradu- 
ally, and as the number of his troops would al- 
low, to carry a line of circumvallation quite 
round the town, which the garrison perceiv- 
ing, began to dread the fate of their country- 
men at Alesia, especially Luterius, who had 
been present at that formidable siege, and 
therefore advised them to lay in store of corn. 
Accordingly, they resolved with unanimous 
consent to leave part of the forces to defend 
the town, and march out with the rest to fetch 



provisions. This resolution being taken, the 
following night, Luterius and Drapes, leaving 
two thousand men in the place, marched at the 
head of all the rest. These, in a few days, 
drew together a vast quantity of corn in the 
territories of the Cadurci, who partly stood in- 
clined to assist them in their present exi- 
gence, partly were unable to hinder their car- 
rying it off. Sometimes they attacked our 
posts by night, which made Caninius delay 
the circumvallation of the town, fearing he 
would not be able to defend the line, or man 
it sufficiently in all parts. 

XXVIII. Luterius and Drapes having got 
a great quantity of corn, took up their quarters 
about ten miles from the town, that they might 
convey it thither by degrees. Each chose his 
particular part : Drapes stayed behind with 
part of the army to guard the camp ; Luterius 
set forward with the convoy. Having disposed 
parties along the road for the greater security, 
he began his march towards the town about 
four in the morning, by narrow ways, through 
the woods. But our sentinels hearing a noise, 
and intelligence being brought by the scouts of 
what was doing, Caninius speedily drew some 
cohorts together from the nearest posts, and 
fell upon the convoy about day-break ; who, 
surprised at so unexpected an attack, retreated 
towards their guard. Our men perceiving 
this, fell with redoubled fury upon the escort, 
giving quarter to none. Luterius escaped 
with a few followers, but returned not to the 
camp. 

XXIX. Caninius having succeeded in this 
action, understood from the prisoners that 
Drapes was encamped about ten miles off, with 
the rest of the army. This being confirmed 
from many hands ; as he supposed it would be 
easy to overwhelm them, after the terror oc- 
casioned by the defeat of one of their leaders, 
he thought it very fortunate that none of the 
fugitives had retreated towards the camp, to 
inform Drapes of the disaster. As there was 
therefore no hazard in the attempt, he ordered 
all the cavalry, with the German infantry, who 
were of remarkable swiftness, to advance be- 
fore ; and having distributed one legion into 
his three camps, followed them with the other, 
without baggage. As he drew near the ene- 
my he was informed by his scouts, whom he 
had sent before, that the Gauls, according to 
custom, had pitched their camp at the foot of 
a mountain by the river-side, and that the Ger- 



206 



PANSA'S 



man foot, and cavalry, coming suddenly and 
unexpectedly upon them, had begun the fight. 
Upon this intelligence, he brought forward 
the legion in order of battle, and giving the 
signal of onset, soon possessed himself of the 
higher ground. The Germans, and cavalry, 
encouraged by the ensigns of the legions, re- 
doubled their efforts. The cohorts threw 
themselves in crowds upon the enemy, and 
having either slain or made them all prisoners, 
obtained a considerable booty. Drapes him- 
self was taken in the battle. 

XXX. Caninius, after so fortunate an ac- 
tion, in which scarce any of his soldiers had 
been wounded, returned to the siege of Uxel- 
lodunum. Having got rid of the enemy with- 
out, who had obliged him to augment his gar- 
risons, and postpone the works about the 
place, he now resumed them with great dili- 
gence, and was the next day joined by Fabius 
and his forces, who undertook one side of the 
town. 

XXXI. Meantime Csesar, leaving M. An- 
tony the questor, with fifteen chariots, in the 
country of the Bellovaci, to prevent any new 
insurrections among the Belgians ; marched 
himself into other states, to enjoin hostages, 
and allay their fears. When he arrived among 
the Carnutes, by whom the war was first be- 
gun, as Caesar has mentioned in the preceding 
book; observing that they in a particular 
manner dreaded his resentment, from a con- 
sciousness of their guilt ; that he might the 
sooner free them from their fears, he desired 
them to deliver up to justice Guturvatus, the 
prime mover and incendiary of that war ; who, 
though he hid himself even from his own 
countrymen, yet being diligently sought after 
by a whole people, was soon brought to Cee- 
sar's camp. Csesar, contrary to his natural 
clemency, was constrained to give him up to 
punishment by his soldiers, who imputed to 
Guturvatus all the losses they had sustained, 
and all the dangers they had been exposed to 
during the war. Accordingly he was scourged 
and beheaded. 

XXXII. Here he was informed, by fre- 
quent advices from Caninius, of the defeat of 
Drapes and Luterius, and the resolution taken 
by the garrison of Uxellodunum. Though he 
despised them on account of the smallness of 
their number, he yet thought their obstinacy 
deserved the severest chastisement : that Gaul 
Might not run into a persuasion, that not 



strength, but constancy, had been wanting, to 
enable them to resist the Romans ; which 
might perhaps induce other states, who had 
the advantage of strong towns, to assert their 
liberty ; it being universally known in Gaul, 
that only one year of his government remain- 
ed ; during which, if they could hold but out, 
they had no further danger to apprehend. 
Leaving therefore the two legions he had then 
with him to the care of Q. Calenus his lieuten- 
ant, with orders to follow him by easy march- 
es ; he himself, at the head of all the cavalry, 
hastened to Uxellodunum, to forward the 
siege begun by Caninius. 

XXXIII. He arrived before the town, un- 
expected either by his own troops, or those oi 
the enemy ; saw the circumvallation complet- 
ed ; and that there was no qutting the siege 
without dishonour ; but understanding from 
the deserters, that the place was well stored 
with provisions, he resolved, if possible, to 
cut off their water. Uxellodunum stood up- 
on a steep rock, surrounded almost on every 
side by a very deep valley, through which ran 
a river. There was no possible way of turn- 
ing the course of this stream ; because it flow- 
ed by the foot of the rock in so low a channel, 
that ditches could not be sunk deep enough 
to receive iti But the descent was so difficult 
and steep, that the townsmen, in coming to 
and returning from it, lay greatly exposed to 
our troops, who might wound and kill them at 
pleasure. This being known to Ctesar, he 
posted his archers and slingers, with some en- 
gines, over against the places of easiest access, 
and thereby hindered their approach to the 
river. This obliged the whole multitude to 
water at one place, close under the walls of the 
town, whence issued a very plentiful fountain 
on the side where the river intermitted its cir- 
cuit, and left an opening of about three hun- 
dred feet. The whole army were desirous to 
deprive the besieged of this resource ; but 
Csesar alone discovered the means of affecting 
it. He brought forward his galleries, and be- 
gan a terrace over against the mountain, with 
much danger to the soldiers, incredible fatigue, 
and a continued series of fighting. For the 
garrison rushing furiously upon us from the 
higher ground, charged without danger, and 
wounded great numbers of our men, as they 
advanced obstinately to the combat ; yet with- 
out deterring them from bringing forward their 
machines, and by their works and assiduity 



COMMENTARIES. 



207 



surmounting the difficulties of the ground. At 
the same time they carried on their mines, 
from the terrace and galleries, quite to the foun- 
tain ; a kind of work in which they proceeded 
without danger or suspicion. A terrace was 
raised sixty feet high, and a tower of ten 
stories placed upon it ; not indeed to equal 
the height of the walls, for which no works 
were sufficient ; but to command the top of the 
spring. From this tower we were continually 
playing our engines upon all the accesses to 
the fountain, which made it extremely dan- 
gerous to water at the place ; insomuch that 
not only cattle and beasts of carriage, but 
great numbers of people perished by thirst. 

XXXIV. The enemy, terrified at this dis- 
aster, filled several barrels with tallow, pitch, 
and dry wood ; and having set them on fire, 
rolled them down upon the works. At the 
same time they charged the Romans with 
great fury, that the anxiety and danger of the 
battle might hinder them from extinguishing 
the flames. The conflagration soon became 
general ; for whatever was rolled down from 
above, being stopped by the machines and ter- 
race, communicated the flame to that part. 
But our soldiers, though engaged in a danger- 
ous kind of fight, because of the inequality 
of the ground, yet bore all with great firm- 
ness and resolution. For the action was 
in a conspicuous place, within view of our ar- 
my, and great shouts were raised on both 
sides. Thus every one was the more ardent 
to signalize himself, and brave the flames and 
darts of the enemy, as his bravery would be 
better known, and have the testimony of many 
witnesses. 

XXXV. Csesar seeing many of his soldiers 
wounded, ordered the cohorts to ascend the 
mountain on all sides, and, as if preparing to 
scale the walls, raise a mighty shout. This 
alarmed the inhabitants, who not knowing 
what passed in other parts, recalled their 
troops from the attack, and disposed them 
along the walls. Thus our men, being relieved 
from the battle, soon found means to extin- 
guish or put a stop to the flames. But as the 
besieged still continued to defend themselves 
with great obstinacy, and notwithstanding the 
loss of the greatest part of their number by 
thirst, persisted in their first resolution ; Cae- 
sar at last contrived to drain or avert the 
spring by mines. Upon this the fountain 
suddenly becoming dry, so effectually deprived 



the besieged of all hopes of safety, that they 
imagined it an event brought about, not by 
human counsels, but by the will of the gods : 
and therefore, compelled by necessity, imme- 
diately surrendered themselves. 

XXXVI. Caesar conscious that his cle- 
mency was known to all, and no way fearing 
that his severity on this occasion would be im- 
puted to any cruelty of nature ; as he perceived 
there would be no end of the war, if other 
states, in dlfierent parts of Gaul, should, in 
like manner, form the design of a revolt ; re- 
solved, by a signal example of punishment, to 
defer them from all such projects. He there- 
fore cut off the hands of all whom he found 
in arms ; granting them their lives, that their 
punishment might be the more conspicuous. 
Drapes who, as we have said, had been made 
prisoner by Caninius; either out of indigna- 
tion at finding himself a captive, or dreading a 
severe fate, put an end to his life, by abstain, 
ing from food. At the same time, Luterius, 
who had escaped out of the battle, falling in- 
to the hands of Epasnactus of Auvergne, (for, 
by continually moving from place to place, he 
was obliged to confide in many, because he 
could stay no where long without danger, and 
knew the little reason he had to expect favour 
from Ca;sar,) was, by him, a great favourer of 
the Roman people, delivered, without hesita- 
tion, bound, to Caesar. 

XXXVII. In the meantime Labienus en- 
gaged the cavalry of the Treviri with success : 
and having killed a considerable number on 
the spot, as likewise many Germans, who were 
always ready to join against the Romans, 
made the greatest part of their chiefs prison- 
ers ; and, among the rest, Sums the ^duan, 
a nobleman of distinguished birth and valour, 
and the only one of that nation, who had con- 
tinued until then in arms. Upon notice of 
this victory, Caesar, who saw his affairs in a 
flourishing condition in Gaul, and that his last 
campaigns had completed the subjection of 
the whole country ; resolved upon a journey 
to Aquitain, where he had never yet been in 
person, though P. Crassus had in part re- 
duced it to his obedience. He therefore set out 
for that country with two legions, designing 
to spend there the rest of the campaign. This 
expedition was attended with the desired suc- 
cess : for all the states of Aquitain sent am- 
oassadors to him, and delivered hostages. He 
then went with a guard of cavalry to Nar- 



208 



PANSA'S 



bonne, and distributed iiis array into winter 
quarters, under the care of his lieutenants. 
M, Antony, C. Trebonius, P. Vatinius, and 
Q. Tullius, were quartered in Belgium, with 
four legions. Two were sent into the country 
of the ^duans, whom he knew to be the most 
powerful people in Gaul ; two into that of the 
Turones, bordering upon the Carnutes, to hold 
the maritime states in awe : and the remaining 
two were stationed among the Lemovices, not 
far from Auvergne, that none of the provinces 
of Gaul might be destitute of troops. He re- 
mained some days at Narbonne, held all the 
usual assemblies of the province, decided the 
differences subsisting among the people, re- 
compensed those who had distinguished them- 
selves by their faithful services ; Tfor he had 
a wonderful faculty of discerning how men 
stood affected in the general revolt of Gaul, 
which he had been able to sustain, merely by 
the fidelity and assistance of the province ;) 
and having despatched all these affairs, re- 
paired to the legions in Belgium, and took up 
his winter quarters at Nometocenna. 

XXXVIII. Here he was informed that 
Comius of Arras had had an engagement with 
his cavalry. For, after the arrival of Antony 
in his winter quarters, as the Atrebatians, 
awed by his presence, continued in their duty 
to Csesar ; Comius, who, ever since the wound 
above-mentioned, had kept a watchful eye 
upon all the motions of his countrymen, that, 
in case of war, he might be ready to offer 
them his counsel and assistance ; finding that 
the state now submitted quietly to the Romans, 
applied his troops to support himself and his 
followers by plunder; and often carried off 
the convoys that were going to the Roman 
winter quarters. 

XXXIX. Among those who commanded 
under Antony, in his winter quarters, was C. 
Volusenus Quadratus, an. officer of the first 
rank among the horse. Him Antony sent in 
pursuit of the enemy's cavalry. Volusenus, 
to his natural bravery, which he possessed in 
an eminent degree, added a particular hatred 
of Comius, which induced him the more readi- 
ly to accept of this commission. Accordingly, 
having planted his ambuscades, he found 
means frequently to engage the enemy, and 
always came off victorious. At last, a very 
warm dispute ensuing; and Volusenus, 
through an eager desire of making Comius 
prisoner, urging the chase with only a few at- 



tendants, while Comius, by a hasty retreat, 
drew him a considerable way from his party 
suddenly, the latter, invoking the assistance 
of his followers, called upon them to revenge 
the wound he had treacherously received from 
the Romans ; and turning short upon our de- 
tachment, advanced without precaution to- 
wards Volusenus. All his cavalry did the 
same, and soon put our small party to flight. 
Comius, clapping spurs to his horse, ran furi- 
ously against Quadratus, and drove his lance 
through his thigh. Our men, seeing their 
commander wounded, instantly faced about, 
and forced the enemy to give ground. In 
this last attack, the Gauls, after a considerable 
slaughter, were entirely routed by the vigor- 
ous charge of our cavalry. Some were trod- 
den to death in the pursuit, others made pri- 
soners ; but Comius escaped by the swiftness 
of his horse. Volusenus being dangerously 
wounded, almost beyond hope of recovery, 
was carried back to the camp. Comius, either 
satisfied with the revenge he had taken, or 
apprehensive he must at least be ruined, as he 
continually lost some of his men, sent a depu- 
ation to Antony, offering to retire wher- 
ever he should order him, to submit to what- 
ever should be imposed on him, and to give 
hostages for the performance of these condi- 
tions ; he only requested, that so much regard 
might be shown to his just fears, as not to have 
it insisted on that he should appear before any 
Roman. Antony, conscious that his appre- 
hensions were but too well grounded, excused 
him, took hostages, and granted him peace. 

Csesar, I know, assigns a distinct book to 
each of his several campaigns. But I have 
not judged it necessary to pursue this method ; 
because the ensuing year, under the consul- 
ship of L. Paulus, and C. Marcellus, fur- 
nishes nothing memorable transacted in Gaul. 
However, that none may be ignorant where 
Caesar and his army were during this time, I 
have subjoined a short account to the present 
commentary. 

XL. CaBsar, during the time of his winter 
quarters in Belgium, made it his whole study 
to ingratiate himself with the Gauls, and de- 
prive them of all pretence or colour for a re- 
volt. For there was nothing he more earnestly 
desired, than to leave Gaul peaceably dispos- 
ed at his departure ; lest, when he was about 
to withdraw his army, any sparks of rebellion 
should remain, which would infallibly rekindle 



COMMENTARIES. 



209 



into a war, were the Koman troops once re- 
moved. Wherefore, by treating the several 
states with respect, liberally rewarding their 
chiefs, and abstaining from the imposition of 
new burdens, he easily prevailed with the 
Gauls, wearied and exhausted by long unsuc- 
cessful wars, to embrace the ease and quiet at- 
tendant on their present submission. 

XLI. The winter being over, contrary to 
his custom, he posted, by long journeys, into 
Italy, to visit the municipal towns and colonies 
of Cisalpine Gaul, and engage their interest 
in favour of M. Antony, his questor, who was 
then a candidate for the priesthood. He the 
more warmly interested himself in this affair, 
not only as it was in behalf of a man united 
to him by the strictest ties of friendship, but 
as it likewise gave him an opportunity of op- 
posing a small faction, who aimed to diminish 
Caesar's credit, by repulsing Antony. Al- 
though he heard upon the road, before he 
reached Italy, that Antony had been made 
augur, he still thought it incumbent upon him 
to visit the municipal towns and colonies of 
the province ; in order to thank them for the 
zeal they had shown in behalf of his friend, 
and to recommend them his own petition for 
the consulship of the ensuing year. For his 
enemies every where boasted, that L. Lentul- 
us and C. Marcellus had been chosen consuls, 
in the view of despoiling him of all his hon- 
ours and dignities ; and that Sergius Galba 
had been excluded, though much the strong- 
est in the number of votes, because of his 
known intimacy with Cssar, and having 
served under him as lieutenant. 

XLII. He was received every where with 
incredible honours, and the warmest testimo- 
nies of the people's affection. For this was the 
first time he had appeared among them since 
the total reduction of Gaul. Nothing was 
omitted that could contribute to the ornament 
of the gates, ways, and places through which 
he was to pass. The people, with their chil- 
dren, came out to meet him ; sacrifices were 
offered in all parts ; tables, richly spread, 
were placed in the public squares and temples : 
and so great was the magnificence displayed 
by the rich, such the eagerness of the poor to 
express their satisfaction, that every thing 
wore the face of a most splendid triumph. 

XLIII. Cffisai, having visited the several 
provinces of Cisalpine Gaul, returned, in all 
haste, to the army at Nemetocenna; and or- 
19 



dering the legions to quit their winter quarters, 
and rendezvous in the territories of the Tre- 
viri, went thither and reviewed them in per- 
son. He gave the government of Cisalpine 
Gaul to Labienus, the better to reconcile him 
to his demand of the consulship ; and marched 
the army from place to place, that by the mo- 
tion and change of air, he might prevent any 
sickness getting among the troops. Although 
he often heard, that Labienus was strongly so- 
licited by his enemies ; and was, for certain, 
informed, that some were labouring, by means 
of the senate's authority, to deprive him of part 
of his army ; yet neither did he credit any re- 
ports to Labienus's disadvantage, nor could be 
induced to set himself in opposition to the au- 
thority of the senate. For he made no doubt 
of obtaining his demand by the free suffrages 
of the fathers ; and the rather, because C. 
Curio, tribune of the people, having under- 
taken the defence of Csesar's cause and digni- 
ty, had often proposed in the senate ; " That 
if Caesar's army gave umbrage to any, as Pom- 
pey was no less formidable to the true friends 
of liberty, both should be ordered to dismiss 
their troops, and return to a private condition, 
which would entirely free the commonwealth 
from all apprehensions of danger." Nor did 
he only propose this, but even began to put it 
to the vote. But the consuls and Pompey's 
friends interposed, which hindered the senate 
from coming to any resolution. 

XLIV. This was an authentic testimony 
from the whole senate, and agreeable to what 
had passed on a former occasion. For when 
Marcellus who strove to render himself con- 
siderable by opposing Caesar, had proposed, 
the year before, contrary to the law of Pompey 
and Crassus, to recall Caesar before his com- 
mission was expired, the overture was reject- 
ed by a very full house. J3ut this, instead of 
discouraging Coesar's enemies, only pushed 
them on to new attempts, that they might, at 
length, bring the senate into their measures. 

XLV. A Se7iatits CoiisiilUim soon after 
passed, that one legion from Pompey, and an- 
other from Caesar, should be sent to the Par- 
thian war. But it was visibly their design to 
take both legions from Caesar alone. For 
Pompey offered the first legion for that ser- 
vice, which he had lent some time before to Cae- 
sar, having raised it in his province. But 
Caesar, though now fully satisfied of the ill de- 
signs of his enemies, readily sent back Pom- 
2 B 



no 



PANSA'S COMMENTARIES. 



pey's legion; and in compliance with the de- 
cree of the senate, ordered the fifteenth, one 
of his own number, which was then in hither 
Gaul, to be delivered to their commissioners ; 
and sent the thirteenth into Italy to replace it, 
and supply the garrison whence it had been 
drawn. He then put his army into winter 
quarters. C. Trebonius, with four legions, 
was ordered into the country of the Belgians ; 
and C. Fabius, with the like number, was 
placed among the ^duans. For thus he 
thought Gaul was most likely to be kept in 
subjection ; if the Belgse, the most renowned 
for their valour, and the ^duans, the most 



considerable for their authority, were awed by 
the presence of two armies. 

XLVI. After this he returned into Italy, 
where he understood, that the two legions he 
had sent, in conformity to the decree of the 
senate, to be employed in the Parthian war, 
had been delivered, by the Consul Marcellus, 
to Pompey, and were by him still detained in 
Italy. Although by this it was abundantly 
evident, that they were preparing to take up 
arms against him, he yet resolved to suffer 
any thing, while any hope remained of adjust- 
ing their differences by the methods of peace 
rather than those of violence and war. 



CJESAR'S COMMENTARIES 



OF 



THE CIVIL WAR. 



BOOK I. 



311 



THE ARGUMENT. 

I. Different opinions in the senate in relation to Caesar's letter.— HI. Tlie origin and causes of the opposition 
formed against him. — IV. Tlie senate's severe decree, and flight of Caesar's friends. — T. War against Caesar 
resolved on. — VI. Caesar harangues his troops.— VII. Pompey sends proposals of peace. — YU\. Caesar's an- 
swer. — IX. Pompey sends proposals a second time. — ^X. Which not pleasing Caesar, he prepares for war.— 
XI. Caesar makes himself master of Iguvium and Ausimum. — XII. Which so alarms his enemies at Rome, 
that they hastily quit the city, and retire to Capua. — Xill. Cssar by his expedition, obliges many of the towns 
in Italy to submit. — XXIII. Pompey, after the reduction of Corfinium by Caesar, withdraws with his troops to 
Brundusium. — XXIV. Caesar besieges him there. — XXVT. He escapes by sea, after which the town surren- 
der. — XXVin. Caesar cannot pursue him for want of a fleet. — ^XXIX. Valerius and Curio, partisans of C»sar, 
drive Cotta from Sardinia, and Cato from Sicily. Varus compels Tubero to desist from his design upon 
Africa. — XXX. Caesar's speech to the senate. — XXXI. Which producing no effect, he sets out for Transal- 
pine Gaul.— XXXII. The people of Marseilles shut their gates against Cassar. — XXXIV. Who commands 
Brutus and Treboniusto besiege the place.— XXXV. Fabius sent before into Spain. — XXXIX. Caesar follows, 
and comes up with Afranius andPetreius at Lerida. — XLI. A skirmish, with almost equal advantage on both 
sides. — XL VI. A sudden storm having broke down his bridges, Caesar is shut up between two rivers. — Xl.VIII. 
And reduced to great straits for want of provisions. — LI. He extricates himself at length, and surprises the 
enemy's foragers. — LH. Brutus defeats the people of Marseilles in a sea-fight. — Lm. Caesar obtains the su- 
periority near Lerida. — LIV. Many states declare for him. — LV. Afranius and Petreius remove towards 
Celtiberia. — LVI. Caesar pursues them with his cavalry. — LVn. Then drawing out the legions, continues 
to urge them in their retreat. — LXIV. He cuts off their provisions. — LXVI. Afranius and Petreius's men talk 
with Caesar's about a surrender.— LXVII. Petreius interrupts the conference.— LXVIII. And obliges the 
soldiers to take an oath of fidelity to their generals. — ^LXX. Wlio, finding both their provisions and forage 
intercepted, resolve to return to Lerida. — LXXI. Caesar follows, and greatly molests them in their march. — 
TiX.X III. At length, water, forage, and every thing failing them, they are forced to sue for peace, and accept 
of Caesar's terms. 



212 



THE SUPPLEMENT 



DIONYSIUS VOSSIUS TO CtESAR'S FIRST BOOK 



THE CIVIL WAR 



I THINK it needless to say any thing here, in 
opposition to those who pretend, that the fol- 
lowing Commentaries, concerning the Civil 
War, were not penned by Csesar himself. We 
have not only the express testimony of Sue- 
tonius to the contrary, but the very style suffi- 
ciently declares, that Csesar alone could be the 
author of the work. There is room however 
to suspect, from the abrupt manner in which 
the subject is introduced, that the beginning 
of this first book is wanting : for history takes 
notice of several previous facts, of which no 
mention is made here. I have therefore col- 
lected out of Plutarch, Appian, and Dion, as 
much as was necessary to connect this and the 
former Commentary, and fancy it will not be 
disagreeable to the reader, to offer it here by 
way of Preface. 

Gaul being wholly reduced, Cjesar, upon 
his arrival in Lombardy, thought proper, for 
many reasons, to send deputies to Rome, to 
demand the consulship, and a prolongation of 
his command. Pompey, who, though averse to 
CsBsar's interest, had .not yet openly declared 
against him, neither furthered nor opposed 
his request. But the consuls Marcellus and 
Lentulus, who had already joined the party of 
his enemies, resolved by every method in their 
power to frustrate the design. Marcellus scru- 
pled not to add other injuries to that of which 
we speak. For Csesar had lately planted a 
colony at Novocomum in Cisalpine Gaul ; and 
Marcellus, not satisfied with stripping the in- 
habitants of the privilege of Roman citizens, 
seized one of their chief magistrates at Rome, 
ordered him to be scourged, and then dis- 
19* 



missed him to carry his complaints to CiEsar, 
an ignominy from which all free citizens were 
expressly exempted by the laws. While af- 
fairs were in this train, C. Curio, tribune of 
the people, came to Ctesar in Gaul. This no- 
bleman, after many attempts in behalf of the 
commonwealth, and to promote Cajsar's inter- 
est ; finding at length all his endeavours with- 
out effect, fled from Rome, to avoid the ma- 
lice of his enemies, and informed Ca3sar of all 
that was transacted against him. Casar re- 
ceived him with great marks of respect, as 
well on account of his rank in the common- 
wealth, as the many services he had done him- 
self and the state ; and thanked him for the 
signal zeal he had shown in his cause. But 
Curio advised him, since his enemies were 
now openly preparing for war, to draw his 
army together without delay, and rescue the 
commonwealth from the tyranny of an as- 
piring faction. Csesar, though fully satisfied 
of the truth of Curio's report, resolved to sacri- 
fice all other considerations to the public tran- 
quillity, that no man might justly charge him 
with being the author of a civil war. He there- 
fore only petitioned by his friends, that, the 
government of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, 
with the command of two legions, might be 
continued to him, in all which his principal 
aim was, by the equity of his demands, to in- 
duce his enemies to grant peace to the com- 
monwealth. These offers appeared so reason- 
able, that even Pompey himself knew not hov/ 
to oppose them. But the consuls still continu- 
ing inflexiblej Cssar wrote a letter to the 
senate, wherein, after briefly enumerating his 
213 



214 



SUPPLEMENT 



exploits and services, he requested them not to 
deprivehimofthebenefit of the people's favour, 
who had permitted him to sue for the consul- 
ship in his absence. He protested his readi- 
ness, if such was the resolution of the senate 
and people of Rome, to dismiss his army, 
provided Pompey did the same : but could by 
no means resolve, so long as he continued in 
command and authority, to divest himself of 
troops, and lay himself open to the injuries of 
his enemies. Curio was commissioned to 



carry this letter, who travelling with incredible 
despatch, reached Rome in three days (a dis- 
tance of a hundred and sixty miles,) before the 
beginning of January, and ere the consuls 
could get any thing determined relating to 
Csesar's command. Curio, upon his arrival, 
refused to part with the letter, resolving not to 
deliver it but in fall senate, and when the tri- 
bunes of the people were present : for he was 
apprehensive, should he do otherwise, that the 
consuls would suppress it. 



CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 



OF 



THE CIVIL WAR. 



BOOK I, 



I. CajSAR's letter being delivered to the con- 
suls, the tribunes, with much difficulty, pro- 
cured it a reading in the senate ; but could by 
no means prevail to have his demands brought 
under deliberation. The consuls proposed to 
debate upon the state of the republic. " Len- 
tulus promised to stand by the senate and the 
people, if they would deliver their sentiments 
with freedom and courage ; but if they re- 
garded Csesar, and affected to court his friend- 
ship, as had been the practice for some time 
past, he knew, he told them, what he had to 
do, and was determined to disclaim their 
authority ; not doubting but he would find a 
ready admittance to the favour and protection 
of Cffisar." Scipio spoke much to the same 
purpose : " That Pompey was firmly bent not 
to abandon the republic, if he found the sena- 
tors read}' to support him ; but if they cooled, 
or were remiss in their resolves, it would be 
in vain for them to expect his aid, if they saw 
cause afterwards to apply for it." This 
speech of Scipio, as the senate was held in the 
city, and Pompey resided in the suburbs, was 
considered as coming from Pompey's own 
mouth. Some were for following milder 
counsels, of which number was M. Marcellus, 
who gave it as his opinion : " That it was 
not proper to enter upon the present delibera- 
tion, till troops were raised over all Italy, and 
an army got ready, under whose protection 
the senate might proceed with freedom and 
safety in their debates." " Callidius was for 
sending Pompey to his government, to take 
away all occasion of discord; because Csesar 
had reason to fear, as two of his legions had 



been taken from him, that Pompey retained 
them in the neighbourhood of Rome, with a 
view to employ them against him." M. Ru- 
fus nearly agreed with Callidius. But they 
were all severely reprimanded by the consul 
Lentulus, who expressly refused to put Cal- 
lidius's motion to the vote. Marcellus, awed 
by the consul's reprimand, retracted what he 
had said. Thus the clamours of Lentulus, the 
dread of an army at the gates of Rome, and 
the menaces of Pompey's friends, forced the 
greater part of the senate, though with the 
utmost reluctance and dislike, into a compli- 
ance with Scipio's motion : " That Caesar 
should be ordered to disband his army before 
a certain day then fixed ; and that in case of 
disobedience, he should be declared an enemy 
to the republic." M. Antonius and Q. Cas- 
sius, tribunes of the people, opposed their 
negative to this decree. Immediately a de- 
bate arose, upon the validity of their inter- 
position. Many severe speeches were made 
against them ; and the more warm and pas- 
sionate any one appeared, the more was he 
applauded by Caesar's enemies. 

II. In the evening the senate rose ; and 
Pompey sending for all those of his party, com- 
mended the forward; confirmed them in their 
resolutions ; reproved and animated the more 
moderate. Multitudes of veterans who had 
formerly served under him, flocked to him 
from all parts, allured by the expectation of 
rewards and dignities. A great number of 
officers belonging to the two legions lately re- 
turned by Caesar, had likewise orders to attend 
him. Rome was filled with troops. Curio 
21.5 



216 



CiESAR'S 



assembled the tribunes to support the decree 
of the people. On the other hand, all the 
friends of the consuls, all the partizans of 
Pompey, and of such as bore any ancient 
grudge to Cssar, repaired to the senate : by 
■whose concourse and votes the weaker sort 
were terrified, the irresolute confirmed, and 
the greater part deprived of the liberty of 
speaking their mind freely. L. Piso the cen- 
sor, and L. Roscius the pretor, offered to 
go and acquaint Ctesar with the state of 
affairs, demanding only six days for that 
purpose. Some were for sending deputies 
to him, to inform him of the senate's disposi- 
tion. 

III. But all these proposals were rejected, 
because the consul, Scipio, and Cato, de- 
clared against them. Cato was incited by the 
remembrance of an old quarrel, and the dis- 
appointment he had sustained in standing 
candidate for the pretorship with Caesar. 
Lentulus was oppressed with debt, and flat- 
tered himself with the command of armies, 
the government of provinces, and the largesses 
of the kings for whom he should procure the 
title of allies and friends of the Roman people. 
He was besides wont to boast, among those of 
his own party, that he doubted not of becom- 
ing a second Sylla, in whom the whole autho- 
rity of the commonwealth should centre. 
Scipio entertained the same hope of commands 
andgovernments, which he expected to share 
with his son-in-law Pompey ; added to this his 
dread of a prosecution ; his vanity and self-con- 
ceit; and the flatteries and applauses of his 
friends, who at that time bore a considerable 
sway in the commonwealth and courts of jus- 
tice. Pompey himself, instigated by Caesar's 
enemies, and not able to endure an equal dig- 
nity, was now entirely alienated from him, and 
had joined with their common adversaries, 
most of whom Cssar had contracted during his 
affinity with Pompey. Beside, the fraudulent 
step he had taken, in detaining, for the pur- 
poses of his own ambition, the two legions 
destined to serve in Asia and Syria, deter- 
mined him to use all his endeavours to bring 
on a civil war. 

IV. Thus nothing but tumult and violence 
was to be seen in the public debates. Ccesar's 
friends had no time given them to inform him 
of what passed. Even the tribunes themselves 
were not exempt from danger, nor durst they 
have recourse to that right of intercession, 



which Sylla had left them, as the last bulwark 
of liberty ; insomuch that the seventh day af- 
ter entering upon their office, they saw them- 
selves obliged to provide for their safety ; 
whereas in former times, the most turbulent 
and seditious tribunes never began to appre- 
hend themselves in danger, till towards the 
eighth month of their administration. Re- 
course was had to that rigid and ultimate de- 
cree which was never used but in the greatest 
extremities, when the city was threatened with 
ruin and conflagration : " That the consuls, 
the pretors, the tribunes of the people, and 
the proconsuls that were near Rome, should 
take care that the commonwealth received no 
detriment." This decree passed the seventh 
of January ; so that during the first five days 
in which it was permitted the senate to assem- 
ble, after Lentulus's entrance upon the con- 
sulship, (for two days are always appro- 
priated to the holding of the comitia,) the 
most severe and rigorous resolutions were 
taken, both in relation to Caesar's government, 
and the tribunes of the people, men of eminent 
worth and dignity. The tribunes imme- 
diately quitted the city, and fled to Caesar, 
who was then at Ravenna, waiting an answer 
to his late demands, whose equity he hoped 
would dispose all parties to entertain thoughts 
of peace. 

V. The following days the senate assem- 
bled without the city, where Pompey con- 
firmed everything he had before intimated by 
the mouth of Scipio. He applauded the re- 
solution and courage of the senators, acquainted 
them with the state of his forces, that he had 
ten legions already in arms, and was besides 
well informed, that Caesar's troops were by 
no means satisfied with their general ; nay, 
had even refused to support and follow him. 
It was then proposed in the senate, that troops 
should be raised over all Italy ; that Faustus 
Sylla should be sent propretor into Mauri- 
tania ; that Pompey should be supplied with 
money out of the public treasury, and that 
king Juba should be declared friend and ally 
of the people of Rome : but Marcellus op- 
posed the last of these ; and Philippus, tri- 
bune of the people, would not agree to the 
propretorship of Sylla. The other motions 
were approved by the senate. The aflair of 
the provinces was next decided ; two of 
which were consular, the rest pretorian. Syria 
fell to the share of Scipio, and Gaul fell to L.> 



COMMENTARIES. 



217 



Domitius. Philippus and Marcellus were set 
aside, through the private views of the prevail- 
ing party. The rest of the provinces were as- 
signed to men of pretorian rank ; who waited 
not to have their nomination confirmed by 
the people, as had been the custom in former 
years, but after taking the usual oath, departed 
for their several commands in a military habit. 
The consuls left the city, a thing unheard of 
till that time, and lictors were seen walking 
before private men in the forum and capitol, 
contrary to the express practice of former ages. 
Troops were levied over all Italy, arms en- 
joined, money demanded of the colonies and 
free towns, and even taken from the very tem- 
ples ; in fine, neither divine nor human rights 

^,^were regarded. 

y^ VI. Ctesar having intelligence of these pro- 
ceedings, addressed himself to his troops : 
" He took notice of the many injuries he had 
received on all occasions from his enemies,who 
had alienated Pompey from him, by filling him 
with an envy and jealousy of his reputation, 
though he had done every thing in his power 
to promote his glory, and favour his advance- 
ment to the highest dignities. He complained 
of the new precedent introduced into the com- 
monwealth, in checking, and hindering by 
arms, the opposition of the tribunes, which of 
late years had been restored to its wonted force. 
That Sylla, who had almost annihilated the 
tribuneship, had yet left it the liberty of oppo- 
sition ; whereas Pompey who valued himself 
upon the re-establishment of that office, de- 
prived it now of a privilege it had always en- 
joyed. That the decree enjoining the magis- 
trates to provide for the safety of the common- 
wealth, which implied an order to the Roman 
people to repair to arms, was never wont to be 
used but on occasion of dangerous laws, sedi- 
tious measures pursued by the tribunes, or a 
general secession of the people, when they 
possessed themselves of the temples and places 
of strength ; crimes, which in former ages had 
been expiated by the fate of Saturninus and 
the Gracchi. That at present nothing of this 
kind had been attempted, nor so much as 
thought of; no law promulged, no endeavour 
used to seduce the people, no appearance of 
revolt or disaffection. He therefore conjured 
them to defend against the malice of his ene- 
mies, the honour and reputation of a general, 
under whom they had served nine years with 
so much advantage to the commonwealth, 



gained so many battles, and subdued all Gaul 
and Germany." The soldiers of the thirteenth 
legion, who were present, and whom he had 
sent for in the beginning of the troubles, (the 
rest not being yet arrived,) cried out, that they 
were determined to maintain the honour of 
their general, and to revenge the wrongs done 
to the tribunes. 

VII. Being assured of the good will of the 
soldiers, he marched with that legion to Rim- 
ini, where he was met by the tribunes of the 
people, who had fled to him for protection. 
He ordered the other legions to quit their win- 
ter quarters, and follow him with all expedi- 
tion. While he was at Rimini, young L. Cse- 
sar, whose father was one of his lieutenants, 
came to him ; and after acquainting him with 
the occasion of his journey, added, that he had 
a private message to him from Pompey, " who 
was desirous of clearing himself to Caesar, that 
he might not interpret those actions as de- 
signed to affront him, which had no other aim 
but the good of the commonwealth : that it had 
been his constant maxim, to prefer the interest 
of the republic to any private engagement : 
that it was worthy of Coesar, to sacrifice his 
passion and resentment to the same noble mo- 
tive; and not prejudice the commonwealth, 
by pushing too far his revenge against his pri- 
vate enemies." He added something more to 
the same purpose, mingled with excuses for 
Pompey. The pretor Roscius joined likewise 
in the negotiation, declaring he was commis- 
sioned so to do. 

VIII. Though all this tended little to re- 
dress the injuries of which Csesar complained, 
yet considering these as proper persons by 
whom to transmit his thoughts, he begged of 
them, that as they had not scrupled to bring 
Pompey's demands to him, they would like- 
wise carry back his proposals to Pompey ; that, 
if possible, so small a labour might put an end 
to mighty differences, and deliver all Italy 
from the fear of a civil war. He told them 
" That the interest of the commonwealth had 
always been dearer to him than life ; but he 
could not help grieving at the malice of his 
enemies, who had frustrated the good inten- 
tions of the Roman people in his favour, by 
cutting off six months from his command, and 
obliging him to return to Rome to sue for the 
consulship, though a law had been made dis- 
pensing with his personal attendance ; that 
he had yet, for the sake of the commonwealth, 

2 F 



218 



CiESAR'S 



patiently submitted to this assault upon his ho- 
nour; that even his proposal of disbanding 
the armies on both sides, which he had made 
by a letter to the senate, had been rejected: 
that new levies were making over all Italy : 
that two legions, which had been taken from 
him, under pretence of the Parthian war, were 
still retained in the service of his enemies : 
that the whole state was in arms. What 
could all this aim at but his destruction ] That, 
nevertheless, he was ready to agree to any pro- 
posal, and expose himself to any danger, for 
the sake of his country. Let Pompey go to 
his government : let all the armies be disband- 
ed : let every body throughout Italy lay down 
their arms : let every thing that participates 
of terror and force be removed : let the elec- 
tions of magistrates be made with perfect free- 
dom ; and let the republic be administered by 
the authority of the senate and people. And 
the better to settle all these articles, and cor- 
roborate them with the sanction of an oath, 
let either Pompey himself draw nearer, or suf- 
fer Cajsar to approach him ; as all their differ- 
ences may be most easily terminated by a con- 
ference." 

IX. Roscius and L. Csesar, having received 
this answer, departed for Capua, where they 
found Pompey and the consuls, and laid be- 
fore them Cjesar's proposals. After delibera- 
ting upon the affair, they sent a reply, in 
writing, by the same messengers, the purport 
of which was : " That Csesar should quit Rim- 
ini, return to Gaul, and disband his army ; 
which conditions performed, Pompey would 
go into Spain. In the meantime, till Cssar 
gave the security for the performance of what 
he had promised, neither Pompey nor the con- 
suls would discontinue the levies." 

X. It was, by no • means, a fair proposal, 
that Caesar should be obliged to quit Rimini 
and return to Gaul, while Pompey held pro- 
vinces and legions that were none of his : that 
he should dismiss his army, whilst the other 
was levying troops : and, that only a general 
promise of going into Spain should be given, 
without fixing a day for his departure ; by 
which evasion, was he to be found in Italy, 
even at the expiration of Csesar's consulship, 
he could not yet be charged with breach of 
faith. His forbearing too to appoint a time for 
a conference, and declining to approach nearer, 
gave little reason to hope for a peace. He there- 
fore sent Antony to Arretium, with five co- 



horts ; remained himself at Rimini, with two, 
where he resolved to levy troops ; and seizing 
Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona, left a cohort 
in each for a garrison. 

XI. Meantime being informed that Ther- 
mus the pretor had entered Iguvium, with five 
cohorts, and was endeavouring to fortify the 
town ; as he knew the inhabitants to be well 
inclined to his interest, he detached Curio 
thither, with three cohorts, drawn from Lisau- 
rum and Rimini. Upon this, Thermus, who 
could not confide in the townsmen, retired 
with his cohorts, and quitted the place : but his 
troops abandoning him in his march, returned 
severally to their own homes. Curio was 
received into the place with great demonstra- 
tions of joy : which being reported to Caesar, 
as he found he had the good will of the colo- 
nies and free towns, he drew the cohorts of 
the thirteenth legion out of garrison, and 
marched to Auximum, which Attiusheld with 
a body of troops, and whence he had despatched 
senators to levy forces over all Picenum. Cae- 
sar's arrival being known, the chief citizens of 
Auximum went in a body to Attius Varus, and 
told him : " That it did not belong to them to 
determine on which side justice lay ; but that 
neither they, nor the other municipal towns, 
could endure to see their gates shut against 
Caesar, who by his great actions had deserved 
so well of the commonwealth : that therefore 
he would do well to consult his own safety 
and reputation." Attius, moved by this speech, 
drew off his garrison and fled. But some of 
Caesar's first ranks pursuing him, obliged him 
to stop ; and a battle ensuing, he was deserted 
by his men. Some of the troops returned 
home ; the rest went over to Caesar, and 
brought along with them L. Pupius, first cen- 
turion of the legion, who had formerly held 
the same rank in Pompey's army. Caesar 
commended Attius's soldiers ; dismissed Pu- 
pius ; returned thanks to the inhabitants of 
Auximum; and promised to retain always a 
grateful remembrance of their attachment. 

XII. These things being reported ftt Rome, 
the consternation was so great over the whole 
city, that when the consul Lentulus came to 
the treasury, to deliver out the money to Pom- 
pey, in consequence of the decree of the se- 
nate, he scarce waited the opening of the inner 
door, but precipitately left the place, upon a 
false rumour, that Caesar was approaching, 
and some of his cavalry already in view. He 



COMMENTARIES 



219 



was soon followed by his colleague Marcellus, 
and the greater part of the magistrates. Pom- 
pey had left the town the day before, and was 
upon his way to Apulia, where he had quar- 
tered the legions he had received from Csesar. 
The levies were discontinued within the city, 
and no place appeared secure on this side 
Capua. Here, at last, they took courage and 
rallied, and began to renew their levies in the 
colonies round about, which had been sent 
thither by the Julian law. Lentulus sum- 
moned into the forum the gladiators whom 
Caesar had ordered to be trained up there, 
gave them their liberty, furnished them witli 
horses, and commanded them to follow him. 
But being afterwards admonished by his 
friends that this step was universally con- 
demned, he dispersed them into the neighbour- 
ing town of Campania, to keep garrison there. 
XIII. Csesar meanwhile leaving Auximum, 
traversed the whole country of Picenum ; 
where he was joyfully received in all parts by 
the inhabitants, who furnished his army with 
every thing necessary. Even Cingulum itself, 
a town founded by Labienus, and built at his 
own expense, sent deputies to him, with an 
offer of their submission and services. He 
demanded a certain number of soldiers, which 
were sent immediately. Meantime the twelfth 
legion joined him; and with these two he 
marched to Asculum, a town of Picenum. 
Here Lentulus Spinther commanded with ten 
cohorts ; who, hearing of Csesar's approach, 
quitted the place with his troops, who almost 
all deserted him upon the march. Being left 
with only a few, he fell in with Vibullius 
Rufus, whom Pompey had sent into Picenum 
to encourage his followers in those parts. Vi- 
bullius understanding from him the state of 
affairs in Picenum, dismissed Lentulus, and 
took the soldiers under his command. He 
likewise drew together from the neighbouring 
provinces as many as he could meet with of 
Pompey's levies : among the rest, Ulcilles 
Hirus, who was flying, with six cohorts, from 
CameriTium, where they had been quartered. 
Out of all these he formed thirteen cohorts, 
with which he posted, by great journeys, to 
Corfinium, where Domitius AhenObarbus com- 
manded ; whom he informed that Caesar was ap- 
proaching with two legions. Domitius had al- 
ready got together, with great expedition, 
twenty cohorts from Alba, the country of the 
Marsi, Peligni, and the neighbouring provinces. 



XIV. Caesar having made himself master 
of Asculum, and obliged Lentulus to retire, 
ordered the soldiers who had deserted him, to 
be sought after, and new levies to be made. 
He remained only one day there, to settle what 
related to provisions, and then pursued his 
march to Corfinium. Upon his arrival there, 
he found five cohorts, whom Domitius had de- 
tached from the garrison, employed in break- 
ing down a bridge about three miles distant 
from the town. But Caesar's advanced parties 
attacking them, they quickly abandoned the 
bridge, and retired to Corfinium. Caesar hav- 
ing passed with his legions, halted before the 
town, and encamped under the walls. 

XV. Upon this, Domitius engaged by great 
rewards, persons well acquainted with the 
country, to carry letters into Apulia to Pompey, 
wherein he earnestly requested him to come 
to his aid. He told him, " That it would be 
easy, in that close country, to shut up Caesar 
between two armies, and cut off his provisions : 
that unless this course was followed, he him- 
self, with above thirty cohorts, and a great num- 
ber of senators and Roman knights, would be 
exposed to imminent danger." Meanwhile, 
having encouraged his men, he disposed en- 
gines along the walls, appointed every one his 
particular post, and, the more to animate them, 
promised each soldier four acres of land out of 
his own estate, and, in proportion, to every 
centurion and volunteer. 

XVI. Meantime Caisar was informed that 
the people of Sulmona, a town seven miles dis- 
tant from Corfinium, desired to put themselves 
under his protection, but were restrained by 
Q. Lucretius, a senator, and Attius, a Pelignian, 
who held them in subjection with a garrison, 
of seven cohorts. He therefore despatched M. 
Antony thither, with five cohorts of the sev- 
enth legion, whose ensigns were no sooner des- 
cried from the walls of Sulmona, than the 
gates were thrown open, and the whole people 
in a body, both soldiers and townsmen, came 
out to congratulate Antony on his arrival. Lu- 
cretius and Attius endeavoured to escape over 
the wall : but Attius being taken, and brought 
to Antony, requested that he might be sent to 
Caesar. Antony returned the same day, bring- 
ing along with him the cohorts and Attius. 
Caesar joined these cohorts to his army, and 
set Attius at liberty. 

XVII. Caesar resolved to employ the three 
first days in strongly fortifying his camp, in 



220 



CiESAR'S 



procuring corn from the neighbouring towns, 
and waiting the arrival of the rest of his forces. 
During this space, the eighth legion joined 
him, with two and twenty cohorts of new lev- 
ies from Gaul, and about three hundred horse 
from the king of Noricum. This obliged him 
to form a second camp on the other side of the 
town, under the command of Curio. The re- 
maining days were spent in drawing a line 
with redoubts round the place, which work 
was nearly completed when the messengers, 
that had been sent to Pompey, returned, 

XVIII. Domitius, perusing the despatches, 
thought proper to dissemble the contents, and 
declared, in council, that Pompey would 
speedily come to their assistance. Meantime 
he exhorted them to behave with courage, and 
provide every thing necessary for a vigorous 
defence. He conferred, however, privately 
with a few of his most intimate friends, and, 
in concert with them, determined upon flight. 
But as 'his looks and speech were found to 
disagree ; as he behaved not with his usual 
composure and firmness ; and was observed, 
contrary to custom, to be much in secret con- 
ference with his friends ; avoiding public ap- 
pearances, and councils of war : it was not pos- 
sible for the truth to remain any longer con- 
cealed. For Pompey had wrote back, " That 
he could not put all to hazard for his sake ; 
that he had neither advised nor consented to 
his shutting himself up in Corfinium ; that he 
must therefore endeavour to extricate himself 
as well as he could, and come and join him 
with all his forces." But as Caesar had in- 
vested and carried his lines round the place, 
this retreat was now become impracticable. 

XIX. Domitius's design being discovered, 
the soldiers who were at Corfinium began to 
assemble in the evening, and, by means of 
their tribunes, centurions, and other officers, 
made known their thoughts to one another : 
" That they were besieged by Cassar, who had 
already, in a manner completed his works : 
that their general, Domitius, in whose pro- 
mises of assistance they had placed their chief 
hope, abandoning all concern for their safety, 
was contriving to escape privately by flight : 
that it was therefore incumbent upon them to 
look also to their own preservation." The 
Marsi at first opposed this resolution, and pos- 
sessed themselves of the strongest part of the 
town ; nay, the dispute was so warm, that it 
almost came to be decided by the sword. But 



shortly after, being made acquainted with 
Domitius's intended flight, of which before they 
had no knowledge ; they all, in a body, sur- 
rounded Domitius, secured his person, and 
sent deputies to Csesar : " That they were 
ready to open their gates, receive his orders, 
and deliver Domitius alive." 

XX. Though CfEsar was fully sensible of 
how great importance it was to get possession 
of the town immediately, and join the garrison 
to his own array ; lest by largesses, promises 
of speedy relief, or false reports, any change 
should be produced ; as in war great revolu- 
tions often arise from very trifling causes : yet, 
fearing that if he introduced his soldiers in the 
dark, they would take that opportunity to 
plunder the town, he sent back the deputies, 
with thanks for their proflFer, resolving to have 
the walls and gates watched with great care. 
To that end he disposed his men along the 
works, not at a certain distance, as usual, but 
in one continued rank, so as to touch each 
other, and completely invest the town. He 
ordered the military tribunes, and officers of 
the cavalry, to patrol about the works, and not 
only be on their guard against sallies, but even 
take care to prevent the escape of particular 
persons. And indeed so alert and vigilant 
were our soldiers, that not a man closed his 
eyes that night ; each expecting the event with 
impatience, and carrying his thoughts from 
one thing to another ; what would be the fate 
of the Corfinians, what of Domitius, what of 
Lentulus, and the other illustrious persons in 
the place : in fine, what was like to be the issue 
of so complicated a scene. 

XXI. About the fourth watch of the night, 
Lentulus Spinther called from the wall to the 
guard, and desired to be conducted to Caesar. 
His request being granted, he came out of 
the town, attended by some of Domitius's 
soldiers, who never left him till they had con- 
ducted him into Caesar's presence. " He begged 
him to spare his life, and pardon the injuries he 
had done him, in consideration of their former 
friendship. He owned the many obligations 
he had laid him under, in procuring him an 
admission into the college of priests, obtaining 
for him the government of Spain, after the ex- 
piration of the pretorship, and supporting him 
in the demand of the consulship." Caesar in- 
terrupted him by saying : " That he was not 
come out of the bounds of his province, with 
an intent to injure any body ; but to repel the 



COMMENTARIES, 



221 



injuries done him by his enemies ; to revenge 
the wrongs of the tribunes ; and to restore to 
the Roman people, who wore oppressed by a 
small faction of the nobles, their liberties and 
privileges." Lentulus, encouraged by this 
speech, asked leave to return into the town, 
"where, he said, the assurances he had ob- 
tained of his own safety, would contribute not 
a little to the consolation of others, some of 
whom were so terrified, that they were ready 
to take desperate resolutions," Leave being 
granted, he departed for the town. 

XXII. As soon as it was light, Csesar order- 
ed before him all the senators, senators' sons, 
military tribunes, and Roman knights. There 
were of senatorian rank, L. Domitius, P. 
Lentulus Spintlier L. Vibullius Rufus, Sextus 
Quintilius Varus, questor, L. Rubrius ; also 
Domitius's son, and many young men of 
quality, with a great number of Roman knights, 
and some decurions, or senators of the neigh- 
bouring municipal towns, who had been sent 
for by Domitius. As soon as they appeared, 
he gave order to secure them from the insults 
of the soldiery ; and, addressing them in a few 
words, remonstrated : " That they had made a 
very ill requital for the many signal services 
received at his hands." After which, he set 
them at liberty. He likewise restored to Domi- 
tius six millions of sesterces, which that gene- 
ral had brought with him to Corfinium, and 
deposited in the hands of the two treasurers of 
the town, who surrendered it to Cffisar. As 
this was public money, assigned by Pompey to 
pay the forces with, Ca3sar might justly have 
seized it ; but he was willing to show himself 
generous, as well as merciful. He ordered 
Domitius's soldiers to take the usual oath to 
him, decamped that very day ; made the ordi- 
nary march ; and after staying in all seven days 
before Corfinium, arrived in Apulia, through 
the territories of the Marrucini, Frentani, and 
Larinates. 

XXIII. Pompey, having intelligence of 
what passed at Corfinium, retreated from Lu- 
ceria, to Canusium, and from thence to Brun- 
dusium. He ordered all the new levies to 
join him, armed the shepherds and slaves, fur- 
nished them with horses, and formed a body 
of about three hundred cavalry. Meanwhile 
the pretor L. Manlius flying from Alba, with 
six cohorts ; and the pretor Rutilus Lupus, 
from Tarracina, with three ; saw Cajsar's cav- 
alry at a distance, commanded by Bivius Cu- 

20 



rius : upon which, the soldiers immediately 
abandoned the two pretors, and joined the 
troops under the conduct of Curius. Several 
other parties, flying different ways, fell in, some 
with the foot, others with the horse. Cn- 
Magius of Cremona, Pompey's chief engineer, 
being taken on his way to Brundusium, was 
brought to Cffisar, who sent him back to Pom- 
pey with this message : " That as he had not 
yet obtained an interview, his design was to 
come to Brundusium, there to confer with him 
in relation to the common safety ; because they 
soon would be able to despatch, in a personal 
treaty, what, if managed by the intervention of 
others, could not be hindered from running 
into a tedious negotiation." 

XXIV. Having dismissed him with these 
instructions, he arrived before Brundusium 
with six legions, three of which were composed 
of veteran soldiers, and the rest of new levies 
drawn together upon his march ; for as to Do- 
mitius's troops, he had sent them directly from 
Corfinium to Sicily. He found the consuls 
were gone to Dyrrhachium with great part of 
the army, and that Pompey remained in Brun- 
dusium with twenty cohorts. Nor was it cer- 
tainly known whether he continued there with 
design to keep possession of Brundusium, that 
he might be master of the whole Adriatic Sea, 
the extreme parts of Italy, and the country 
of Greece, in order to make war on both 
sides the gulf; or for want of shipping to trans- 
port his men. Fearing, therefore, that it was 
his intention to keep footing in Italy, he re- 
solved to deprive him of the advantages he 
might receive from the port of Brundusium. 
The works he contrived for this purpose were 
as follows : He carried on a mole on either 
side the mouth of the haven where the entrance 
was narrowest, and the water shallow. But as 
this work could not be carried quite across the 
port, by reason of the great depth of the sea, 
he prepared double floats of timber, thirty feet 
square, which were each secured by four 
anchors from the four corners, to enable them 
to resist the fury of the waves. These, extend- 
ing all the way between the two moles, were 
covered over with earth and fascines, that the 
soldiers might pass and repass with ease, and 
have firm footing to defend them. The front 
and sides were armed with a parapet of hur- 
dles, and every fourth float had a tower of two 
stories, the better to guard the work from fire 
and the shocks of the vessels. 



223 



CESAR'S 



XXV. Against these preparations, Pom- 
pey made use of several large ships which he 
found in the port of Brundusium : and having 
fitted them with towers of three stories, which 
he filled with a great number of engines and 
darts, let them loose upon Caesar's floats, to 
break through the staccado, and interrupt the 
works. Thus daily skirmishes happened with 
darts, arrows, and slings, at a distance. Amidst 
these hostilities, Csesar's thoughts were still 
bent upon peace ; and though he could not 
but wonder that Magius, whom he had sent 
with proposals to Pompey, was not yet re- 
turned with an answer ; and even saw his de- 
signs and undertakings retarded by his fre- 
quent offers of this kind ; he nevertheless still 
persevered in these peaceful resolutions. Ac- 
cordingly, he despatched Caninius Rebilus, 
one of his lieutenants, a relation and intimate 
friend of Scribonius Libo, to confer with him 
on this subject. He charged him to exhort 
that nobleman to think seriously of peace, and, 
if possible, procure an interview between him 
and Pompey. Could this be effected, he 
showed there was the greatest ground to be- 
lieve that peace would soon be concluded on 
reasonable terms ; the honour and reputation of 
which would in a manner wholly redound to 
Libo, if, by his mediation, both parties should 
be prevailed with to lay down their arms. 
Libo, after conferring with Caninius, waited 
on Pompey ; soon after he returned with this 
answer ; that the consuls were absent, without 
whom Pompey had no power to treat of an ac- 
commodation. Thus Caesar having often tried 
in vain to bring about a peace, thought it now 
time to drop that design, and bend all his 
thoughts to war. 

XXVL Cajsar having spent nine days 
about his works, had now half finished the 
staccado, when the ships employed in the first 
embarkation, being sent back by the consuls 
from Dyrrhachium, returned to Brundusium. 
Pompey, either alarmed at Csesar's works, or 
because from the first he had determined to 
relinquish Italy, no sooner saw the transports 
arrive, than he prepared to carry over the-rest 
of his forces. And the better to secure himself 
against Caesar, and prevent his troops from 
breaking into the town during the embarka- 
tion, he walled up the gates, barricaded the 
streets, or cut ditches across them, filled with 
pointed stakes, and covered with hurdles and 
eanh. The two streets which led to the port, 



and which he left open for the passage of his 
men, were fortified with a double palisado of 
very strong well sharpened stakes. These 
preparations being made, he ordered the 
soldiers to embark with great silence, having 
placed on the walls and towers some select 
archers and slingers, who were to wait till all 
the troops had got aboard, and then retire, 
upon a signal given, to some small ships that 
waited them at a convenient distance. 

XXVIL The people of Brundusium, pro- 
voked by the affronts they had received from 
Pompey, and the insults of his soldiers, wished 
well to Caesar's cause ; and having notice of 
Pompey's intended departure while the soldiers 
were busied with the care of embarking, found 
means to signify it from the tops of their 
houses. Caesar, upon this intelligence, or- 
dered scaling ladders to be prepared, and the 
soldiers to repair to their arms, that he might 
not lose any opportunity of acting. Pom- 
pey weighed anchor a little before night, and 
gave the signal for recalling the soldiers that 
were upon the walls, who repaired with all 
expedition to the ships prepared for them. 
Meantime the scaling ladders are applied to 
the walls, and Caesar's troops enter the town. 
But being informed by the Brundusians of the 
snares and ditches provided for them by the 
enemy, they were obliged to take a great cir- 
cuit, which gave Pompey time enough to put 
to sea. Two transports only, impeded by Cae- 
sar's mole, were taken with the troops on 
board. 

XXVIIL Though Caesar was fully sensi- 
ble, that to finish the war at a blow, he must 
pass the sea immediately, and endeavour to 
come up with Pompey, before he could draw 
his transmarine forces together ; yet he dreaded 
the delay and length of time that such a pro- 
ject might require : because Pompey having 
carried with him all the ships on the coast, 
rendered the present execution of the design 
impracticable. He must therefore wait the 
arrival of ships from Picenum, Sicily, and the 
remoter coasts of Gaul, which was a tedious 
business, and, at that season of the year, 
subject to great uncertainty. It appeared 
likewise of dangerous consequence, to suffer 
a veteran army, and the two Spains, one of 
which was wholly devoted to Pompey, to 
strengthen themselves in his rival's interest ; 
to let them grow powerful by levies of horse 
and foot, and leave Gaul and Italy open to 



COMMENTARIES. 



223 



their attacks in his absence. He determined, 
therefore, to lay aside, for the present, the 
design of pursuing Pompey, and turn all his 
thoughts towards Spain. He ordered the 
magistrates of the municipal towns to assem- 
ble all the vessels they could, and send them 
to Brundusium. He sent Valerius, one of 
his lieutenants, into Sardinia, with one legion, 
and the propretor Curio into Sicily with 
three, ordering him, as soon as he had mas- 
tered Sicily, to pass over with his army into 
Africa. 

XXIX. M. Cotta commanded in Sardinia; 
M. Cato in Sicily ; and Africa had fallen by lot 
to Tubero. The inhabitants of Cagliari, hear- 
ing of Valerius's commission, of their own ac- 
cord, before he had left Italy, drove Cotta out 
of their city ; who terrified by the unanimous 
opposition he met with from the province, fled 
into Africa. In Sicily, Cato applied himself with 
great diligence to the refitting of old ships, 
and building of new. He sent his lieutenant 
to raise forces in Lucania, and the country of 
the Brutians, and ordered the states of Sicily to 
furnish him with a certain number of horse 
and foot. When these preparations were al- 
most completed, being informed of Curio's 
arrival, he called his chief officers together, 
and complained, " That he was betrayed and 
abandoned by Pompey, who, without any 
previous preparation, had involved the com- 
monwealth in an unnecessary war ; and upon 
being questioned by himself and others in the 
senate, had assured them, that he was abun- 
dantly able to sustain it." Having thus de- 
clared his mind, he quitted the province, which 
by this means submitted without trouble to 
Curio, as Sardinia had before done to 
Valerius. Tubero arriving in Africa, found 
Attius Varus in possession of that province, 
who, after the loss of his cohorts at Auximum, 
as we have shown -above, had fled into those 
parts, and, with the consent of the natives, 
taken upon him the command. Here he -had 
found means to levy two legions, by his 
knowledge of the people and country, where 
he had been governor some years before, 
after the expiration of his pretorship. Tubero 
coming before Utica with his fleet, was forbid 
the harbour and town ; nor could he even ob- 
tain leave for his son to land, though he had 
a fit of sickness upon him, but was obliged to 
weigh anchor and be gone. 

XXX. These affairs despatched, Csesar, 



that his troops might enjoy some repose, can- 
toned them in the nearest towns, and set out 
himself for Rome. There he assembled the 
senate, and after complaining of the injuries of 
his enemies, told them, " That he had never 
affected extraordinary honours, but waited 
patiently the time prescribed by the laws, to 
solicit for a second consulship, to which every 
Roman citizen had a right to aspire : that the 
people, with the concurrence of their tribunes, 
(in spite of the attempts of his enemies, and 
the vigorous opposition of Cato, who en- 
deavoured, according to custom, to spin out 
the time in speaking,) had permitted him to 
stand candidate though absent, and that even 
in the consulship of Pompey ; who, if he dis- 
approved of the decree, why did he let it 
passl But if he allowed it, why now oppose 
the execution 1 He set before them his 
moderation, in voluntarily proposing that both 
parties should lay down their arms, by which 
he must have been himself divested of his 
government and command. He displayed the 
malice of his enemies, who sought to impose 
terms on him, to which they would not submit 
themselves; and chose rather to involve the 
state in a civil war than part with their armies 
and provinces. He enlarged upon the injury 
they had done him, in taking away two of his 
legions, and their cruelty and insolence, in 
violating the authority of the tribunes. He 
spoke of his many offers of peace, his frequent 
desire of an interview, and the continual re- 
fusals he had received. For all these reasons, 
he requested and conjured them to undertake 
the administration of the republic, jointly with 
him. But if they declined it through fear, he 
had no intention to force so great a burden 
upon them, and would take the whole charge 
alone. That in the mean time it would be 
proper to send a deputation to Pompey, to 
treat of an accommodation : nor was he fright- 
ed at the difliculty Pompey had started some 
time before in the senate; that to send depu- 
ties was to acknowledge the superiority of him 
to whom they were sent, and a sign of timidi- 
ty in the sender. That this was a little low 
way of thinking ; and that, in the same man- 
ner as he had endeavoured at a superiority in 
action, he would also strive to be superior in 
justice and equity." 

XXXI. The senate liked the proposal of 
a deputation to Pompey ; « but the great 
difficulty was, to find deputies ; every one, out 



224 



CiESAR'S 



of fear, refusing to charge himself with that 
commission. For Pompey, at his departure 
from Rome, had declared in the senate, 
" That he would esteem those who stayed be- 
hind, as no less guilty than those in Cesar's 
camp." Thus three days were spent in de- 
bates and excuses. The tribune L. Metellus 
had likewise been suborned by Csesar's ene- 
mies to traverse his design, and hinder what- 
ever he should propose. Which Cssar 
coming to understand, and that he only 
wasted his time to no purpose ; he set out 
from Rome, without effecting what he intend, 
ed, and arrived in farther Gaul. 

XXXII. Here he was informed, that 
Pompey had sent into Spain Vibullius Rufus, 
the same vyho, a few days before, had been 
made prisoner at Corfinium, and set at liberty 
by Cassar ; that Domitius was gone to take 
possession of Marseilles, with seven galleys, 
which he had fitted out at Igilium and 
Cosanum, and manned with his slaves, freed, 
men, and labourers ; that the deputies of the 
above-mentioned state, young men of the first 
quality, (whom Pompey, at his departure from 
Rome, had exhorted not to suffer the memory 
of his past services to their country to be 
blotted out by those lately received from 
Csesar,) had been sent before, to prepare the 
way for his reception. ^ In consequence of 
their remonstrances, the inhabitants of Mar. 
seilles shut their gates against Caesar, and 
summoned to their assistance the Albici, a 
barbarous people, who had long been under 
their protection, and inhabited the adjoining 
mountains. They brought provisions from 
the neighbouring country and castles, re- 
fitted their navy, and repaired their walls and 
gates. 

XXXIII. Csesar sending for fifteen of the 
principal men of the city, exhorted them not 
to be the first to begin the war, but to be swayed 
rather by the authority of all Italy, than the 
will of one particular person. He forgot not 
such other considerations as seemed most 
likely to bring them to reason. The deputies 
returning into the town, brought back this 
answer from the senate : " That they saw the 
Romans divided into two parties, and it did 
not belong to them to decide such a quarrel : 
that at the head of these parties were Pom- 
pey and Caisar, both patrons of their city, the 
one having added to it the country of the 
Volcae Arecomici and Helvians ; the other 



after the reduction of Gaul, considerably aug- 
mented its territories and revenues ; that as 
they were therefore equally indebted to both, 
it became them not to aid the one against the 
other ; but to remain neuter, and grant 
neither an admittance into their city nor 
port." 

XXXIV. Whilst these things were in 
agitation, Domitius arrived at Marseilles with 
his fleet, and being received into the town, 
was appointed governor, and charged with 
the whole administration of the war. By his 
order, they sent out their fleet to cruise round 
the coasts ; seized and brought in all the 
merchant vessels they could find, and made 
use of the nails, rigging, and timber of such 
as were unfit for service, to repair the rest. 
They deposited in public granaries all the 
corn that was to be found in the city, and se- 
cured whatever else they thought might be 
serviceable to them in case of a siege. Caesar, 
provoked at these preparations, brought three 
legions before the town, began to erect towers 
and galleries, and gave orders for building 
twelve galleys at Aries, which being finished, 
launched, and brought to Marseilles, within 
thirty days from the cutting of the wood they 
were composed of, he put them under the 
command of D. Brutus, and having directed 
the manner of the siege, left the care of it to 
C. Trebonius, his lieutenant. 

XXXV. During these orders and prepara- 
tions, he sent C. Fabius before him into 
Spain, with three legions that had wintered 
about Narbonne, charging him to secure with 
all diligence the passage of the Pyrenean 
Mountains, which was at that time guarded 
by a party of Afranius's army. His other 
legions, whose quarters were more remote, had 
orders to follow as fast as they could. Fabius, 
according to his instructions, having made 
great despatch, forced the passes of the 
Pyrenees, and by long marches came up with 
Afranius's army. 

XXXVI. Pompey had then three lieuten- 
ants in Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro. 
The first of these was at the head of three le- 
gions, and governed the nearer Spain. The 
other two had each two legions, and comman- 
ded, the one from the Castilian Forest to the 
Anas ; the other from the Anas, quite through 
Lusitania, and the territories of the Vettones. 
These three lieutenants, upon the arrival of 
Vibullius Rufus, whom Pompey had sent into 



COMMENTARIES. 



225 



Spain, as we have seen above, consulted to- 
gether, and agreed, that Petreius should join 
Afranius with his two legions, and that Var- 
ro should slay and secure farther Spain. These 
resolutions being taken, Petreius levied horse 
and foot in Lusitania, and Afranius in Celti- 
beria, and the barbarous nations bordering 
upon the ocean. When the levies were com- 
pleted, Petreius speedily joined Afranius, 
through the territories of the Vettones ; and 
both resolved to make Lerida the seat of the 
war, because the country lay convenient for 
their purpose. 

XXXVII. We have already observed that 
Afranius had three legions, and Petreius two. 
Besides these, there were about eighty cohorts, 
some light, some heavy armed, and five thou- 
sand horse, raised in both provinces. Csesar 
had sent his legions before him into Spain, 
with six thousand auxiliary foot, and three 
thousand horse, who had served under him in 
all his former wars, and he was furnished with 
the like number from Gaul, ail chosen troops. 
For hearing thatPompey was coming with his 
whole force through Mauritania into Spain, he 
sent circular letters to all the Gallic states, in- 
viting by name those of the most known and 
approved valour, and in particular a select 
body of mountaineers from Aquitain, where it 
borders upon the Roman province. At the 
same time he borrowed money from the mili- 
tary tribunes and centurions, which he distri- 
buted among the soldiers. This policy was 
attended with two great advantages : it bound 
the officers to him by the obligation of interest, 
and the soldiers by the tie of gratitude. 

XXXVII. Fabius, by letters and messen^ 
gers, endeavoured to sound the disposition of 
the neighbouring states. He had laid two 
bridges over the Sicoris, four miles distant 
from each other, for the convenience of forag- 
ing, having consumed all the pasture on this 
side the river. Pompey's generals did the 
same, with much the like view, which occa- 
sioned frequent skirmishes between the horse. 
Two of Fabius's legions, which was the ordi- 
nary guard of the foragers, passing one day ac- 
cording to custom, and the cavalry and car- 
riages following, the bridge broke down on a 
sudden, by the violence of the winds and 
floods, and separated them from the rest of the 
army. Afranius and Petreius perceiving it, by 
the fascines and hurdles that came down with 
the stream ; detached immediately four le- 
20* 



gions, with all their cavalry, over the bridge 
that lay between the town and their camp, and 
marched to attack Fabius's legions. Upon 
this L. Plancus, who commanded the escort, 
finding himself hard pressed, seizing a rising 
ground, and forming his men into two divi- 
sions, posted them back to back, that he 
might not be surrounded by the enemy's 
horse. By this disposition, though inferior in 
number, he was enabled to sustain the furious 
charge of their legions and cavalry. During 
the course of the battle, the ensigns of two le- 
gions were perceived at a distance, which 
Fabius had sent by the farther bridge to sus- 
tain his party, suspecting what might happen, 
and that Pompey's generals might seize the 
opportunity ofl'ered them by fortune, to fall 
upon our men. Their arrival put an end to 
the engagement, and both parties returned 
to their respective camps. 

XXXIX. Two days after, Caesar arrived 
in the camp with nine hundred horse, which 
he had kept for a body guard. He began by 
re-establishing in the night the bridge which 
had been broken down, and was not yet quite 
repaired. Next day he took a view of the 
country, and leaving six cohorts to guard the 
bridge, the camp, and the baggage, marched 
with all his forces in three lines to Lerida, and 
stopped near Afranius's camp, where he re- 
mained some time under arms, and ofl!ered him 
battle on an even ground. Afranius drew out 
his troops, and formed them before his camp, 
half way down the hill. Cassar, finding that 
he declined an engagement, resolved to encamp 
within four hundred paces of the foot of the 
mountain ; and to hinder his troops from being 
alarmed or interrupted in their works, by sud- 
den incursions from the enemy, ordered them 
not to throw up a rampart, which must have 
appeared and betrayed them at a distance, but 
to cut a ditch in front, fifteen feet broad. The 
first and second lines continued in order of 
battle, as had been resolved from the beginning, 
and the third carried on the work behind them 
unperceived. Thus the whole was completed, 
before Afranius had the least suspicion of his 
design to encamp there. 

XL. In the evening Caesar retreated with 
his legions behind the ditch, and passed the 
whole night under arms. Next day he car- 
ried the intrenchment quite round his camp, 
and because materials for a rampart must have 
been fetched from a great distance, he con- 
2 G 



226 



CiESAR'S 






tented himself for the present with a naked 
ditch, as the day before, allotting a legion to 
each side of the camp, and keeping the rest of 
the troops under arms, to cover those that 
worked. Afranius and Petreius, to alarm our 
men and disturb the works, advanced with their 
troops to the foot of the mountain, and threat- 
ened to give battle. But Caesar, trusting to 
the three legions under arms, and the defence 
of the ditch, still persisted in his design. At 
last, after a short stay, and without daring to 
come forward into the plain, they retreated 
again to their camp. The third day, Caesar 
added a rampart to his camp, and brought into 
it the six cohorts, with the baggage which he 
had left in his former camp. 
y*f XLI. Between the city of Lerida, and the 
hill where Petreius and Afranius were en- 
camped, was a plain of about three hundred 
paces, in the midst of which was a rising 
ground, which Caesar wanted to take possession 
of; because, by that means, he could cut off the 
enemy's communication with the town and 
bridge, and render the magazines they had in 
the town useless. In this hope, he drew out 
three legions, and having formed them in or- 
der of battle, commanded the first ranks of one 
of them to run before, and gain the place. Afra- 
nius perceiving his design, despatched the co- 
horts that were upon guard before the camp, 
a nearer way to the same eminence. The 
contest was sharply maintained on both sides : 
but Afranius's party, who first got possession 
of the post, obliged our men to give ground, 
and being reinforced by fresh supplies, put 
them at last to rout, and forced them to fly for 
shelter to the legions. 

XLII. The manner of fighting of Afranius's 
soldiers was, to come forward briskly against 
an enemy, and boldly take possession of some 
post, neither taking care to keep their ranks, 
nor holding it necessary to fight in a close com- 
pact body. If they found themselves hard 
pushed, they thought it no dishonour to retire 
and quit their posts, following in this the custom 
of the Lusitanians, and other barbarous nations, 
as it almost always happens, that soldiers give 
in to the manners of the country where they 
have long been used to make war. This man- 
ner of fighting, however, as it was new and 
unexpected, disordered our men, who seeing 
the enemy come forward, without regard to 
their ranks, were apprehensive of being sur- 
rounded, and yet not think themselves at 



liberty to break their ranks, or abandon their 
ensigns, or quit their post, without some very 
urgent cause. The first ranks therefore being 
put into disorder, the legion in that wing 
gave ground, and retired to a neighbouring 
hill. 

XLIII. Caesar, contrary to his expectation, 
finding the consternation like to spread through 
the whole army, encouraged his men, and led 
the ninth legion to their assistance. He soon 
put a stop to the vigorous and insulting pur- 
suit of the enemy, obliged them to turn their 
backs, and pushed them to the very walls of 
Lerida. But the soldiers of the ninth legion, 
elated with success, and eager to repair the 
loss we had sustained, followed the runaways 
with so much heat that they were drawn into 
a place of disadvantage, and found themselves 
directly under the hill where the town stood, 
whence when they endeavoured to retire, the 
enemy again facing about, charged vigorously 
from the higher ground. The hill was rough, 
and steep on each side, extending only so far 
in breadth as was sufficient for drawing up 
three cohorts; but they could neither be rein- 
forced in flank, nor sustained by the cavalry. 
The descent from the town was indeed some- 
thing easier for about four hundred paces, 
which furnished our men with the means of 
extricating themselves from the danger into 
which their rashness had brought them. Here 
they bravely maintained the fight, though 
with great disadvantage to themselves, as well 
on account of the narrowness of' the place, as 
because being posted at the foot of the hill, 
none of the enemy's darts fell in vain. Still 
however they supported themselves by their 
courage and patience, and were not disheart- 
ened by the many wounds they received. The 
enemy's forces increased every moment, fresh 
cohorts being sent from the camp through the 
town, who succeeded in the place of those 
that were fatigued. Caesar was likewise 
obliged to despatch small parties to maintain the 
battle, and bring off such as were wounded. 

XLIV. The fight had now lasted five hours 
without intermission, when our men, oppressed 
by the multitude of the enemy, and having 
spent all their darts, attacked the moiintain 
sword in hand, and overthrowing such as op- 
posed them, obliged the rest to betake them- 
selves to flight. The pursuit was continued to 
the very walls of Lerida, and some out of fear 
took shelter in the town, which gave our men 



COMMENTARIES. 



2^7 



an opportunity of making good their retreat. 
At the same time the cavalry, though posted 
disadvantageously in a bottom, found means 
by their valour to gain the summit of the moun- 
tain, and riding between both armies, hindered 
the enemy ■"om harassing our rear. Thus 
the engagement was attended with various 
turns of fortune. Cfesar lost about seventy 
men in the first encounter, among whom was 
Q. Fulginius, first centurion of the Hastati of 
the fourteenth legion, who had raised himself 
by his valour to that rank, through all the in- 
ferior orders. Upwards of six hundred were 
wounded. On Afranius's side was slain T. 
Caecilius, first centurion of a legion ; also four 
centurions of inferior degree, and above two 
hundred private men. 

XLV. Yet such were the circumstances of 
this day's action, that both sides laid claim to 
the victory ; the Afranians, because, though 
allowed to be inferior in number, they had long 
sustained our attack, kept possession of the 
eminence which occasioned the dispute, and 
obliged our men at first to give ground : 
Csesar's troops, because they had maintained 
a fight of five hourS; with a handful of men, 
and in a very disadvantageous post ; because 
they had attacked the mountain sword in 
hand, because they had driven their adversa- 
ries from the higher ground, and compelled 
them to take shelter in the town. Meantime 
Afranius fortified the hillock which had been 
the subject of dispute, with a great number 
of works, and posted there a large body of 
troops. 

XLVI. Two days after, a very unfortunate 
accident happened. For so great a storm 
arose, that the water was never known to be 
higher in those parts ; and the snow came 
down in such quantities from all the mountains 
round about, that the river overflowed its 
banks, and in one day broke down both the 
bridges Fabius had built over it. Caesar's 
army was reduced to great extremities on 
this occasion. For his camp, as we have be- 
fore observed, was between the Sicoris and 
Cinga, two rivers that were neither of them 
fordable, and necessarily shut him up with- 
in the space of no more than thirty miles. By 
this means, neither could the states that had 
declared for him supply him with provisions, 
nor the troops that had been sent beyond the 
rivers to forage, return, nor the large convoys 
he expected from Gaul and Italy get to his 



camp. Add to all this, that it being near the 
time of harvest, corn was extremely scarce : 
and the more, as before Caisar's arrival, 
Afranius had carried great quantities of it to 
Lerida ; and the rest had been consumed by 
Caesar's troops. The cattle, which was the 
next resource in the present scarcity, had been 
removed to places of security, on the breaking 
out of the war. The parties sent out to forage 
and bring in corn, were perpetually harassed 
by the Spanish infintry, who being well ac- 
quainted with the country, pursued them e«€ry 
where. The rivers themselves did not im- 
pede them, because they were accustomed to 
pass them on blown-up skins, which they al. 
ways brought with them into the field. Afran- 
ius, on the contrary, abounded in all things. 
He had large magazines of corn already laid 
up, was continually receiving fresh supplies 
from the province, and had plenty of forage. 
The bridge of Lerida furnished all these con- 
veniences without danger, and opened a free 
communication with the country beyond the 
river, from which Caesar was wholly excluded. 

XLVII. The waters continued several 
days. Caesar endeavoured to re-establish his 
bridges, but could not get the better of the 
obstacles occasioned by the swelling of the 
river, and the enemy's forces stationed on the 
opposite bank. They found it the easier to 
prevent his design, as the river was deep and 
rapid, and they could discharge their darts all 
along the bank, on that particular spot where 
our men were at work : whereas it was ex- 
tremely difficult on our side to struggle with 
the force of the stream, and, at the same time, 
guard ourselves against the assaults of the 
enemy. 

XL VIII. Meanwhile Afranius was inform- 
ed that a large convoy, which was on its way 
to join Caesar, had been obliged to halt at the 
river side. It consisted of archers from Ro- 
vergue, Gaulish horse, with many carts and 
much baggage, according to the custom of 
the Gauls, and about six thousand men of 
all sorts, with their domestics and slaves ; but 
without discipline or commander, every one 
following his own choice, and all marching in 
perfect security, as if they had nothing more to 
apprehend than in former times. There were 
likewise many young gentlemen of quality, 
senators' sons, and Roman knights, with the 
deputies of the states of Gaul, and some of 
Caesar's lieutenants; who were all stopped 



328 



PANSA'S 



short by the river, Afranius set out in the 
night, with three legions, and all his cavalry ; 
and sending the horse before, attacked them 
when they least expected it. The Gaulish 
squadrons, forming with great expedition, be- 
gan the fight. While the contest was upon 
equal terms, the Gauls, though few in number, 
bore up against the vast multitude of the ene- 
my ; but seeing the legions advance, and hav- 
ing lost some of their men, they retreated to 
the neighbouring mountains. This delay 
saved the convoy ; for during the skirmish, 
the rest of the troops gained the higher 
ground. We lost that day about two hundred 
archers, a few troopers, and some servants and 
baggage. 

XLIX. All this served to enhance the 
price of provisions, a calamity inseparable 
from present scarcity, and the prospect of fu- 
ture want. Corn was already at fifty denarii 
a bushel, the soldiers began to lose their 
strength, and the evil increased every moment. 
Nay, so great was the change produced in a 
few days, and such the alteration of fortune, 
that while our men were in the utmost want 
of all kind of necessaries, the enemy had 
plenty of every thing, and were accounted vic- 
torious. Cffisar left nothing untried to remove 
the present scarcity : he dismissed all the use. 
less mouths, and applied to the states that had 
declared for him, desiring them to send him 
cattle where they wanted corn. 

L. These things were greatly exaggerated 
by Afranius, Petreius, and their friends, in 
the letters they sent, upon this occasion, to 
Rome. Nor was fame backward in adding 
to the account; insomuch that the war ap- 
peared to be almost at an end. These cou- 
riers and letters having reached Rome, there 
was a great concourse of people at Afranius's 
house, many congratulations passed, and mul- 
titudes of the nobility flocked out of Italy to 

^ Pompey ; some to carry the first accounts of 
this grateful news ; others, that they might 
not be so late as to subject them to the re- 
proach of having waited for the event of 
things. 

LI. Affairs being in this extremity, and all 

/ the passes guarded by Afranius's parties, with- 
out a possibility of repairing the bridges ; Ca. 
sar ordered the soldiers to build some light 
boats, in imitation of those he had formerly 
seen in Britain, whose keel and ribs were of 
wood, and the rest of wicker, covered with 



leather. When he had got a sufficient num- 
ber, he sent them by night in wagons, twen- 
ty-two miles off from his camp. In these he 
embarked a go ^ 
them over the 
pectedly of a • " 
the other side . i.h . 
fore the enc 

posted a legic ^-..^ii , aim tnen 

threw a bridge over the Sicoris in two days. 
By this means he recovered his foragers, se- 
cured the convoy, and opened a passage for 
future supplies. The same day he detached 
a great part of his cavalry over the river; 
who, falling unexpectedly upon the enemy's 
foragers, dispersed up and down, without a 
suspicion of danger, made a considerable cap- 
ture of men and horses ; and observing some 
Spanish cohorts on the march to their assist- 
ance, skilfully divided themselves into two 
bodies ; one to secure the booty ; the other, 
to receive and return the enemy's charge. 
One of their cohorts, which had rashly sep- 
arated from the rest, and advanced too far be- 
fore the main body, was surrounded and cut 
to pieces by our men, who returned over the. 
same bridge to the camp, without loss, and en- 
riched with a considerable booty. 

LII. Whilst these things passed at Lerida, 
the people of Marseilles, by the advice of L. 
Domitius, equipped seventeen galleys, eleven 
of which were covered. To these they added 
a multitude of smaller vessels, that they might 
strike a terror into our fleet by their very num. 
ber ; and manned them with archers, and the 
mountaineers we have already mentioned, 
whom they encouraged to perform their part 
by great rewards and promises. Domitius de- 
sired some of these ships, and filled them with 
the shepherds and labourers he had brought 
thither with him. Thus furnished and equip- 
ped, they sailed with great confidence, in quest 
of our fleet, which was commanded by Deci. 
mus Brutus, and rode at anchor at an island 
over against Marseilles. Brutus was much in- 
ferior to the enemy in number of ships ; but 
Csesar had manned them with his best sol- 
diers, chosen out of all the legions, and head- 
ed by centurions of distinguished bravery, who 
had petitioned him for this service. These had 
provided themselves with hooks and grappling, 
irons, and a great number of darts, javelins, and 
offensive weapons of all sorts. Thus prepared, 
upon notice of the enemy's arrival, they stood 



COMMENTARIES. 



229 



out to sea, and attacked their fleet. The con- 
flict was sharp and vigorous. For the moun. 
• ■■ ■ i=. a'h^rJy "nf'" 'u i/itu-.'i'''' 'o ^tiqs, and 
up in wa he Ro- 

brnverr ; parted 

lioiD y- cnse of 

th"' ])" e shep- 

..v,.uo luu, uumiaieu oy me Hopes ot liberty, and 
fighting under the eye of their master, did 
wonders to merit his approbation. The 
townsmen themselves, confiding in the nim- 
bleness of their ships, and the slcill of their pi- 
lots, eluded the shocks of our vessels, and baf- 
fled all their attempts. As they had abundance 
of sea-room, they extended their line of bat- 
tle, in order to surround our fleet, or attack 
our ships singly with a number of theirs, or in 
running along-side, sweep away a range of 
oars. If they were compelled to come to a 
closer engagement, setting aside the skill and 
address of their pilots, they relied wholly on 
the bravery of their mountaineers. Our men 
were but indifferently provided with rowers 
and pilots, who had been hastily taken out of 
sOn\p merchant ships, and knew not so much 
as the names of the tackle. They were incom- 
moded too by the weight and lumpishness of 
tljeir vessels, which being built in haste, of 
unseekpned timber, were not so ready at tack- 
ing abmit. But when an opportunity offered of 
coming to close fight, they would boldly get 
between two of the enemy's ships ; and grap- 
pling them with their hooks, charge them on 
each side, board them, and cut to pieces the 
mountaineers and shepherds that defend them. 
In this manner they sunk part of their vessels, 
took some with all the men on board, and 
drove the rest into the haven. In this engage- 
ment, the enemy had nine galleys sunk or 
taken. 

LIII. The report of this battle reaching 
Lerida, and Csesar having finished his bridge 
over the Sicoris, affairs soon began to put on 
a new face. The enemy dreading the courage 
of our horse, durst not disperse about the 
country as formerly; but either foraged in the 
neighbourhood of the camp, that they might 
the sooner make good their retreat ; or, by a 
long circuit, endeavoured to avoid our parties : 
and upon receiving any check, or even des- 
crying our cavalry at a distance, they would 
throw down their trusses, and fly. At last, 
they were reduced to omit foraging several 
days together, and resolved to pursue it 



only by night, contrary to the general custom 
of war. 

LIV. In the mean time the Oscenses and 
Calagurritani jointly sent deputies to Caesar, 
with an offer of their submission and services. 
The Tarraconenses, Jacitani, and Ausetani, 
and not many days after, the Illurgavonenses, 
who inhabit along the banks of the Iberus, 
followed their example. He only required 
them to supply him with corn, to which they 
readily agreed ; and having got together a 
great number of carriage-horses, brought it to 
his camp. A cohort of the Illurgavonenses, 
hearing of the resolution taken by their state, 
deserted from the enemy, and came over to 
Caesar's camp. The change was sudden and 
great; for, the bridge being finished, provisions 
secured, this rumour of Pompey's march 
through Mauritania extinguished, and five con- 
siderable states having declared in his favour; 
a great number of distant provinces renounced 
their engagements with Afranius, and entered 
into new ones with Csesar. 

LV. These things having struck a terror into 
the enemy ; that he might not be always 
obliged to send his cavalry so far about to fo- 
rage, the bridges lying about seven miles from 
his camp, he bethought himself of draining the 
river, by turning some of its water into canals 
thirty feet deep, so as to make it fordable. 
The work being almost completed, Petreius 
and Afranius grew extremely apprehensive 
of being entirely cut off" from their provisions 
and forage, because CfEsar was very strong in 
cavalry. They therefore thought proper to quit 
a post that was no longer tenable, and to carry 
the war into Celtiberia. What contributed still 
further to confirm them in this resolution was, 
that of the two contrary parties, concerned in 
the late war, those who had declared for Sertori- 
us, still trembled at the name of the conqueror, 
and dreaded his power, though absent; and 
those who had attached themselves to Pom- 
pey, continued to love him for the many ser- 
vices he had done them : but Csesar's name was 
hardly known among these barbarians. Here 
they expected considerable reinforcements of 
horse and foot ; and doubted not, by taking 
the advantage of places, to be able to protract 
the war till winter. In order to execute this 
plan, they collected all the boats to be found 
on the Iberus, and ordered them to be brought 
to Octogesa, a city on that river, about twenty 
miles from their camp. Here they commanded 



230 



CiESAR'S 



a bridge of boats to be built ; and, having 
sent two legions over the Sicoris, fortified 
their camp with a rampart of twelve feet. 

LVL Csesar, having notice of this by his 
scouts, laboured day and night at his drains 
with the utmost diligence ; and had already so 
far diminished the water of the Sicoris, that 
the cavahy could, with some difficulty, pass 
over : but it took the infantry as high as the 
shoulders, who had therefore both the depth 
of the river and the rapidity of the stream to 
struggle with. Meanwhile it was known, that 
the bridge over the Iberus was almost finish- 
ed, and Ctssar's ford in great forwardness. 
This was a fresh motive to the enemy to quick- 
en their march : wherefore, leaving two aux- 
iliary cohorts, for a garrison, at Lerida, they 
crossed the Sicoris with all their forces, and 
joined the two legions they had sent over be- 
fore. Csesar had now no other remedy left 
but to harass and fatigue them with his cav- 
alry : for if he went with his whole army over 
his bridge, he lengthened his march prodi- 
giously, and gave Afranius time enough to get 
to the Iberus. Accordingly the horse having 
forded the river, came up with Petreius and 
A.franius's rear, who had decamped about mid- 
night : and making a motion to surround 
them, began to stop and retard their march. 

LVII. At day-break we discovered from 
the hills near the camp, that the enemy's rear 
was greatly harassed by our cavalry. Some- 
times they obliged them to halt, and disor- 
dered their ranks : at other times, the enemy 
facing about, charged with all their cohorts 
at once, and forced our men to give ground ; 
who, wheeling again as soon as they began to 
march, failed not to renew the attack. At this 
sight, the legionary soldiers, running up and 
down the camp, complained that the enemy 
would escape out of their hands, and the war 
necessarily be prolonged. They addressed 
themselves to the centurions and military tri. 
bunes, and desired them to beg of Csesar not 
to spare them ; that they feared neither dan- 
ger nor fatigue, and were ready to pass the 
river as the horse had done. Caesar, moved 
by their alacrity and entreaties, though he saw 
some danger in exposing his army to the ra- 
pidity of a deep river, judged it yet proper to 
attempt and make trial of the passage. Hav- 
ing therefore withdrawn from every company 
such as were weak of body, or of less courage 
than the rest, he left them in the camp with 



a legion, and all the baggage. The rest of 
the army happily passed the river, by the as- 
sistance of a double line of cavalry, placed 
above and below them. Some of the infantry 
were carried away by the violence of the cur- 
rent ; but they were picked up and saved by 
the horse below them ; so that no one man 
was lost. Having passed the river without 
loss, he drew up his army in order of battle, 
and began to pursue the enemy in three lines : 
and such was the ardour of the soldiers, that 
notwithstanding the army was obliged to make 
a circuit of six miles, notwithstanding the time 
necessarily lost in crossing the river, they got 
up at the ninth hour of the day to the enemy, 
who had set out at midnight. 

LVIII. When Afranius and Petreius per- 
ceived them at some distance, being with rea- 
son intimidated, they suspended their march, 
hailed on an eminence, and formed in order 
of battle. Cassar would not hazard an action 
with his troops, thus fatigued, and halted like- 
wise in the plain. On this the enemy re- 
sumed their march, and he the pursuit ; which 
obliged them to encamp earlier than they de- 
signed. Hard by was a range of mountains, 
and about five miles farther, the ways were 
difficult and narrow. The enemy retired 
among these mountains, to avoid the gursuit 
of the cavalry ; and having placed parties in 
all the passes, to stop Caesar's army, hoped, 
by this means, to continue their march to the 
Iberus, without fear or danger. This was 
their great affair, and what before all things 
they should have endeavoured to effect ; but, 
being fatigued by a long march, and their 
continual skirmishes with Caesar's cavalry, 
they deferred it till next day. Caesar like- 
wise encamped on a hill that lay near him. 

LIX. About midnight, the cavalry having 
surprised some of the enemy, who had adveri- 
tured a little too far from their camp in quest 
of water ; Caesar was informed by them, that 
Pompey's lieutenants were decamping without 
noise. Immediately he ordered the alarm to 
be sounded, and gave his army the signal to 
march. The enemy, finding they should be 
pursued, kept still ; being- afraid of a noctur. 
nal flight, wherein they would have had great, 
ly the disadvantage, on account of their heavy 
baggage which they had with them, and the 
superiority of Caesar's cavalry. Next day, 
Petreius went privately out with a party of 
horse, to take a view of the country. Csesar 



COMMENTARIES. 



231 



likewise detached a squadron for the same pur- 
pose, under the command of Decidius Saxa. 
Both made the like report in their several 
camps ; that for five miles together, the coun- 
try was level and open, but after that rough 
and mountainous ; and that whoever should 
first get possession of the defiles, might easily 
prevent the other army from approaching 
them. 

LX, Upon this, a council of war was held 
by Petreius and Afranius, to deliberate about 
the time of beginning their march. The 
greater number were for setting out by night, 
in hopes of reaching the defiles before Csesar 
could have notice of their departure. Others 
argued against the possibility of decamping 
privately, by the alarm given in Ccesar's 
camp the night before : " That the enemy's 
cavalry were continually patrolling in the 
night, and had beset all the ways and passes : 
that a nocturnal engagement was to be avoided, 
because, in a civil war, the soldiers were more 
apt to listen to their fears, than the obligations 
of the military oath : that shame and the pre- 
sence of the centurions and the tribunes, the 
great instruments of obedience and military 
duty, could have their proper effect only in the 
light, which rendered it of infinite importance 
to wait the approach of day ; that in case of 
a disaster, yet the bulk of the army would es- 
cape, and be able to possess themselves of the 
post in question." This opinion prevailed in 
the council, and they resolved to set out the 
next morning by break of day. 

LXI. Caesar having taken a view of the 
country, decamped as soon as it was light, 
taking a considerable circuit, and observing no 
particular route ; for the direct way to the 
Iberus and Octogesa lay in the rear of the 
enemy's camp. He was therefore obliged to 
march through valleys and precipices, and over 
steep rocks, which the soldiers could not climb, 
but by disencumbering themselves of their 
arms, and returning them afterwards to one 
another. But not a man murmured at these 
difficulties, in hope of seeing a speedy end of 
all their labours, if they could but gain the 
Iberus before the enemy, and intercept their 
provisions. As in this march we pursued at 
first an opposite course, and seemed to turn 
our backs upon the enemy, Afranius's soldiers 
who observed us from their camp, came forth 
with joyful looks, and insulted us on our sup- 
posed flight, imagining the want of provisions 



obliged us to return to Lerida. Their generals 
applauded themselves upon their resolution of 
not decamping, and were confirmed in the no- 
tion of our retreat, as they saw we had neither 
horses nor carriages ; whence they concluded 
the scarcity must be exceeding great. But 
when they saw us, after some time, turn to 
the right, and that our advanced guard had 
already gained the ground beyond their camp, 
there was not a man so tardy or indolent, as 
not to perceive the necessity of decamping 
and opposing our march. Immediately they 
ran to arms, and leaving a few cohorts to guard 
the camp, sallied in a body, pursuing their way 
directly to the Iberus. 

LXII. All depended upon despatch, and 
getting the first possession of the defiles and 
mountains. Our troops were retarded by the 
difficulties of the way, and Afranius's by the 
continual attacks of Caesar's cavalry. But 
such was the situation of the Afranians, that 
even supposing them to gain the hills first, 
they could only secure their own retreat, with- 
out a possibility of preserving their baggage, 
and the cohorts left to guard the camp ; be- 
cause Caesar's army getting between, cut them 
off from all communication with their own 
men. Caesar arrived first at the place in ques- 
tion ; and having found a plain beyond the 
rocks, formed his men in order of battle against 
the enemy. Afranius, who now saw our 
army in his front, at the same time that his 
rear was continually harassed by the cavalry, 
halted on an eminence, from whence he 
detached four Spanish cohorts, to take posses- 
sion of the highest mountain thereabouts ; or- 
dering them to make all the despatch they 
could to seize it, that he might get thither 
himself with the rest of his forces, and chang- 
ing his route, march them over the hills to 
Octogesa. The Spaniards wheeling oblique- 
ly, to take possession of the place, were per- 
ceived by Ctesar's cavalry ; who charged them 
furiously, broke them at the first onset, sur- 
rounded, and cut them in pieces in sight of 
both armies. ,i. 

LXIII. Caesar had now an opportunity of 
giving the enemy an effectual blow ; whose 
army, in the present consternation it was under, 
would, he was sensible, make but a faint re- 
sistance ; more especially as it was surrounded 
on all sides by the cavalry, and would be 
obliged to fight on equal ground. He was 
pressed, on all hands, to give the signal. The 



232 



CiESAR 



lieutenants, centurions, and military tribunes, 
got round him, urging him not to delay the 
engagement : " That the soldiers were all 
eager for a battle ; whereas, on the contrary, 
the Afranians had given many marks of fear : 
that they had neither dared to support their 
own detachment, nor offered to descend from 
the hill, nor been able to withstand the very 
first charge of our cavalry ; that they had 
brought their ensigns all into one place, where 
they crowded confusedly round them, without 
observing ranks or order : that if he was afraid 
to attack them on the eminence, he would soon 
have an opportunity of more equal ground, as 
Afranius would be obliged to remove for want 
of water." 

LXIV. Cffisar was in hopes of terminating 
the affair without bloodshed, or a battle ; be- 
cause he had intercepted the enemy's provi- 
sions. Why therefore, even supposing the 
event to be prosperous, should he unneces- 
sarily lose any of his men 1 Why should he 
expose to wounds, soldiers who had so well 
deserved of him 1 Why, in fine, should he 
tempt fortune 1 especially as it redounded no 
less to the honour of a good general, to gain 
the victory by his conduct, than by the force 
of his arms. He was also touched with com- 
passion for Afranius's soldiers ; who, after all, 
were fellow-citizens, and whom he must have 
slaughtered, when he could equally succeed 
without touching their lives. This resolution 
was not at all relished by the army ; who, in 
their discontent, openly declared, that since 
Caesar did not lay hold of so favourable an op- 
portunity, nor let them fight when they had a 
mind, they would not fight when he had a 
mind. But nothing could shake him. Nay, 
he even retreated a little, to give Afranius and 
Petreius liberty to regain their camp, which 
they did. He then posted troops on the moun- 
tains, to guard the defiles, and came and en- 
camped as near the enemy as possible. 

LXV. The day after, Pompey's lieutenants, 
disturbed at finding their provisions cut off, 
and all the ways to the Iberus intercepted, 
consulted what was proper to be done. They 
had it still in their power to return to Lerida, 
or march to Tarraco. But while they were 
debating this matter, notice was brought them, 
that our cavalry had fallen upon their parties 
sent out in quest of water. Upon this intelli- 
gence, they formed several posts of horse and 
foot intermixed with legionary cohorts ; and 



began to throw up a rampart from the camp 
to the place- where they watered, that the sol- 
diers might pass and repass under cover, with- 
out fear, and without a guard. Afranius and 
Petreius divided this work between them, 
and went to give directions about it in per- 
son. 

LXVI. In their absence, their soldiers 
found frequent opportunities of conversing with 
our men, and sought out every one his fellow- 
citizen and acquaintance. They began by 
thanking them for having spared them the 
day before, ov?ning they were indebted to them 
for their lives. Afterwards they asked them, 
if they might trust to Csesar's honour ; testify- 
ing much grief at being obliged to fight with 
their countrymen and relations, with whom 
they were united by the strictest ties. At last 
they stipulated even for their generals, whom 
they would not seem to betray : and promised, 
if the lives of Petreius and Afranius were 
granted them, to change sides. At the same 
time they sent some of their principal officers 
to negotiate with Ccesar : and these prelimina- 
ries to an accommodation being settled, the 
soldiers of both armies went into one another's 
tents, so that the two camps were now in a 
manner one. A great number of centurions 
and military tribunes came to pay their court 
to Csesar, and beg his protection. The Span- 
ish chiefs, who had been summoned to attend 
Afranius, and were detained in the camp as 
hostages, followed their example. Every man 
sought out his acquaintance and friend, who 
might recommend and procure him a favoura- 
ble reception from Caesar. Things were car- 
ried to such a length, that Afranius's son, a 
young gentleman, treated with Caesar, by the 
mediation of Sulpicius, to desire he would give 
his word for his life, and that of his father. 
The joy was general ; they mutually con- 
gratulated each other ; the one, in that they 
had escaped so imminent a danger ; and 
the other, in that they had brought to a 
happy conclusion so important an enter- 
prise, without striking a blow. Caesar, in 
the judgment of all, was upon the point of 
amply reaping the fruits of his wonted 
clemency, and every body applauded his late 
conduct. 

LXVn. Afranius, having notice of what 
passed, quitted the work he was engaged in, 
and returned to the camp ; prepared, as it 
would seem, to bear with an equal mind 



(MJMMENTARIES. 



233 



whatever should happen. But Petreius was 
not wanting to himself. He armed his 
slaves; and joining them to a pretorian co-: 
hort of target-bearers, and some Spanish horse, 
his dependants, whom he always kept about 
him to guard his person ; he instantly flew to 
the rampart, broke off the conferences of the 
soldiers, drove our men from the camp, and 
put all of them he could find to the sword. 
The rest flocked together ; where, alarmed at 
the danger to which they saw themselves ex- 
posed, they wrapped their cloaks round their 
left arms, drew their swords, and, trusting 
to the nearness of their camp, defended them- 
selves against the Spanish target-bearers and 
cavalry, till they had retreated to our ad- 
vanced guard, who screened them from any 
further assault. 

LXVIII. After this he went through the 
whole camp, begging his troops, with tears, 
to have pity on him, and Pompey their gene- 
ral ; and that they would not deliver them 
both up to the cruel vengeance of their ene- 
mies. Every one upon this flocks to the 
head-quarters. There Petreius proposes to 
the army to bind themselves by a new oath, 
not to abandon nor betray their commanders, 
nor to act separately, but all in concert, for 
the common good. He himself took this oath 
first, and then exacted it of Afranius, after- 
wards of the military tribunes and centurions, 
and lastly of all the companies, man by man. 
At the same time an order was issued that all 
who had any of Caesar's soldiers in their tents 
should signify it, that they might be put to 
death in the sight of the whole army. But 
the majority, detesting this bloody order, care- 
fully hid those who were under their protec. 
tion, and procured them means to escape in 
the night. However, the terror they had 
been thrown into by their generals, the 
severity shown in punishing, and the new oath 
they had been obliged to take, defeated, for 
the present, all hopes of a surrender, changed 
fhe soldiers' minds, and reduced the war to its 
former state. 

LXIX. Caesar ordered diligent search to 
be made after such of the enemy's soldiers as 
had come to his camp during the time of con- 
ference, and carefully sent them back. Some 
military tribunes and centurions voluntarily 
chose to stay with him ; whom he afterwards 
treated with great distinction ; promoting the 
centurions to higher ranks, and honouring the 
21 



Roman knights with the ofiice of miUtary 
tribunes. 

LXX. The Afranian troops were destitute 
of forage, and could not water without much 
diflnculty. The legionary soldiers had, in. 
deed, some provisions, because they had been 
ordered to bring two and twenty days' corn 
with them from Lerida ; but the Spanish in- 
fantry and auxiliaries had none ; for they 
neither had opportunities of supplying them- 
selves, nor were their bodies inured to carry 
heavy burdens. Accordingly, they every day 
ideserted in shoals to Caesar. In this ex. 
tremity, of the two expedients proposed, that 
of returning to Lerida appeared the safest, as 
they had still some provisions in that city, and 
might there concert what further measures to 
pursue. Tarraco was at a greater distance, and 
they would of course be exposed to more ac- 
cidents by the way. This resolution being 
taken they decamped. Caesar sent the caval. 
ry before, to harass and retard them in their 
march ; and followed himself with the rest of 
the army. The cavalry gave the enemy no 
respite, being continually engaged with their 
rear. 

LXXI. The manner of fighting was thus : 
— Some light-armed cohorts formed the rear- 
guard, which, in a plain, halted from time to 
time, and made head against our cavalry. When 
they fell in with an eminence, the very nature 
of the ground furnished them with the means 
of defending themselves, because those who 
were first could cover them behind. But 
when a valley or descent came in the way, the 
van could give no assistance to the rear, and 
our cavalry annoyed them with their darts 
from the higher ground, which put them in 
imminent danger. In this case, the le- 
gions were obliged to halt, and endeavour 
to drive back the cavalry a good way, after 
which they ran down the valley precipitately, 
until they came to the opposite eminence. 
For their cavalry, of which they had a con- 
siderable number, was so terrified by their ill 
success in former skirmishes, that, far from be. 
ing of any service, they were forced to place 
it in the centre to secure it ; and if any of 
them chanced to straggle from the main body, 
they were immediately taken by Caesar's 
horse. 

LXXII. During these continual skirmishes, 
in which the enemy were often obliged to halt, 
in order to disengage their rear, it is easy to 
2 H 



234 



C .^ S A R ' S 



perceive that their march could not be very 
expeditious. This was in fact the case ; so 
that after advancing four miles, finding them- 
selves greatly incommoded by the cavalry,they 
halted on an eminence, and drew a line be- 
fore them, as it were to encamp, but did not 
unload their beasts of burden. When they 
saw that Csesar had marked out his camp, 
pitched his tents, and sent his cavalry to for. 
age; suddenly, towards noon, they resumed 
their march briskly, hoping to be rid of the 
cavalry which had so much incommoded them. 
But Caesar set out immediately with his legions, 
leaving a few cohorts to guard the baggage, 
and sent orders to his cavalry to return with all 
diligence. The cavalry returned according, 
ly, and having overtaken the enemy before 
the close of day, attacked their rear so vigor- 
ously, that they were almost routed, a great 
number of soldiers, and even some centurions, 
being slain. Caesar's whole army came up, 
and threatened them with an immediate at. 
tack. 

LXXIII. As they could then neither 
choose a proper place for a camp, nor 
continue their march, they were forced to 
halt where they were, far from any water, 
and on very disadvantageous ground. Csesar 
did not offer to attack them, for the reasons 
mentioned before; he would not even permit 
any tents to be pitched that day, that he 
might be the readier to pursue with all his 
forces, should they attempt to escape either by 
night or by day. The Afranians perceiving the 
disadvantage of their situation, employed the 
whole night in throwing up intrenchments, 
and disposed their camp directly fronting ours. 
The same they did the following day, from 
sun-rise till evening. But the farther they 
extended their camp, and produced their lines, 
in order to better their position, the farther 
they went from water, and to avoid one in- 
convenience, fell into another. The first 
night nobody went out of the camp for water, 
and the next day the whole army was obliged 
to do it in order of battle, so that they could 
not forage that day. Csesar wanted to hum- 
ble them by these misfortunes, and reduce 
them by want and necessity rather than force. 
He began, however, to d.aw lines round the 
camp, the better to check their sudden sallies 
and irruptions, to which he foresaw they would 
be obliged to have recourse at last. Want, 



and the desire of marching with less ditSculty, 
soon constrained them to kill all the beasts of 
burden. 

LXXIV, Two days were spent in forming 
and executing those resolutions ; on the third, 
Cffisar had considerably advanced his works. 
Afranius and Petreius, sensible of the conse- 
quences, drew all their forces out of the camp, 
and formed them in order of battle. Csesar 
previously called in his workmen, assembled 
his cavalry, and put his army in a condition to 
receive them, for he was aware of the hurt his 
reputation might sustain, if, contrary to the 
opinion of the troops, and the earnest expecta- 
tions of all, he should still seem to decline an 
engagement. However, for the reasons al- 
ready mentioned, he resolved to keep only 
upon the defensive ; and the rather, because 
the distance between the two camps was so 
small, that should he even put his adversaries 
to rout, he could not flatter himself with the 
hopes of a complete victory. In fact, from 
camp to camp was not above two thousand 
feet ; the armies were posted on each side of 
this space, which was left void for the mu- 
tual charge and assault of the soldiers. On 
supposition therefore of a battle, the nearness 
of their camp furnished an easy retreat to the 
vanquished. For this reason he resolved to 
wait the enemy's charge, and not enter the 
first into action. 

LXXV. Afranius's troops were ranged in 
two lines, consisting of five legions, and the 
cohorts wont to be stationed in the wings, 
formed a body of reserve. Csesar's army was 
upon three lines ; in the first of which were 
posted four cohorts, detached out of each of 
the five legions ; in the second three ; and in 
the third the like number, all from their re- 
spective legions : the archers and slingers 
were disposed in the midst, and the cavalry 
on the two wings. The armies being drawn 
up in this manner, each general kept firm to 
his resolution ; Csesar, not to engage, unless 
forced to it ; and Afranius, to prevent the 
progress of our works. In this posture they 
continued till sun-set, when both armies re- 
turned to their several camps. The next day, 
Csesar prepared to finish his lines ; and Pom- 
pey's lieutenants, as their last resource, en- 
deavoured to find a fordable place in the Si- 
coris. But Csesar, penetrating their design, 
sent his light-armed Germans, with part of 



COMMENTARIES. 



235 



his cavalry, over the river, and posted many 
good bodies of troops along the banks, at a 
small distance from one another. 

LXXVI. At last, having no hope left, and 
being in wrant of every thing, wood, water, 
forage, corn, they demanded an interview, 
and that it might be, if possible, in some 
place out of the sight of the soldiers. Cse- 
sar denied the last part of their request, but 
offered to grant them a public interview ; 
whereupon Afranius, having given his son for 
a hostage, went to the place appointed by Cse- 
sar, where, in the presence of both armies, he 
addressed him to this effect : " That it was no 
just matter of blame, either in him or his sol- 
diers, to have preserved their fidelity to their 
general, Pompey ; but that they had now suf- 
ficiently acquitted themselves of their duty, 
and suffered enough in his cause, by the want 
of all kind of necessaries : that like wild 
beasts caught in a toil, they were deprived of 
the most common enjoyments, having their 
bodies oppressed by want, and their minds 
overwhelmed with ignominy, that they there- 
fore acknowledged themselves vanquished, 
and besought and conjured him, not to make 
a rigorous use of his victory, but to spare the 
lives of his unhappy countrymen." This 
speech was delivered with all possible marks 
of humility and submission. 

LXXVII. Caesar replied, « That he of all 
mankind, had least reason to complain, or im- 
plore compassion : that all the rest had fully 
done their duty ; himself, in forbearing to at- 
tack him, with all the advantages of time and 
place, that the way to an accommodation might 
be the more open ; his army, in returning un- 
touched, the men that were in their power, 
after injuries received, and the massacre of 
their comrades : in fine, even his own troops, 
in endeavouring to conclude a peace, whereon 
they thought their safety depended. Thus all 
orders had shown an inclination to treat, while 
Afranius and Petreius alone opposed an ac- 
commodation, refusing both interview and 
truce, and barbarously murdering those whom 
the faith of a conference had enticed to their 
camp : that it had therefore happened to them, 
as frequently happens to men of obstinacy and 
arrogance, and they were forced to have re- 
course to those conditions, and earnestly so- 
licit the very same terms, which not long be- 
fore they had despised. However, he would 
not take advantage of their present submis- 



sion, or the favourable circumstances in which 
he found himself, to demand any thing tend- 
ing to the increase of his own power, but only 
that they would disband those troops which 
they had now for so many years kept on foot 
against him. For with what other view had 
six legions been sent into Spain ; a seventh 
levied there, so many powerful navies equipped, 
so many able and experienced officers sent 
overl) These mighty preparations could not 
be meant against Spain, or to supply the 
wants of the province, which having enjoyed 
a long run of peace, had no occasion for such 
extraordinary forces. Their real aim was to 
pave the way to his destruction ; to effect 
which, a new species of power had been in- 
troduced into the commonwealth, and the 
same man appointed to command in Italy, at 
the gates of Rome, and hold for so many years, 
though absent, the government of the two 
most potent provinces of the republic. For 
this reason the magistrates were stripped of 
their prerogatives, and not suffered to take 
possession of their provinces, at the expiration 
of the pretorship or consulship, as had always 
been the custom : but particular governors 
were sent, by the choice and management of 
a faction. For this reason even the excuse 
of old age was disallowed ; and those who had 
merited a discharge by their past services, 
were compelled to take arms again, to com- 
plete the number of their troops. In fine, for 
this reason, he alone had been denied that jus- 
tice, which was never refused to any general 
before him ; that after having successfully 
served the commonwealth, he should be allowed 
to return home, and disband his own armj', 
with some marks of honour, or at least without 
ignominy. All which, nevertheless, ho had 
hitherto borne, and still resolved to bear with 
patience ; nor was it now his design, to take 
from them their soldiers, and enlist them, as it 
would be easy for him to do, but to prevent 
their employing them against him. Therefore, 
as he had already intimated, they must resolve 
to quit Spain, and disband their forces, in 
which case he would injure no man. This was 
his final resolution, and the only condition of 
peace they were to expect." 

LXXVIII. These conditions were agreea- 
ble to Afranius's soldiers, who, instead of 
being punished, as they feared, were in some 
sort rewarded by the discharge procured them. 
They plainly showed their satisfaction. For 



236 



CESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 



while the place and time of their dismission 
were debating, they signified by their gestures 
and cries from the rampart, where they stood, 
that they desired to be disbanded immediately ; 
because no sufficient security could be given 
for the performance of what was put off till 
another time. After some discussion of that 
article by Csesar and Afranius, it was re- 
gulated, that those who had houses or posses- 
sions in Spain, should be discharged on the 
spot ; and the rest near the Var, a river be- 
tween Gaul and Italy. C£esar,on his side, de- 
clared that he would hurt nobody, nor force 
any one to take on in his service. 

LXXIX. Cffisar undertook to find them in 
corn until they got to the Var. He even pro- 
mised to restore to them all they had lost in 
the war, that could be known again : himself 
indemnifying his own soldiers, who hereby lost 



part of their booty. By this conduct he ac- 
quired their confidence to such a degree, that 
he was arbiter of all the disputes they had, 
either among themselves, or with their com- 
manders. The soldiers being ready to mutiny 
about their pay, because Petreius and Afranius 
affirmed it was not yet due, the matter was 
referred to Caosar, who determined it to the 
satisfaction of both parties. About a third of 
the army was disbanded during the two days 
they continued here, after which the rest set 
out for the Var in this order. Two of Ceesar's 
legions marched at the head, the others in the 
rear, and the vanquished troops in the middle. 
Q. Fufius Calenus, one of Csesar's lieutenants, 
presided over the march. In this manner they 
continued their route to the Var, where the 
remainder of the troops were disbanded. 



CiESAR'S COMMENTARIES 



OF 



THE CIVIL WAR. 



BOOK II 



31» 



237 



THE ARGUMENT. 

I. Trebonius continues the siege of Marseilles.— III. Nasidius arrives with a fleet to the relief of the town.— 
IV. The inhabitants repair their fleet, and join it to that of Nasid ius.— V. A sea fight between Brutus and the 
people of Marseilles.— VI. In which the latter are defeated.— VIII. Trebonius raises a prodigious tower 
against the town.— IX. Likewise a musculus of uncommon size.— X. By which a tower belonging to the 
enemy is overthrown.— XI. Upon this the besieged demand a truce.— XIII, Which they afterwards break, 
and in a sudden sally burn Trebonius's works.— XIV. Trebonius, with wonderful expedition, raises a new 
and amazing terrace.-XV. Upon which the besieged again treat of a surrender.— XVI. Meanwhile M. Varro, 
in farther Spain, prepares to oppose Caesar.— XVII. Csesar summons a general assembly of the states at 
Corduba.— XVII. Varro, deserted by his troops, goes over to Ceesar.- XIX. Casar having reduced Spain, ar- 
rives before Marseilles.— XX. The Marseillians surrender. L. Domitius escapes by sea.— XXI. About the 
same time, C. Curio sets out for Africa.— XXII. Where, at first, he wars successfully against Varus.— XXIV. 
Butafterwards, Varus having received supplies from king Juba, he rashly ventures a battle, where, after 
some advantages in the beginning, by means of his cavalry, he is at last cut off with his whole army. 



238 



CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 



OF 



THE CIVIL WAR. 



BOOK II, 



r. While these things passed in Spain, Tre- 
bonius, Csesar's lieutenant, who had been left 
to carry on the siege of Marseilles, raised 
terraces for two diflerent attacks, and ap- 
proached with his towers and galleries. One 
of the attacks was on the side of the port ; the 
other, towards the mouth of the Rhone, which 
empties itself into the sea, bordering upon 
Spain and Gaul. For Marseilles is washed by 
the sea on three sides, and can be approached 
by land only on the fourth ; of which that part 
where the citadel stands, being very strong by 
nature, because of a deep valley that runs 
before it, requires a long and difficult siege. 
For the completing of these works, 'J'rebonius 
drew together, from all parts of the province, 
a great number of workmen and beasts of 
carriage ; ordered wood and osiers to be 
brought ; and having prepared all things ne- 
cessary, raised a terrace eighty feet high. 

II. But so well was the town provided 
with all the requisites of war, and so great 
was the multitude of machines to annoy the 
besiegers, that no rnantles were sufficient to 
withstand their violence. For they had 
wooden bars, twelve feet in length, armed at 
the point with iron, which were shot with such 
force from their balistae, that they pierced four 
rows of hurdles, and entered a considerable 
way into the ground. To resist the violence 
of these batteries, the besiegers made use of 
galleries, whose roofs consisted of pieces of 
wood of about a foot in thickness, strongly 
compacted together. Under this cover, the 
materials necessary for raising the terrace 
were conveyed : and a tortoise, sixty feet long. 



composed of strong beams, and armed with 
every thing necessary to defend it against fire 
and stones, went before, to level the ground. 
But in spite of all endeavours, the greatness 
of the works, the height of the wall and towers, 
and the multitude of machines made use of 
by the besieged, greatly retarded the ap- 
proaches. Besides, the mountaineers made 
frequent sallies, and set fire to the towers and 
mount: which though our men easily sustain, 
ed, driving them back with great loss into the 
town, yet failed not very much to incommode 
the works. 

III. In the mean time L. Nasidius, sent by 
Pompey to the assistance of Domitius and the 
Marseillians, with a fleet of sixteen ships, 
some of which were strengthened with beaks 
of brass, passed the straits of Sicily unknown 
to Curio, landed at Messana, and raised so 
great a terror in the place, that being aban- 
doned by the senate and principal inhabitants, 
he found means to carry off one of their gal- 
lies; and joining it to his own fleet, steered 
directly for Marseilles, having despatched 
a frigate before, to apprize Domitius and 
the inhabitants of his coming, and press 
them to hazard a second engagement with 
Brutus, when they should be reinforced by 
his fleet. 

IV. The Marseillians, after their defeat, had 
drawn as many old ships out of the docks as 
they had lost in the engagement ; and repair- 
ed and rigged them with wondrous expedition. 
They were likewise well provided with row- 
ers and pilots ; and had prepared a number of 
fishing barks, which they filled with archers 

239 



240 



CESAR'S 



and engines, and strengthened with roofs, to 
shelter the rowers from the enemy's darts. 
The fleet being equipped in this manner, the 
Marseillians, animated by the prayers and 
tears of their old men, matrons, and virgins, to 
exert themselves in defence of their country 
in so pressing a conjuncture; embarked with 
no less confidence and assurance, than they 
had before their late defeat. For such is the 
weakness of the human mind, that things 
dark, hidden, and unknown, always produce 
in us a greater degree of confidence or terror ; 
as happened in the present case ; for the arri- 
val of Nasidius had filled all men with an un- 
common share of hope and eagerness. The 
wind springing up fair, they set sail, and ren- 
dezvoused at Tauroenta, a castle belonging to 
the town, where Nasidius lay with his fleet. 
Here they put their ships in order, armed 
themselves with courage for a second encoun- 
ter, and entering readily into all the measures 
proposed by Nasidius, left to him the com- 
mand of the left wing, and stationed them- 
selves upon the right. 

V. Brutus sailed to meet them, with his 
fleet considerably increased ; for besides the 
ships which Caesar had caused to be built at 
Aries, he had also joined to it six more, taken 
from the Marseillians, which he had refitted 
and rigged since the late action. Wherefore 
exhorting his men to despise an enemy, who 
had not been able to resist them when entire 
and unvanquished, he advanced against them 
full of resolution and confidence. It was easy 
to discern from Trebonius's camp, and the emi- 
nences around it, what passed in the town. 
All the youth that were left, the old men, the 
women, children, and even the guards upon 
the walls, extending their hands to heaven, or 
repairing to the temples, and prostrating them- 
selves at the altars, besought the gods to grant 
them victory. Nor was there a man among 
them who did not believe, that their safety 
depended wholly on the issue of that day's ac- 
tion. For the choice of their youth, and the 
most considerable men of their city, were all on 
hoard the fleet : insomuch, that in case of any 
disaster, they had no resource left ; but should 
they obtain the victory,they were in hopes of pre- 
serving their city, either by their own forces, or 
the reinforcements they expected from without. 

VI. Accordingly, in the engagement, they 
behaved with the most determined courage. 
The remembrance of what their wives and 



children had represented to them at their de- 
parture served to exalt their bravery ; in a 
full persuasion, that this was the last opportti- 
nity they should have of exerting themselvj 
in defence of their country ; and that if they 
fell in the engagement, their feIlow-citiz«ns 
could not long survive them, as their fate 
must be the same upon the taking of the town. 
Our ships being at some distance from each 
other, both gave the enemy's pilots an oppor- 
tunity of showing their address in working 
their vessels, and flying to the assistance of 
their friends, when they were laid hold on by 
our grappling hooks. And indeed, when it 
came to a close fight, they seconded the moun- 
taineers with wonderful resolution, and, in 
bravery, seemed to yield but little to our men. 
At the same time, a great quantity of darts, 
poured incessantlj' from their smaller frigates, 
wounded a great many of our rowers, and such 
of the soldiers as were without shelter. Two 
of their galleys fell upon that of Brutus, which 
was easily distinguished by its flag ; but though 
they attacked him on both sides, he extricated 
himself with such agility and address, as in a 
short time to get a little before ; which made 
them run foul of each other so violently, that 
they were both considerably shattered ; one 
in particular had its beak broken, and was in a 
manner totally crushed ; which being observed 
by those of our fleet that lay nearest, they 
suddenly fell upon and sunk them, before they 
could recover out of their disorder. 

VII. In this encounter, the ships under 
Nasidius were of no manner of service to the 
Marseillians, but quickly retired out of the 
fight. For as they were neither animated by 
the sight of their country, nor the entreaties of 
their relations, they were not very forward to 
expose their lives to hazard, but escaped with- 
out hurt from the combat. The Marseillians 
had five ships sunk, and four taken. One es- 
caped to the coast of hither Spain, with those 
of Nasidius. Of the rest that remained, one 
was immediately despatched to Marseilles, to 
carry thither the news of the defeat. As soon 
as it drew near the town, all the inhabitants 
flocked out to know what had passed ; and 
being informed of it, appeared no less dejected 
than if the city had been taken by storm. 
However, they still continued their prepara- 
tions for the defence of the place with as much 
diligence as ever. 

VIII. The legionaries, who had the chaage 



COMMENTARIES. 



241 



of the works on the right, perceived, that a 
tower of brick, built at a little distance from 
the walls, would be of great service to shelter 
them from the frequent sallies of the enemy. 
At first they made it very low and small, to 
guard against sudden incursions. Hither they 
retired in case of danger : here they defended 
themselves against the most obstinate attacks 
of the enemy ; nay, even assaulted them in 
their turn, repulsed, and pursued them. This 
tower was of a square form, thirty feet every 
way, allowing for the thickness of the walls, 
which might be about five feet. Afterwards, 
(being instructed by experience, which is the 
best of teachers,) they plainly perceived, that 
the higher it was carried, the more serviceable 
it would prove. The manner of effecting it was 
thus : When the work was raised to the height 
of one story, they laid a floor over it, the ex- 
tremities of whose beams were concealed in 
the thickness of the wall ; that they might not 
by appearing on the outside, be liable to be 
set on fire. Thence they continued the wall 
directly upwards, as far as their galleries and 
mantles would allow. Here they laid two 
beams crosswise, whose extremities almost 
reached the angles of the wall, for supporting 
the floor, which was to serve as a roof to the 
whole. Over these beams they laid the joists 
of the roof, and boarded them with planks. 
The roof was so contrived as to project a little 
beyond the wall, in order to suspend from 
it what might be necessary to shelter the 
workmen, while employed in completing the 
story. This floor was paved with tiles and 
clay, to render it proof against fire, and had 
besides a covering of strong mattresses, to 
break the force of stones and darts. At the 
same time they suspended from the beams of 
the roof, that projected beyond the wall, cur- 
tains made of strong cables, woven to the depth 
of four feet, and which went round the three 
sides of the tower that were exposed to the en- 
gines of the enemy ; having experienced on 
former occasions, that this kind of cover was 
impenetrable to any dart or engine whatever. 
When this part of the tower was finished, 
roofed, and sheltered from the enemy's blows, 
they removed their mantles to another, and 
by means of engines elevated the roof 
entire from the first story, as far as the cur- 
tains would allow. There, secure from all 
insult, they laboured at the wall, elevating the 
roof a second time, and thereby enabling 



themselves both to continue the work, and lay 
the interjacent floors. In this manner they 
proceeded from story to story, mounting them 
one upon another, till, without danger or 
wounds, they had completed the number of 
six, leaving loop-holes in convenient places, 
for the engines to play through. -■'' ' 

^IX, When, by means of this tower, they 
thought they had sufficiently provided for 
the security of the works around it, they re- 
solved to build a gallery sixty feet long, of 
wood, two feet in thickness, to extend from 
the brick tower to the tower of the enemy, 
and the very walls of the town. The form of 
the gallery was this : — First, two beams of 
equal length were laid upon the ground, at 
the distance of four feet from one another; 
and in these were fixed little pillars five feet 
high, joined at the top by beams designed to 
support the roof of the gallery. Over these 
were laid rafters, two feet square, fastened 
strongly with nails and plates of iron. The 
upper part of the roof was composed of square 
laths, four inchps thick, which were placed 
at a small distance one from another, to bear 
the tiles that were to be laid upon them. 
Thus was the whole finished with a sloping 
roof, which being partly composed of tiles and 
mortar, was proof against fire, and had be- 
sides a covering of hides, to hinder the mor- 
tar from being washed away by spouts of wa- 
ter. Over all we threw strong mattresses, to 
screen the hides from fire and stones. This 
work was finished close by the brick tower, 
under cover of four mantles, and immediately 
carried forward upon rollers, in the manner 
ships are launched, till it unexpectedly reach- 
ed the very tower of the enemy. 

X. The Marseillians astonished at so threat- 
ening and unlooked-for a machine, pushed 
forward with levers the largest stones they 
could find, and tumbled them from the top of 
the wall upon the gallery. But the strength 
of the wood resisted the violence of their blows, 
so that they fell to the ground without doing 
any hurt. Observing this, they changed their 
design, and poured down upon us burning bar- 
rels of pitch and tallow. But these likewise 
rolled along the roof without damage, and 
falling upon the ground, were afterwards 
thrust away with forks and long poles. Mean- 
while our soldiers, under protection of the 
gallery, were endeavouring with their levers 
to undermine the enemy's tower. The gal. 
21 



242 



CESAR'S 



lery itself was defended by the tower of brick, 
whence our engines played without inter- 
mission ; insomuch that the enemy, driven 
from their tower and walls, were at last obliged 
to abandon their defence. By degrees the 
tower being undermined, part of it fell down, 
and the rest was so shaken that it could not 
stand long. 

XI. Upon this the enemy, alarmed at so 
unexpected a misfortune, discouraged by the 
downfall of the tower, awed by such a testi. 
mony of the wrath of the gods, and dreading 
the plunder and devastation of their city, came 
forth in the habit of suppliants, and with out- 
stretched hands, besought the compassion of 
the army and generals. At this new and un- 
expected sight, all acts of hostility ceased, and 
the soldiers, laying aside their ardour for the 
fight, were eager to hear and get acquainted 
with the proposals of the enemy, who arriving 
in presence of the army and generals, threw 
themselves at their feet, requesting them to 
suspend all further operations till Cajsar's 
arrival. They told them : " That as the works 
were now completed, and the tower destroyed, 
they were sensible the city could no longer 
hold out, and therefore meant not to defend it : 
that in the mean time, no prejudice could arise 
to the besiegers from this respite, because, if 
they refused to submit upon Caesar's coming, 
he would have it in his power to treat them as 
he pleased. They added, that if the whole 
tower should be brought down, it would be 
impossible to hinder the soldiers from yielding 
to the desire of plunder, by breaking into and 
pillaging the town." This, and much more 
of the same nature, (for the Marseillians are 
a learned people,) they urged in a very moving 
and pathetic strain. 

XII. The generals, moved by these remon- 
strances, drew off the soldiers from the works, 
discontinued the attack, and contented them- 
selves with posting guards in convenient places. 
Compassion occasioned a kind of truce till 
Ctesar's arrival ; so that on neither side were 
any acts of hostility committed, but every thing 
was quiet and secure, as if the siege had been 
at an end. For Csesar had earnestly recom. 
mended it to Trebonius, by letter, to prevent, 
if possible, the city's being taken by storm, lest 
the soldiers, irritated by their revolt, and the 
resistance they had found, should put all the 
youth to the sword, as they threatened to do. 
Nay, they were even then hardly restrained 



from breaking into the town, and loudly mur. 
mured against Trebonius for delaying a con- 
quest which they looked upon as certain. 

XIII. But the Marseillians, a nation with- 
out faith, aimed at nothing further in all this, 
than to find a time and opportunity to deceive 
us, and put in practice the treacherous purpose 
they had formed. For after some days, our 
men suspecting no danger, but relying upon 
the good faith of the enemy, while some were 
retired to their tents, others laid down to rest 
in the trenches, overpowered by the long fatigue 
they had undergone, and all the arms laid up 
and removed out of sight, suddenly they sal- 
lied from the town, and the wind being high, 
and favourable to their design, set fire to the 
works. The flame in a moment spread itself 
on all sides, insomuch that the battery, the 
mantles, the tortoise, the tower, the machines, 
and the gallery were entirely destroyed, before 
it was possible to discover whence the disaster 
arose. The suddenness of the accident made 
our men immediately run to their arms, where 
every one took what came first to hand. Some 
sallied out upon the enemy, but were checked 
by the arrows and darts poured upon them 
from the town ; insomuch that the Marseillians, 
sheltered by their walls, burnt without any 
difficulty the tower of brick and the gallery. 
Thus the labour of many months was destroyed 
in an instant, by the treachery of an enemy, 
and the violence of the wind. Next day they 
made the same attempt, favoured by the same 
wind, and with yet greater assurance, against 
the tower and terrace of the other attack. 
They approached them boldly, and threw 
plenty of fire upon them ; but our men, grown 
wise by their late misfortune, had made all 
necessary preparations for their defence, so 
that after losing many men, they were obliged 
to retreat into the city, without effecting their 
purpose. 

XIV. Trebonius immediately resolved to 
repair his loss, in which he found himself 
warmly seconded by the zeal of the soldiers. 
They saw the works, which had cost so much 
labour and toil, destroyed by the perfidy of a 
people, who made no scruple of violating the 
most sacred engagements : they saw that their 
credulity had been abused, and that they were 
become the jest of their enemies, which griev- 
ed and provoked them at the same time. But 
it was still difficult to determine whence they 
might be supplied with wood, to repair all 



COMMENTARIES. 



243 



these works. There was none in the neighbour- 
hood of Marseilles, the trees having been all 
cut down for a great way round. They resolved 
therefore to raise a terrace of a new kind, and 
such as history no where mentions before 
that time. They raised two walls of brick, 
each six feet thick, and distant from one ano- 
ther, nearly the breadth of the former mount. 
Over these they laid a floor, and to render it 
firm, besides its being supported on either side, 
placed pillars underneath between the walls, 
to bear it up where it was weakest, or had a 
greater stress of weight to support. There 
were moreover cross beams, which rested upon 
niches in the wall ; and to render the several 
floors proof against fire, hurdles were laid over 
them, which were afterwards covered with clay. 
The soldiers, thus sheltered over head by the 
roof, on the right and left by walls, and before 
by a breast-work, brought the necessary mate- 
rials without danger, and by the eagerness with 
which they laboured, soon completed the 
whole, leaving overtures in convenient places 
to sally out upon occasion. 

XV. The enemy seeing we had repaired, in 
so short a time, what they imagined must have 
cost us the labour of many days ; that there 
was now hope left, either of deceiving us, 
or sallying out upon us with success ; that all 
the approaches to the city by land, might 
in like manner be shut up by a wall and 
towers, so as to render it impossible for them 
to appear upon their works, our walls over- 
topping and commanding theirs, that they 
could neither discharge their javelins, nor 
make any use of their engines, in which their 
principal hope lay : and that they were now 
reduced to the necessity of fighting us upon 
equal terms, though conscious of their great 
inferiority in point of valour; they were forced 
to have recourse again to the same conditions 
of truce they had so ill observed before. 

XVI. M. Varro,' in farther Spain, having 
early notice of what passed in Italy, and be- 
ginning to distrust the success of Pompey's 
affairs, spoke in a very friendly manner to 
CaBsar. He said, " That he was indeed under 
particular obligations to Pompey, who had 
made him his lieutenant-general, but at the 
same time was no less indebted to Caesar : 
that he was not ignorant of the duty of a lieu- 
tenant, employed by his general in an oflice 
of trust ; but that he likewise knew his own 
strength, and the attachment of the whole 



province to Cassar." After this manner he 
talked in all companies, nor declared expressly 
for either side. But when he afterwards under- 
stood, that Cffisar was detained by the siege 
of Marseilles ; that the armies of Petreius and 
Afranius had joined, and daily grew stronger 
by the arrival of new succours ; that there was 
room to hope for every thing ; that the hither 
province had unanimously declared in their 
favour ; that Cassar himself was reduced to 
great straits at Lerida, of all which Afranius 
wrote largely, magnifying his own advantages, 
he began to alter with fortune. He raised 
troops over the whole province; added thirty 
auxiliary cohorts to the two legions he had 
already under his command; formed great 
magazines of corn to supply Marseilles, and 
the armies under Afranius and Petreius ; or- 
dered the Gaditani to furnish him with ten 
ships of war ; caused a considerable number to 
be built at Hispalis ; sent all the money and 
ornaments he found in the temple of Hercules 
to Cales ; left there a garrison of six cohorts, 
under the command of Caius Gallonius, a 
Roman knight, the friend of Domitius, who 
had sent him hither to look after an in- 
heritance of his ; conveyed all the arms, public 
and private, to Gallonius's house ; spoke every 
where disadvantageously of Csesar ; declared 
several times from his tribunal, that Csesar had 
been worsted, and that many of his soldiers 
had gone over to Afranius, as he was well as- 
sured by undoubted testimonies : by all which, 
having struck a terror into the Roman citizens 
of that province, he obliged them to promise 
him one hundred and ninety thousand sesterces, 
twenty thousand weight of silver, and one 
hundred and twenty thousand bushels of 
wheat. The states well affected to Caesar he 
loaded with heavy contributions ; confiscated 
the effects of such as had spoken against the 
commonwealth ; quartered soldiers upon them ; 
harassed them with arbitrary judgments ; and 
in fine, obliged the whole province to take an 
oath of fidelity to himself and Pompey. Hear- 
ing of what had passed in hither Spain, he 
prepared for war. His design was, to shut 
himself up with his two legions in Cales, 
where all the provisions and shipping lay, be- 
cause he very well understood, that the whole 
province was in Caesar's interest ; for he judged 
it would be easy in that island, with the ships 
and provisions he had, to draw out the war 
into length. 



244 



CESAR'S 



XTjU. CjEsar, thoDgh called upon bv many i 
and necessary affairs to return to Italy, re- 1 
solved, however, not to leave Spain, till he 
had entirely quelled the war in that province ; 
for he knew that hither Spain had many obli- 
gations to Pompey, and that most of the in- 
habitants were strongly in his interest. Hav- 
ing therefore detached two legions into farther 
Spain, under the command of Q. Cassius, 
tribune of the people, he himself advanced, 
by great journeys, at the head of six hundred 
horse. He sent orders before to the magis- 
trates, and the principal men of every state, to 
meet bim by a certain day at Cordova. All 
obeyed ; every state sent his deputies ; nor 
was there a single Roman citizen of any con- 
sideration, who did not repair thither on this 
occasion. The very senate of Cordbvia, of 
their own proper motion, shut their gates 
against Yarro, stationed guards and sentinels 
along the walls, and detained two cohorts, 
called Calonicse, which chanced to march that \ 
way, that they might serve to protect the town. ■ 
At the same time those of Carmona, the most! 
considerable state in the province, drove out j 
of their city three cohorts, which Yarro had 
left to garrison the citadel, and shut their gates 
against them. 

XV 111. This determined Yarro to make 
all possible despatch, that he might reach 
Cales as soon as possible, lest his march 
should be intercepted ; so great and apparent 
was the affection of the province to Cssar. 
When he was advanced a little way, he re- 
ceived letters from Cales, which informed 
him, " That as soon as Cjesar's edict was 
known, the principal men of Cales, with the 
tribunes of the cohorts he had left in garrison, 
had conspired to drive GaUonius from the city, 
and preserve the town and island for Cssar; 
that this project being formed, they had warned 
GaUonius to retire of his own accord, while he 
yet might with safety ; threatening, if he did 
not, to come to some immediate resolution 
against him : that GaUonius, terrified by so 
general a revolt, had accordingly left Cales." 
Upon this inteUigence, one of the two legions, 
known by the name of Yernacula, took up 
their ensigns in Yarro's presence, quitted the 
camp, and marched directly to Hispalis, where 
they sat down in the market-place and clois- 
ters, without committing the least act of vio- 
lence, which so wrought upon the Roman 
citizens residing in the town, that every one 



was desirous of accommodating them in their 
houses. Yarro, astonished at these proceed- 
ings, turned back with design to reach Italn-a, 
but was informed that the gates were shut. 
At last, finding himself surrounded on all 
sides, and the ways every where beset, he 
wrote to Caesar that he was ready to resign 
the legion under his command, to whomsoever 
he should order to receive it. Ccesar sent 
Sextus Caesar to take the command ; and 
Yarro, having resigned the legion accordingly, 
came to bim at Cordova. After giving him 
an account of the state of the province, he 
faithfully resigned aU the public money he 
had in his hands, and informed bim of the 
quantity of com and shipping he had pre- 
pared. 

MX. Caesar, assembling the states at Cor- 
dova, returned thanks severally to all who 
had declared in his fevoux : to the Roman citi- 
zens, for having made themselves masters of 
the town in his name; to the Spaniards, for 
driving out Pompey's garrisons ; to the people 
of Cales, for having frustrated the designs of 
his enemies, and asserted their own Uberty ; 
to the nulitary tribunes and centurions sent 
thither to guard the place, for having con- 
firmed them in their resolutions by their ex- 
ample. He remitted the tribute imposed by 
YauTO upon the Romam citizens ; restored 
their estates to those who had been deprived 
of them for speaking their thoughts freely; 
distributed rewards to a great many, both in 
public and private, and gave all room to hope 
for like fevours in the issue. xAiter a stay of 
two days at Cordova, he went to Cales, where 
he restored to the temple of Hercules all the 
treasures and ornaments which had been cau:- 
ried off, amd lodged in private houses. He 
commiitted the goveniment of the province to 
Q. Cassius, assigned him four legions for that 
purpose ; and embarking for Tarraco on board 
the fleet which Yarro had obliged the Gadi- 
tani to furnish, arrived there in a few days. 
There he found deputies fi-om almost all the 
states of the province, and having, in like 
maimer as at Cordova, both publicly and pri- 
vately rewarded some states, he left Tatrraco, 
came by land to Xairbonne, and thence to 
iMarseUles. There he was informed of the 
law touching the dictatorship, and that M. 
Lepidus the pretor had named him to that 
office. 

XX. The Marseillians, overwhelmed wit* 



COMMENTARIES, 



245 



a profusion of calamities, reduced to the ut- 
most distress by famine, worsted in two differ- 
ent engagements by sea, weakened by contin- 
ual sallies, assaulted by a heavy pestilence, 
occasioned by the length of the siege, and 
their constant change of diet. (for they were 
obliged to feed upon old meal and musty 
barley, which had been long treasured up in 
their magazines against an accident of this 
kind,) their tower being overthrown, a great 
part of their walls undermined, and no pro- 
spect of relief from armies or the provinces, I 
■which were now all reduced under Csesar's 
power, they resolved to surrender in good 
earnest. But some days before, Domitius, 
who was apprized of their intentions, having 
prepared three ships (two of which he assigned 
to his followers, and embarked in person on 
board the third,^ took occasion during a storm 
to make his escape. Some of Brutus's galleys, 
which he had ordered to keep constantly 
cruising before the port, chancing to get sight 
of him, prepared to give chase. That in which 
Domitius was, escaped under favour of the 
tempest ; but the two others, alarmed at seeing 
our galleys so near them, re-entered the port. 
Csesar spared the town, more in regard to its 
antiquity and reputation, than any real merit 
it could plead. He obliged the citizens how. 
ever to deliver up their arms, machines, and 
ships of war, whether in the port or arsenal ; 
to surrender all the money in their treasury ; 
and to receive a garrison of two legions. Then 
sending the rest of the army into Italy, he 
himself set out for Rome. 

XXI. About the same time, C. Curio 
sailed from Sicily into Africa, with two of the 
four legions which had been put under his 
command by Cssar, and five hundred horse ; 
having conceived the highest contempt of the 
troops headed by P. Attius Varus. After 
two days and three nights sailing, he landed 
at a place called Aquilaria. This place is 
about twenty-two miles distant from Clupea, 
and has a very convenient harbour for ships in 
the summer time, sheltered on each side by a 
promontory. L. Caesar, the son, waited for 
him at Clupea, with ten galleys, which P. 
Attius had taken in the war against the pi- 
rates, and repaired at Utica, for the service of 
the present war. But terrified at the number 
of ships Curio brought with him, he stood in 
for the cost ; where, running his galley on 
shore, he left her, and went by land to Adru- 
23 



metum. C. Confidius Longus commanded in 
that town, with one legion : and here also the 
rest of the fleet repaired after Caesar's flight. 
M. Rufus the questor pursuing them, with 
twelve galleys, which Curio had brought with 
him from Africa, to guard the transports ; 
when he saw Csesar's own gallev upon the 
strand, he towed her off, and returned with 
the fleet to Curio. 

XXII. Curio ordered him to sail directly 
for Utica, and followed himself with the land 
army. After a march of two days, he arrived 
at the river Bagradas, where he left C. Cani- 
nius Rebilus with the legions, and advanced 
before with the cavalry, to take a view of the 
Cornelian camp, which was judged to be a 
situation extremely advantageous. It is a high 
rock, jutting out into the sea, steep and rough 
on both sides, but with an easier descent where 
it fronts Utica. It lies little more than a mile 
from I'tica in a direct line ; but as there is a 
fountain about half way, which runs towards 
the sea, and overflowing the plain, forms a 
morass ; to avoid this, in marching to Utica, 
it is necessary to take a compass of six miles. 
When he had taken a view of this post, he 
went next and examined Tarus's camp, which 
was under the walls of the town, towards the 
gate named the Gate of War. The situatioji 
of it was extremely advantageous ; for on the 
one side it was covered by the city of Utica 
itself, and on the other by a kind of theatre, 
which stood without the walls, the works 
round which took up so much room, that they 
rendered the approach to the camp extremely 
diflScult. At the same time he saw all the 
ways crowded with people, who, out of fear of 
I being pillaged, were carrying their most valu- 
able effects into the city. He detached the 
I cavalry against them to disperse them, and 
' likewise have an opportunity of making some 
j booty. Upon which. Varus ordered six hun- 
dred Xumidian horse to advance to their assis- 
tance, which he further strengthened with 
four hundred foot, sent by Juba, a few days 
before, to reinforce the garrison of Utica. 
This king inherited from his father an affec- 
tion for Pompey, and besides personally 
hated Curio ; who, during his tribuneship 
had published a law to deprive him of his 
kingdom. The Xumidian cavalry soon came 
to blows with ours ; but were not able to stand 
their first charge, retreating to their camp, 
with the loss of a hundred and twenty men. 



246 



CiESAR'S 



Meantime, upon the arrival of Curio's fleet 
he ordered proclamation to be made among 
the merchant ships, which were at Utica, to 
the number of two hundred, that he would 
treat them as enemies, if they did not imme- 
diately repair to the Cornelian camp. Upon 
this proclamation, they instantly weighed an- 
chor, and leaving Utica, sailed whither they 
were ordered ; by which means the array was 
plentifully supplied with every thing they 
stood in need of. 

/'XXIIL These things despatched. Curio 
//repaired to his camp at Bagrada, where, with 
^ the joint acclamations of the whole army, he 
was saluted by the name of Imperator, Next 
day he led his army towards Utica, and en- 
camped not far from the town. But before he 
had finished his entrenchments, he was in- 
formed by some parties of horse, who were 
upon the scout, that a powerful body of horse 
and foot had been sent by the king of Utica : 
at the same time a great cloud of dust began 
to appear, and soon after the enemy's van was 
in view. Curio, astonished at a motion so un- 
expected, sent the cavalry before to sustain 
their first charge, and keep them in play : he, 
meanwhile, drawing oflf the legions from the 
works, with all possible expedition, formed 
them in order of battle. The horse engaged, 
according to orders ; and with such success, 
that before the legions could be duly drawn 
up, the whole reinforcement sent by the king, 
who marched without order or apprehension 
of danger, falling into confusion, at last betook 
themselves to flight. The cavalry, wheeling 
nimbly along the shore, escaped, with little 
loss, into the town ; but great numbers of the 
infantry were cut to pieces, 

XXIV. Next night, two centurions of the 
nation of the Marsi, with twenty-two private 
soldiers, deserted from Curio, and went over 
to Attius Varus. These, either believing the 
thing themselves, or desirous to carry grate- 
ful tidings to Varus, (for we easily believe 
what we wish, and readily hope that others 
will fall into our way of thinking,) assured 
him, that the whole army was extremely 
averse to Curio, and would infallibly revolt, if 
he would but advance, and come to a confer- 
ence with them. Accordingly Varus drew 
out his legions next day. Curio did the same ; 
and the two armies stood facing one another in 
order of battle, with a small valley between 
them. 



XXV. Sextus Quintilius Varus, who, as 
we have related above, had been made prison- 
er at Corfinium, was now in the enemy's army : 
for Caesar having granted him his liberty, he 
had retired into Africa. Curio had brought 
over with him from Sicily the very same le. 
gions, who had revolted some time before to 
Cassar at the siege of Corfinium: so that ex- 
cepting a few centurions who had been chang- 
ed, the officers and companies were the same 
as had formerly served with this very Quin. 
tilius. He made use of this handle to debauch 
the army of Curio ; " and began with putting 
the soldiers in mind of their former oath to 
Domitius, and to himself, that general's ques. 
tor ; he exhorted them not to carry arms against 
the old companions of their fortune, who had 
shared with them in all the hazards of that 
siege ; nor fight in defence of that party, who 
treated them ignominiously, and as deserters." 
To these considerations, he added oflfers of a 
liberal recompense, if they would follow his for- 
tune and that of Attius." But his speech made 
no impression upon Curio's troops, so that 
both armies retired to their respective camps. 

XXVI. But an uncommon panic soon 
spread itself over Curio's camp, which the 
various discourses of the soldiers served only 
to increase. For every one had his opinion, 
and added the suggestions of his own fear to 
that which he heard from others. These re- 
ports spreading from one to many, and receiv- 
ing additions in every new relation, there ap- 
peared to be several authors of the same 
notions : " That in a civil war it was lawful for 
every soldier to choose what side he pleased ; 
that the same legion, who a little before 
had fought on the side of the enemy, might, 
without scruple, return again to the same 
cause, since Csesar's conferring favours upon 
his enemies, ought not to render them un- 
mindful of prior and greater obligations : that 
even the municipal towns were divided in 
their affection, and sided some with one party, 
some with another." These discourses pro- 
ceeded not from the Marsi and Peligni alone, 
but ran like a torrent through the whole camp. 
However, some of the soldiers blamed their 
companions for this so great freedom of talk ; 
and others, who aff'ected to appear more di- 
ligent than the rest, enlarged in their accounts 
of it to the officers, 

XXVII, For these reasons. Curio summon- 
ing a council of war, began to deliberate 



COMMENTARIES. 



247 



about the proper remedies for this evil. Some 
were for attacking, at all hazards, the camp of I 
Varus, in order to find employment for the 
soldiers, whose idleness they considered as the 
cause of all the present alarms. Besides, it 
was better, they said to trust to valour, and 
try the fortune of a battle, than see themselves 
abandoned by their men, and delivered up to 
the barbarity of the enemy. Others were for 
retiring, during the night, to the Cornelian 
camp, where they would have more time to 
cure the infatuation of the soldiers : and 
whence, incase of a disaster, they could, with 
more safety and ease, make good their retreat 
into Sicily, by means of the great number of 
ships they were there provided with. Curio 
relished neither of these notions : the one, he 
thought, argued cowardice ; the other, a rash 
boldness: to retreat, would have all the ap- 
pearance of a shameful flight ; to attack, they 
must resolve to fight in a place of disadvan- 
tage. " With what hope," said he, " can we 
attack a camp fortified by nature and art 1 
And what advantage can we draw from an 
attempt, whence we shall be obliged to retire 
with loss 1 Does not success always secure to 
a general the affection of his troops, whereas ill 
fortune is evermore followed with contempt 1 
And what would a decampment imply but an 
ignominious flight, an absolute despair of all 
things, and an unavoidable alienation of the 
whole army 1 That we ought not to let the 
modest think we distrust them, nor the inso- 
lent that we fear them ; because the know- 
ledge of our fear only augments the presump- 
tion of the one, and an apprehension of being 
suspected, abates the zeal of the other. But 
if what is reported of the discontent of the 
army be true, which I am yet unwilling to be- 
lieve, at least to the degree some pretend ; we 
ought, for that reason, rather to hide and dis- 
semble our fears, than by an unreasonable 
discovery of them, to add strength to the evil ; 
that, as in some cases, it was necessary to con- 
ceal the wounds of the body, that the enemy 
might not conceive hope from our misfortunes ; 
so also ought we to hide the indisposition of an 
army : that by retreating in the night, as some 
proposed, they would only furnish a fairer oc- 
casion to the ill-affected to execute their pur- 
pose : for fear and shame are powerful re- 
straints, by day, but night entirely divests them 



nor so blinded by fear, as to be at a loss what 
measures to pursue : that he thought it his 
duty to examine things to the bottom ; and 
as he had called them together to deliberate 
upon the present state of affairs, doubted not, 
with their assistance, to take such measures as 
would be attended with success." 

XXVIII. He then dismissed the council; 
and assembling the soldiers, put them in mind 
of what advantage their steadiness and zeal 
had been to Caesar at Corfinium, and how ser- 
viceable towards the conquest of the greatest 
part of Italy. " It was you," said he, " that 
gave the example, and all the municipal towns 
soon followed : their submission to Csesar was 
your work ; and therefore it is not without 
reason, that he is so particularly attached to 
you, and that Pompey hates you sincerely. It 
was you that obliged him to quit Italy, with- 
out being forced to it by the loss of a battle. 
CcBsar, who ranks me in the number of his 
dearest friends, has committed my safety to 
your care, with Sicily and Africa, without 
which it would be impossible to defend either 
Rome or Italy. You are now in the presence 
of those who exhort you to abandon us : and 
indeed what could be more desirable to them, 
than at the same time to ensnare us, and 
fix upon you the stain of an infinite crime T 
What worse opinion could an enraged enemy 
testify of you, than to suppose you capable of 
betraying those, who own themselves indebted 
to you for all ; and of throwing yourselves into 
the power of a party, who consider you as the 
authors of all their misfortunes 1 Are you 
strangers to Caesar's exploits in Spain 1 Two 
armies defeated ! Two generals overcome ! 
Two provinces brought under subjection ! And 
all this in the space of forty days! Is it likely that 
those, who, with forces unbroken, could not 
stand their ground, will be able to resist, now 
they are vanquished 1 And will you who fol- 
lowed Caesar before fortune declared in his 
favour, now return to the vanquished, when 
fortune has already decided the quarrel, and 
you are upon the point of obtaining the re- 
ward of your services 1 They charge you with 
having abandoned and betrayed them, con- 
trary to the faith of oaths. But is it indeed 
true, that you abandoned Domitius ] Or did 
he not rather meanly abandon you, at a time 
when you were ready to suffer every thing for 



of their force : that he was neither so rash, as | his sake 1 Did he not, unknown to you, re- 
to attack a camp without hopes of success ; solve to seek his safety in flight 1 And were 



248 



CAESAR'S 



you not, after being thus basely betrayed by 
him, indebted to Csesar's goodness for your 
preservation 1 How could your oath bind you 
to one, who after throwing away the ensigns 
of his authority, and divesting himself of his 
office, surrendered himself a private man and 
a captive into the power of another 1 The new 
engagement you were then brought under 
alone subsists at present, and ought quite to 
obliterate that, which the surrender of your 
general, and his loss of liberty, have made 
void. But though I doubt not of your being 
satisfied with Caesar, you may perhaps have 
taken offence at me. And, indeed, I have no 
thought of mentioning any services I may 
have done you ; which, as yet, come far short 
of my intentions, and your expectations : but 
you are not ignorant, that the rewards of mili- 
tary service come not till after the conclusion 
of the war; and I believe you little doubt 
what the issue of this will be. Nor need I, 
on this occasion, decline taking notice of the 
diligence I have used, the progress already 
made, and the good fortune that has hitherto 
attended me. Are you dissatisfied that I have 
landed my army safe in Africa, without the 
loss of a single ship 1 That I dispersed the 
enemy's fleet at the first onset 1 That within 
the space of two days I have twice defeated 
their cavalry 1 That I forced two hundred 
of their merchantmen to quit the port of 
Utica and join me 1 And that I have reduced 
them to a situation where it is impossible for 
them to receive any supplies either by land or 
sea 1 Can you think of abandoning a cause 
conducted by such leaders, and attended with 
such success ; to follow the fortune of those 
who so ignominiously delivered up Corfinium, 
relinquished Italy, surrendered Spain, and have 
already sustained considerable losses in the 
African war 1 I never pretended to more than 
being a follower of Csesar : it was you that 
honoured me with the title of Imperator, which 
I am ready this moment to resign, if you think 
me unworthy of the favour. Restore me my 
former name, that it may not be said I was 
honoured, to be covered afterwards with the 
greater ignominy." 

XXIX. These remonstrances made such 
an impression upon the soldiers, that they fre- 
quently interrupted him while he was speaking, 
and appeared deeply touched at his suspecting 
their fidelity. As he retired, they all gathered 
round him, exhorting him not to be discour- 
aged, or scruple to hazard a battle, and make 



trial of their fidelity and bravery. This be- 
haviour of the troops wrought so great a change 
in the minds of the officers, that Curio with the 
joint concurrence of them all, resolved to 
give battle the first opportunity that offered. 
Accordingly, drawing out his men next day, in 
the same place he had done for some time past, 
he ranged them in order of battle. Attius 
Varus did the same; that if an opportunity of- 
fered, either of corrupting the soldiers, or 
fighting to advantage, he might be in readiness 
to lay hold of it. 

XXX. Between the two armies lay a val- 
ley, as we have observed above, not indeed con- 
siderable for its breadth, but steep and dif- 
ficult of ascent. Both sides waited till the other 
should pass it, that they might engage to more 
advantage. Curio observing that all the horse 
on Varus's right wing, together with the light- 
armed foot, had ventured down into this val- 
ley, detached his cavalry against them, with 
two cohorts of Marrucinians ; whose first shock 
the enemy were not able to sustain, but re- 
turned full speed to their own men, leaving the 
light-armed foot behind, who were surrounded 
and cut to pieces in the sight of Varus's army ; 
which, fronting that way, was witness to the 
flight of the one, and the slaughter of the 
other. Upon this Rebilus, one of Caesar's 
lieutenants, whom Curio had brought with him 
from Sicily, on account of his consummate 
knowledge in the art of war ; " Why," says 
he, " do you delay seizing the favourable mo- 
ment 1 You see the enemy struck with terror." 
Curio made no answer, only desired his soldiers 
to remember what they had promised the day 
before, and marching the first, commanded 
them to follow him. The valley was so steep 
and difficult, that the first ranks could not as- 
cend, but with the assistance of those that came 
after. But the Attinian army was so dispirited 
with fear, and the flight and slaughter of their 
troops, that they never thought of making re- 
sistance, fancying themselves already sur- 
rounded by our cavalry ; so that before we 
could arrive within reach of the dart, the whole 
army of Varus fled and retreated to their camp. 

XXXI. In this flight, one Fabius Pelignus, 
a centurion of the lowest rank in Curio's army, 
as he was pursuing the fugitives, called with a 
loud voice to Varus as if he had been one of 
his own men, who wanted to admonish him of 
something. Varus hearing himself named 
several times, turned and stood still, demand- 
ing who he was, and what he wanted. Fabius 



COMMENTARIES. 



249 



aimed a blow at his breast with his sword, and 
would certainly have killed him, had not Varus 
warded it off with his shield. Fabius himself 
was soon after surrounded and slain. Mean- 
while, the multitude of fugitives so closed up 
the gates of the camp, and pressed upon one 
another in such a manner, that more were 
crowded to death, than fell either in the battle 
or pursuit. Nay, the camp itself was very 
near being taken ; because great numbers, in- 
stead of stopping there to defend it, made di- 
rectly for the town. But both the nature of 
the ground, and the fortifications themselves, 
prevented the assault ; and the rather, as 
Curio's soldiers being armed only for battle, 
had brought with them none of the necessary 
tools to force a camp. Curio brought back 
his army without the loss of a man, Fabius ex- 
cepted. Of the enemy, about six hundred were 
killed, and a thousand wounded. After Curio 
had drawn off his men, all the wounded quit- 
ted the camp, and retired into the city, as did 
a great many others, who, overcome by fear, 
sheltered themselves there also under the 
same pretence. Varus observing this, and 
that a universal dread had seized the army, 
left only a trumpet in the camp, with a few 
tents for show, and, about midnight, silently 
entered the town with all his forces. 

XXXII. Next day Curio resolved to be- 
siege Utica, and draw a line of circumvallation 
round it. There was in the town a multitude 
of men unfit for the fatigues of war, through a 
long enjoyment of peace. The inhabitants 
themselves were strongly attached to Cajsar, 
for ancient favours received from him. The 
senate was composed of people greatly differ- 
ing in their tempers, and the losses already 
sustained spread terror through all ranks. A 
surrender was publicly talked of, and all con- 
curred in soliciting Varus not to ruin them by 
his obstinacy and peryerseness. While these 
things were in agitation, messengers sent by 
king Juha arrived, who informed them of the 
approach of his army, and exhorted them to 
defend the city ; which contributed not a little 
to confirm their wavering minds. 

XXXIII. Curio received the same news, but 
for some time would not believe it, so greatly 
did he confide in his good fortune. Besides, 
Caesar's success in Spain was already known 
in Africa ; whence he concluded it improba. 
ble that Juba would attempt any thing against 
him. But when he was for certain informed 

22* 



of his being within twenty-five miles of Utica 
with his whole army, he retired from before 
the town to the Cornelian camp, laid in great 
quantities of corn and wood, began to fortify 
himself, and sent directly to Sicily for the ca. 
valry, and the two legions he had left there. 
The camp itself was very advantageous for 
protracting the war, being strong both by na- 
ture and art, near the sea, and abounding in 
water and salt, great quantities of which had 
been carried thither from the neighbouring salt, 
pits. Neither ran he any hazard of being 
straitened for wood and corn, as the country 
abounded in trees and grain. He resolved, 
therefore, with the consent of the whole army, 
to wait here the arrival of the rest of the troops, 
and make preparation for continuing the war. 

XXXIV. This resolution being taken, and 
meeting with general approbation, some of the 
townsmen, who had deserted to Curio, informed 
him, that the war in which Juba was engaged 
with the Leptitani, having obliged him to re- 
turn into his own kingdom, he had only sent 
his lieutenant Sabura, with a small body of 
forces, to the assistance of the Uticans. Upon 
this intelligence, to which he too hastily gave 
credit, he changed his design, and resolved to 
give battle. The fire of youth, his courage, 
good success, and self-confidence, contributed 
greatly to confirm him in this resolution. Urged 
by these considerations, about the beginning of 
the night, he sent all his cavalry towards the 
enemy's camp, which was upon the river Bag- 
radas, and where Sabura, of whom we have 
spoken before, commanded in chief. But the 
king followed with all his forces, and was not 
above six miles behind him. The cavalry 
which Curio had detached, marched all night, 
and coming unexpectedly upon the enemy, at- 
tacked them before they were ready to re- 
ceive the charge : for the Numidians, accord- 
ing to the custom of that barbarous country, 
were encamped without order or rule. Fall- 
ing upon them therefore, in this confusion, and 
oppressed with sleep, they slew great numbers, 
and obliged the rest to fly in the utmost con- 
sternation ; after which they returned to Curio 
with the prisoners they had taken. 

XXXV. Curio had set out with all his for. 
ces about the fourth watch of the night, leav- 
ing only five cohorts to guard his camp. After 
a march of six miles he was met by his cavalry, 
who informed him of all that had passed. He 
asked the prisoners, who commanded at Bag. 

2K 



250. 



CESAR'S 



radas ? They answered, Sabura. Upon this, 
without making any further inquiries, for fear 
of being detained too long, he turned to the 
troops next to him, and said, " Do you not see, 
fellow-soldiers, that the report of the prisoners 
corresponds exactly with the intelligence given 
by the deserters 1 Juba is not with the army. 
It must consist of but a few troops, since they 
were not able to withstand the charge of a 
small body of horse. Haste, therefore, in the 
pursuit of glory, booty, and victory." What 
the cavalry had done was indeed considerable, 
because they were but few in number in com- 
parison of the Numidians ; but as vanity always 
makes us believe our merit to be greater than 
it is, they themselves boasted immoderately 
of the action, and endeavoured to enhance 
the value of it. They made a mighty parade 
of the booty. The prisoners too, as well in- 
fantry as cavalry, marched in procession be- 
fore them. And indeed the whole army 
imagined, that to delay the battle, was no 
other than to delay the victory ; so that the 
ardour of the troops perfectly seconded Curio's 
hopes. He therefore hastened his march, 
ordering the horse to follow, that he might 
as soon as possible come up with the frighted 
enemy. But as they were fatigued with their 
late march, they found themselves unable to 
keep pace with the army ; but stopped, some 
in one place, some in another ; which, how- 
ever, retarded not Curio's hopes. 

XXXVI. Juba having notice from Sabura 
of the action in the night, detached to his as- 
sistance two thousand Spanish and Gallic 
horse, of his ordinary guard, with that part of 
the infantry in which he put the greatest con- 
fidence. Himself followed leisurely with the 
rest of the troops, and about forty elephants, 
suspecting that Curio, who had sent the caval- 
ry before, could not be far off with his army. 
Sabura drew up his horse and foot, ordering 
them to give ground upon the enemy's attack, 
and, as through fear, counterfeit a flight. 
Meanwhile he told them, that he would give 
the signal of battle when he saw proper, 
and direct their motions as the case might re- 
quire. 

XXXVII. Curio, flattered with new hopes, 
and imagining, by the enemy's motions, 
that they were preparing for flight, made his 
troops come down from the mountain into the 
plain ; and advancing still farther, though 
his army was already very much fatigued. 



having marched upwards of sixteen miles, 
halted at last to give the men breath. That 
moment Sabura sounded the charge, led on 
his men in order of battle, and went from rank 
to rank to animate the troops ; but he suffer- 
ed only the cavalry to come to blows, keeping 
the infantry at a distance within sight. Curio 
was not wanting on his side, but exhorted his 
men to place all their hopes in their valour. 
And indeed neither the infantry, though 
fatigued with their march, nor the cavalry, 
though few in number, and spent with toil, 
showed any want of valour, or backward, 
ness to fight; though the last in particular 
did not exceed two hundred, the rest having 
stopped by the way. These, wherever they 
attacked the enemy, obliged them to give 
ground, but they could neither pursue far, 
nor drive their horses on with impetuosity. 
On the other hand, the Numidian cavalry 
began to surround our men, and charge them 
in the rear. When the cohorts advanced 
against them, they fell back, and by the 
quickness of their retreat, eluded the charge, 
but immediately returning, they got behind 
our men, and cut them off from the rest of 
the army. Thus it was equally dangerous for 
them to maintain their ranks, or advance to 
battle. The enemy's forces increased con- 
tinually, by the reinforcements sent from the 
king ; ours, on the contrary, were disabled by 
fatigue. Neither could our wounded men re- 
tire, or be sent to any place of safety, the 
whole army being invested by the enemy's 
horse. These despairing of safety, as is usual 
for men in the last moments of life, either 
lamented their own fate, or recommended 
their relations to their fellow-soldiers, if any 
should be so fortunate as to escape that 
danger. The whole army was filled with 
consternation and grief. 

XXXVIII. Curio perceiving the general 
alarm, and that neither his exhortations nor 
prayers were regarded, ordered the troops to 
retire with the standards to the nearest 
mountains, as the only resource in the present 
exigence. But the cavalry detached by 
Sabura had already seized them. All hope 
being now lost, some were slain while en- 
deavouring to fly ; others threw themselves 
upon the ground, partly in despair, partly 
unable to make any efforts for their own 
safety. At this moment, Cn. Domitius, who 
commanded the horse, addressing Curio, en- 



COMMENTARIES. 



251 



treated him to regain his camp with the few 
cavalry that remained, promising not to aban- 
don him. "Can I," says Curio, " look Cssar 
in the face, after having lost an army he had 
committed to my charge?" So saying, he 
continued fighting till he was slain. Very 
few of the cavalry escaped, those only excepted 
who had stopped to refresh their horses ; for 
perceiving at a distance the rout of the whole 
army, they returned to their camp. All the 
infantry were slain to a man. 

XXXIX. When this disaster was known, 
M. Rufus the questor, whom Curio had left 
to guard the camp, entreated his men not to 
lose courage. They begged and requested 
him to reconduct them into Sicily ; which he 
promised, and ordered the masters of the 
transports to have their ships in readiness at 
night along the shore. But fear had so uni- 
versally seized the minds of the soldiers, that 
some cried out Juba was arrived with his 
troops ; some that Varus approached with the 
legions, the dust of whose march they pre- 
tended to discern ; and others, that the enemy's 
fleet would be upon them in an instant; though 
there was not the least ground for these re- 
ports. The consternation thus becoming 
general, each man thought only of his own 



safety. Those who were already embarked, 
sailed immediately, and their flight drew after 
it that of the transports ; so that only a very 
few small frigates obeyed the summons, and 
came to the general rendezvous. The disor- 
der was so great upon the shore, every one 
striving who should first embark, that many 
boats sunk under the crowd, and others were 
afraid to come near the land. 

XL, Thus only a few soldiers and aged 
men, who either through interest or compas- 
sion were received on board, or had strength 
enough to swim to the transports, got safe to 
Sicily. The rest, deputing their centurions 
to Varus by night, surrendered to him. Juba, 
coming up next day, claimed them as his 
property, put the greater number to the sword, 
and sent a few of the most considerable, 
whom he had selected for that purpose, into 
Numidia. Varus complained of this violation 
of his faith ; but durst not make any resistance. 
The king made his entrance into the city on 
horseback, followed by a great number of 
senators, among whom were Servius Sulpicius, 
and Licinius Damasippus. Here he stayed a 
few days, to give what orders he thought 
necessary; and then returned, with all his 
forces, into his kingdom. 



CESAR'S COMMENTARIES 



OF 



THE CIVIL WAR. 



BOOK III. 



253 



THE ARGUMENT. 

1. Caesar reserves some judgments given upon persons for bribery at elections. — II. He sets out for Brundu- 
sium. — III. Pompey's mighty preparations for war. — IV. Csesar embarlis and arrives at tlie Promontory of 
Ceraunium.— VI. His fleet returning from Brundusium is intercepted by tlie enemy.— VII. M. Octavius, one 
of Pompey's adherents, laying siege to Salona, is obliged, by a sudden sally of the inhabitants, to abandon 
his lines.— VIII. Caesar's embassy to Ponipey with proposals of peace.— IX. Caesar makes himself master of 
Oricum. — X. Also of Apollonia, and the whole country round about. — XT. Caesar and Pompey encamp over 
against each other on the iDanks of the river Apsus. — XII. Caesar's transports sailing from Brundusium, put 
back immediately for fear of the enemy. — XIII. Pompey's fleet reduced to great straits. — XIV. — ;Conferences 
set on foot about a peace, which come to nothing. — XV. Bibulus, admiral of Pompey's fleet, dies. — XVI. Pom- 
pey's answer to Caesar's proposals of peace.— XVII. The conferences about a peace renewed, but without ef- 
fect. — XVIII. A commotion in Rome. — XXI. Libo, one of Pompey's followers, blocks up the port of Brundu- 
sium with a fleet. — XXII. But by the valour and conduct of Antony, is forced to quit his project. — XXIII. An- 
tony and Kalenus transport Caesar's troops to Greece, with wonderful good success. — XXVII. Pompey, to 
avoid being shut up between two armies, retires to Asparagiiim. — XXVIII. Scipio, a parlizan of Pompey, be- 
haves very tyrannically in Asia. — XXIX. The motions of Caesar's lieutenants in Thessaly,iEtolia, and Mace- 
donia. — XXXIV. Young Ponipey burns Caesar's fleet in the port of Oricum. — XXXV. Caesar cuts off Pompey's 
communicationwith Dyrrhachium.— XXXVI. And besieges him in his camp.— XXXIX. Many attempts and 
dispositions on both sides, with various turns of fortune. — XL. Caesar's troops, distressed for want of corn, 
make bread of a certain root.— XLIII. Pompey repulsed in a sally. — XLVII. Kalenus, one of Caesar's lieute- 
nants, possesses himself of several towns in Achaia. — XL VIII. Casar offers Pompeybattle. — XLIX. Another 
embassy, with proposals of peace, which are rejected. — L. Pompey distressed for want of forage, resolves to 
break through Caesar's lines. — LI. Roscillus and JEgas, disgusted at some check they had received from 
CaBsar, revolt to Pompey. — LII. Ponipey breaks through Caesar's lines, after making great slaughter of his 
troops. — LXI. Caesar desists from the design of inclosing Pompey, and makes a speech to his men. — LXII. 
Caesar retires to Asparagium, and is followed by Pompey. — LXV. Thence to Apollonia.— LXVII. And then to 
Gomphi, atown of Thessaly, which, refusing to open its gates, is taken by assault the first day.— LXVIIT. 
Metropolis submits, and their example is followed by other Thessalian states.— LXIX. Pompey arrives in 
Thessaly, elated with his success, and confident of victory.— LXX. Caesar resolves to give battle. His reso- 
lution with respect to his cavalry.— LXXII. Pompey likewise resolvesto give battle, and boasts of an assured 
victory.— LXXIII. The disposition of Pompey's army.— LXXIV. The disposition of Cssar's.—LXXV. Caesar's 
speech to his soldiers.— LXXVI. The battle of Pharsalia, in which Caesar obtains a complete victory. — 
LXXVII. Cfesar makes himself master of Pompey's camp. — LXXVIII. Where he finds great riches. — LXXIX. 
Pompey's flight. — LXXX. Caesar pursues Pompey's troops, and obliges them to surrender. — LXXXI. The 
number of men killed on each side.— LXXXII. Bleanwhile, Laelius. a follower of Pompey, blocks up the port 
of Brundusium with afleet.— LXXXIII. And Cassius burns some ships in Sicily belonging to Caesar.— LXXXIV. 
Caesar pursues Pompey. — LXXXV. Pompey flying to Pelusium, is murdered there by some of king Ptolemy's 
court.— LXXXVI. Some prodigies that happened on the day of Cxsaj's victories.— LXXXVII. Caesar pur- 
suing Pompey to Alexandria, hears there the news of his death. — LXXXVIII. And is unexpectedly entangled 
in a new war. 



254 



CJESARS COMMENTARIES 



THE CIVIL WAR. 



BOOKIII. 



I. CiESAK, as dictator, holding the Comitia, 
Julius Caesar, and P. Servilius, were chosen 
consuls; for this was the year in which he 
could be elected to that magistracy, consistent 
with the laws. This affair being despatched, 
as CiEsar saw public credit at a stand over all 
Italy, because nobody paid their debts ; he 
ordered that arbiters should be chosen, who 
should make an estimate of the possessions of 
all debtors, and should convey them in payment 
to their creditors, at the price they bore before 
the war. The regulation he thought best cal- 
culated to restore public credit, and prevent 
the apprehension of a general abolition of debts, 
which is but too common a consequence of wars 
and civil dissensions. At the same time, in 
consequence of an address of the people, he re- 
established the praetors and tribunes, who had 
been deprived upon a charge of bribery, at a 
time when Pompey awed the city by his le- 
gions. These decisions were so little con- 
formable to law, that sentence was often pro- 
nounced by a party of judges different from 
those who attended the pleadings. As these 
had made him an offer of their service in the 
beginning of the war, he accounted the obliga- 
tion the same as if he had actually accepted of 
their friendship ; but thought it better their res- 
toration should seem to flow from the people, 
than appear a mere act of bounty in him, that 
he might neither be charged with ingratitude 
to his followers, nor accused of invading the 
prerogatives of the people. 

II. All this business, with the celebration 
of the Latin festivals, and the holding of the 
comitia for elections, took him up eleven days, 



at the end of which he abdicated the dictator- 
ship, and immediately set out from Rome, in 
order to reach Brundusium, where he had or- 
dered twelve legions, with all the cavalry, to 
rendezvous. But he had scarce ships to carry 
over twenty thousand legionary soldiers, and 
six hundred horse, which alone hindered him 
from putting a speedy end to the war. Be- 
sides, the legions were considerably weakened 
by their many losses in the Gallic war, and 
the long and painful march from Spain ; and 
an unhealthful autumn in Apulia, and about 
Brundusium, with the change of so fine a cli- 
mate as that of Gaul and Spain, had brought a 
general sickness among the troops. 

Ill, Pompey having had a whole year to 
complete his preparations, undisturbed by 
wars, and free from the interruption of an 
enemy, had collected a mighty fleet from 
Asia, the Cyclades, Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, 
Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia, and Egypt, 
and had given orders for the building of ships 
in all parts. He had exacted great sums from 
the people of Asia and Syria ; from the kings, 
tetrarchs, and dynasties of those parts ; from 
the free states of Achaia, and from the corpora- 
tions of the provinces subject to his com- 
mand. He had raised nine legions of Roman 
citizens ; five he had brought with him from 
Italy ; one had been sent him from Sicily, con- 
sisting wholly of veterans, and called Gemella, 
because composed of two ; another from 
Crete and Macedonia, of veteran soldiers like- 
wise, who, having been disbanded by former 
generals, had settled in those parts : and two 
more from Asia, levied by the care of Len- 
2.-35 



256 



CiESAR'S 



tulus. Besides all these, he had great numbers 
from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus ; 
■whom, together with Antony's soldiers, he 
distributed among the legions by way of re- 
cruits. He expected also two legions that 
Metellus Scipio was to bring out of Syria. 
He had three thousand archers, drawn to- 
gether from Crete, Lacedemon, Pontus, Syria, 
and other provinces ; six cohorts of slingers ; 
and two of mercenaries. His cavalry amounted 
to seven thousand ; six hundred of which 
came from Galatia, under Dejotarus ; five 
hundred from Cappadocia, under Ariobarzanes ; 
and the like number had been sent him out 
of Thrace, by Cotus, with his son Sadalis at 
their head. Two hundred were from Mace- 
donia, commanded by Eascipolis, an officer of 
great distinction ; five hundred from Alexan- 
dria, consisting of Gauls and Germans, left 
there by A. Gabinius, to serve as a guard to 
king Ptolemy ; and now brought over by young 
Pompey in his fleet, together with eight hun- 
dred of his own domestics. Tarcundarius 
Castor and Donilaus furnished three hundred 
Gallogrfficians : the first of these came himself 
in person ; the latter sent his son. Two hun- 
dred, most of them archers, were sent from 
Syria, by Comagenus of Antioch, who lay 
under the greatest obligations to Pompey. 
There were likewise a great number of Darda- 
nians and Bessians, partly volunteers, partly 
mercenaries ; with others from Macedonia, 
Thessaly, and the adjoining states and pro- 
vinces; who altogether made up the number 
mentioned above. To subsist this mighty army, 
he had taken care to amass vast quantities of 
corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cy- 
rene, and other countries : resolving to quarter 
his troops, during the winter, at Dyrrhachium, 
Apollonia, and the other maritime towns, to 
prevent Cssar's passing the sea ; for which 
purpose, he ordered his fleet to cruise perpetu- 
ally about the coasts. Young Pompey com- 
manded the Egyptian squadron ; D. Lfelius and 
C. Triarius the Asiatic ; C. Cassius the Syrian ; 
C. Marcellus and C. Coponius the Rhodian ; 
Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius the Libur- 
nian and Achaian ; but the chief authority 
was vested in M. Bibulus, who was admiral of 
the whole, and gave his orders accordingly. 

IV. Csesar, upon his arrival atBrundusium, 
harangued his troops, and told them : " That 
as they were now upon the point of seeing an 
end of all their toils and dangers, they ought 



not to scruple at leaving their servants and 
baggage behind them in Italy, that they might 
embark with less confusion, and in greater 
numbers ; putting all their hopes in victory, 
and the generosity of their general." The 
whole army testified their approbation of what 
was proposed, and called out that they were 
ready to submit to his orders. Accordingly 
having put seven legions on board, as we have 
before observed, he set sail the fourth of Jan- 
uary, and arrived next day at the Ceraunian 
mountains : where, having found, among 
the rocks and shelves, with which that coast 
abounds, a tolerable road ; and not daring to 
go to any port, as he apprehended they were 
all in the enemy's possession ; he landed his 
troops at a place called Pharsalus, whither he 
brought his fleet, without the loss of a single 
ship. 

V. Lucretius Vespillo and Minucius Rufus 
were at Oricum, with eighteen Asiatic ships : 
and Bibulus had a hundred and ten at Cor- 
cyra. But the first durst not hazard an en- 
gagement, though CfEsar was escorted by no 
more than twelve galleys, only four of which 
had decks ; and Bibulus had not time to re- 
assemble his sailors and soldiers, who were 
dispersed in full security ; for no news of 
Caesar's approach had reached those parts, till 
his fleet was seen from the continent. 

VI. Cffisar having landed his troops, sent 
the fleet back the same night to Brundusium, 
to bring over his other legions and cavalry. 
Fufius Kalenus, lieutenant-general, had the 
charge of this expedition, with orders to use 
the utmost despatch. But setting sail too late, 
he lost the benefit of the wind, which oflJered 
fair all night, and fell in with the enemy. For 
Bibulus hearing at Corcyra of Caesar's arrival, 
forthwith put to sea, in hopes of intercepting 
some of the transports ; and meeting the fleet 
as it returned empty, took about thirty ships, 
which he immediately burned, with all that 
were on board ; partly to satisfy his own ven- 
geance for the disappointment he had received ; 
partly to deter the rest of the troops from at- 
tempting the passage. He then stationed 
his fleet along the coast, from Salona to Ori- 
cum, guarded all places with extraordinary 
care, and even lay himself aboard, notwith- 
standing the rigour of the winter ; declining 
no danger nor fatigue, and solely intent upon 
intercepting Caesar's supplies. 

VII. After the departure of the Liburnian 



COMMENTARIES. 



257 



galleys, M. Octavius, with the squadron under 
his command, sailed from Iliyricum, and came 
before Salona. Having spirited up the Dal- 
matians, and other barbarous nations in those 
parts, he drew Issa to revolt from Ccesar. 
But finding that the council of Salona was 
neither to be moved by promises nor threats, 
he resolved to invest the town. Salona is 
built upon a hill, and advantageously situated 
for defence ; but as the fortifications were very 
inconsiderable, the Roman citizens, residing 
there, immediately surrounded the place with 
wooden towers ; and finding themselves too 
few to resist the attacks of the enemy, who 
soon overwhelmed them with wounds, betook 
themselves to their last refuge, by granting 
liberty to all slaves capable of bearing arms, 
and cutting oft* the women's hair, to make 
cords for their engines, Octavius perceiving 
their obstinacy, formed five different camps 
round the town, that they might at once suffer 
all the inconveniences of a siege, and be ex- 
posed to frequent attacks. The Salonians, 
determined to endure any thing, found them- 
selves most pressed for want of corn ; and 
therefore sent deputies to Csesar to solicit 
a supply, patiently submitting to all the other 
hardships they laboured under. When the 
siege had now continued a considerable time, 
and the Octavians began to be off their guard, 
the Salonians, finding the opportunity favour- 
able, about noon, when the enemy were dis- 
persed, disposed their wives and children upon 
the walls, that every thing might have its 
wonted appearance ; and sallying in a body 
with their enfranchised slaves, attacked the 
nearest quarters of Octavius. Having soon 
forced these, they advanced to the next ; 
thence to a third, a fourth, and so on through 
the rest ; till having driven the enemy from 
every post, and made great slaughter of their 
men, they at length compelled them, and 
Octavius their leader, to betake themselves to 
their ships. Such was the issue of the siege. 
As winter now approached, and the loss had 
been very considerable ; Octavius, despairing 
to reduce the place, retired to Dyrrhachium, 
and joined Pompey. 

Vni. We have seen that L. Vibullius 
Rufus, Pompey's chief engineer, had fallen 
twice into Caesar's hands, and been as often 
set at liberty ; the first time at Corfinium, the 
next in Spain. Having been therefore twice 
indebted to him for his life, and being also 
23 



much in Pompey's esteem, Csesar thought 
him a proper person to negotiate between 
them. His instructions were ; " That it was 
now time for both to desist from their obstinacy, 
and lay down their arms, without exposing 
themselves any more to the precarious events 
of fortune. That the losses they had already 
sustained ought to serve as lessons and cau. 
tions, and fill them with just apprehensions 
with regard to the future. That Pompey had 
been forced to abandon Ital}"^, had lost Sicily 
and Sardinia, the two Spains, with about a 
hundred and thirty cohorts of Roman citizens, 
who had perished in these countries. That 
himself too had been a considerable sufferer 
by the death of Curio, the destruction of the 
African army, and the surrender of his forces 
at Corcyra. That it was therefore incumbent 
on them to show some regard to the sinking 
state of the commonwealth, having sufficiently 
experienced, by their own misfortunes, how 
prevalent fortune was in war. That the pre- 
sent moment was the most favourable in this 
respect ; because, not having yet tried one 
another's strength, and considering them as 
equals, there would be more likelihood of 
agreeing on terms : whereas, if one of them 
once got the superiority, he would exact every 
thing from the other, and give up nothing. 
That as hitherto they had been unable to settle 
the conditions of peace, they ought to refer 
them to the decision of the senate and people 
of Rome ; and, in the meantime, to obtain a 
free and unbiassed judgment, both swear to 
disband their armies in three days' time. That 
when they were once divested of their national 
and auxiliary forces, in which their whole 
confidence lay, they would find themselves 
under a necessity of submitting to the decree 
of the senate and people. In fine, that to give 
Pompey a proof of his readiness to perform 
these proposals, he would give immediate or- 
ders for the discharge of all his forces, both 
in garrison and in the field.' 

IX, Vibullius having received these in- 
structions, thought it necessary to give Pom- 
pey speedy notice of Ccesar's arrival, that he 
might be provided against that event, before 
he laid open the commission he was charged 
with. Accordingly, journeying day and night, 
and frequently changing horses, for the greater 
expedition, he at length got to Pompey, and 
informed him that Csesar was approaching 
with all his forces, Pompey was at that 
2L 



258 



CiESAR'S 



time in Candavia, from whence he was march- 
ing through Macedonia, to his winter quarters 
at Apollonia and Dyrrhachium. Concerned 
at this unexpected news, he hastened his 
march to Apollonia, to prevent Caesar's mak- 
ing himself master of the sea-coasts. Mean- 
while Caesar, having landed his forces, marched 
the same day to Oricum. Upon his arrival 
there, L. Torquatus, who commanded in the 
town for Pompey, with a garrison of Parth- 
inians, ordered the gates to be shut, and the 
Greeks to repair to their arms, and man the 
walls. But they refusing to fight against the 
authority of the people of Rome, and the in- 
habitants, of their own accord, endeavouring 
to admit Csesar, Torquatus, despairing of re- 
lief, opened the gates, and surrendered both 
himself and the town to Caesar, who readily 
granted him his life. 

X. Cffisar having made himself master of 
Oricum, marched directly to Apollonia. Upon 
the report of his arrival, L. Staberius, who 
commanded in the place, ordered water to be 
carried into the castle, fortified it with great 
care, and demanded hostages of the towns- 
men. They refused to comply ; declaring 
they would not shut their gates against the 
consul of the Roman people, nor presume to 
act in contradiction to the judgment of the 
senate, and of all Italy. Staberius finding it 
in vain to resist, privately left the place ; upon 
which, the Apollonians sent deputies to Cae- 
sar, and received him into the town. Bulli- 
denses, Amantiani, with the rest of the neigh- 
bouring countries, and all Epirus, followed 
their example ; acquainting Caesar, by their 
ambassadors, that they were ready to execute 
his commands. 

XI. Meanwhile Pompey, having notice of 
what passed at Oricum and Apollonia, and 
being apprehensive for Dyrrhachium, marched 
day and night to reach the place. At the 
same time it was reported that Caesar was not 
far off; which meeting with the more credit, 
because of their hasty march, put the whole 
army into such consternation, that many aban- 
doning their colours in Epirus and the neigh- 
bouring states, and others throwing down their 
arms, every thing had the appearance of a 
precipitate flight. But upon Pompey 's halt- 
ing near Dyrrhachium, and ordering a camp 
to be formed ; as the army had not even then 
recovered its fright, Labienus advanced before 
the rest, and swore never to abandon his gen- 



eral, but to share in whatever lot fortunr 
should assign him. The other lieutenants did 
the same, as likewise the military tribunes and 
centurions, whose example was followed by 
the whole army. Caesar, finding that he was 
prevented in his design upon Dyrrhachium, 
pursued his march more leisurely, and en- 
camped on the river Aspus, in the territories 
of the Apollonians ; that he might protect the 
possessions of a state, which had so warmly 
declared in his favour. Here he resolved to 
pass the winter in tents, and wait the arrival 
of the rest of his legions out of Italy. Pompey 
did the like, and having encamped on the 
other side of the Aspus, assembled there all 
his legions and auxiliaries. 

XII. Kalenus having embarked the legions 
and cavalry at Brundusium, according to the 
instructions he had received, put to sea with 
his whole fleet ; but had not sailed very far 
till he was met by letters from Caesar, inform- 
ing him that all the Grecian coasts were 
guarded by the enemy's fleet. Upon this, he 
recalled his ships, and returned again into the 
harbour. Only one continued its route, which 
carried no soldiers, nor was subject to the or- 
ders of Kalenus, but belonged to a private 
commander. This vessel arriving before 
Oricum, fell into the hands of Bibulus, who, 
not sparing the very children, put all on board 
to death, both freemen and slaves. So much 
did the safety of the whole army depend upon 
a single moment. 

XIII. Bibulus, as we have related above, 
lay at Oricum, with his fleet ; and as he de- 
prived Caesar of all supplies by sea, so was he, 
in like manner, greatly incommoded by Caesar 
at land : who, having disposed parties along 
the coast, hindered him from getting water or 
wood, or coming near the shore. This was 
attended with many inconveniences, and threw 
him into great straits ; insomuch that he was 
obliged to fetch all his other necessaries, as 
well as wood and water, from the island of 
Corcyra ; and once, when foul weather pre- 
vented his receiving refreshments from thence, 
the soldiers were necessitated, for want of 
water, to collect the dew, which, in the night, 
fell on the hides that covered their ships. Yet 
he bore all these difficulties with surprising 
firmness, and continued resolute in his design 
of not unguarding the coast. But at last, be- 
ing reduced to the above-mentioned extremity, 
and Libo having joined him, they called from 



COMMENTARIES. 



259 



on board to M. Acilius and Stalius Marcus, 
two of Caesar's lieutenants, one of whom 
guarded the walls of Oricum, and the other 
the sea-coasts ; that they wanted to confer 
with Caesar about affairs of the greatest con- 
sequence, if they could but have an opportuni- 
ty. To gain the more credit, they let fall 
some expressions that seemed to promise ac- 
commodation ; and in the meanwhile demand- 
ed and obtained a truce ; for Marcus and 
Acilius believing their proposals to be serious, 
knew how extremely grateful they would be 
to Cffisar, and doubted not but Vibullius had 
succeeded in his negotiation. 

XIV. Cffisar was then at Buthrotum, a 
town over against Corcyra ; whither he was 
gone, with one legion, to reduce some of the 
more distant states, and supply himself with 
corn, which then began to be scarce. Here, 
receiving letters from Acilius and Marcus, 
with an account of Libo and Bibulus's de- 
mands, he left the legion, and returned to 
Oricum. Upon his arrival, he invited them 
to a conference. Libo appeared, and made 
an apology for Bibulus : " That being natur- 
ally hasty, and bearing a personal grudge to 
Caisar, contracted during the time of his ed- 
ileship and questorship, he had, for that rea- 
son, declined the interview ; to prevent any 
obstructions from his presence to the success 
of so desirable and advantageous a design : 
that Pompey was, and ever had been inclined 
to lay down his arms, and terminate their dif- 
ference by an accommodation ; but as yet had 
not sent him sufficient powers to treat; which, 
however, he doubted not soon to receive, as 
the council had intrusted him with the whole 
administration of the war : that if he would 
therefore make known his demands, they 
would send them to Pompey, who would soon 
come to a resolution upon their representations. 
In the meantime, the truce might continue, 
and both parties abstain from acts of hostility, 
till an answer could be obtained." He added 
something about the justice of their cause, and 
their forces, both natural and auxiliary ; to 
which Cfesar neither at that time returned any 
answer, nor do we now think it of importance 
enough to be transmitted to posterity. Caesar's 
demands were : " That he might have leave to 
send ambassadors to Pompey ; and that they 
would either stipulate for their return, or un- 
dertake themselves to convey them in safety : 
that with regard to the truce ; such were the 



present circumstances of the war, that their 
fleet kept back his supplies and transports, and 
his forces deprived them of water and access 
to the shore. If they expected any abatement 
on his side, they must likewise abate in guard- 
ing the coast ; but if they still persisted in 
their former vigilance, mithcr would he yield 
in what depended on him : that, notwithstand- 
ing, the accommodation might go forward 
without any obstruction from this mutual de- 
nial." Libo declined receiving Ca;sar's am- 
bassadors, or undertaking for their safe return, 
and chose to refer the whole matter to Pom- 
pey ; yet insisted on the truce. Cajsar perceiv- 
ing that the only aim of the enemy was to ex- 
tricate themselves out of their present straits 
and danger, and that it was in vain to entertain 
any hopes of peace, turned all his thoughts to 
the vigorous prosecution of the war. 

XV. Bibulus having kept at sea for many 
days, and contracted a dangerous illness by 
the cold and perpetual fatigue, as he could 
neither have proper assistance on board, nor 
would be prevailed upon to quit his post, he at 
last sunk under the weight of his distemper. 
After his death, nobody succeeded in the com- 
mand of the whole fleet ; but each squadron 
was governed, independently of the rest, by its 
particular commander. 

XVI. M^hen the surprise occasioned by 
Caesar's sudden arrival was over, Vibullius, in 
presence of Libo, L. Lucceius, and Theo- 
phanes, who were among Pompcy's most inti- 
mate counsellors, resolved to deliver the com- 
mission he had received from Cffisar. But 
scarce had he begun to speak, when Pompey 
interrupted him, and ordered him to proceed 
no further. " What," says he, " is my life or 
country to me, if I shall seem to be beholden 
to Caesar for them 1 And will it be believed 
that I am not indebted to him for them, if he, 
by an accommodation, restores me to Italy V 
Caesar was informed of this speech, after the 
conclusion of the war, by those who were pre- 
sent when it was delivered : he still continued, 
however, by other methods, to try to bring 
about an accommodation. 

XVII. As the two camps were only se- 
parated by the river Apsus, the soldiers had fre- 
quent discourse among themselves ; and it was 
settled by mutual consent, that no act of hos- 
tility should pass during the conferences. 
Caesar taking advantage of this opportunity, 
sent P. Vatinius, one of his lieutenants, to for- 



260 



CiESAR'S 



ward to the utmost an accommodation ; and 
to demand frequently with a loud voice, 
" Whether it might not be permitted to 
citizens, to send deputies to their fellow citizens 
about peace : that this had never been denied 
even to fugitives and robbers, and could much 
less be opposed, when the only design was to 
prevent the elTusion of civil blood." This and 
much more he said, with a submissive air, as 
became one employed to treat for his own and 
the common safety. He was heard with great 
silence by both parties, and received this 
answer from the enemy : " That A. Varro 
had declared he would next day appear at an 
interview, whither the deputies of both parties 
might come in perfect security, and mutually 
make known their demands." The hour of 
meeting was likewise settled ; which being 
come, multitudes on both sides flocked to the 
place ; the greatest expectations were formed ; 
and the minds of all seemed intent upon peace. 
T. Labienus, advancing from the crowd, began 
in a low voice to confer with Yatinius, as if to 
settle the articles of the treaty. But their dis- 
course was soon interrupted by a multitude of 
darts that came pouring in on all sides. Vati- 
nius escaped the danger, by means of the sol- 
diers, who protected him with their shields ; 
but Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius, L. Tibur- 
tus, centurions, and some private men, were 
wounded. Labienus then lifted up his voice, 
and cried : " Leave off prating of an accom- 
modation ; for you must not expect peace, till 
you bring us Csesar's head." 

XVIII. About the same time, M. Coelius 
Rufus, pretor at Rome for foreign affairs, 
having undertaken the cause of the debtors, 
on his entrance into his ofBce, ordered his 
tribunal to be fixed near that of the city pretor, 
C. Trebonius, and promised to receive the 
complaints of such as should appeal to him, in 
regard to the estimation and payments, made 
in consequence of Csesar's late regulation. But 
such was the equity of the decree, and the 
humanity of Trebonius, who, in so nice and 
critical an affair, thought it necessary to con- 
duct himself with the utmost clemency and 
i^ moderation, that no pretence of appeal could 
^ be found. For to plead poverty, personal loss- 
es, the hardness of the times, and the difficulty 
of bringing their effects to sale, is usual enough 
even with reasonable minds : but to own them- 
selves indebted, and yet aim at keeping their 
possessions entire, would have argued a total 



want both of honesty and shame. Accordingly 
not a man was found who had made any such 
demand. Ccelius's whole severity, therefore, 
was pointed against those, to whom the in- 
heritance of the debtor was adjudged ; and 
having once embarked in the affair, that he 
might not seem to have engaged himself to no 
purpose in an unjustifiable cause, he published 
a law, by which he allowed the debtors six 
years for the discharge of their debts, which 
they were to clear at equal payments, without 
interest. 

XIX. But the consul Servilius, and the 
rest of the magistrates opposing the law, when 
he found it had not the effect he expected, he 
thought proper to drop that design; and in 
the view of inflaming the people, proposed two 
new laws ; the one, to exempt all the tenants 
in Rome from paying rents ; the other, for a 
general abolition of debts. This bait took 
with the multitude, and Coelius at their head, 
came and attacked C. Trebonius on his tri- 
bunal, drove him thence, and wounded some 
about him. The consul Servilius reported 
these things to the senate, who interdicted to 
Ccelius the functions of his office. In conse- 
quence of this decree, the consul refused him 
admittance into the senate, and drove him out 
of his tribunal, when he was going to ha- 
rangue the people. Overwhelmed with shame 
and resentment, he openly threatened to carry 
his complaints to Csesar ; but privately gave 
notice to Milo, who had been banished for the 
murder of Clodius, to come into Italy, and 
join him with the remains of the gladiators, 
which he bought formerly to entertain the 
people with, in the shows he gave them. With 
this view he sent him before to Turinum, to 
solicit the shepherds to take arms, and went 
himself to Casilinum : where hearing that his 
arms and ensigns had been seized at Capua, 
his partisans at Naples, and their design of be- 
traying the city discovered ; finding all his 
projects defeated, the gates of Capua shut 
against him, and the danger increased every 
moment, because the citizens had taken arms, 
and began to consider him as a public enemy ; 
he desisted from the project he had formed, 
and thought proper to change his route. 

XX. In the meantime Milo, having des. 
patched letters to all the colonies and free 
towns, intimating that what he did was in vir- 
tue of Pompey's authority, who had sent him 
orders byBibulus, endeavoured to draw over the 



'COMMENTARIES. 



261 



debtors to his party. But not succeeding in 
his design, he contented himself with setting 
some slaves at Uberty, and with them marched 
to besiege Cosa, in the territory of Turinum. 
Q. Paedius the pretor, with a garrison of one 
legion, commanded in the town : and here Milo 
was slain by a stone from a machine on the 
walls. Coelius giving out that he was gone 
to Caesar, came to Thurium, where endeavour- 
ing to debauch the inhabitants, and corrupt by 
promises of money the Spanish and Gaulish 
horse, whom Caesar had sent thither to garri- 
son the place, they slew him. Thus these 
dangerous beginnings, that by reason of the 
multiplicity of affairs wherewith the magistrates 
were distracted, and the ticklish situation of 
the times, threatened great revolutions, and 
alarmed all Italy, were brought to a safe and 
speedy issue. 

XXI. Libo leaving Oricum, with the fleet 
under his command, consisting of fifty sail, 
came to Brundusium, and possessed himself of 
an island directly facing the harbour, judging 
it of more consequence to secure a post, by 
which our transports must necessarily pass, 
than guard all the coasts and havens on the 
other side. As his arrival was unexpected, he 
surprised and burned some transports, and 
carried off a vessel loaded with corn. The 
consternation was great among our men, inso- 
much that having landed some foot, with a 
party of archers, in the night, he defeated our 
guard of cavalry, and had so far the advantage, 
by the commodiousness of his post, that he 
wrote Pompey word, he might draw the rest 
of the navy on shore, and order them to be ca- 
reened ; for he alone, with his squadron, would 
undertake to cut off Caesar's supplies. 

XXII. Antony was then at Brundusium, 
who confiding in the valour of the troops, or- 
dered some boats belonging to the fleet to be 
armed with hurdles and galleries, and having 
filled them with chosen troops, disposed them 
in several places along the shore. At the 
same time, he sent two three-benched galleys, 
which he had caused to be built at Brundu- 
sium, to the mouth of the harbour, as if with 
design to exercise the rowers. Libo perceiving 
them advance boldly, and hoping he might be 
able to intercept them, detached five quadrire- 
mes for that purpose. At their approach, our 
men rowed towards the harbour, whither the 
enemy, eager of the pursuit, inconsiderately 
followed them ; for now Antony's armed 

23* 



boats, upon a signal given, came pouring upon 
them from all parts, and on the very first onset 
took a quadrireme, with all the soldiers and 
sailors on board, and forced the rest to an 
ignominious flight. To add to this disgrace, 
the cavalry, which Antony had posted all 
along the coast, hindered the enemy from 
'watering ; which reduced them to such straits, 
that Libo was forced to quit the blockade of 
Brundusium, and retire with his fleet. 

XXIII. Several months had now passed ; 
the winter was almost over; meantime, neither 
the ships nor legions were yet arrived, which 
Caesar expected from Brundusium. He could 
not help thinking that some opportunities had 
been lost, as it was certain the wind had 
many times offered fair, and there was a ne- 
cessity of trusting to it at last. The longer 
the delay in sending over the troops, the more 
vigilant and alert were the enemy in guarding 
the coast, and the greater their confidence to 
hinder the passage ; nay, Pompey in his letters 
frequently reproached them, that as they had 
not prevented the first embarkation, they ought 
at least to take care that no more of the troops 
got over ; and the season itself was becoming 
less favourable, by the approach of milder wea- 
ther, when the enemy's fleet would be able to 
act and extend itself. For these reasons, Cae- ' 
sar wrote sharply to his lieutenants at Brun- 
dusium, charging them not to omit the first 
opportunity of sailing, as soon as the wind of- 
fered fair, and to steer for the coast of Apol- 
lonia, which they could approach with less 
danger, as it was not so strictly guarded by 
the enemy, who were afraid of venturing on a 
coast so ill provided with havens. 

XXIV. The lieutenants, roused and em- 
boldened by these letters, and encouraged by 
the exhortations of the troops themselves, who 
professed they were ready to face any danger 
for Caesar's sake, embarked under the direction 
of M. Antony and Fufius Kalenus, and setting 
sail with the wind at south, passed Apollonia 
and Dyrrhachium next day. Being descried 
from the continent, C. Coponius, who com- 
manded the Rhodian squadron at Dyrrhach- 
ium, put out to sea, and the wind slackening 
upon our fleet, it was near falling into the 
hands of the enemy : but a fresh gale spring- 
ing up at south, saved us from that danger. 
Coponius however desisted not from the pur- 
suit, hoping by the labour and perseverance 
of the mariners, to surmount the violence of 



262 



CiESAR'S 



the tempest ; and though we had passed 
Dyrrhachium with a very hard gale, still con- 
tinued to follow us. Our men, apprehensive 
of an attack, should the wind again chance to 
slacken, seized an advantage fortune threw in 
their way, and put into the port of Nyphaeum, 
about three miles beyond Lissus. This port is 
sheltered from the south-west wind, but lies 
open to the south ; but they preferred the 
hazard they might be exposed to by the tem- 
pest, to that of fighting. At that instant, by 
an unusual piece of good fortune, the wind, 
which for two days had blown from the south, 
changed to the south west. This was a sud- 
den and favourable turn ; for the fleet so lately 
in danger from the enemy, was sheltered in 
a safe commodious port : and that which 
threatened ours with destruction, was in its 
turn exposed to the utmost peril. By this 
unexpected change, the storm, which protected 
our fleet, beat so furiously on the Rhodian gal- 
leys, that they were all, to the number of six- 
teen, broken to pieces against the shore. Most 
of the soldiers and mariners perished among 
the rocks : the rest were taken up by our men, 
and sent by Ceesar's orders to their several 
homes. 

XXV. Two of our transports, unable to 
keep up with the rest, were overtaken by the 
night : and not knowing where the fleet had 
put in, cast anchor over against Lissus. Ota- 
cilius Crassus, who commanded in the place, 
sent out some boats and small vessels to attack 
them : at the same time he urged them to sur- 
render, promising quarter to such as would 
submit. One of these vessels carried two hun- 
dred and twenty new-raised soldiers ; the 
other less than two hundred veterans. On this 
occasion appeared, how great a defence against 
danger results from firmness of mind. The 
new levies, frighted at the number of their 
adversaries, and fatigued with sea-sickness, 
surrendered on promise of their lives. But 
when they were brought to Otacilius, regard- 
less of the oath he had taken, he ordered them 
all to be cruelly slain in his presence. The 
veterans, on the contrary, though they had both 
the storm and a leaky vessel to struggle with, 
abated nothing of their wonted bravery : but 
having spun out the time till night under pre- 
tence of treating, obliged the pilot to run the 
vessel ashore, where finding an advantageous 
post, they continued the remainder of the night. 
At day-break, Otacilius detached against them 



about four hundred horse, who guarded that 
part of the coast, and pursued them sword in 
hand ; but they defended themselves with great 
bravery, and having slain some of the enemy, 
rejoined, without loss, the rest of the troops. 

XXVI. Upon this the Roman citizens in- 
habiting Lissus, to whom Caesar had before 
made a grant of the town, after fortifying it 
with great care, opened their gates to Antony, 
and furnished him with every thing he stood 
in need of. Otacilius, dreading the conse- 
quences of this revolution, quitted the place, 
and fled to Pompey. Antony having landed 
his troopsjwhich consisted of three veteran le- 
gions, one new raised, and eight hundred 
horse, sent most of the transports back again 
to Brundusium, to bring over the rest of the 
foot and cavalry ; retaining, nevertheless, some 
ships of Gaulish structure, that if Pompey, 
imagining Italy destitute of troops, should at- 
tempt to run thither, as was commonly ru- 
moured, Cffisar might be able to follow him. 
At the same time he gave Casar speedy notice 
of the number of forces he had brought over 
with him, and the place where he had landed. 

XXVII. This intelligence reached Caesar 
and Pompey much about the same time ; for 
both had seen the fleet pass Apollonia and 
Dyrrhachium, and had in consequence directed 
their march that way ; but neither knew, for 
some days, into what harbour it had put. 
On the first news of Antony's landing, the two 
generals took different resolutions ; Caesar, to 
join him as soon as possible ; Pompey, to op- 
pose his march, and, if possible, draw him in- 
to an ambuscade. Both quitted their camps 
on the Apsus about the same time ; Pompey, 
privately, during the night; Cassar, publicly, 
by day. But Cassar, who had the river to cross, 
was obliged to fetch a compass, that he might 
come at a ford. Pompey, on the other hand, 
having nothing to obstruct his march, advanced 
by great journeys against Antony ; and, under- 
standing that he was not far off, posted his 
troops on an advantageous ground, ordering 
them to keep within their camp, and light no 
fires, that his approach might not be perceived. 
But Antony, being informed of it by the 
Greeks, would not stir out of his lines, and 
sending immediate notice to Cassar, was joined 
by him next day. On advice of Caesar's ar- 
rival, Pompey, that he might not be shut up 
between two armies, quitted the place, and 
coming with all his forces to Asparagium, a 



COMMENTARIES. 



263 



town belonging to the Dyrrhachians, encamp- 
ed there on an advantageous ground. 

XXVIII. About the same time Scipio, 
notwithstanding some checks he had received 
near Mount Amanus, assumed the title of 
emperor, after which he exacted great sums 
of money from the neighbouring states and 
princes ; obliged the farmers of the revenue 
to pay the two years' taxes, which lay in their 
hands, and advance a third by way of loan, and 
sent orders to the whole province for levying 
cavalry. Having got a sufficient number to- 
gether, he quitted the Parthians, his nearest 
enemies,who not long before had slain M. Cras- 
sus, and held Bibulus invested; and march- 
ed out of Syria with his legions and cavalry. 
When he arrived in Asia Minor, he found the 
whole country filled with terror on account 
of the Parthian war ; and the soldiers them- 
selves declared, that they were ready to march 
against an enemy, but would never bear arms 
against a consul, and their fellow-citizens. 
To stifle these discontents, he made consider- 
able presents to the troops, quartered them in 
Pergamus and other rich towns, and gave up 
the whole country to their discretion. Mean- 
while the money demanded of the province 
was levied with great rigour, and various pre- 
tences were devised, to serve as a ground to 
new exactions. Slaves and freemen were sub- 
ject to a capitation tax. Imports were laid 
upon pillars and doors of houses. Corn, sol- 
diers, mariners, arms, engines, carriages, in a 
word, every thing that had a name, furnished 
a sufficient handle for extorting money. 
Governors were appointed not only over towns, 
but over villages and castles ; and he that 
acted with the greatest rigour and cruelty, 
was accounted the worthiest man and best citi- 
zen. The province swarmed with lictors, 
overseers, and collectors, who, besides the 
sums imposed by public authority, exacted 
money likewise on tlieir own account, colour- 
ing the iniquitous demands with a pretence 
that they had been expelled their country and 
native homes, and were in extreme want of 
every thing. Add to all these calamities, im- 
moderate usury, an evil almost inseparable 
from war; for so great sums arc then exacted, 
beyond what a country is able to furnish, they 
are obliged to apply for a delay, which at any 
price is still accounted a favour. Thus the 
debts of the province increased considerably 



during these two years. Nor were the Ro- 
man citizens the only sufferers on this occasion ; 
for certain sums were demanded of every state 
and corporation, as a loan upon the senate's 
decree ; and the farmers of the revenue were 
ordered to advance the next year's tribute, in 
like manner as when they first entered upon 
office. Besides all this, Scipio gave orders 
for seizing the treasures of the temple of Di- 
ana at Ephesus, with all the statues of that 
goddess. But when he came to the temple, 
attended by many persons of senatorian rank, 
he received letters from Pompey, desiring him 
to lay aside all other concerns, and make what 
haste he could to join him, because Caesar 
had passed into Greece with his whole army. 
In consequence of this order, he sent back 
the senators who had been summoned to at- 
tend him at Ephesus, made preparations for 
passing into Macedonia, and began his march 
a few days after. Thus the Ephesian trea- 
sures escaped being plundered. 

XXIX. Caesar having joined Antony's 
army, and recalled the legion he had left at 
Oricum to guard the sea-coast, judged it 
necessary to advance farther into the country, 
and possess himself of the more distant pro- 
vinces. At the same time deputies arrived 
from Thessaly and ^tolia with assurances oi 
submission from all the states in those parts, 
provided he would send troops to defend them. 
Accordingly he despatched L. Cassius Longi- 
nus, with a legion of new levies, called the 
twenty-seventh, and two hundred horse, into 
Thessaly ; and C. Calvisssius Sabinus, with five 
cohorts, and some cavalry, into ^tolia; charg- 
ing them in a particular manner, as those pro- 
vinces lay the nearest to his camp, that they 
would take care to furnish him with corn. He 
likewise ordered Cn. Domitius Calvinus, with 
the eleventh and twelfth legions, and five 
hundred horse, to march into Macedonia: 
for Menedemus, the principal man of that 
country, having come ambassador to Caesar, 
had assured him of the affection of the pro- 
vince. 

XXX. Calvisius was well received by the 
..-Etolians, and having driven the enemy's gar- 
risons from Calydon and Naupactum, possess- 
ed himself of the whole country. Cassius arriv- 
ing in Thessaly with his legion, found the 
state divided into two factions. Egesaretus, 
a man in years, and of estaWished credit, fa- 



264 



CESAR'S 



\ered Pompcy ; Petreius, a young nobleman 
of the first rank, exerted his whole interest in 
behalf of Csesar. 

XXXI. About the same time Domitius ar- 
rived in Macedonia ; and while deputies were 
attending him from all parts, news came that 
Scipio approached with his legions, which 
spread a great alarm through the countrj' ; as 
fame, for the most part, magnifies the first ap- 
pearances of things. Scipio, without stopping 
any where in Macedonia, advanced by great 
marches towards Domitius ; but being come 
within twenty miles of him, suddenly changed 
his route, and turned off to Thessaly, in quest 
of Cassius Longinus. This was done so ex- 
peditiously, that he was actually arrived with 
his troops, when Cassius received the first 
notice of his march : for to make the more de- 
spatch, he had left M. Favonius at the river 
Haliacmon, which separates Macedonia from 
Thessaly, with eight cohorts, to guard the bag- 
gage of the legions, and ordered him to erect 
a fort there. At the same time, king Cotus's 
cavalry, which had been accustomed to make 
inroads into Thessaly, came pouring upon 
Cassius's camp ; who, knowing that Scipio 
was upon his march, and believing the caval- 
ry to be his, retired in a fright to the moun- 
tains that begirt Thessaly, and thence directed 
his course towards Ambracia. Scipio prepar- 
ing to follow him, received letters from M. 
Favonius, that Domitius was coming up with 
his legions, nor would it be possible for him to 
maintain the post he was in, without his assis- 
tance. Scipio, upon his intelligence, changed 
his resolution, gave over the pursuit of Cas- 
sius, and advanced to the relief of Favonius. 
As he marched day and night without inter- 
mission, he arrived so opportunely, that the 
dust of Domitius's army, and his advanced par- 
ties, were descried at the same time. Thus 
Domitius's care preserved Cassius, and Sci- 
pio's diligence Favcnius. 

XXXII. Scipio continued two days in his 
camp upon the Haliacmon, which ran between 
him and the army of Domitius, put his troops 
in motion on the third, and by day-break ford- 
ed the river. Early next morning he drew 
up his troops in order of battle at the head of 
his camp. Domitius was not averse to an en- 
gagement ; but as between the two camps 
there was a plain of six miles, he thought that 
the fittest place for a field of battle, and 
drew up his men at some distance from Sci- 



pio's camp. Scipio would not stir from his 
post ; yet hardly could Domitius restrain his 
men from advancing to attack him through a 
rivulet with steep banks, that ran in the front 
of the enemy's camp, and opposed their passage. 
Scipio observing the keenness and alacrity ot 
our troops, and fearing that next day he should 
either be forced to fight against his will, or 
ignominiousiy keep within his camp ; after 
great expectations raised, by too hastily cross- 
ing the river, he saw all his projects defeated; 
and decamping in great silence during the 
night, returned to his former station, beyond 
the Haliacmon, and posted himself on a ris- 
ing ground, near the river. A few days after, 
he formed an ambuscade, of cavalry, by night, 
in a place where our men were wont to for- 
age : and when Q. Varus, who commanded 
the horse under Domitius, came next day, ac- 
cording to custom ; suddenly the enemy rose 
from their lurking holes : but our men brave- 
ly sustained the attack, soon recovered their 
ranks, and in their turn vigorously charged 
the enemy. About fourscore fell on this oc- 
casion ; the rest betook themselves to flight; 
and our men returned to their camp, with the 
loss of only two of their number. 

XXXIII. After his rencounter, Domitius, 
hoping to draw Scipio to a battle, feigned to 
decamp for want of provisions ; and having 
made the usual signal for retreating, after 
a march of three miles, drew up the cavalry 
and legions in a convenient plain, shrouded 
from the enemy's view. Scipio, preparing to 
follow, sent the horse and liglit-armed infantry 
before to explore his route, and examine the 
situation of the country. When they were 
advanced a little way, and their first squadrons 
had come within reach of our ambush ; be- 
ginning to suspect something from the neigh- 
ing of the horses, they wheeled about, in order 
to retreat ; which the troops that followed ob- 
serving, suddenly halted. Our men, finding 
that the ambush was discovered, and knowing 
it would be in vain to wait for the rest of the 
army, fell upon the two squadrons that were 
most advanced. M. Opimius, general of 
the horse to Domitius, was amongst these, but 
somehow found means to escape. All the 
rest were either slain, or made prisoners. 

XXXIV. CfBsar having drawn off his gar- 
risons from the sea-coast, as we have related 
above, left three cohorts at Oricum to defend 
the town, and committed to their charge the 



COMMENTARIES. 



265 



yalleys he had brought out of Italy. Acilius, 
one of his lieutenants, had the command of 
these troops ; who, for the greater security, 
caused the ships to be drawn up into the har- 
bour behind the town, and made them fast to 
the shore. He likewise sunk a transport in 
the mouth of the haven, behind which another 
rode at anchor, on whose deck a tower was 
erected, facing the entrance of the port, and 
filled with troops, to be ready in case of sur- 
prise. Young Pompey, who commanded the 
Egyptian fleet, having notice of this, came to 
Oricum ; weighed up the vessel that had been 
sunk in the mouth of the harbour ; and, after 
an obstinate resistance, took the other, which 
had been placed there by Acilius, to guard 
the haven. He then brought forward his 
fleet, on which he had raised towers, to fight 
with the greater advantage ; and having sur- 
rounded the town on all sides, attacked it by 
land with scaling ladders, and by sea from the 
towers, sending fresh men continually in the 
place of those that were fatigued, and thereby 
obliged us to yield, through weariness and 
wounds. At the same time he seized an emi- 
nence, on the other side of the town, which 
seemed a kind of natural mole, and almost 
formed a peninsula over against Oricum ; and 
by means of this neck of land, carried four 
small galleys, upon rollers, into the inner part 
of the haven. Thus the galleys, that were 
made fast to the land, and destitute of troops, 
being attacked on all sides, four were carried 
off, and the rest burned. This affair des- 
patched, he left D. Laelius, whom he had 
taken from the command of the Asiatic fleet, 
to prevent the importation of provisions from 
Biblis and Amantia ; and sailing for Lissus, 
attacked and burned the thirty transports 
which Antony had left in that haven. He 
endeavoured likewise to take the town ; but 
the Roman citizens of that district, aided by 
the garrison Csesar. had left, defended it so 
well, that at the end of three days, he retired 
without effecting his purpose, having lost some 
men in the attempt. 

XXXV. Caesar being informed that Pom- 
pey was at Asparagium, marched thither with 
his army ; and having taken the capital of the 
Parthinians by the way, where Pompey had 
a garrison ; arrived the third day in Mace- 
donia, and encamped at a small distance from 
the enemy. The next day he drew out all 
his forces, formed them before his camp, and 



offered Pompey battle. Finding that he kept 
within his lines, he led back his troops, and 
began to think of pursuing other measures. 
Accordingly, on the morrow, by a long circuit, 
and through very narrow and difficult ways, 
he marched, with all his forces, to Dyrrha- 
chium ; hoping either to oblige Pompey to 
follow him thither, or cut off his communica- 
tion with the town, where he had laid up all 
his provisions, and magazines of war ; which 
happened accordingly. For Pompey, at first, 
not penetrating his design, because he coun- 
terfeited a route different from what he really 
intended, imagined he had been obliged to 
decamp for want of provisions ; but being af- 
terwards informed of the truth, by his scouts, 
he quitted his camp next day, in hopes to pre- 
vent him by taking a nearer way. Casar, 
suspecting what might happen, exhorted his 
soldiers to bear the fatigue patiently ; and al- 
lowing them to repose during only a small 
part of the night, arrived next morning at 
Dyrrhachium, where he immediately formed 
a camp, just as Pompey 's van began to appear 
at a distance. 

XXXVI. Pompey, thus excluded from 
Dyrrhachium, and unable to execute his first 
design, came to a resolution of encamping on 
an eminence, called Petra, where was a toler- 
able harbour, sheltered from some winds. 
Here he ordered part of his fleet to attend 
him, and corn and provisions to be brought 
him from Asia, and the other provinces sub- 
ject to his command. Caesar, apprehending 
the war would run into length, and despairing 
of supplies from Italy, because the coasts were 
so strictly guarded by Pompey's fleet; and 
his own galleys, built, the winter before, in 
Sicily, Gaul, and Italy, were not yet arrived ; 
despatched L. Canuleius, one of his lieuten- 
ants, to Epirus, for corn. And because that 
country lay at a great distance from his camp, 
he built granaries in several places, and wrote 
to the neighbouring states to carry their corn 
thither. He likewise ordered search to be 
made for what corn could be found in Lissus, 
the country of the Parthinians, and the other 
principalities in those parts. This amounted 
to very little ; partly occasioned by the soil, 
which is rough and mountainous, and obliges 
the inhabitants often to import grain ; partly 
because Pompey, foreseeing Caesar's wants, 
had, some days before, ravaged the country of 
the Parthinians, plundered their houses, and, 
2M 



266 



CESAR'S 



by means of his cavalry, carried off all their 
corn. 

XXXVII. For these reasons, Caesar 
formed a project which the very nature of 
the country suggested. All round Pompey's 
camp, at a small distance, were high and steep 
hills. Caesar took posst ssion of those hills, and 
built forts upon them ; resolving, as the na- 
ture of the ground would allow, to draw lines 
of communication from one fort to another, 
and inclose Pompey within his works. His 
views herein were ; first, to facilitate the pas- 
sage of his convoys, which the enemy's cav- 
alry, which was very strong and fine, would 
no longer cut off; next, to distress this very 
cavalry, for want of forage; and lastly, to 
lessen the great reputation and high idea en- 
tertained of Pompey, when it should be re- 
ported all over the world, that he had suffered 
himself to be blockaded, and, as it were, im- 
prisoned by Ca3sar's works ; and durst not 
hazard a battle to set himself at liberty. 

XXXVIII. Pompey would neither leave 
the sea and Dyrrhachium, where he had all 
his magazines and engines of war, and whence 
he was supplied with provisions by means of 
his fleet; nor could prevent the progress of Ca3- 
sar's works, without fighting, which, at that 
time, he was determined against. He could do 
nothing therefore but extend himself, by taking 
as many hills, and as large a circuit of country 
as possible, to give his adversary the more 
trouble, and divide his forces. This he did, 
by raising twenty-four forts, which took in a 
circumference of fifteen miles, wherein were 
arable and pasture lands, to feed his horses 
and beasts of burden. And as our men had 
carried their circumvallation quite round, by 
drawing lines of communication from fort to 
fort, to prevent the sallies of the enemy, and 
guard against the attacks in the rear; in like 
manner, Pompey's men had surrounded them- 
selves with lines, to hinder us from breaking 
in upon them, and charging them behind. 
They even perfected their works first, because 
they had more hands, and a less circuit to in- 
close. When Cffisar endeavoured to gain any 
place, Pompey, though determined not to op- 
pose him with all his forces, nor hazard a gen- 
eral action, failed not, however, to detach 
parties of archers and slingers ; who wounded 
great numbers of our men, and occasioned 
such a dread of their arrows, that almost all 
the soldiers furnished themselves with coats of 



mail, or thick leather, to guard against the 
danger. 

XXXIX. Both parties disputed every post 
with great obstinacy: Caesar, that he might 
inclose Pompey within as narrow a space as 
possible ; and Pompey, that he might have 
liberty to extend himself; which occasioned 
many sharp skirmishes. In one of these, Cae- 
sar's ninth legion having possessed themselves 
of an eminence, which they began to fortify, 
Pompey seized the opposite mount, with a re- 
solution to hinder their works. As the access 
on one side was very easy, he sent first some 
archers and slingers, and afterwards a strong 
detachment of light-armed foot, plying us, at 
the same time, with his military engines; 
which obliged our men to desist ; as they found 
it impossible at once to sustain the enemy's 
charge, and go forward with their works. Cae- 
sar, perceiving that his men were wounded 
from all sides, resolved to quit the place and re- 
tire. But as the descent, by which he must re- 
treat, was pretty steep, the Pompeians charged 
him briskly in drawing off, imagining he gave 
way through fear. Pompey went so far as to 
say. That he consented to be accounted a gene- 
ral of no merit, if Csesar's men got off without 
considerable loss. Cassar, concerned about the 
retreat of his men, ordered hurdles to be fixed 
on the ridge of the hill fronting the enemy ; be- 
hind which he dug a moderate ditch, and rend- 
ered the place as inaccessible as he could, on 
all sides. When this was done, he began to 
file off the legionary soldiers, supporting them 
by some light-armed troops, posted on their 
flanks, who, with arrows and stones, might re- 
pulse the enemy. Pompey's troops failed not 
to pursue them, with great outcries and fierce 
menaces, overturned the hurdles, and used 
them as bridges to get over the ditch. Which 
Caesar observing, and fearing some disaster 
might ensue, should he seem to be driven from 
a post, which he quitted voluntarily ; when his 
forces were got half down the hill, encourag- 
ing them by Antony, who had the command 
of that legion, he gave the signal to face 
about, and fall on the enemy. Immediately 
the soldiers of the ninth legion, forming them- 
selves into clo e order, launched their darts ; 
and advancing briskly up the hill against the 
enemy, forced them to give ground, and at 
last betake themselves to flight ; which was 
not a little incommoded by the hurdles, pali- 
sades, and ditch, Cajsar had thrown up to stop 



COMMENTARIES. 



267 



their pursuit. But our men who sought only 
to secure their retreat, having killed several 
of the enemy, and lost only five of their own 
number, retired without the least disturbance, 
and inclosing some other hills within their 
lines, completed the circumvallation. 

XL. This method of making war was new 
and extraordinary ; as well in regard to the 
number of forts, the extent of the circumvalla- 
tion, the greatness of his works, and the 
manner of attack and defence, as on other ac- 
counts. For whoever undertakes to invest 
another, is, for the most part, moved thereto, 
either by some previous defeat he has sustained, 
the knowledge of his weakness, to take ad- 
vantage of his distress, to profit by a superi- 
ority of forces ; or, in fine, to cut off his provi- 
sions, which is the most ordinary cause of 
these attempts. But Csesar, with an inferior 
force, besieged Pompey, whose troops were 
entire, in good order, and abounded in all 
things. For ships arrived every day, from all 
parts, with provisions ; nor could the wind 
blow from any quarter, that was not favoura- 
ble to some of them ; whereas Ofesar's army, 
having consumed all the corn round about, 
was reduced to the last necessities. Never- 
theless the soldiers bore all with singular pa- 
tience ; remembering, that though reduced to 
the like extremity the year before, in Spam, 
they had yet, by their assiduity and perseve- 
rance, put an end to a very formidable war. 
They called to mind too their sufferings at 
Alcsia, and their still greater distresses before 
Avaricum, by which, however, they triumphed 
over mighty nations. When barley or pulse 
was given them instead of corn, they took it 
cheerfully ; and thought themselves regaled 
when they got any cattle, which Epirus fur- 
nished them with in great abundance. They 
discovered in the country a root, called chara, 
which they pounded and kneaded with milk, 
so as to make a sort of bread of it. This fur- 
nished a plentiful supply ; and when their ad- 
versaries reproached them with their want, 
by way of answer to their insults, they threw 
their loaves at them. 

XLI. By this time, the corn began to ripen, 
and the hopes of a speedy supply supported 
the soldiers under their present wants. Nay, 
they were often heard to say one to another, 
that they would sooner live on the bark of 
trees, than let Pompey escape. For they were, 
informed from time to time, by deserters, that 



their horses were almost starved, and the rest 
of their cattle actually dead ; that the troops 
themselves were very sickly ; partly occasioned 
by the narrow space in which they were in- 
closed, the number and noisome smell of dead 
carcases, and the daily fatigue to which they 
were unaccustomed, partly by their extreme 
want of water. For GBEsar had either turned 
the course of all the rivers and brooks that 
ran into the sea, or dammed up their currents, 
^nd as the country was mountainous, inter- 
mixed with deep valleys, by driving piles into 
the earth, and covering them with mould, he 
stopped up the course of the waters. This 
obliged the enemy to search for low and marshy 
places, and to dig wells, which added to their 
daily labour. The wells too, when discovered, 
lay at a considerable distance from some parts 
of the army, and were soon dried up by the 
heat. CsBsar's army, on the contrary, was 
very healthy, abounded in water, and had 
plenty of all kinds of provisions, corn excepted, 
which they hoped to be soon supplied with, as 
the season was now pretty far advanced, and 
harvest approached. 

XLII. In this method of making war, new 
stratagems were every day put in practice by 
both generals. Pompcy's soldiers, observing 
by the fires the place where our cohorts were 
upon guard, stole thither privately by night, 
and pouring upon them a fliglit of arrows, re- 
tired instantly to their camp, which obliged 
our men to have fires in one place, and keep 
guard in another. 

XLIir. Meanwhile P. Sylla, whom Csesar 
at his departure had left to command the 
camp, being informed of what passed, came to 
the assistance of the cohort, with two legions. 
His arrival soon put the Pompeians to flight, 
who could not stand the very sight and shock 
of his troops ; but seeing their first ranks bro- 
ken, took to their heels, and quitted the place. 
Sylla checked the ardour of his men, whom 
he would not suffer to continue the pursuit too 
far ; and it was the general belief, that had 
he pursued the enemy warmly, that day might 
have put an end to the war. His conduct, 
however, cannot be justly censured ; for the 
difference is great between a lieutenant and 
a general ; the one is tied up to act according 
to instructions ; the other, free from restraint, 
is at liberty to lay hold of all advantages. Sylla, 
who was left by Cajsar to take care of the 
camp, was satisfied with having disengaged 



268 



CiESAR'S 



his own men, and had no intention to hazard 
a general action, which might have been at- 
tended with ill consequences, and would have 
looked like arrogating the part of a general. 
The Pompeians found it no easy matter to 
make good their retreat ; for having advanced 
from a very disadvantageous post to the sum- 
mit of the hill, they had reason to fear our men 
would charge them in descending, and the 
rather, as it was very near sunset, for they 
had protracted the affair almost till night, iij 
hopes of accomplishing their design. Thus 
Pompey, compelled by necessity, immediately 
took possession of an eminence, at such a dis- 
tance from our fort, as to be secure from darts 
and military engines. Here he encamped, 
threw up an intrenchment, and drew his forces 
together to defend the place. 

XLIV. At the same time we were engaged 
in two other places ; for Pompey attacked 
several castles together to divide our forces, 
and hinder the forts from mutually succouring 
one another. In one of these, Volcatius Tul- 
lus, with three cohorts, sustained the charge 
of a whole legion, and forced them to retire. 
In the other, the Germans, sallying out of their 
intrenchments, slew several of the enemy, and 
returned again without loss. 

XLV. Thus there happened no less than 
six actions in one day ; three near Dyrrhachium, 
and three about the lines. In computing 
the number of the slain, it appeared that Pom- 
pey lost two thousand men, with several vol- 
unteers and centurions, among whom was 
Valerius Flaccus, the son of Lucius, who had 
formerly been prsetor of Asia. We gained 
six standards, with the loss of no more than 
twenty men in all the attacks ; but in the fort, 
not a soldier escaped being wounded ; and 
four centurions belonging to one cohort, lost 
their eyes. As a proof of the danger they 
had been exposed to, and the efforts they had 
sustained, they brought and counted to Ctesar 
about thirty thousand arrows that had been 
I shot into the fort, and showed him the centu- 
\ rion Scffiva's buckler, which was pierced in 
N;wo hundred and thirty places. Csesar, as a 
reward for his services both to himself and 
the republic, presented him with two hundred 
thousand asses, and advanced him directly 
from the eighth rank of captains to the first ; it 
appearing that the preservation of the fort was 
chiefly owing to his valour. He also distri- 
buted military rewards among the other offi- 



cers and soldiers of that cohort, and assigned 
them double pay, and a double allowance of 
corn. 

XLVI. Pompey laboured all night at his 
fortifications, raised redoubts the following 
(lays, and having carried his works fifteen feet 
high, covered that part of his camp with man- 
telets. Five days after, taking advantage of 
a very dark night, he walled up the gates of 
his camp, rendered all the avenues impracti- 
cable ; and drawing out his troops in great si- 
lence about midnight, returned to his former 
works. 

XLVII. ^tolia, Acarnania, and Amphilo- 
chis, having been reduced by Cassius Lon- 
ginus, and Calvisius Sabinus, as we have re- 
lated above; Caesar thought it expedient to 
pursue his conquests, and attempt to gain 
Achaia. Accordingly he despatched Fufius 
Kalenus thither, ordering Sabinus and Cassius 
to join him, with the cohorts under their com- 
mand. Rutilius Lupus, Pompey's lieutenant 
in Achaia, hearing of their approach, resolved 
to fortify the isthmus, and thereby hinder Fu- 
bius from entering the province. Delphos, 
Thebes, and Orchomenus, voluntarily submit- 
ted to Kalenus ; some states he obtained by 
force, and sending deputies to the rest endea- 
voured to make them declare for Caesar. These 
negotiations found sufficient employment for 
Fufius. 

XLVIII. Caesar meanwhile drew up his 
army every day, offisring Pompey battle upon 
equal ground ; and, to provoke him to accept 
it, advanced so near his camp, that his van was 
within engine-shot of the rampart. Pompey, 
to preserve his reputation, drew out his legions 
too, but posted them in such a manner, that 
his third line touched the rampart, and the 
whole army lay under cover of the weapons 
discharged from thence. 

XLIX. Whilst these things passed in 
Achaia and at Dyrrhachium, and it was now 
known that Scipio was arrived in Macedonia, 
CaBsar still adhering to his former views of 
peace, despatched Clodius to him, an intimate 
friend of both, whom he had taken into his 
service upon Scipio's recommendation. At 
his departure, he charged him with letters and 
instructions to this effect : " That he had tried 
all ways to bring about a peace ; but he believed 
he had hitherto miscarried, through the fault 
of those to whom his proposals were addressed, 
because they dreaded presenting them to 



COMMENTARIES. 



269 



Pompey at an improper time : that he knew 
Scipio's authority to be such, as not only pri- 
vileged him to advise freely, but even to en- 
force his counsels, and compel the obstinate 
to hearken to reason : that he was possessed 
of an independent command, and had an army 
at his disposal to give weight to his interposi- 
tion : that in employing it for so desirable an 
end, he would gain the indisputable praise of 
having restored quiet to Italy, peace to the 
provinces, and saved the empire." Clodius 
reported this commission to Scipio, and at first 
met with a favourable reception, but was af- 
terwards denied audience : for Favonius hav- 
ing sharply reprimanded Scipio, as we learned 
after the conclusion of the war, the negotiation 
■was discontinued, and Clodius returned to 
Caesar without success. 

L. CjEsar, the more effectually to shut up 
Pompey's horse at Dyrrhachium, and hinder 
them from foraging, blocked up the two nar- 
row passes, of which we have spoken, with 
strong works, and raised forts to defend them. 
Pompey finding his cavalry rendered by this 
means unserviceable, conveyed them some 
days after by sea to his camp again. Forage 
was so scarce, that they were forced to have 
recourse to the leaves of trees, and the roots 
of green reeds, bruised ; for the corn sown 
within their lines was all consumed ; nor had 
they had any supplies but what came a long 
way about by sea, from Corcyra and Acarna- 
nia ; and even this was so inconsiderable, that 
to increase the quantity, they were forced to 
mix it with barley, and by these contrivances 
support their horses. At last, all expedients 
being exhausted, and the horses dying daily, 
Pompey thought it time to attempt to force 
the barricade, and set himself at liberty. 

LI. Among the cavalry in Cajsar's camp 
were two brothers, AUobrogians by birth, 
named Roscillus and .^gus, the sons of Ad- 
bucillus, who had long held the chief sway in 
his own state ; men of singular bravery, and 
who had been of signal service to Csesar in all 
his Gallic wars. For these reasons he had 
raised them to the highest offices in their own 
country, got them chosen into the senate be- 
fore they were of age, given them lands in 
Gaul taken from the enemy, besides pecuniary 
rewards to a great value, insomuch that from 
very moderate beginnings they had risen to 
vast wealth. These men were not only highly 
honoured by Csesar on account of their bravery, 
24 



but in great esteem with the whole army. 
But presuming on Caesar's friendship, and 
foolishly elated with their prosperity, they used 
the troopers ill, defrauded them of their pay, 
and secreted all the plunder to their own use. 
The Gaulish cavalry, offended at these pro- 
ceedings, went in a body to Ctesar, and openly 
complained of the two brothers ; adding, 
among other accusations, that, by giving in 
false musters, they received pay for more 
men than they had. Caesar not thinking it a 
proper time for animadversion, and regarding 
them greatly on account of their valour, de- 
clined all public notice of the affair, and con- 
tented himself with reprimanding them in 
private, admonishing them to expect every 
thing from his friendship, and to measure their 
future hopes by the experience of what he 
had already done for them. This rebuke, 
however, disgusted them greatly, and very 
much lessened their credit with the whole army, 
which they easily perceived, as well from the 
raillery they were often forced to bear, as in 
consequence of the secret reproaches and sense 
of their own minds. Thus prompted by shame, 
and perhaps imagining they were not cleared, 
but reserved to a more favourable opportunity, 
they resolved to desert, to try their fortunes 
elsewhere, and search for new friendships. 
Having imparted their design to a few of their 
clients, whom they judged fit instruments for 
so black a treason, they first attempted to 
murder C. Volusenus, general of the cavalry, 
(as was afterwards known, when the war was 
over,) that by so signal a piece of service they 
might the more effectually recommend them- 
selves to Pompey's favour. But finding that 
design attended with great hazard, and that 
no favourable opportunity offered for putting 
it in execution, they borrowed all the money 
they could, under pretence of reimbursing the 
troops, and making restitution; and having 
bought up a great number of horses, went 
over to Pompey, with those whom they had 
made acquainted with their design. As they 
were persons of noble birth, liberally educated, 
came with a great train of horses and ser- 
vants, had been highly honoured by Caesar, 
and were universally esteemed on account of 
their valour, Pompey carried them ostenta- 
tiously over all the camp, triumphing in this 
new and unusual acquisition ; for till then, 
neither horse nor foot-soldier had deserted 
from Caesar to Pompey ; whereas scarce a 



270 



CESAR'S 



day passed without some desertion from Pom- 
pey's army, especially among the new levies 
in Epirus, JEtolia, and those countries that 
had declared for Caesar. The brothers being 
well acquainted with the condition of Csesar's 
camp, what was wanting to complete the for- 
tifications, where the foible of the lines lay, the 
particular times, distance of places, strength 
and vigilance of the guards, with the temper 
and character of the officers who commanded 
in every post, made an exact report of all to 
Pompey. 

LII. Upon this intelligence, having already 
formed the design of forcing Ceesar's lines, he 
ordered the soldiers to make coverings of 
osier for their helmets, and provide themselves 
with fascines. This done, he embarked by 
night, in boats and small barks, a great num- 
ber of light-armed troops and archers, with 
the fascines for filling up Csesar's trenches ; 
and having drawn together sixty cohorts 
from the greater camp and forts, led them 
about midnight towards that part of the 
enemy's lines nearest the sea, a good distance 
from the main camp. Thither likewise he des- 
patched the barks, on board of which were 
the light-armed troops and fascines, together 
with all the galleys that lay at Dyrrhachium, 
giving each their particular instructions. Len- 
tulus Marcellinus the questor, with the ninth 
legion, had charge of this part of the fortifica- 
tions : and as his health was but infirm, 
Cffisar had joined Fulvius Posthumus with 
him in the command. 

LIII. This place was guarded by a ditch, 
fifteen feet broad, with a rampart towards the 
enemy, ten feet high, and of equal thickness. 
Behind this, at the distance of six hundred 
feet, was another rampart, somewhat lower 
than the former, and fronting the contrary 
way. Cffisar, apprehending an attack from 
the sea, had raised this double rampart, some 
days before, that he might be able to defend 
himself against the enemy, should they charge 
him on both sides at once. But the extent of 
the circumvallation, and the continued labour 
of so many days, in inclosing a space of 
eighteen miles, had not allowed us time to 
finish the work. Accordingly, the line of com- 
munication, which ran along the sea-side, 
and was to have joined these two ramparts, 
was not yet completed. This Pompey was in- 
formed of by the Allobrogian brothers, which 
proved of fatal consequence to us. For 



while some cohorts of the ninth legion were 
upon guard, near the sea, suddenly the Pom- 
pcians arrived about day-break, and surprised 
them with their unexpected appearance. At 
the same time the troops that came by sea, 
launched their darts against the outward 
rampart and began to fill up the ditch with 
fascines ; while the legionary soldiers, planting 
their scaling-ladders against the inner works, 
and plying those that defended them with 
darts and engines, spread a general terror 
over that part of the camp, which was still 
increased by the multitude of archers that 
came pouring upon them from all sides. The 
osiers they had bound round their helmets, 
contributed greatly to defend them from the 
stones thrown down from the rampart, which 
were the only weapons we had. At last, all 
things going against us, and our resistance 
becoming every moment more languid, the 
enemy discovered the defect before spoken of 
in our lines ; and landing their men between 
the two ramparts, where the line of commu- 
nication towards the sea remained unfinished, 
they attacked our soldiers in the rear, and 
obliged them to abandon both sides of the 
works. 

LIV. Marcellinus hearing of this disorder, 
detached some cohorts to sustain the flying 
troops : but as the rout was becoming general, 
they could neither persuade them to rally, nor 
were able themselves to withstand the enemy's 
charge. The like happened to a second de- 
tachment ; insomuch that the several supplies 
sent, by catching the general terror, served 
only to add to the confusion and danger ; for 
the multitude of runaways rendered the retreat 
the more difficult. In this action, the eagle- 
bearer of the ninth legion finding himself 
dangerously wounded, and that his strength 
began to fail, called to some troopers who 
passed by, and said : " I have preserved to 
the last moment of my life, with the greatest 
care, this eagle, with which I have been in- 
trusted ; and, now I am dying, I return it to 
Csesar, with the same fidelity. Carry it to 
him, I beseech you: nor suffer Csesar's arm-s 
to experience, in losing it, an ignominy, with 
which they have been hitherto unacquainted." 
Thus the eagle was preserved ; but all the 
centurions of the first cohort were slain, ex- 
cept the first of the Principes. 

LV. And now the Pompeians, having 
made great slaughter of our men, approached 



COMMENTARIES. 



271 



the quarters of Marcellinus, to the no small 
terror of the rest of the cohorts ; when Mark 
Antony, who commanded in the nearer re- 
doubts, upon notice of what passed, was seen 
descending from the higher ground, at the head 
of twelve cohorts. His arrival put a stop to the 
enemy's progress, and by enabling our men to 
recover from their extreme terror, restored them 
to their wonted courage. Soon after Cajsar ar- 
rived in person, with some troops, being ap- 
prised of the attack by the smoke of the forts, 
the usual signal on these occasions; and per- 
ceiving the loss he had sustained, and that 
Pompey had forced the lines, being able to 
forage, and having an easy communication 
with the sea ; he quitted his former project, 
which had proved unsuccessful, and encamp- 
ed as near Pompey as he could. 

LVI. When the intrenchments were finish- 
ed, Cfesar had notice from his scouts, that a 
certain number of the enemy's cohorts, which 
to them appeared a complete legion, were re- 
tired behind a wood, and seemed to be on 
their march to the old camp. The situation of 
the two armies was this : some days before, 
when Cffisar's ninth legion was sent to oppose 
a body of Pompcy's troops, they thought pro- 
per to intrench themselves upon an opposite 
hill, and form a camp there. This camp bor- 
dered upon a wood, and was not above four 
hundred paces from the sea. But afterwards, 
for certain reasons, Caesar removed a little be- 
yond that post ; and Pompey, a few days after, 
took possession of it. But as his design was 
to place several legions there ; leaving the 
inner rampart standing, he surrounded it with 
greater works. Thus the smaller camp, in- 
closed within one of larger circumference, 
served by way of a castle or citadel. He like- 
wise carried an intrenchment from the left 
angle of the camp to the river, through a space 
of about four hundred paces, which enabled 
him to water freely and without clanger. 
But he too, soon after, changed his mind, for 
reasons which it is not needful to repeat here ; 
and abandoned the place, which thereby was 
left several days without troops, though the 
fortifications remained entire. Hither the 
scouts reported they saw the standard of a 
legion carried which was likewise confirmed 
by those who were stationed in the higher 
forts. The place was about five hundred 
paces distant from Pompey's new camp. 
Cffisar, desirous to repair the loss he had sus- 



tained, and hoping he might be able to sur- 
prise this legion, left two cohorts in his in- 
trenchments, to prevent any suspicion of his 
design ; and with thirty-three more, amongst 
which number was the ninth legion, which 
had lost many centurions and soldiers, march- 
ed by a diflerentroute, as privately as he could, 
against the legion which Pompey had lodged 
in the lesser camp. Neither was he deceived 
in his first conjecture : for he arrived before 
Pompey could have notice of his design ; and 
though the intrenchments were strong, yet 
charging the enemy briskly with his left wing, 
where he himself commanded in person, he 
quickly drove them from the rampart. But 
as the gates were secured by a barricade, 
they still maintained the fight here for some 
time, our men endeavouring to break in, and 
the enemy to defend the camp. T. Pulcia, who 
betrayed the army of C. Antony, as we have 
related above, gave signal proofs of his valour 
on this occasion. But our men, at last, pre- 
vailed ; and having cut down the barricade, 
broke first into the greater camp, and after- 
wards into the fort within it, whither the le- 
gion had retired, some of whom were slain, en- 
deavouring to defend themselves. 

LVn. But fortune, whose influence is very 
great, as in other things, so particularly in 
war ; often effects mighty changes from the 
most trifling causes: as happened upon this 
occasion. For the cohorts of Cresar's right 
wing being unacquainted with the situation 
of the camp, and mistaking the rampart which 
led to the river for one of its sides, marched 
on that way in quest of a gate ; but perceiving 
at length their error, and that nobody defend- 
ed the intrenchment, they immediately mount- 
ed the rampart, and were followed by the 
v/hole cavalry. This delay saved the enemy ; 
for Pompey, having notice of what passed, 
brought up the fifth legion to sustain his 
party ; so that at one and the same instant, 
his cavalry approached ours, and his troops 
were seen advancing in order of battle, by 
those who had taken possession of the camp : 
which quicklj' changed the face of affairs. 
For Pompey's legion, encouraged by the hope 
of speedy succours, sallied by the Decuman 
port, and briskly charged our cohorts. On 
the other hand, Cassar's cavalry, who had en- 
tered, by a narrow breach in the rampart, fore- 
seeing that a retreat would be extremely diffi- 
cult, began betimes to think of flying. The right 



272 



CiESAR'S 



wing, which had no communication with the 
left, observing the consternation of the cavalry, 
and fearing they should be overpowered within 
the camp, retired the same way they had en- 
tered. Many, to avoid being engaged in the nar- 
row passes, threw themselves from the ram- 
part, which was ten feet high, into the ditch ; 
where the first ranks being trodden to death, 
their bodies afforded a safe passage to those 
that followed. The left wing, who from the 
rampart whence they had driven the enemy, 
saw Pompey advancing against them, and 
their own men flying ; fearing to be entangled 
in the defiles, as they had the enemy upon 
them, both within and without the camp, re- 
treated the same way they came. Nothing was 
to be seen but consternation, flying, and dis- 
order : insomuch that all Caesar's efforts to ral- 
ly his troops were fruitless. If he seized any 
by the arm, they struggled till they got away. 
If he laid hold of the colours, they left them in 
his hands. Not a man could be prevailed on to 
face about. 

LVIII. In this calamity, what saved the ar- 
my from entire destruction was, that Pompey, 
apprehending an ambuscade, (probably because 
the success was beyond his hopes, as a little 
before he had seen his men worsted and put to 
flight,) durst not, for some time, approach the 
intrenchments ; and his cavalry were retarded 
in the pursuit by Csesar's troops, who were 
possessed of all the gates and defiles. Be that 
as it will, a small matter proved of very great 
consequence to both parties : for the intrench- 
ment between the camp and the river, stopped 
the course of Ceesar's victory, when he had al- 
ready forced Pompey's lines : and the same, by 
retarding the pursuit of his enemy, saved the 
army from destruction. 

LIX. In these two actions, Cssar lost nine 
hundred and sixty private men, thirty officers, 
and several knights of note, as Flavius Tuti- 
canus Gallus, a senator's son ; C. Felginus, 
of Placentia ; A. Gravius, of PuteoU ; and M. 
Sacrativir, of Capua. But the greatest part 
of these died without wounds, being trodden 
to death in the ditch, about the works, and on 
the banks of the river, occasioned by the flight 
and terror of their own men. He lost also 
thirty-two colours. Pompey was saluted em- 
peror on this occasion ; a title which he bore 
ever after, and suffered himself to be accosted 
by : but neither in the letters which he wrote, 



proper to assume the laurel. The prisoneis 
were delivered up to Labienus at his own 
request; and this deserter, brutal and cru- 
el as usual, diverted himself with insulting: 
them in their calamity ; and asked them sar 
casticaliy, if it was usual for veterans to run 
away ; after which, he caused them all to be 
put to death. 

LX. This success gave such confidence 
and spirit to the Pompeian party, that they 
now no longer took any concern about the 
conduct of the war, but began to consider 
themselves as already victorious. They never 
reflected on the inconsiderable number of our 
troops, the disadvantage of the ground, the 
narrow passes we were engaged in, by their 
having first possession of the camp, the double 
danger, both within and without the fortifica- 
tion, and the separation of the two wings of 
the army, which hindered them from mutually 
succouring one another. They forgot that 
the advantage they had gained, was not the 
effect of a brisk and vigorous attack; and that 
our men had suffered more by crowding upon 
one another in the narrow passes, than by the 
sword of the enemy. In fine, they never call- 
ed to mind the uncertain chance of war, and 
upon what minute causes good or bad success 
often depends ; how a groundless suspicion, a 
panic terror, or a religious scruple, has fre- 
quently been productive of the most fatal 
events ; when either by the misconduct of a 
general, or the terror of a tribune, some false 
persuasion has been suffered to take root in an 
army. But as if the victory had been purely 
the effect of their valour, and no change of 
fortune was to be apprehended, they every 
where proclaimed and made public the success 
of this day. 

LXI. Cffisar, seeing all his former projects 
disconcerted, resolved to submit to fortune, 
and entirely change the manner of the war. 
He therefore called in all his forces from the 
forts, gave up the design of inclosing Pompey, 
and having assembled his army, addressed 
them as follows : " That they ought not to be 
discouraged, or give way to consternation, upon 
what had lately happened, but oppose their 
many successful engagements to one slight 
and inconsiderable check. That fortune had 
already befiiended them greatly, in the re- 
duction of Italy without bloodshed ; in the 
conquest of the two Spains, though defended 



nor in his consular ensigns, did he think [ by warlike troops, under the conduct of skil- 



COMMENTARIES. 



273 



ful and experienced leaders ; and in the sub- 
jection of the neighbouring provinces, whence 
they could be plentifully supplied with corn. 
In fine, they ought to call to mind, how hap- 
pily they had passed into Greece, through the 
midst of the enemy's fleets, though possessed 
of all the coasts and havens. If they were 
not successful in every thing, they must en- 
deavour, by prudence, to overcome the disap- 
pointments of fortune ; and attribute their late 
disaster to the caprice of that goddess rather 
than to any fault on their side. That he had 
led them to an advantageous ground, and put 
them in the possession of the enemy's camp, 
after driving them from all their works. If 
either some sudden consternation, the mistak- 
ing their way, or any other mishap, had 
snatched an apparent and almost certain victo- 
ry out of their hands, they ought to exert their 
utmost endeavours to repair that disgrace, 
which would turn their misfortune to a bene- 
fit, as happened at Gergovia, where those who 
at first dreaded to encounter the enemy, de- 
manded earnestly in the end to be led to 
battle." Having made this speech, he con- 
tented himself with stigmatizing, and reducing 
to private men, some of the standard bearers ; 
for the whole army were so grieved at their 
loss, and so desirous of expunging the stain 
their glory had received, that there was no 
occasion either for the tribunes or the centu- 
rions to remind them of their dnty; nay, they 
even undertook to punish themselves by the 
severest impositions, and demanded with great 
outcries to be led against the enemy ; being 
seconded by some centurions of the first rank, 
who, touched with their remonstrances, were 
for continuing in the post they then possessed, 
and putting all to the hazard of a battle. But 
Caesar did not think it prudent to expose to 
an action troops that had been just worsted, 
and in whom might remain too deep impres- 
sions of their late fright. He was for allow- 
ing them time to recover themselves ; and 
having quitted his works, thought it needful 
to provide for the security of his convoys. 

LXII. Accordingly, after proper care 
taken of the sick and wounded, and as soon as 
night approached, he sent all the baggage 
privately towards Apollonia, under a guard 
of one legion, with orders not to halt till they 
had reached the place. This affair despatch- 
ed, he made two legions remain in the camp, 
and marching out all the rest about three in 
24* 



the morning at several gates, ordered them to 
follow the same route the baggage had taken. 
Soon after, that this departure might not have 
the appearance of a flight, and yet be known 
to the enemy as late as possible, be ordered 
the usual signal to be given, and setting out 
with the rest of his forces, lost sight of the 
camp in a moment. Pompey hearing of his 
retreat, prepared to follow him without delay, 
and hoping to surprise the army in its march, 
whilst encumbered with baggage, and not yet 
recovered from its consternation, drew out all 
his troops, and sent out all his cavalry before 
to retard our rear, which, however, he could 
not overtake, because Ccesar marching without 
baggage, had got a great way before him. But 
when we came to the river Genusus, we found 
the banks so steep and difiicult. that before all 
the men could get over, Pompey's cavalry 
came up, and fell upon our hindmost batta- 
lions. Caesar sent his horse to oppose them, 
intermixed with some light-armed troops ; 
who charged with that vigour and success, 
as to put them all to rout, and leave a con- 
siderable number dead upon the field, and 
return without loss to the main body of their 
army, 

LXIII, Having completed the intended 
march of that day, and brought his army over 
the Genusus, he took up his quarters in his 
old camp at Asparagium, suffering none of the 
soldiers to stroll without the rampart, and 
charging the cavalry, who had been sent out 
under pretence of foraging, to return imme- 
diately to the Decuman port. Pompey like- 
wise having completed that day's march, 
encamped at his old post at Asparagium, 
where the troops having nothing to do, be- 
cause the works were still entire ; some made 
long excursions in quest of wood and forage; 
others who had come almost without any bag- 
gage, by reason the march was undertaken 
on a sudden, enticed by the nearness of their 
former camp, laid down their arms in their 
tents, quitted the intrenchments, and went to 
fetch what they had left behind them. This 
rendering them unable to pursue, as Ccesar 
had foreseen ; about noon, he gave the signal 
for decamping, led forth his troops, and 
doubling that day's march, gained eight miles 
upon Pompey, who could not follow him by 
reason his troops were dispersed. 

LXIV. Next day Csesar decamped agam 
at three in the morning, having sent away his 
2N 



274 



C iE S A R ' S 



baggage over night, that if he should find 
himself under a necessity of fighting, he 
might have his army clear of all encumbrance. 
The same he did the following days ; by which 
means, though he had very difficult ways to 
pass, and some great rivers to cross, he suf- 
fered no loss during the whole march. For 
Pompey, after the first day's hinderance, 
endeavouring in vain by long and forced mar- 
ches to overtake Csesar, gave over the pursuit 
on the fourth, and began to think of taking 
other measures, 

LXV. Csesar was under a necessity of 
going to ApoUonia, to leave his wounded 
there, to piy his army, confirm his friends in 
their duty, and garrison the towns that had 
submitted. But he took no longer time to 
these affairs, than the importance of his other 
engagements would allow. For fearing that 
Pompey might surprise Domitius Calvinus, he 
put himself in full march to join him. The 
scheme he proceeded on was this : that if 
Pompey took the same route, he must leave 
the sea, the forces he had at Dyrrhachium, 
with all his ammunition and provision ; which 
would bring them upon equal terms ; if he 
passed into Italy, Ceesar purposed to join 
Domitius, and march to its defence by the 
coast of lUyricum ; in fine, should he fall upon 
Apollonia and Oricum, and endeavour to 
exclude him from the sea coast ; in that case 
he reckoned to oblige him, by attacking Metel- 
lus Scipio, to leave every thing to succour him. 
Caesar therefore despatched couriers to Do- 
mitius, to acquaint him with his design ; 
and leaving four cohorts at Apollonia, one 
at Lissus, and three at Oricum, with the sick 
and wounded, began his march through 
Epirus and Acarnania. Pompey, on his side, 
guessing Caesar's design, made what haste he 
could to join Scipio, that if Caesar should 
march that way, he might prevent his being 
overpowered ; but should he still keep near 
Corcyra, and the sea, because of the legions 
and cavalry he expected from Italy ; in that 
case, he purposed to fall upon Domitius with 
all his forces. 

LXVI. For these reasons both generals 
studied despatch, as well to aflford timely 
succour to their friends, as not to miss an op- 
portunity of distressing their enemies. But 
Csesar had turned off to Apollonia ; whereas 
Pompey took the nearest way through Can- 
davia for Macedonia. It happened, too, very 



unfortunately, that Domitius, who for several 
days had been encamped near Scipio, quitted 
that station for the convenience of provisions, 
and was upon his march to Heraclea Sentica, 
a city of the Candavians ; so that chance 
seemed to throw him directly in Pompey's 
way, which Cajsar had not then the least 
knowledge of. Pompey, too, having sent 
letters through all the states and provinces, 
relating to the action at Dyrrhachium, with 
representations that far exceeded the truth ; a 
rumour began to prevail, that Cssar had been 
defeated with the loss of almost all his forces, 
and was forced to fly before Pompey. These 
reports raised him many enemies on his march, 
and induced some states to throw off their 
allegiance ; whence it happened, that the 
couriers mutually sent by Caesar and Domitius, 
were all intercepted. But the Allobrogians 
in the train of ^gus and Roscillus, who, as 
we have seen before, had deserted from Cffisar 
to Pompey, meeting some of Domitius's scouts ; 
either out of ancient custom, because they had 
served together in the Gallic wars ; or from' 
a motive of vain-glory; informed them of all 
that had passed ; of Pompey's victory, and 
Caesar's retreat. Advice being given of this 
to Calvinus, who was not above four hours' 
march from the enemy, he avoided the danger 
by a timely retreat, and joined Caesar near 
^ginium, a town on the borders of Thessaly. 
LXVII. After the junction of the two 
armies, Caesar arrived at Gomphi, the first 
town of Thessaly, as you come from Epirus. 
A few months before, the inhabitants had of 
their own accord sent ambassadors to Caesar, 
to make an offer of what their country afford- 
ed, and petition for a garrison. But the re- 
port of the action at Dyrrhachium, with many 
groundless additions, had by this time reached 
their ears. And therefore Androsthenes, 
pretor of Thessaly, choosing rather to be the 
companion of Pompey's good fortune, than as- 
sociate with Caesar in his adversity, ordered all 
the people, whether slaves or free, to assemble 
in the town ; and having shut the gates against 
Caesar, sent letters to Scipio and Pompey to 
come to his assistance, intimating, " That the 
town was strong enough to hold out if they 
used despatch, but by no means in condition 
to sustain a long siege." Scipio, on advice of 
the departure of the armies from Dyrrhachium, 
was come to Larissa with his legions ; and 
Pompey was yet far enough distant from 



COMMENTARIES. 



275 



Thessaly. Caesar having fortified his camp, or- 
dered mantelets, hurdles, and scaling-ladders to 
be prepared for a sudden attack ; and then ex- 
horting his men, represented, " Of how great 
consequence it was to render themselves mas- 
ters of an opulent city, abounding in all things 
needful for the supply of their wants, and 
by the terror of whose punishment other states 
would be awed into submission; and this, he 
told them, must be done quickly, before any 
succours could arrive." Accordingly, seizing 
the opportunity offered by the uncommon ar- 
dour of the troops, he attacked the town the 
same day about three in the afternoon ; and 
having made himself master of it before sun- 
set, gave it up to be plundered. From Gomphi, 
CcEsar marched directly to Metropolis, and ar- 
rived before they were acquainted with the 
misfortune of their neighbours. 

LXVIII. The Metropolitans at first fol- 
lowing the example of Gomphi, to which they 
were moved by the same reports, shut their 
gates and manned the walls. But no sooner 
came they to understand the fate of their 
neighbour city, by some prisoners whom Cae- 
sar had produced for that end, than imme- 
diately they admitted him into the town. He 
suffered no hostilities to be committed, nor any 
harm to be done them ; and so powerful was 
the example from the different treatment of 
these two cities, that not a single state in 
Thessaly refused to submit to Caesar, and re- 
ceived his orders, except Larissa ; which was 
awed by the numerous army of Metellus Sci- 
pio. As the country was good and covered with 
corn, which was near ripe, Caasar took up 
quarters there, judging it a proper place to 
wait for Pompey in, and render the theatre of 
the war. 

LXIX. A few days after, Pompey arrived 
in Thessaly, and joining Metellus Scipio, ha- 
rangued both armies. He first thanked his 
own for their late services, and then turning 
to Scipio's troops, exhorted them to put in for 
their share of the booty, which the victory 
already obtained gave them the fairest pros- 
pect of. Both armies being received into one 
camp, he shared all the honours of command 
with Scipio, ordered a pavilion to be erected 
for him, and the trumpets to sound before it. 
This increase of Pompey's forces, by the con- 
junction of two mighty armies, raised the con- 
fidence of his followers, and their assurance of 
victory to such a degree, that all delays were 



considered as a hinderance of their return to 
Italy ; insomuch that if Pompey on any occa- 
sion acted with slowness and circumspection, 
they failed not to cry out, " That he indus- 
triously protracted an affair, for the despatch 
of which one day was sufficient, in the view of 
gratifying his ambition for command, and hav- 
ing consular and pretorian senators amongst 
the number of his servants." Already they 
began to dispute about rewards and dignities, 
and fixed upon the persons who were annually 
to succeed to the consulship. Others sued 
for the houses and estates of those who had 
followed Caesar's party. A warm debate 
arose in council in relation to L. Hirrus, 
whom Pompey had sent against the Parthians, 
whether, in the next election of pretors, he 
should be allowed to stand candidate for that 
office in his absence ; his friends imploring 
Pompey to make good the promise he had made 
him at his departure, and not suffer him to be 
deceived by depending on the general's honour ; 
while such as aspired to this office complain- 
ed publicly, that a promise should be made 
to any one candidate, when all were embarked 
in the same cause, and shared the like dan- 
gers. Already Domitius, Scipio, and Lentu- 
lus Spinther, were openly quarrelling about 
the high priesthood, which Caesar was in pos- 
session of. They even descended to personal 
abuse ; and pleaded their several pretensions ; 
Lentulus urging the respect due to his age; 
Domitius, his dignity, and the interest he had 
in the city ; a nd Scipio his alliance with Pom- 
pey. Attius Rufus impeached L. Afranius 
hi^before Pompey, charging him with having 
occasioned the loss of the army in Spain. 
And L. Domitius moved in council, that after 
the victory, all the senators in Pompey's 
army and camps, should be appointed judges, 
and empowered to proceed against those who 
had stayed in Italy, or who had appeared 
cool, or shown any indifference to the cause ; 
and that three billets should be given to these 
judges, one for acquittance, another for 
condemnation, and a third for a pecuniary 
fine. In a word, nothing was thought on but 
honours, or profit, or vengeance; nor did they 
consider by what methods they were to con- 
quer, but what advantage they should make 
of victory. 

LXX. Caesar having provided for the sub- 
sistence of his troops, who were now no longer 
fatigued, and had sufficiently recovered from 



376 



CiESAR'S 



the consternation the different actions at Dyr- 
rhachiura had thrown them into; thought it 
high time to make trial how Pompey stood 
affected to an engagement. Accordingly he 
drew out his men, and formed them in order 
of battle ; at first near his own camp, and some- 
what distant from the enemy: but perceiving 
this had no effect upon Pompey, who still 
maintained his post on the eminences, he each 
day drew nearer, and by that conduct animated 
and gave fresh courage to his soldiers. His 
cavalry being much inferior to the enemy's in 
number, he followed the method already men- 
tioned ; of singling out the strongest and nim- 
blest of his foot-soldiers, and accustoming 
them to fight intermixed with the horse ; in 
which way of combat they were become very 
expert by daily practice. This disposition, 
joined to constant exercise, so emboldened 
his cavalry, that though but a thousand in num- 
ber, they would upon occasion sustain the 
charge of Pompey's seven thousand, even in 
an open plain, and appear not greatly dismay- 
ed at their multitude: nay, they actually got 
the better in a skirmish that happened be- 
tween them, and killed JEgus the Allobrogian, 
one of the two brothers who deserted to Pom- 
pey, with several others of his party. 

LXXI. Pompey, whose camp was on an 
eminence, drew up his army at the foot of the 
mountain, expecting, as may be presumed,that 
CsBsar would attack him in that advantageous 
situation. But Csesar despairing to draw 
Pompey to battle on equal terms, thought it 
would be his best course to decamp, and be 
always on the march ; in liopes, that by fre- 
quent shifting his ground, he might the better 
be supplied with provisions ; and that as the 
enemy would not fail following him, in the 
frequent marches he should make, he might 
perhaps find an opportunity of attacking them, 
and forcing them to fight : at least he was sure 
of harassing Pompey's army, little accustom- 
ed to these continued fatigues. Accordingly 
the order for marching was given, and the 
tents struck ; when Csesar perceived that 
Pompey's army, which had quitted their in. 
trenchments, had advanced farther towards 
the plain than usual, so that he might engage 
them at a less disadvantage : whereupon, ad- 
dressing himself to his soldiers, who were just 
ready to march out of their trenches : " Let 
us no longer think," says he, " of marching; 
now is the time for fighting, so long wished 
for ; let us therefore arm ourselves with cour- 



age, and not miss so favourable an opportunity." 
This said, he immediately drew out his forces. 
LXXII. Pompey likewise, as was after- 
wards known, had resolved to offer battle, in 
compliance with the repeated importunities 
of his friends. He even said in a council of 
war held some days before, that Cassar's army 
would be defeated before his infantry came 
to engage. And when some expressed their 
surprise at this speech : " I know," says he, 
" that what I promise appears almost incredi- 
ble ; but hear the reasons on which I ground my 
confidence, that you may advance to battle 
with the greater assurance. I have persuad- 
ed the cavalry, and obtained their promise for 
the performance, that as soon as the armies 
are formed, they shall fall upon Caesar's right 
wing, which they will easily be able to out- 
flank and surround. This must infallibly oc- 
casion the immediate rout of that wing, and 
consequently of the rest of Caesar's troops, 
without danger or loss on our side. Nor will 
the execution be attended with any difficulty, 
as we are so much superior to them in horse. 
Be read}' therefore for battle ; and since the 
so much desired opportunity of fighting is 
come, take care not to fall short of the good 
opinion the world entertains of your valour 
and experience." Labienus spoke next, high- 
ly applauding this scheme of Pompey, and ex- 
pressing the greatest contempt of Caesar's 
army ; '' Think not," says he, addressing him- 
self to Pompey, " that these are the legions 
which conquered Gaul and Germany. I was 
present in all those battles, and can, of my 
own knowledge, affirm, that but a very small 
part of that army now remains : great numbers 
have been killed, as must of necessity happen, 
in such a variety of conflicts : many perished 
during the autumnal pestilence in Apulia: 
many are returned to their own habitations : 
and not a few were left behind to guard Italy. 
Have you not heard, that the cohorts in gar- 
rison, at Brundusium, are made up of invalids 1 
The forces, which you now behold, are com- 
posed of new levies, raised in Lombardy, and 
the colonies beyond the Po: for the veterans, 
in whom consisted the main strength of the 
army, perished all in the two defeats at Dyrrha- 
chium." Having finished this speech, he took 
an oath, which he proffered to all that were 
present, never to return to camp otherwise than 
victorious. Pompey commended his zeal, took 
the oath himself, and the rest followed his ex- 
ample, without hesitation. After these en- 



COMMENTARIES, 



277 



gagements, taken publicly in council, they all 
departed, full of joy and expectation ; con- 
sidering themselves as already victorious, and 
relying entirely on the ability of their general ; 
who, in an aflair of that importance, they were 
confident would promise nothing without an 
assurance of success. 

LXXIII. When Caesar approached Pom- 
pey's camp, he found his army drawn up in 
this manner : In the left wing were the two 
legions delivered by Csesar, at the beginning 
of the quarrel, in consequence of a decree of 
the senate; one of which was called the first, 
the other the third legion ; and here Pompey 
commanded in person. Scipio was in the 
centre, with the legions he had brought out of 
Syria. The Cilician legion, joined to the 
Spanish cohorts, brought over by Afranius, 
formed the right wing. These Pompey es- 
teemed his best troops, distributing the less 
expert between the wings and the main body. 
He had in all a hundred and ten cohorts, 
amounting to five and forty thousand ; besides 
two cohorts of volunteers, who had served 
under him in former wars ; and who, out of 
affection to their old general, though their le- 
gal time was expired, flocked to his standard 
on this occasion, and were dispersed amongst 
the whole army. His other seven cohorts were 
left to guard the camp and the adjoining forts. 
As the Enipeus, a river with very steep banks, 
covered his right wing, he placed all his horse, 
slingers, and archers in the left. 

LXXIV. Caesar observing his ancient cus- 
tom, placed the tenth legion in the right, and 
the ninth in the left wing. As this last had 
been considerably weakened by the general 
actions at Dyrrhachium, he joined the eighth 
to it in such manner, that they formed as it 
were but one legion, and had orders mutually 
to relieve each other. His whole army 
amounted to fourscore cohorts, making in all 
twenty-two thousamd men ; besides two co- 
horts left to guard the camp. Domitius Cal- 
vinus was in the centre, Mark Antony on the 
left, and P. Sylla on the right. Csesar took 
his post opposite to Pompey, at the head of the 
tenth legion. And as he had observed the 
disposition of the enemy contrived to out- 
flank his right wing, to obviate that inconve- 
nience, he made a draught of six cohorts from 
his rear line, formed them into a separate 
body, and opposed them to Pompey's horse ; 
instructing them in the part they were to act ; 



and admonishing them, that the success of that 
day would depend chiefly on their courage. At 
the same time, he charged the whole army, and 
in particular the third line, not to advance to bat- 
tle without orders ; which, when he saw it pro- 
per, he would give, by making the usual signal. 

LXXV. When he was exhorting them to 
battle, as military custom required, and re- 
minding them of the many favours they had, 
on all occasions, received at his hands, he 
chiefly took care to observe, " That they had 
themselves been witnesses of his earnest en- 
deavours after peace ; that he had employed 
Vatinius to solicit a conference with Labienus, 
and sent A. Clodius to treat with Scipio ; that 
he had pressed Libo, in the warmest manner, 
at Oricum, to grant him a safe conduct for his 
ambassadors ; in a word, that he had left 
nothing unattempted to avoid wasting the 
blood of his soldiers, and to spare the common- 
wealth the loss of one of her armies," After 
this speech, observing his soldiers ardent for 
the fight, he ordered the trumpets to sound a 
charge. Among the volunteers in Caesar's 
army was one Crastinus, a man of distinguished 
courage, who the year before, had been first 
centurion of the tenth legion. This brave 
officer, as soon as the signal was given, calling 
to those next him ; " Follow me," said he, 
"you that were formerly under my command, 
and acquit yourselves of the duty you owe to 
your general. This one battle more will 
crown the work, by restoring him to his proper 
dignity, and us to the enjoyment of our 
freedom," At the same time, turning to 
Ca;sar : " General," says he, " this day you shall 
be satisfied with my behaviour, and whether 
I live or die, I will take care to deserve your 
commendations." So saying he marched up 
to the enemy, and began the attack at the head 
of a hundred and twenty volunteers, 

LXXVI. Between the two armies, there 
was an interval sufficient for the onset : but 
Pompey had given his troops orders to keep 
their ground, that Cassar's army might have 
all that way to run. This he is said to have 
done by the advice of C. Triarius, that the 
enemy's ranks might be broken and themselves 
put out of breath, by having so far to run ; of 
which disorder he hoped to make an advantage. 
He was besides of opinion, that our javelins 
would have less effect, by the troops continu- 
ing in their post, than if they sprung for- 
ward at the very time they were launched ; 



278 



CtESAR'S 



and as the soldiers would have twice as far to 
run as usual, they must be weary and breath- 
less by the time they came up with the first 
line. But herein Pompey seems to have acted 
without sufficient reason ; because there is a 
certain alacrity and ardour of mind, naturally 
planted in every man, which is inflamed by 
the desire of fighting ; and which an able ge- 
neral, far from endeavouring to repress, will, 
by all methods he can devise, foment and 
cherish. Nor was it a vain institution of our 
ancestors, that the trumpets should sound on 
every side, and the whole army raise a shout, 
in order to animate the courage of their own 
men, and strike terror into the enemy. Gas- 
sar's soldiers entirely defeated Pompey's 
hopes, by their good discipline and experience. 
For, perceiving the enemy did not stir^ they 
halted, of their own accord, in the midst of 
their career ; and having taken a moment's 
breath, put themselves, a second time, in mo- 
tion, marched up in good order, flung their 
javelins, and then betook themselves to their 
swords. Nor did Pompey's men act with less 
presence of mind ; for they sustained our at- 
tack, kept their ranks, bore the discharge of 
our darts ; and having launched their own, 
immediately had recourse to their swords. At 
this instant, Pompey's horse, accompanied by 
the archers and slingers, attacked Csesar's ; 
and having compelled them to give ground, 
began to extend themselves to the left, in 
order to flank the infantry. Whereupon Caesar 
gave the appointed signal to the six cohorts, 
who fell on the enemy's horse with such fury, 
that they not only drove them from the field of 
battle, but even compelled them to seek refuge 
in the highest mountains. The archers and 
slingers, deprived of their protection, were 
soon after cut to pieces. Meanwhile the six 
cohorts, not content with this success, wheeled 
round upon the enemy's left wing, and be- 
gan to charge it in the rear: whereupon 
Caesar, perceiving the victory so far advanced, 
to complete it, brought up his third line, 
which till then had not engaged. Pompey's 
infantry being thUs doubly attacked, in front 
by fresh troops, and in rear, by the victorious 
cohorts, could no longer resist, but fled to 
their camp. Nor was Cffisar mistaken in his 
conjecture, when, in exhorting his men, he de- 
clared that victory would depend chiefly on the 
six cohorts, which formed the body of reserve, 
and were stationed to oppose the enemy's 



horse ; for by them were their cavalry defeated, 
their archers and slingers cut to pieces, and 
their left wing surrounded and forced to 

fly- 

LXXVir. Pompey seeing his cavalry 
routed, and that part of the army on which 
he chiefly depended put into disorder, des- 
paired of being able to restore the battle, and 
quitted the field. Repairing immediately to 
his camp, he said aloud, to the centurions, who 
guarded the pretorian gate, so as all the 
soldiers might hear him : " Take care of the 
camp, and defend it vigorously in case of an 
attack. I go to visit the other gates, and 
give orders for their defence." This said, he 
retired to his tent, despairing of success, yet 
waiting the event. Ctesar having forced the 
Pompeians to seek refuge in their camp, and 
not willing to allow them time to recover 
from their consternation, exhorted his troops 
to make the best of their present victory, and 
vigorously attack the enemy's intrenchments. 
Though the battle had lasted till noon, the 
weather being extremely hot ; yet, prepared 
to encounter all difficulties, they cheerfully 
complied with his orders. The camp was 
bravely defended, for some time, by the co- 
horts left to guard it ; and particularly by a 
great number of Thracians, and other bar- 
barians, who made a very stout resistance ; for 
as to such troops as had there sought refuge 
from the field of battle, they were in too great 
a consternation to think of any thing more 
than a safe retreat. It was not, however, pos- 
sible for the troops posted on the rampart, 
long to stand the multitude of darts continually 
poured upon them ; which, in the end, obliged 
them to retire covered with wounds, and under 
the conduct of their tribunes and centurions, 
seek shelter in the mountains adjoining to the 
camp. 

LXXVIII. On entering Pompey's camp, ^ 
we found tables ready-covered, sideboards 
loaded with plate, and tents adorned with 
branches of myrtle ; that of L. Lentulus, 
with some others, was shaded with ivy. Every 
thing gave proofs of the highest luxury, and 
an assured expectation of victory ; whence 
it vsras easy to see, that they little dreamed of 
the issue of that day, since, intent only on 
voluptuous refinements, they pretended, with 
troops immersed in luxury, to oppose Caesar's 
army accustomed to fatigue, and inured to the 
want of necessaries. 



COMMENTARIES. 



279 



LXXXI. Pompey finding our men had 
forced his intrenchments, mounted his horse, 
quitted his armour for a habit more suitable 
to his ill fortune, and withdrawing by the 
Decuman port, rode full speed to Larissa. 
Nor did he stop there ; but continuing his 
flight day and night, without intermission, he 
arrived at the sea-side, with thirty horse, and 
went on board a little bark ; often complaining, 
" That he had been so far deceived in his 
opinion of his followers, as to see those very 
men, from whom he expected victory, the first 
to fly, and in a manner betray him into the 
hands of his enemies." 

LXXX. CiEsar having mastered the ene- 
my's camp, requested his soldiers not to leave 
the victory imperfect, by busying themselves 
about the plunder. Finding them ready to 
obey, he began a line of circumvallation round 
the mountain. The Pompeians quickly aban- 
doned a post, which, for want of water, was not 
tenable, and endeavoured to reach the city of 
Larissa : whereupon Caisar, dividing his army, 
left one part in Pompey's camp, sent back 
another to his own camp, and having, with 
four legions, taken a nearer road than that 
by which the enemy passed, he found means 
to intercept them, and, after six miles march, 
drew up in order of battle. But the Pom- 
peians once more found protection from a 
mountain, at the foot of which ran a rivulet. 
Though Caesar's troops were greatly fatigued, 
by fighting the whole day, before night he 
had flung up some works, sufficient to pre- 
vent the enemy from having any communi- 
cation with the rivulet. As by this step 
they were cut off from all hopes of relief, or 
of escaping, they sent deputies to treat about 
a surrender. Aff'airs continued in this situa- 
tion all that night, of which some few sena- 
tors, who had accompanied them, took the 
advantage to make their escape. At break of 
day, they all, by Ccesar's order, came down 
into the plain, and delivered up their arms ; 
humbly imploring his goodness, and suing for 
mercy. Caesar spoke to them with great 
mildness, and to alleviate their apprehensions, 
cited various instances of his clemency, which 
he had, on so many occasions, made evident. 
In fact, he gave them their lives, and forbade 
his soldiers to offer them any violence, or to 
take any thing from them. He then sent for 
the legions, which had passed the night in 
camp, to relieve those that had accompanied 



him in the pursuit ; and being determined to 
follow Pompey, began his march, and arrived 
the same day at Larissa. 

LXXXI. This battle cost Cfesar no more 
than two hundred soldiers : but he lost thirty 
centurions, men of singular courage. Among 
these latter was Crastinus, whose gallantry 
and intrepidity, in marching up to battle, has 
been taken notice of. This brave officer, 
fighting, regardless of danger, received a 
wound in the mouth, from a sword. Nor was 
he deceived in promising himself Caesar's ap- 
probation, who was thoroughly sensible of his 
merit, and greatly applauded his behaviour in 
this action. On Pompey's side, there fell 
about fifteen thousand : but upwards of four 
and twenty thousand were taken prisoners : 
for the cohorts that guarded the forts, sur- 
rendered to Sylla ; though many escaped into 
the adjacent countries. One hundred and 
eighty colours were taken, and nine eagles. 
L. Domitius, flying towards the mountains, 
and growing faint through the fatigue, was 
overtaken and killed by some horsemen. 

LXXXIL About this time D. Lajlius ar- 
rived with his fleet at Brundusium, and pos- 
sessed himself of the island over against the 
harbour, as Libo had done before. Vafinius, 
who commanded in the place, having equipped 
several boats, endeavoured to entice some of 
Lailius's ships within the haven, and took a 
five-benched galley, with two smaller vessels, 
that had ventured too far into the port ; then 
disposing his cavalry along the shore, he pre- 
vented the enemy from getting fresh water. 
But Lfelius having chosen a more convenient 
season of the year for sailing, brought water 
in transports from Corcyra and Dyrrhachium ; 
still keeping to his purpose, from which 
neither the disgrace of losing his ships nor 
the want of necessaries could divert him, 
till he received intelligence of the battle of 
Pharsalia. 

LXXXIIL Much about the same time Cas- 
sius arrived in Sicily, with the Syrian, Phoeni- 
cian, and Cilician fleets. And as Cresar's fleet 
was divided into two parts, in one of which P. 
Sulpicius the pretor commanded at Vibo, in 
the straits ; in the other M. Pomponius at 
Messana ; Cassius was arrived at Messana 
with his fleet before Pomponius had notice of 
his coming. And finding him unprepared, 
without guards, order, or discipline, he took 
the opportunity of a favourable wind, and 



280 



CESAR'S 



sent several fire-ships against him, which con- 
sumed his whole fleet, thirty-five in number, 
twenty of which were decked. The terror 
occasioned by this blow was so great, that 
though there was an entire legion in garrison 
at Messana, they durst scarce look the enemy 
in the face ; and would doubtless have de- 
livered up the town, had not the news of 
Cffisar's victory reached them, by means of 
the cavalry stationed along the coast. Cas- 
sius then sailed for Sulpicius's fleet at Vibo, 
which finding at anchor near the shore by 
reason the consternation was become general 
over the whole island ; he put the same 
stratagem in practice as before. For taking 
the advantage of a favourable wind, he made 
forty fire-ships advance against them, and 
the flame catching hold on both sides, 
quickly reduced five galleys to ashes. The 
conflagration continuing to spread, roused the 
indignation of some veteran soldiers, who 
had been left to guard the ships. Accordingly 
they went on board, weighed anchor, and, 
attacking the enemy, took two quinqueremes, 
in one of which was Cassius himself; but he 
escaped in a boat. Two three-benched galleys 
were sunic ; and soon after he was informed 
of the defeat at Pharsalia, by some of Ppmpey 's 
own followers ; for hitherto he had regarded 
it as a false report, spread about by Cesar's 
lieutenants and friends. Upon this intelligence 
he quitted Sicily, and retired with his fleet. 

LXXXIV. CsBsar laying all other thoughts 
aside, determined to pursue Pompey, whither- 
soever he should retire, to prevent his drawing 
together fresh forces, and renewing the war. 
He tnarched every day as far as the body of 
cavalry he had with him could hold out, and 
was followed, by shorter marches, by a single 
legion. Pompey had issued a proclamation 
at Amphipolis, enjoining all the youth of the 
province, whether Greeks or Romans, to join 
him in arms. But whether this was with in- 
tent to conceal his real design of retreating 
much farther, or to try to maintain his ground 
in Macedonia, if nobody pursued him, is hard 
to determine. Here he lay one night at an- 
chor, sending to what friends he had in the 
town, and raising all the money he possibly 
could. But being informed of Cassar's approach, 
he departed with all expedition, and came in a 
few days to Mitylene. Here he was detained 
two days by the badness of the weather ; and 
having increased his fleet with a few galleys 



sailed to Cilicia, and thence to Cyprus. There 
he was informed, that the Antiochians, and 
Roman citizens trading hither, had with joint 
consent seized the castle, and sent deputies to 
such of his followers as had taken refuge in 
the neighbouring states, not to come near Anti- 
och at their peril. The same had happened at 
Rhodes to L. Lentulus, the consul of the fore- 
going year, to P. Lentulus a consular senator 
and to some other persons of distinction ; who, 
following Pompey in his flight, and arriving at 
that island, were refused admittance into the 
town and harbour, and received an order to with- 
draw immediately, which they were necessi- 
tated to comply with ; for the time of Csesar's 
approach had now reached the neighbouring 
states. 

LXXXV. ypon this intelligence Pompey 
laid aside his design of going into Syria, seized 
all the money he found in the public bank, 
borrowed as much more as he could of his 
friends, sent great quantities of brass on board 
for military uses ; and having raised two thou- 
sand soldiers, amongst the public officers, mer- 
chants, and his own servants, sailed for Pelu- 
sium. Here, by accident, was king Ptolemy, 
a minor, warring with a great army against his 
sister Cleopatra ; whom, some months before, 
by the assistance of his friends, he had ex- 
pelled the kingdom, and was then encamped 
not far distant from her. Pompey sent to de- 
mand his protection, and a safe retreat in Alex- 
andria, in consideration of the friendship that 
had subsisted between him and his father. 
The messengers, after discharging their com- 
mission, began to converse freely with the 
king's troops, exhorting them to assist Pompey 
and not despise him in his adverse fortune. 
Among these troops were many of Pompey's 
old soldiers, whom Gabinius, having draughted 
out of the Syrian army, had carried to Alex- 
andria, and, upon the conclusion of the war, 
left there with the young king's father. The 
king's ministers, who had the care of the go- 
vernment during his minority, being informed 
of this, either out of fear, as they afterwards 
pretended, lest Pompey should debauch the ar- 
my, and thereby render himself master of Alex- 
andria and Egypt; or despising his low condi- 
tion,(^as friends, in bad fortune, often turn ene- 
mies,) spoke favourably to the deputies in 
public, and invited Pompey to court ; but 
privately despatched Achillas, captain of the 
king's guards, a man of singular boldness, and 



COMMENTARIES, 



281 



L. Septimius, a military tribune, with orders 
to murder him. They accosted him with an 
air of frankness, especially Septimius, who 
had served under him as a centurion in the 
war with the pirates ; and inviting him into the 
boat, treacherously slew him. L. Lentulus 
was likewise seized by the king's command, 
and put to death in prison. 

LXXXVI. When Cssar arrived in Asia 
he found that T. Ampius, having formed the 
design of seizing the treasurer of the Ephesian 
Diana, and summoned all the senators in the 
province to bear witness to the sum taken, had 
quitted that project upon Caesar's approach 
and betaken himself to flight. Thus was the 
temple of Ephesus a second time saved from 
plunder by Caesar. It was remarked in the 
temple of Minerva at Elis, that the very day 
Caesar gained the battle of Pharsalia, the im-; 
age of victory, which before stood fronting,' 
the statue of the goddess, turned towards the) 
portal of the temple. The same day, at An-'i 
tioch, in Syria, such a noise of fighting and 
trumpets was heard two several times, that 
the inhabitants ran to arms and manned their 
walls. The like happened at Ptolemais. 
At Pergamus, in the inner recesses of the 
temple, called by the Greeks Adyta, where 
none but priests are allowed to enter, the 
sound of cymbals was heard. And in the 
Temple of Victory, at Trallis, where a statue 
was consecrated to Caesar, a palm sprouted be- 
tween the joining of the stones that arched 
the roof. 

L XXXVII. Caesar, after a short stay in 
Asia, hearing that Pompey had been seen at 
Cyprus, and thence conjecturing that he was 
for Egypt, because of the interest he had in 
that kingdom, and the advantages it would af- 
ford him, left Rhodes, with a convoy of ten 
Rhodian galleys and a few others from Asia, 
having on board two legions, one of which he 
ordered to follow him from Thessaly, the other 
detached from Fufius's army in Achaia ; and 
eight hundred horse. In these legions were 
no more than three thousand two hundred 
men : the rest, fatigued with the length of the 
march, or weakened with wounds, had not 
been able to follow him. But Caesar depen- 
ding on the reputation of his former exploits, 
scrupled not to trust the safety of his person to 
a feeble escort, believing no place would dare 
to attempt any thing against him. At Alex- 
andria he was informed of Pompey's death : 
25 



and upon landing, was accosted in a clamorous 
manner by the soldiers, whom Ptolemy had 
left to garrison the city : and he observed that 
the mob appeared dissatisfied to see the fasces 
carried before him, which they interpreted 
a degradation of the sovereign authority. 
Though this tumult was appeased, yet each 
day produced some fresh disturbance, and 
many of the Roman soldiers were murdered 
in all parts of the city. 

LXXXVIII. For these reasons he sent into 
Asia for some of the legions which he had 
jraised out of the remains of Pompey's army : 
jbeing himself necessarily detained by the 
/Etesian winds, which are directly contrary to 
jany passage by sea from Alexandria. Mean- 
jtime, considering the difference between Pto- 
lemy and his sister, as subject to the cogniz- 
ance of the Roman people, and of him as con- 
sul ; and the rather, because the alliance with 
Ptolemy, the father, had been contracted during 
his former consulship ; he gave the king and 
, Cleopatra to understand, that it was his plea- 
sure they should dismiss their troops, and in- 
stead of having recourse to arms, come and 
plead their cause before him. 

LXXXIX. Pothinus the eunuch, governor 
to the young king, had the chief management 
of affairs during his minority. This minister 
complained bitterly to his friends, that the king 
should be summoned to plead his cause before 
Caesar : afterwards finding among those that 
sided with the king, some who vi'ere disposed 
to enter into his views, he privately sent for 
the army from Pelusium to Alexandria, and 
conferred the chief command upon Achillas, the 
same we have spoken of before : inciting him 
by letters and promises, both in the king's 
name and his own, to execute such orders as he 
should receive from him. Ptolemy, the father, 
by his will had appointed the eldest of the two 
sons, and his elder daughter, joint heirs of the 
kingdom. For the more certain accomplish- 
ment of his design, he in the same will im- 
plored the protection of the Roman people ; 
adjuring them by all the gods, and the treaties 
he had made at Rome, to see it put in execution. 
A copy of this will was sent by ambassadors to 
Rome, to be deposited in the public treasury; 
but the domestic troubles preventing it, it was 
left in the hands of Pompey. The original, 
signed and sealed, was kept at Alexandria. 

XC. While this affair was debated before 
Caesar, who passionately desired to terminate 
20 



282 



CESAR'S 



the matter amicably, and to the satisfaction of 
both parties, he was informed that the king's 
army, with all the cavalry, were arrived at 
Alexandria. Cssar's forces were by no means 
sufficient to give them battle without the town ; 
and therefore the only course left was to 
secure the most convenient posts within 
the city, till he should get acquainted with 
Achillas's designs. Meantime he ordered all 
the soldiers to their arms, and admonished the 
king, to send some persons of the greatest 
authority to Achillas, to forbid his approach. 
Discorides and Serapion, who had both been 
ambassadors at Rome, and in great credit with 
Ptolemy, the father, were deputed to this 
office. But no sooner did they come before 
Achillas, than without giving them a hearing, 
or enquiring after the message they brought, 
he ordered them to be seized and put to death. 
One was killed upon the spot ; and the other, 
having received a dangerous wound, was car- 
ried off for dead by his attendants. Upon 
hearing this, Cajsar took care to secure the 
king's person, the authority of whose name 
would authorise his proceedings, and occasion 
Achillas and his associates to be esteemed se- 
ditious and rebellious. 

XCI. Achillas's army was far from being 
contemptible, whether we regard their num- 
ber, courage, or experience in war. It amounted 
to twenty thousand effective men, many of 
whom were originally Romans, brought into 
the country by Gabinius, when he came to 
settle Auletes on the throne ; and who, 
having afterwards married and settled in 
Alexandria, were devoted to the Ptolemean 
interest. Their were also some brigades 
raised in Syria and Cilicia, together with a 
considerable number of renegade slaves, who 
had deserted their masters, and found protec- 
tion in Egypt, by entering into the service. 
If any of these was seized by his master, their 
companions flocked to his rescue, regarding 
his safety as a common cause, because they 
were all embarked in the like guilt. These 
would often take upon them to put to death 
the king's ministers, to plunder the rich, for 
the sake of increasing their pay, to invest the 
royal palace, to banish some, and send for others 
home, with other liberties of the like nature, 
which the Alexandrian army claims by a 
kind of prescription. Besides these, he had 
likewise two thousand horse, who, during the 
late troubles, and the wars that ensued, had 



had opportunities of inuring themselves to 
arms. These had restored Ptolemy the father 
to his kingdom, killed Bibulus's two sons, 
warred against the Egyptians with success, 
and acquired a thorough experience in miUtary 
affairs. 

XCII. Achillas trusting to the valour of 
his troops, and despising the handful of men 
that followed Csesar, quickly make himself 
master of Alexandria, the palace only excepted', 
where Csesar thought proper to make his 
stand, and which he attacked briskly, though 
without effect. But it was on the side of the 
harbour that the greatest efforts were made. 
On that, in effect, the victory depended. Be- 
sides two and twenty constant guard-ships, 
there were in the port fifty galleys, from three 
to five banks of oars, which the year before 
had been sent to Pompey's assistance, and were 
returned since the battle of Pharsalia. Had 
Achillas been once master of these vessels, he 
might have cut Caesar off from all communi- 
cation with the ocean, and consequently from 
all hopes of receiving supplies of victuals or 
forces. Thus the Egyptians, in hopes of a 
complete victory, and the Romans to avoid 
a certain ruin, exerted themselves with in- 
credible vigour. At length Cjesar carried his 
point, and not only set fire to the vessels 
above-mentioned, but to all that were in the 
arsenals, after which he passed some troops 
into the Isle of Pharos. 

XCIII. The Pharos is a tower of prodigious 
height and wonderful workmanship, built in 
an island, from whence it takes its name. 
This island, lying over against Alexandria, 
makes a haven, and is joined to the continent 
by a causeway of nine hundred paces, and by 
a bridge. Here dwell several Egyptians, who 
have built a town, and live by pillaging the 
ships that are thrown upon their coast, either 
by mistake or tempest. As it is situate at the 
entrance of the port, which is but narrow, it 
absolutel}' commands it. Coesar knowing the 
importance of this post, whilst the enemy were 
engaged in the assault, landed some troops 
there, seized the tower, and put a garrison 
into it ; thereby securing a safe reception for 
the supplies he had sent for on all sides. In the 
other quarters of the town, the fight was main- 
tained with equal advantage, neither party 
losing ground, because of the narrowness of 
the passes, which enabled them easily to sup- 
port themselves. After a few men killed on 



COMMENTARIES. 



283 



both sides, Caesar having secured the most 
necessary places, fortified them in the night. 
In this quarter was a small part of the king's 
palace, where Caesar was lodged upon his first 
arrival ; and adjoining thereto a theatre, that 
served instead of a citadel, and had a commu- 
nication with the port and other arsenals. 
These works he increased afterwards, that 
they might serve instead of a rampart, to pre- 
vent his being obliged to fight against his will. 
Meantime Ptolemy's youngest daughter, hop- 
ing the throne would be vacant, fled from the 



palace to Achillas, and joined with him in 
the prosecution of the war. But they soon 
disagreed about the command, which increased 
the largesses to the soldiers, each party en- 
deavouring to gain them by large presents. 
During these transactions, Pothinus, Ptole- 
my's governor, and regent of the kingdom, 
being discovered in a clandestine correspond- 
ence with Achillas, whom he encouraged to 
the vigorous prosecution of his enterprise, 
Caesar ordered him to be put to death. Such 
was the commencement of the Alexandrian war. 



PANSA'S COMMENTARIES 



OF 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR. 



26* S8C 



THE ARGUMENT. 

i. Caesar prepares for war.— 11. As likewise the Alexandrians.— III. Arsinoe, Ptolemy's daughter, possesses 
herself of the supreme authority.— IV. Schemeof the Alexandrians, to deprive the Romans of water.— V. Cae- 
sar's speech to his soldiers. They fall to digging of wells, and thereby find water.— VI. Caesar having brought 
his transports to Alexandria, has the advantage in several naval encounters. — Xin. And afterwards makes 
himself master of some forts that commanded the port. — XIV. But attempting some others is repulsed, and 
narrowly escapes by swimming.— XV. Which loss, serves only the more to animate his soldiers.— XVI. Cae- 
sar, at the request of the Alexandrians, sends them their king, Ptolemy, who immediately becomes his ene- 
my.— XVII. Caesar's fleet has the disadvantage in an engagement.— XVIII. Mithridates, Caesar's friend, having 
made himself master of Pelusium, advances towards Alexandria, at the head of a great body of troops. — 
XIX. The king's forces, endeavouring to oppose him, are repulsed, with loss. — XX. Caesar marching to the 
assistance of Mithridates, and Ptolemy, at the same time, to reinforce his troops, they come to a battle, with 
all their forces, in which the king is entirely defeated. — XXII. Caesar storms the enemy's camp ; and the king 
himself, endeavouring to make his escape, is drowned. — XXIII. Caesar admitting the Alexandrians to a sur- 
render, restores tranquillity to Egypt.— XXIV. And settles the kingdom upon Cleopatra, and her brother. — 
XXV. Meantime Domitius Calvinus, one of Caesar's generals, loses a battle against Pharnaces, in Armenia 
the Lesser. — XXXII. At the same time Gabinius receives a considerable check in Illyricum, which had been 
gallantly defended by Q. Cornificius.— XXXIV. But this loss is afterwards repaired by the bravery of Vatinius, 
who recovers Illyricum to the obedience of Caesar. — XXXVIII. About the same time, commotions arise in 
Spain, occasioned by the extortions of Cassius Longinus.— XLII. Cassius is wounded by the conspirators. 
— XLIII. After which he behaved still more tyrannically.— XLIV. Whence new disturbances arise.— L. 
Which are appeased at last, by the arrival of Lepidu, and the death of Cassius.— LII. Caesar restores his 
affairs in Syria.— LIII. As likewise in Cilicia and Cappadocia.— LIV. And in Gallo-graecia. — LV. He af- 
terwards treats of peace, with Pharnaces in Pontus.— LVI. And finding him not faithful to his engage- 
ments, resolves to make war upon him.— LIX. Pharnaces rashly hazarding a battle, is totally routed, and 
his army cut to pieces.— LXII. Pontus being thus speedily recovered, and tranquillity restored to all the 
Asiatic provinces, Caesar returns to Italy. 



PANSA'S COMMENTARIES 



THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR. 



I. The war thus commencing at Alexandria, 
Caesar sent to Rhodes, Syria, and Cilicia, for 
his fleet ; to Crete, for archers ; and to Mal- 
chus, king of the Nabatheans, for cavalry. He 
likewise ordered military engines to be pro- 
vided, corn to be brought, and forces despatched 
to him with all diligence. Meanwhile, he was 
daily employed in augmenting his works ; and 
such parts of the town as appeared less tena- 
ble, were strengthened with tortoises and 
mantelets. Openings were made in the walls, 
through which the battering rams might play ; 
and whatever houses were thrown down, or 
taken by force, were brought within the in- 
trenchments. For Alexandria is in a manner 
secure from fire, because the inhabitants use 
no wood in their buildings, the houses being 
all vaulted, and roofed with tile or pavement. 
Ccesar's principal aim was, to enclose with 
works the smallest part of the town, separated 
from the rest by a morass towards the south. 
For thus the army would lie closer together, 
be subject to one command, and could read- 
ily despatch relief where it was most wanted. 
Above all, he by this means made sure of 
water and forage, 'which was of so much the 
more consequence, as he was but ill provided 
of the one, and wholly destitute of the other. 
The morass, on the contrary, served abundantly 
to supply him with both. 

II. Nor were the Alexandrians remiss on 
their side, or less active in the conduct of their 
affairs. They had sent deputies and commis- 
sioners into all parts, where the power and ter- 
ritories of Egypt extend, with orders to levy 
troops. They had carried vast quantities of 



darts and engines into the town, and drawn to- 
gether an innumerable multitude of soldiers. 
Yet not contented with all these preparations, 
they established work-shops in every part of 
the city, for the making of arms, and enlisted 
all the slaves that were of age, the richer citi- 
zens paying and maintaining them. With these 
they guarded the remoter parts of the town ; 
while the veteran cohorts, exempt from all 
other service, were quartered in the squares 
and open places ; that on whatever side an at- 
tack should be made, they might be at hand 
to give relief, and march fresh and entire to 
the charge. All the avenues and passes were 
shut up by a triple wall, built of square stones, 
and carried to the height of forty feet. The 
lower parts of the town were defended by very 
high towers of ten stories : besides which, they 
had likewise contrived a kind of moving 
towers, which consisted of the same number of 
stories, and being fitted with ropes and wheels, 
could, by means of horses, as the streets of 
Alexandria were quite even and level, be 
conveyed wherever their service was neces- 
sary. The city abounding in every thing, and 
being very rich, furnished ample materials for 
these several works ; and as the people were 
extremely ingenious, and quick of apprehen- 
sion, they so well copied what they saw done 
by us, that our men seemed rather to imi- 
tate them.->'They even invented many things 
themselves, and at once invested our works and 
defended their own. Their chiefs every where 
represented : " That the people of Rome were 
endeavouring by degrees to steal into the pos- 
session of Egypt ; that a few years before 
287 



288 



PANSA'S 



Gabinius had come thither with an army ; that 
Pompey had chosen it for the place of his re- 
treat ; that Ceesar was now among them with a 
considerable body of troops, and notwithstand- 
ing his rival's death, made no offers to return ; 
that if they did not therefore find means to 
expel him, they would soon, from a kingdom, 
be reduced to a Roman province ; that no 
time was to be lost in this attempt, because 
the season of the year having put a stop to 
navigation, he could receive no supplies from 
beyond sea." 

III. Meanwhile, a division arising between 
Achillas, who commanded the veteran army, 
and Arsinoe, the youngest daughter of king 
Ptolemy, as has been demonstrated above ; 
while they mutually endeavoured to supplant 
one another, each striving to engross the su- 
preme authority ; Arsinoe, by the assistance 
of the eunuch Ganymed, her governor, at 
length prevailed, and caused Achillas to be 
slain. After his death, being possessed of 
the whole power without a rival, she raised 
Ganymed to the command of the army ; who, 
on his entrance into that high office, augment- 
ed the allowance of the troops, and with 
equal diUgence discharged all other parts of 
his duty. 

IV. Alexandria is almost quite hollow under- 
neath, occasioned by the many aqueducts to 
the Nile, that furnish private houses with 
water ; where being received in cisterns, it 
settles by degrees, and becomes perfectly clear. 
This is preserved for the use of the master 
and his family ; for the water of the Nile be- 
ing extremely thick and muddy, is apt to breed 
many distempers. The common people, how- 
ever, are forced to be contented with it, be- 
cause there is not a single spring in the whole 
city. The river was in that part of the town 
where the Alexandrians were masters. Hence 
Ganymed conceived that a way might be 
found to deprive the Romans of water ; be- 
cause being distributed into several streets, 
for the more easy defence of the works, they 
made use of that which was preserved in the 
cisterns of private houses. With this view he 
began a great and difficult work ; for having 
stopped up all the canals by which his own 
cisterns were suppHed, he drew vast quantities 
of water out of the sea, by the help of wheels 
and other engines, pouring it continually into 
the canals of Caesar's quarter. The cisterns 
in the nearest houses soon began to taste salter 



than ordinary, and occasioned great wonder 
among the men, who could not think from 
what cause it proceeded. They were even 
ready to disbelieve their senses, when those 
who were quartered a little lower in the town, 
assured them that they found the water the 
same as before. This put them upon compar- 
ing the cisterns one with another, and by trial 
they easily perceived the difference. But in 
a little time the water in the nearest houses 
became quite unfit for use, and that lower down 
grew daily more tainted and brackish ; upon 
which such a terror eusued among the troops, 
that they fancied themselves reduced to the 
last extremity. Some complained of Csesar's 
delay, that he did not order them immediately 
to repair to their ships. Others dreaded a yet 
greater misfortune, as it would be impossible 
to conceal their design of retreating from the 
Alexandrians, who were so near them ; and no 
less so to embark in the face of a vigorous 
and pursuing enemy. There were besides a 
great number of the townsmen in Csesar's 
quarter, whom he had not thought proper to 
force from their houses, because they openly 
pretended to be in his interest, and to Ijiave 
quitted the party of their fellow-citizens. But 
to offer here at a defence either of the sincerity 
or conduct of these Alexandrians, would be 
only labour in vain, since all who know the 
genius and temper of the people, must be satis- 
fied that they are the fittest instruments in the 
world for treason. 

V. Csesar laboured to remove his soldiers' 
fears, by encouraging and reasoning the case 
with them, " They might easily," he told 
them, " find water, by digging wells, as all 
sea-coasts naturally abounded with fresh 
springs : that if Egypt was singular in this re- 
spect, and differed from every other soil ; yet 
still, as the sea was open, and the enemy with- 
out a fleet, there was nothing to hinder their 
fetching it at pleasure in their ships, either from 
Parsetonium on the left, or Pharos on the right; 
which two places lying different ways, the wind 
could neither exclude them from both at the 
same time ; that a retreat was on no account to 
be thought of, not only by those who had a 
concern for their honour, but even by such as 
regarded nothing but life ; that it was with the 
utmost difficulty they could defend themselves 
behind their works ; but if they once quittea 
that advantage, neither in number nor situa- 
tion would they be a match for the enemy : 



COMMENTARIES. 



289 



that to embark would require much time, and 
he attended with great danger, especially 
where it must be managed by little boats : 
that the Alexandrians, on the contrary, were 
nimble and active, and thoroughly acquainted 
with the streets and buildings : that flushed 
with so manifest an advantage, they would not 
fail to run before, seize all the advantageous 
posts, possess themselves of the tops of the 
houses, and, by annoying them in their 
retreat, effectually prevent their getting on 
board ; that they might therefore think no 
more of retiring, but place all their hopes of 
safety in victory." Having by this speech re- 
assured his men, he ordered the centurions to 
lay aside all other cares, and apply them- 
selves day and night to the digging of wells. 
The work once begun, they pushed it on so 
vigorously that the very first night abundance 
of fresh water was found. Thus with labour 
on our side, the mighty projects and pain- 
ful attempts of the Alexandrians were entirely 
frustrated. 

VI. During these transactions, the thirty- 
seventh legion, composed of Pompey's vete- 
rans that had surrendered to Csesar, embarking 
by order of Domitius Calvinus, with arms, 
darts, provisions, and military engines, arrived 
upon the coast of Africa, a little above Alex- 
andria. An easterly wind, which continued 
to blow for several days together, hindered 
their being able to gain the port; but all along 
that coast it is very safe riding at anchor. Be- 
ing detained, however, longer than they ex- 
pected, and pressed with want of water, they 
gave notice of it to Csesar by a despatch sloop. 
Cffisar, that he might himself be able to de- 
termine what was best to be done, went on 
board one of the ships in the harbour, and or- 
dered the whole fleet to follow. He took none 
of the land forces with him, because he was 
unwilling to leave the v^orks unguarded dur- 
ing his absence. Being arrived at that part 
of the coast known by the name of Cherronesus, 
he sent some mariners on shore to fetch 
water. Part of these venturing too far into 
the country for the sake of plunder, were 
intercepted by the enemy's horse. From them 
the Egyptians learned that Caesar himself was 
on board, without any soldiers. Upon this in- 
formation, they thought fortune had thrown a 
fair occasion in their way, of attempting some- 
thing with success. They therefore manned 
all the ships that were in condition to sail,and 



met Caesar on his return. He declined fight= 
ing that day for twojeasons ; because he ha^ Iv 
no soldiers on board, ^nd it was past four in 
the afternoon. The night, he was sensible, 
must be highly advantageous to his enemies, 
who were perfectly acquainted with the coast : 
and he would himself be deprived of the 
benefit of encouraging his men, which could 
not be done with any effect in the dark, 
where courage and cowardice must remain 
equally unknown. He therefore drew all his 
ships towards the shore, where he imagined 
the enemy would not follow him. 

VH. There was one Rhodian galley in 
Caesar's right wing, considerably distant from 
the rest. This being observed by the enemy, 
they came forward with four decked ships, 
and several open barks, to attack her. Caesar 
was obliged to advance to her relief, that 
he might not suffer the disgrace of seeing one 
of his galleys sunk before his eyes ; though, 
had he left her to perish, she seemed to de- 
serve it for her rashness. The attack was 
sustained with great courage by the Rhodians, 
who though at all times distinguished by their 
valour and experience in engagements at sea, 
yet exerted themselves in a particular manner 
on this occasion, that they might not draw 
upon themselves the charge of having occasion- 
ed a misfortune to the fleet. Accordingly, they 
obtained a complete victory, took one four- 
benched galley, sunk another, disabled a third, 
and slew all that were on board, besides a 
great number belonging to the other ships. 
Nay, had not night interposed, Caesar would 
have made himself master of their whole fleet. 
During the consternation that followed upon 
this occasion, Cssar finding the contrary winds 
to abate, took the transports in tow, and ad- 
vanced with the victorious fleet to Alexandria. 

VHI. The Alexandrians, disheartened at 
this loss, as finding themselves now worsted, 
not by the superior valour of the soldiers, but 
by the skill and ability of the mariners, re- 
tired to the tops of their houses, and blocked 
up the entrance of their streets, as fearing our 
fleet might attack them even by land. But 
soon after, Ganymed assuring them in council, 
that he would not only restore the vessels they 
had lost, but even increase their number ; they 
began to repair their old ships with great ex- 
pectation and confidence, and resolved to apply 
more than ever to the putting their fleet in 
a good condition. And although they had 
2 P 



290 



PANSA'S 



lost above a hundred and ten ships in the port 
and arsenal, yet did not all this discourage 
them ; because, by making themselves masters 
at sea, they saw they would have it in their 
power to hinder Caesar's receiving any rein- 
forcements or supplies. Besides, being natu- 
rally mariners, born upon the sea-coast, and 
exercised from their infancy in naval affairs, 
they were desirous to return to that wherein 
their true and proper strength Iay,remember- 
ing the advantages they had formerly gained, 
even with their little ships. They therefore 
applied themselves with all diligence to the 
equipping a fleet. 

IX. Vessels were stationed at all the mouths 
of the Nile, for receiving and gathering in 
the customs. Several old ships were likewise 
lodged in the king's private arsenals, where 
they had remained unrigged for many years. 
These last they refitted, and recalled the for- 
mer to Alexandria. To supply themselves 
with oars, they uncovered the porticoes. Aca- 
demies, and public buildings, and made use 
of the planks they furnished. Their natural 
ingenuity, and the abundance of all things to 
be met with in the city, supplied every want. 
In fine, they had no long navigation to pro- 
vide for, and were only solicitous about pre- 
sent exigencies, foreseeing they would have no 
occasion to fight but in the port. In a few 
days, therefore, contrary to all expectation, 
they had fitted out twenty-two quadriremes, 
and five quinqueremes. To these they added 
a great number of small open barks ; and em- 
ploying the rowers in the harbour, to practise 
and exercise themselves, put a sufficient num- 
ber of soldiers on board, and prepared every 
thing necessary for an engagement. Ca;sar had 
nine Ehodian galleys (for of the ten which were 
sent, one was shipwrecked on the coast of 
Egypt ; eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, 
and twelve out of Asia. Of these ten were 
quadriremes and five quinqueremes. The rest 
were of an inferior bulk, and for the most part 
without decks. Yet trusting to the valour of 
his soldiers, and knowing the strength of the 
enemy, he prepared for an engagement. 

X. When both sides were come to have 
sufficient confidence of their own strength, 
Csesar sailed round Pharos, and formed in 
line of battle over against the enemy. The 
Ehodian galleys were in his right wing, and 
those of Pontus in his left. Between these 
he left a space of four hundred paces, to serve 



for the extending and working the vessels. 
This disposition being made, he drew up the 
rest of the fleet as a reserve, giving them the 
necessary orders, and distributing them in such 
manner, that every ship followed that to which 
she was appointed to give succour. The Alex- 
andrians came forth with great confidence, 
and drew up their fleet, placing their twenty- 
two quadriremes in front, and disposing the 
rest behind them in a second line, by way of 
reserve. They had besides a great number of 
boats and smaller vessels, that carried fire and 
combustible weapons, with design to fright us 
by their number, cries, and flaming darts. 
Between the two fleets were certain flats, se- 
parated by very narrow channels, and which 
are said to be on the African coast, as being 
in that division of Alexandria which belongs 
to Africa. Both sides waited which should 
first pass these shallows, because whoever en- 
tered the narrow channels between them, in 
case of any misfortune, would find it very dif- 
ficult either to retreat, or work the ships to 
advantage. 

XI. Euphranor commanded the Ehodian 
fleet, who for valour and greatness of mind 
deserved rather to be ranked among the Ro- 
mans than the Grecians. The Rhodians had 
raised him to the post of Admiral, on account 
of his known courage and experience. He 
perceiving Csesar's design, addressed him to 
this effect: " You seem afraid of passing the 
shallows first, lest you should be thereby forced 
to come to an engagement, before the rest of 
the fleet can be brought up. Leave the matter 
to us, we will sustain the fight, and I hope too 
without disappointing your expectations, until 
the whole fleet gets clear of the shallows. It 
is both dishonourable and afflicting, that they 
should so long continue in our sight with an 
air of triumph." Csesar encouraging him in 
his design, and bestowing many praises upon 
him, gave the signal for engaging. Four 
Rhodian ships having passed the shallows, the 
Alexandrians gathered round and attacked 
them. They maintained the fight with great 
bravery, disengaging themselves by their art 
and address, and working their ships with so 
much skill, that notwithstanding the inequality 
of number, none of the enemy were suffered 
to run alongside, or break their oars. Mean- 
time the rest of the fleet came up : when, on 
account of the narrowness of the place, art be- 
coming useless, the success depended wholly 



COMMENTARIES. 



291 



upon valour. The Alexandrians and Romans 
who were in the town, laying aside all thoughts 
of attack and defence, mounted the tops of 
the houses, and all the eminences that could 
give a view of the fight, addressing the gods 
by vows and prayers for victory. 

XII. The event of the battle was by no 
means equal. A defeat would have deprived 
us of all resource either by land or by sea ; 
and even victory itself would not much bet- 
ter our condition. The Alexandrians, on the 
contrary, by a victory, gained every thing ; 
and if defeated, might yet again have recourse 
to fortune. It was likewise a matter of the 
highest concern, to see the safety of all depend 
upon the bravery of a few, whose want of 
courage would expose their whole part}^ to 
destruction. This Ctesar had often represented 
to his troops during the preceding days, that 
they might be thereby induced to fight with 
the more resolution, when they knew the 
common safet}' to depend upon their bravery. 
Every man said the same to his comrade, 
companion, and friend, requesting him not to 
disappoint the expectation of those who had 
chosen him preferably to others for the de- 
fence of the common interest. Accordingly 
they fought with so much resolution, that nei- 
ther the art nor address of the Egyptians, a 
maritime and seafaring people, could stand them 
in any stead, nor the multitude of their ships be 
of service to them ; nor the valour of those 
selected for this engagement, stand in com- 
petition with the determined courage of the 
Romans. In this action a quinquereme was 
taken, and a bireme, with all the soldiers and 
mariners on board, besides three sunk, with- 
out any loss on our side. The rest fled to- 
wards the town, sheltering themselves under 
the mole and forts, whither we durst not pur- 
sue them. 

XIII. To deprive the enemy of this re- 
source for the future, Caesar thought it by all 
means necessary, to render himself master of 
the mole and island; for having already in 
a great measure completed his works within 
the town, he was in hopes of being able to de- 
fend himself both in the island and city. 
This resolution being taken, he put into boats 
and small vessels ten cohorts, a select body of 
light-armed infantry, and such of the Gallic 
cavalry as he thought most for his purpose, and 
sent them against the island ; whilst at the 
same time, to occasion a diversion, he attacked 



it on the otlier side with his fleet, promising 
great rewards to those who should first render 
themselves masters of it. At first the attack 
was brisk, and the defence vigorous : for they 
both annoyed our men from the tops of the 
houses, and gallantly maintained their ground 
along the shore ; which being steep and craggy, 
our men could find no way of approach ; all 
the more accessible avenues being skilfully de- 
fended by small boats, and five galleys, pro- 
perly stationed for that purpose. But when, 
after examining the approaches, and sounding 
the shallows, a few of our men got upon the 
shore, and were followed by others, who pushed 
the islanders, without intermission, the Pha- 
rians at last betook themselves to flight. 
Upon this, abandoning the defence of the 
port, they quitted their ships, and retired into 
the town, to provide for the sccurit}' of their 
houses. But they could not long maintain their 
ground there : though to compare small things 
with great, their buildings resemble those of 
Alexandria, and their towers were high, and 
joined together so as to form a kind of wall ; 
and our men had neither ladders, fascines, nor 
any weapons for assault. But fear often de- 
prives men of counsel and strength, as hap- 
pened upon this occasion. Those who had 
ventured to oppose us on even ground, terri- 
fied by the loss of a few men, and the general 
rout, durst not face us from a height of thirty 
feet; but throwing themselves from the mole, 
into the sea, endeavoured to gain the town, 
though above eight hundred paces distant. 
Many, however, were slain, and about six 
hundred taken. 

XIV. Cffisar giving up the plunder to the 
soldiers, ordered the houses to be demolished ; 
but fortified the castle at the end of the bridge 
next the island, and placed a garrison in it. 
This the Pharians had abandoned ; but the 
other, towards the town, which was con- 
siderably stronger, was still held by the 
Alexandrians. Cfesar attacked it next day ; 
because, by getting possession of these two 
forts, he would be entirely master of the port, 
and prevent sudden excursions and piracies. 
Already he had, by means of his arrows and 
engines, forced the garrison to abandon the 
place, and retire towards the town. He had 
also landed three cohorts, which was all the 
place would contain ; and disposed the rest of 
his troops abroad to sustain them. He then 
fortified the bridge on the side of the en- 



^9^ 



PANSA'S 



ferny, built an arch across the entrance of the 
port, and filled it up, in such a manner, with 
stones, that not the smallest boat could pass. 
When the work was almost finished, the 
Alexandrians sallied, in crowds, from the 
toVvn, and drew up, in an open place over 
against the intrenchment we had cast up at 
the head of the bridge. At the same time, 
the vessels, which they had been wont to make 
pass under the bridge, to set fire to our ships 
of burden, were ranged along the mole. Our 
men fought from the bridge and the mole ; 
the enemy from the area, over against the 
bridge, and from their ships, by the side of the 
mole. While Csesar, attentive to what passed, 
was exhorting his troops,a number of rowers 
and mariners, quitting their ships, threw them- 
selves upon the mole ; partly out of curiosity, 
pairtly to have a share in the action. At first, 
with stones and slings, they forced the ene- 
my's ships from the iuole ; and seemed to do 
still greater execution with their darts. But 
when, some time after, a few Alexandrians 
found means to land and attack them in flank ; 
as they had left their ships without order or 
discipline, so they soon began to fly with pre- 
cipitation. 'J'he Alexandrians, encouraged by 
this success, landed in great numbers, and 
vigorously pushed our men, who were by this 
time in great confusion. Those that remained 
in the galleys perceiving this, drew up the 
ladders, and put off from the shore, to prevent 
the enemy's boarding them. The three co- 
horts, v?ho were at the head of the mole, to 
guard the bridge, astonished at this disorder, 
the cries they heard behind them, and the 
general rout of their party ; unable, besides, to 
bear up against the multitude of darts which 
came pouring upon them, and fearing to be 
surrounded, and have their retreat cut off, by 
the departure of their ships, abandoned the 
defence of the bridge, and ran with all the 
speed they could, towards the galleys. Some 
getting on board the nearest vessels, overloaded 
and sunk them. Part making head against 
the enemy, and uncertain what course to take, 
were cut to pieces by the Alexandrians. 
Others, more fortunate, got to the ships that 
rode at anchor ; and a few, by the help of 
their bucklers, swam to the nearest vessels. 
Caesar endeavouring to re-animate his men, 
, and lead them back to the defence of the 
\works, was exposed to the same danger with 
the rest : when finding them universally to 



give ground, he retreated to his own galley ; 
whither such a multitude followed, and crowded 
after him, that it was impossible either to work 
or put her off. Foreseeing what must happen, 
he flung himself into the sea, and swam to a 
ship that lay at some distance. Hence des- 
patching boats to succour his men, he, by 
that means, preserved a small number. His 
own ship, sunk by the multitude that crowded 
into her, perished with all that were on board. 
We lost, in this action, about four hundred 
legionary soldiers, and somewhat above that 
number of sailors and rowers. The Alexan- 
drians secured the fort by strong works, and a 
great number of engines ; and having cleared 
away the stones with which Csesar had 
blocked up the port, enjoyed henceforward a 
free and open navigation. 

XV. Our men, instead of being disheartened 
at this loss, seemed rather roused and animated 
by it. They were making continual scillies 
upon the enemy, to destroy or check the pro- 
gress of their works ; fell' upon them as often 
as they had an opportunity ; and never failed 
to intercept them, when they ventured to ad- 
vance beyond their fortifications. In short, 
the legions were so bent upon fighting, that 
they even outstripped the orders and exhorta- 
tions of Cajsar. They were inconsolable for 
their late disgrace, and impatient to come to 
blows with the enemy ; insomuch that he 
found it rather necessary to restrain and 
check their ardour, than incite them to ac- 
tion. 

XVI. The Alexandrians, perceiving that 
success confirmed the Romans, and that ad- 
verse fortune only animated them the more ; 
as they knew of no medium between these, on 
which to ground any further hopes, resolved, 
either by the advice of the friends of their 
king who were in Caesar's quarter, or of their 
own motion; or, perhaps, on an intimation 
from the king himself, suggested to him by 
secret emissaries, to send ambassadors to Cae- 
sar to demand their king. They represented, 
" That the people, weary of subjection to a 
woman, of living under a precarious govern- 
ment, and submitting to the cruel laws of the 
tyrant Ganymed, instead of obeying their own 
lawful king, desired nothing so much as to 
have him amongst them : that in granting their 
request, he would pave the way to an alliance, 
and extinguish all the fears and objections 
that had hitherto obstructed it." Though Cse- 



COMMENTARIES 



293 



sar knew the nation to be false and perfidious, 
seldom speaking as they really thought, he 
ludged it best, however, to comply with their 
desire. He even flattered himself, that his 
condescension in sending back their king at 
their request, would prevail on them to be 
faithful ; or, as was more agreeable to their 
character, if they only wanted the king to 
head their army ; at least it would be more for 
his honour and credit, to have to do with a 
monarch, than with a band of slaves and 
fugitives. * Accordingly he sent Ptolemy to 
them, exhorting him " to lake the government 
into his own hands, and consult the welfare of 
so fair and illustrious a kingdom, defaced by 
hideous ruins and conflagrations. That he 
would make his subjects sensible of their 
duty, preserve them from the destruction that 
threatened them, and act with fidelity towards 
himself and the Romans, who put so much 
confidence in him, as to send him amongst 
armed enemies." Then taking him by the 
hand, he told him he was at liberty to depart. 
But the young prince, thoroughly versed in 
the art of dissimulation, and no way degener- 
ating from the character of his nation, entreat- 
ed Caesar with tears not to send him back : 
for that his company was to him preferable to 
a kingdom. Caesar moved at his concern, 
dried up his tears ; and telling him if these 
were his real sentiments they would soon 
meet again, dismissed him. The king, like a 
wild beast, escaped out of confinement, car- 
ried on the war with such acrimony against 
Ca;sar, that the tears he shed at parting, 
seemed to have been tears of joy. Caesar's 
lieutenants, friends, centurions, and soldiers, 
were not a little pleased at this ; because, 
through his easiness of temper, he had suf- 
fered himself to be imposed upon by a child ; 
as if in truth Caesar's behaviour on this occa- 
sion had been the eflfect of easiness of temper, 
and not of the most consummate prudence. 

XVil, When the Alexandrians found that 
the restoration of their king had neither ren- 
dered their own party stronger, nor the Ro- 
mans weaker; that the troops despised the 
youth and weakness of their king ; and that 
their affairs were no way bettered by his pre- 
sence ; they were greatly discouraged : the ra- 
ther, because a report ran, that a great body of 
troops was marching by land from Syria and 
Cilicia to Caesar's assistance, of which he had 
not as yet himself received information. This, 
26 



however, did not hinder their design of inter- 
cepting the convoys that came to him by sea. 
To this end having equipped some ships, they 
ordered them to cruise before the Canopic 
branch of the Nile, by which they thought it 
most likely our supplies would arrive. Casar, 
who was informed of it, sent likewise his 
fleet to sea, under the command of Tiberius 
Nero. The Rhodian galleys made part of 
this squadron, headed by Euphranor their ad- 
miral, without whom he had little hopes of 
success from any maritime expedition. But 
fortune, which often reserves the heaviest 
disasters for those who have been loaded with 
her highest favours, encountered Euphranor 
upon this occasion, with an aspect very dif- 
ferent from what she had hitherto worn. For 
when our ships were arrived at Canopus, and 
the fleets drawn up on each side had begun 
the engagement, Euphranor, according to 
custom, having made the first attack, and 
pierced and sunk one of the enemy's ships; 
as he pursued the next a considerable way, 
without being suflSciently sustained by those 
that followed him, he was surrounded by the 
Alexandrians. None of the fleet advanced to 
his relief, either out of fear for their own 
safety, or because they imagined he would 
easily be able to extricate himself by his 
courage and good fortune. Accordingly he 
alone behaved well in this action, and being 
abandoned by all the rest, perished with his 
victorious galley. 

XVIII. About the same time Mithridates 
of Pergamus, a man of illustrious descent, 
distinguished for his bravery and knowledge 
in the art of war, and who bore a very high 
place in the friendship and confidence of 
Caesar; having been sent, in the beginning of 
the Alexandrian war, to raise succours in Syria 
and Cilicia, arrived by land at the head of a 
great body of troops, which his diligence, and 
the aflfection of these two provinceSj had ena- 
bled him to draw together in a very short time. 
He conducted them first to Pelusium, a city 
which joins Syria to Egypt. Achillas, who 
was perfectly well acquainted with its impor- 
tance, had seized and put a strong garrison into 
it. For Egypt is considered as defended on all 
sides by strong barriers ; towards the sea by 
the Pharos, and towards Syria by Pelusium 
which are accounted the two keys of that 
kingdom. He attacked it so briskly with a 
large body of troops, fresh men continuvdiv 



294 



PANSA'S 



succeeding in the place of those that were 
fatigued ; and urged the assault with so much 
firmness and perseverance, that he carried it 
the same day, and placed a garrison in it. 
Thence he pursued his march to Alexandria, 
reducing all the provinces through which he 
passed, and conciliating them to Csesar, by 
that authority which always accompanies 
victory. 

XIX. Not far from Alexandria lies Delta, 
the most celebrated province of Egypt, which 
borrows its name from the Greek letter so call- 
ed. For the Nile, dividing the two channels, 
which gradually run off as they approach the 
sea, into which they at last discharge them- 
selves, at a considerable distance from one 
another, leaves an intermediate space in form 
of a triangle. The king, understanding that 
Mithridates approached this place, and know- 
ing he must pass the river, sent a great body 
of troops against him, sufficient, as he thought, 
if not to overwhelm and crush him, at least to 
stop his march; for though he earnestly de- 
sired to see him defeated, yet he thought it a 
great point gained, to hinder his junction with 
Caesar. The troops that first passed the river, 
and came up with Mithridates, attacked him 
immediately, that they might alone have the 
honour of the victory. Mithridates at first 
confined himself to the defence of his camp, 
which he had with great prudence fortified ac- 
cording to the custom of the Romans : but ob- 
serving that they advanced insolently and 
without caution, he sallied upon them from all 
parts, and put a great number of them to the 
sword ; insomuch that but for their knowledge 
of the places, and the neighbourhood of the 
vessels in which they had passed the river, 
they must have been all destroyed. But re- 
covering by degrees from their terror, and 
joining the troops that followed them, they 
again prepared to attack Mithridates. 

XX. Mithridates sent to inform Caesar of 
what had happened. The king was likewise 
informed on his side. Thus much about the 
same time, Ptolemy set out to crush Mithri- 
dates, and Caesar to relieve him. The king 
made use of the more expeditious conveyance 
of the Nile, where he had a large fleet in readi- 
ness. Caesar declined the navigation of the 
river, that he might not be obliged to fight 
the enemy's fleet ; and coasting along the Af- 
rican shore, found means to join the victorious 



troops of Mithridates, before Ptolemy could 
attack him. 

XXI. The king had encamped in a very 
dangerous place, being an eminence surround- 
ed on all sides by a plain. Three of its sides 
were secured by various defences. One ad- 
joined to the Nile, the other was steep and 
inaccessible, and the third was defended by a 
morass. Between Ptolemy's camp and Caesar's 
route lay a narrow river with very high banks, 
which discharged itself into the Nile. This 
river was about seven miles from the king's 
camp ; who understanding that Caesar directed 
his march that way, sent all his cavalry, with 
a choice body of light-armed foot, to hinder 
Caesar from passing, and maintain an unequal 
fight from the banks, where courage had no op- 
portunity to exert itself, and cowardice ran no 
hazard. Our men, both horse and foot, were 
extremely mortified, that the Alexandrians 
should so long maintain their ground against 
them. Wherefore the German cavalry, dis- 
persing in quest of a ford, some found means 
to swim the river where the banks were low- 
est ; and the legionaries at the same time cut- 
ting down several large trees, that reached 
from one bank to another, and throwing them 
into the water, by their help got to the other 
side. The enemy, unable to sustain the first 
charge, betook themselves to flight ; but in 
vain : for very few returned to the king, being 
almost all cut to pieces in the pursuit. 

XXII. Ca3sar, upon this success, judging 
that his sudden approach must strike great 
terror into the Alexandrians, advanced towards 
their camp with his victorious army. But 
finding it well intrenched, strongly fortified by 
nature, and the ramparts crowded with armed 
soldiers, he did not think proper to attack it 
at that time, as his troops were very much fa- 
tigued, both by their march and the late battle ; 
and therefore encamped at a small distance 
from the enemy. Next day he attacked a 
fort, in a village not far off, which the king 
had joined to his camp by a line of communica- 
tion, with a view of keeping possession of the 
village. He employed his whole army in this 
assault; not because it would have been dif- 
ficult to carry it with a few forces ; but with 
design of falling immediately upon the enemy's 
camp during the alarm the loss of this fort 
must give them. Accordingly the Romans, 
in continuing the pursuit of those that fled 



COMMENTARIES. 



295 



from the fort, arrived at last before the Alex- 
andrian camp, where a furious battle ensued. 
There were two approaches by which it 
might be attacked : one by the }dain, of which 
we have spoken before ; the other by a nar- 
row pass, between their camp and the Nile. 
The first, which was much the easiest, was de- 
fended by a numerous body of their best troops ; 
and the access on the side of the Nile gave 
the enemy great advantages in distressing and 
wounding our men ; for they were exposed to 
a double shower of darts : in front from the 
rampart ; behind, from the river ; where the 
enemy had stationed a great number of ships, 
furnished with archers and slingers, that kept 
a continual discharge. Csesar observing that 
his troops fought with the utmost ardour, and 
yet made no great progress, on account of the 
disadvantage of the ground ; as he saw they 
had left the highest part of their camp un- 
guarded, because, being sufficiently fortified by 
nature, they had all crowded to the other at- 
tacks, partly to have a share in the action, 
partly to be spectators of the issue ; he order- 
ed some cohorts to wheel round the camp, 
and gain that ascent : appointing Carsulcnus 
to command them, a brave officer, and well 
acquainted with the service. When they had 
reached the place, where they found but very 
few to defend it, our men attacked them so 
briskly, that the Alexandrians, terrified by 
the cries they heard behind them, and seeing 
themselves attacked both in front and rear, 
fled in the utmost consternation on all sides. 
Our men, animated by the confusion of the 
enemy, entered the camp in several places at 
the same time, and running down from the 
higher ground, put a great number of them to 
the sword. The Alexandrians, endeavouring to 
escape, threw themselves in crowds over the 
rampart next the river. The foremost tum- 
bling into the ditch, where they were crushed 
to death, furnished an easy passage for those 
that followed. The king made his escape 
the same way: but by the crowd that followed 
him, the ship to which he fled was overloaded 
and sunk. 

XXIII. After this speedy and successful ac- 
tion, Caesar, in confidence of so great a victory, 
marched the nearest way by land to Alexan- 
dria with his cavalry, and entered triumphant 
into that part of the town possessed by the 
enemy. He was not mistaken in thinking, 
that the Alexandrians, upon hearing of the 



issue of the battle, would give over all thoughts 
of war. Accordingly as soon as he was arrived, 
he reaped the just fruit of his valour and 
magnanimity. For the Alexandrians, throw- 
ing down their arms, abandoning their works, 
and assuming the habit of suppHants, came 
forth to surrender themselves to Csesar, pre- 
ceded by all those sacred symbols of religion 
with which they were wont to molhfy their 
offended kings. Cssar accepting their sub- 
mission, and encouraging them, advanced 
through the enemy's works into his own 
quarter of the town, where he was received 
with the universal congratulations of his 
party, who were no less overjoyed at his ar- 
rival and presence, than at the happy issue of 
the war. 

XXIV. Cffisar having thus made himself 
master of Alexandria and Egypt, lodged the 
government in the hands of those to whom 
Ptolemy had bequeathed it by will, appoint- 
ing the people of Rome his executors, and 
requesting them to confirm his choice. For 
the eldest of his two sons being dead, he 
settled the kingdom upon the youngest, in 
conjunction with his sister Cleopatra, who 
had always continued faithful to the Romans. 
The younger Arsinoe, in whose name Gany- 
med, as we have seen, reigned for some time, 
he thought proper to banish the kingdom, that 
she might not raise any new disturbance, be- 
fore the king's authority should be firmly es- 
tablished. Things thus settled, he carried 
the sixth legion with him into Syria, leaving 
the rest to support the authority of the king 
and queen, who neither stood well in the af- 
fections of their subjects, on account of their 
attachment to Ctesar, nor could be supposed 
to have given any fixed foundation to their 
power, in an administration of only a few days' 
continuance. It was also for the honour and 
interest of the republic, that if they continued 
faithful, our forces should protect them ; if 
otherwise, would be in a condition to restrain 
them. Plaving thus settled the kingdom, he 
marched by land into Syria. 

XXV. While these things passed in Egypt, 
king Dejotarus applied to Domitius Calvinus, 
to whom CsEsar had intrusted the government 
of Asia and the neighbouring provinces, be- 
seeching him, " Not to sufier Pharnaces to 
seize and lay waste the Lessor Armenia, which 
was his kingdom ; or Cappadocia, which be- 
longed to Ariobarzancs ; because unless they 



296 



P A K S A ' S 



were delivered from these insults, it would be 
impossible to execute Caesar's orders, or raise 
the money they stood engaged to pay." 
Domitius, who was not only sensible of the 
necessity of money to defray the expenses of 
the war, but likewise thought it dishonourable 
to the people of Rome and Csesar, as well as 
infamous to himself, to suffer the dominions 
of allies and friends to be usurped by a foreign 
prince, " That he must withdraw immediately 
out of Armenia and Cappadocia, and no longer 
insult the majesty and right of the Roman 
people, engaged in a civil war." But believ- 
ing that his deputation would have greater 
weight, if he was ready to second it himself at 
the head of an army, he repaired to the 
legions which Vi'ere then in Asia, ordering 
two of them into Egypt, at Caesar's desire, 
and carrying the thirty-sixth along with him. 
To this Dejotarus added two more, which he 
had trained up for several years, according to 
our discipline, and a hundred horse. The 
like number of horse were furnished by Ario- 
barzanes. At the same time, he sent P. Sex- 
tius to C. Plffitorius the questor, for the legion 
which had been lately levied in Pontus ; and 
Quinctius Patisius into Cilicia, to draw thence 
a body of auxiliary troops. All these forces 
had orders to rendezvous, as soon as possible at 
Comana. 

XXVI. Meanwhile his ambassadors re- 
turned, with Pharnaces' answer: " That he 
had quitted Cappadocia; but kept possession 
of the Lesser Armenia, as his own, by right 
of inheritance: however, he was willing to 
submit all to the decision of Caesar, to whose 
commands he would pay immediate obedience." 
C. Domitius, sensible that he had quitted 
Cappadocia, not voluntarily, but out of neces- 
sity ; because he could more easily defend 
Armenia, which lay contiguous to his own 
kingdom, than Cappadocia, which was more 
remote ; and because believing, at first, that 
Domitius had brought all the three legions 
along with him, upon hearing that two were 
gone to Caesar, he seemed more determined 
to keep possession ; insisted " upon his quit- 
ting Armenia likewise, the reason, in both ca- 
ses, being the same ; nor was it just to demand 
that the matter should be postponed till Caesar's 
return, unless things were put in the condition 
in which they were at first." Having returned 
his answer, he advanced towards Armenia, 
with the forces above mentioned, directing his I 



march along the hills. For from Pontus, 
by way of Comana, runs a woody ridge of 
hills, that extends as far as Armenia the Less, 
dividing it from Cappadocia. The advanta- 
ges he had in view, by such a march were, 
that he would thereby effectually prevent all 
surprises, and be plentifully furnished with 
provisions from Cappadocia. 

XXVn. Meantime Pharnaces was per- 
petually sending ambassadors to Domitius with 
presents, and to treat of peace. All these he 
firmly rejected, telling the deputies; « That 
nothing was more sacred with him, than the 
majesty of the Roman people, and the rights 
of their allies." After a long march, he 
reached Nicopolis, a city of Armenia the Less, 
situated in a plain, having mountains, however, 
on its two sides, at a considerable distance. 
Here he encamped, about seven miles from the 
town. Between his camp and Nicopolis, lay 
a difficult and narrow pass, where Pharnaces 
placed a chosen body of foot, and all his horse, 
in ambuscade. He ordered a great number 
of cattle to be dispersed in the pass, and the 
townsmen and peasants to show themselves; 
that if Domitius entered the defile as a friend, 
he might have no suspicion of an ambuscade 
when he saw the men and flocks dispersed, 
without apprehension, in the fields; or if he 
should come as an enemy, that the soldiers, 
quitting their ranks to pillage, might fall an 
easy prey to his troops. 

XXVIIL While this design was going for- 
ward, he never ceased sending ambassadors 
to Domitius, with proposals of peace and amity, 
as fancying by this means, the most easy to 
insnare him. The expectation of peace kept 
Domitius in his camp, so that Pharnaces, dis- 
appointed of his hopes, and fearing the ambus- 
cade might be discovered, drew off his troops. 
Next day Domitius approached Nicopolis, and 
encamped near the town. While our men 
were working at the trenches, Pharnaces drew 
up his army in order of battle, forming his 
front into one line, according to the custom of 
the country, and securing his wings with a 
triple body of reserves. Domitius ordering part 
of the troops to continue under arms before 
the rampart, completed the fortifications of 
his camp. 

XXIX. Next night, Pharnaces having in- 
tercepted the couriers who brought Domitius 
an account of the posture of affairs at Alexan- 
dria, understood that Ceesar was in great dan 



COMMENTARIES. 



ger, and requested Domitius to send him suc- 
cours speedily, and came himself to Alexandria 
by the way of Syria. Pharnaces, upon this 
intelligence, imagined that protracting the 
time would be equivalent to a victory ; be- 
cause Domitius, he supposed, must very soon 
depart. He therefore dug two ditches, four 
feet deep, at a moderate distance from each 
other, on that side where lay the easiest ac- 
cess to the town, and our forces might, wi*ih 
most advantage, attack him ; resolving not to 
advance beyond them. Between these, he 
constantiy drew up his army, placing all his 
cavalry upon the wings without them, which 
greatly exceeded ours in number, and would 
otherwise have been useless. 

XXX. Domitius, more concerned at 
Cesar's danger than his own, and believing 
he could not retire with safety, should he now 
desire the conditions he had rejected, or 
march away without any apparent cause ; drew 
his forces out of the camp, and ranged them 
in order of battle. He placed the thirty-sixth 
legion on the right, that of Pontus on the left, 
and those of Dejotarus in the main body ; 
drawing them up with a very narrow front, 
and posting the rest of the cohorts to sustain 
the wings. The armies, thus drawn up on 
each side, they prepared for battle ; and the 
signal being given at the same time by both 
parties, the engagement began. The con- 
flict was sharp and various : for the thirty-sixth 
legion falling upon the king's cavalry, that 
was drawn up without the ditch, and charged 
them so successfully, that they drove them to 
the very walls of the town, passed the ditch, 
and attacked their infantry behind. But on 
the other side, the legion of Pontus having 
given way ; the second line, which advanced 
to sustain them, fetching a compass round the 
ditch, in order to attack the enemy in flank, was 
overwhelmed and borne down by a shower of 
darts, in endeavourihg to pass it. The legions 
of Dejotarus scarce made any resistance ; so 
that the victorious right wing, and main body 
of the king's army, fell upon the thirty-sixth 
legion, which yet made a brave stand ; and 
though surrounded by the forces of the ene- 
my, with wonderful presence of mind, cast 
themselves into an orb, and retired to the foot 
of a mountain, whither Pharnaces did not 
think fit to pursue them, because of the dis- 
advantage of the place. Thus the legion of 
Pontus being almost wholly cut off, with 
26* 



great part of those of Dejotarus, the thirty-, 
sixth legion retreated to an eminence, with 
the loss of about two hundred and fifty men. 
Several Roman knights, of illustrious rank, 
fell in this battle. Domitius, after this defeat, 
rallied the remains of his broken army, and 
retreated, by safe ways, through Cappadocia, 
into Asia, 

XXXI. Pharnaces, elated with this success, 
and hoping that Caesar would never be able 
to extricate himself at Alexandria, entered 
Pontus with all his forces. There acting as 
conqueror and king, and promising himself a 
happier destiny than his father, he ravaged 
their towns, seized the effects of the Roman 
citizens and natives, inflicted punishments 
worse than death, upon such as were dis- 
tinguished by their age or beauty ; and 
having made himself master of all Pontus, 
as there was no one to oppose his progress, 
boasted, that he had recovered his father's 
kingdom. 

XXXn. About the same time, we received 
a considerable check in Illyricum ; which 
province, Q. Cornificius, Caesar's questor, had 
defended the preceding months, not only 
without insult, but even with honour, and a 
conduct worthy of praise. Cajsar had sent 
him thither, the summer before, with two 
legions ; and though it was of itself little 
able to subsist an army, and at that time in 
particular almost totally ruined by the neigh- 
bourhood of so many wars ; yet by his pru- 
dence, vigilance, and uncommon care, he de- 
fended and kept possession of it. For he made 
himself master of several forts, built on emi- 
nences, whose advantageous situation tempted 
the inhabitants to make descents and inroads 
upon the country ; and gave the plunder of 
them to his soldiers : which, though but in- 
considerable, yet as they were no strangers 
to the distress and ill condition of the pro- 
vince, did not cease to be grateful ; the rather, 
as it was the fruit of their own valour. And 
when, after the battle of Pharsalia, Octavius 
had retreated to that coast with a large fleet ; 
Cornificius, with some vessels of the Judeitini, 
I who had always continued faithful to the com- 
monwealth, made himself master of the greatest 
part of his ships, which joined to those of ihe 
Judertini, rendered him capable of sustaining 
even a naval engagement. And while Casar, 
victorious, was pursuing Pompey to the re- 
motest parts of the earth ; upon advice that 
2 Q 



298 



PANSA'S 



Jthe enemy had, for the most part, retired into 
Illyricum, on account of its neighbourhood to 
Macedonia, and were there uniting into a 
body, he wrote to Gabinius, '< To repair di- 
rectly thither, with the new-raised legions, 
and join Cornificius, that in case of any 
danger to the province, they might be the 
better able to protect it ; but if less forces suf- 
ficed, to march into Macedonia, which he 
foresaw would never be free from commotions, 
so long as Pompey lived." 

g' XXXIII. Gabinius, whether he imagined 
,'the province better provided than it really was, 
or depended much upon the auspicious fortune 
of Cassar, or confided in his own valour and 
abilities, having often terminated, with success, 
difficult and dangerous wars ; marched into 
Illyricum, in the middle of winter, and the 
most difficult season of the year : where, not 
finding sufficient subsistence in the province, 
which was partly ruined, partly ill-affected ; 
and having no supplies by sea, because the 
season of the year had put a stop to naviga- 
tion ; he found himself compelled to carry on 
the war, not according to his own inclination, 
but as necessity allowed. As he was there- 
fore obliged to lay siege to forts and castles 



in a very rude season, he received many checks, ^]^XXXV. Octavius, understanding that Va 



and fell under such contempt with the barba- 
rians, that retiring to Salona, a maritime city, 
inhabited by a set of brave and faithful Ro- 
mans, he was attacked upon his march ; and 
after the loss of two thousand soldiers, thirty- 
eight centurions, and four tribunes, got to 
Salona with the rest ; where his wants con- 
tinually increasing, he died a few days after. 
His misfortunes and sudden death gave Octa- 
vius great hopes of mastering the province. 
But fortune, whose influence is so great in 
matters of war, joined to the diligence of Cor- 
nificius, and the valour of Vatinius, soon put 
an end to his triumphs. 

XXXIV. For Vatinius, who was then at 
Brundusium, having intelligence of what 
passed in Illyricum, by letters from Cornifi- 
cius, who pressed him to come to the assistance 
of the province, and informed him, that Oc- 
tavius had leagued with the barbarians, and, 
in several places, attacked our garrisons, partly 
by sea, with his fleet, partly by land, with 
the troops of the barbarians : Vatinius, I say, 
upon notice of these things, though extremely 
weakened by sickness, insomuch that his 
strength of body no way answered his resolu- 



tion and greatness of mind ; yet by his valour, 

surmounted all opposition, the force of his dis- 
temper, the rigour of the season, and the dif- 
ficulties of a sudden preparation. For having 
himself but a very few galleys, he wrote to 
Q. Kalenus, in Achaia, to furnish him with a 
squadron of ships. But these not coming 
with that despatch which the danger our army 
was in required, because Octavius pressed hard 
upon them ; he fastened beaks to all the barks 
and vessels that lay in the port, whose number 
was considerable enough, though they were not 
sufficiently large for an engagement. Join- 
ing these to what galleys he had, and put- 
ting the veteran soldiers aboard, whereof he 
had a great number, who had been left sick at 
Brundusium, when the army went over to 
Greece, he sailed for Illyricum ; where ha- 
ving subjected several maritime states that had 
declared for Octavius ; and neglecting such as 
continued obstinate in their revolt, because 
he would suffer nothing to retard his design of 
meeting the enemy ; he came up with Octavius 
before Epidaurus; and obliging him to raise 
the siege, which he was carrying on with 
great vigour, by sea and land, joined the garri- 
son to his own forces. 



tinius's fleet consisted mostly of small barks, 
and confiding in the strength of his own, stop- 
ped at the Isle of Tauris. Vatinius followed 
him thither, not imagining he would halt at 
that place, but because he was determined to 
pursue him wherever he went. Vatinius, who 
had no suspicion of an enemy, and whose 
ships were moreover dispersed by a tempest, 
perceived, as he approached the isle, a vessel 
filled with soldiers, that advanced towards him 
with full sails. Upon this, he gave orders for 
furling the sails, lowering the sail-yards, and 
arming the soldiers : and hoisting a flag, as a 
signal for battle, intimated to the ships that 
followed to do the same. Our men prepared 
themselves in the best manner their sudden 
surprise would allow, while Octavius advanced, 
in good order, from the port. The two fleets 
drew up. Octavius had the advantage as to 
disposition, and Vatinius in the bravery of his 
troops. 

XXXVI. Vatinius finding himself inferior to 
the enemy, both in the number and largeness 
of his ships, resolved to commit the aflTair to for- 
tune, and, therefore, in his own quinquereme, 
attacked Octavius in his four-benched galley. 



COMMENTARIES, 



299 



This he did with such violence, and the shock 
was so great, that the beak of Octavius's gal- 
ley was broke. The battle raged with great 
fury likewise in other places, but chiefly round 
the two admirals : f()r as the ships on each side 
advanced to sustain those that fought, a close 
and furious conflict ensued in a very narrow 
sea, where the nearer the vessels approached, 
the more had Vatinius's soldiers the advantage. 
For, with admirable courage, they leaped into 
the enemy's ships, and forcing them, by this 
means, to an equal combat, soon mastered them 
by their superior valour. Octavius's galley 
was sunk. Many others were taken, or suf- 
fered the same fate. The soldiers were partly 
slain in the ships, partly thrown overboard in- 
to the sea. Octavius got into a boat, which 
sinking under the multitude that crowded 
after him, he himself, though wounded, swam 
to his brigantine ; where being taken up, and 
night having put an end to the battle, as the 
wind blew very strong, he spread all his sails 
and fled. A few of his ships, that had the 
good fortune to escape, followed him. 

XXXVII. Vatinius, seeing the enemy en- 
tirely defeated, sounded a retreat, and entered 
victorious the port whence Octavius had sailed 
to fight him, without the loss of a single 
vessel. He took, in this battle, one quinque- 
reme, two triremes, eight two-benched galleys, 
and a great number of rowers. The next day 
was employed in repairing his own fleet, and 
the ships he had taken from the enemy : after 
which, he sailed for the island of Issa, ima- 
gining Octavius would retire thither after his 
defeat. In this island was a flourishing city, 
well affected to Octavius, which, however, 
surrendered to Vatinius, upon the first sum- 
mons. Here he understood that Octavius, 
attended by a few small barks, had sailed, 
with a fair wind, for Greece, whence he in- 
tended to pass on to Sicily, and afterwards to 
Africa. Vatinius having, in so short a space, 
successfully terminated the affairs of Illyricum, 
restored the province, in a peaceable condi- 
tion, to Cornificius, and driven the enemy's 
fleet out of those seas, returned victorious to 
Brundusium, with his army and fleet in good 
condition. 

XXXVIII. While Cssar besieged Pom- 
pey at Dyrrhachium, triumphed at Pharsalia, 
and carried on the war, with so much danger, 
at Alexandria, Cassius Longinus, who had 
been left in Spain as pro-pretor of the farther 



province; either through his natural disposi 
tion, or out of a hatred he had contracted to the* 
province, because of a wound he had treacher- 
ously received there, when questor, di-ew upon 
himself the general dislike of the people. 
He discerned this temper among them, partly 
from a consciousness that he deserved it, partly 
from the manifest indications they gave of 
their discontent. To secure himself against 
their disaffection, he endeavoured to gain the 
love of the soldiers ; and having, for this pur- 
pose, assembled them together, promised them 
a hundred sesterces a man. Soon after, hav- 
ing made himself master of Medobriga, a 
town in Lusitania, and of Mount Herminius, 
whither the Medobrigians had retired; and 
being, upon that occasion, saluted imperator, 
by the army, he gave them another hundred 
sesterces each. These, accompanied with other 
considerable largesses, in great number, seemed, 
for the present, to increase the good-will 
of the army, but tended gradually and im- 
perceptibly to the relaxation of military dis- 
cipline. 

XXXIX. Cassius having sent his army 
into winter-quarters, fixed his residence at 
Cordova, for the administration of justice. 
Being greatly in debt, he resolved to pay it 
by laying heavy impositions upon the province ; 
and, according to the custom of prodigals, 
made his liberalities a pretence to justify the 
most exorbitant demands. He taxed the rich 
at discretion, and compelled them to pay, 
without the least regard to their remonstrances ; 
frequently im.proving light and trifling offences, 
as a handle for all manner of extortions. All 
methods of gain were pursued, whether 
great and apparent, or mean and sordid. 
None that had any thing to lose could es- 
cape accusation ; insomuch that the plunder 
of their private fortunes was aggravated by 
the dangers they were exposed to from pre- 
tended crimes. 

XL. Thus Longinus, acting the same part 
when pro-consul which he had done when 
questor, drew upon himself the like con- 
spiracies against his life. Even his own de- 
pendants concurred in the general hatred ; who, 
though the ministers of his rapine, yet hated 
the man by whose authority they committed 
those crimes. The odium still increased upon 
his raising a fifth legion, which added to the 
expense and burden of the province. The 
cavalry was augmented to three thousand, with 



u 



PANSA'S 



costly ornaments afad equipage ; nor had the 
people any respite from his extortions. 

XLI. Meanwhile he received orders from 
Caesar, to transport his army into Africa, and 
march through Mauritania, towards Numidia, 
because king Juba had sent considerable 
succours to Pompey, and was preparing to 
send more. These letters filled him with an 
insolent joy, by the opportunity they offered 
him of pillaging new provinces and a wealthy 
kingdom. He therefore hastened into Lusi- 
tania, to assemble his legions, and draw to- 
gether a body of auxiliaries ; appointing cer- 
tain persons to provide corn, ships, and money, 
that nothing might retard him at his return ; 
which was much sooner than expected ; for 
when interest called, Cassius wanted neither 
industry nor vigilance. 

XLII. Having got his army together, and 
encamped near Cordova, he made a speech 
to the soldiers, wherein he acquainted them 
wiih the orders he had received from Csesar, 
and promised them a hundred sesterces each, 
when they should arrive in Mauritania. The 
fifth legion, his told them. Was to remain in 
Spain; Having ernied his speech, he returned 
to Cordova. The same day, aboiit noon, as 
he went to the hall of justice, one Minutius 
Silo, a client of L. Racilius, presented him 
with a paper, in a soldier's habit, as if he had 
some request to make. Then retiring behind 
Racilius,(who walked beside Cassius,) as if 
waiting for an answer, he insensibly drew near; 
and a favourable opportunity offering, seized 
Cassius with his left hand, and wounded him 
twice with a dagger in his right. The noise 
this occasioned was as a signal to the conspir- 
ators, who all rushed upon him in a body. 
Munatius Plancus killed the lictor, that was 
next Longinus ; and wounded Q. Cassius his 
lieutenant. T. Vasius, and L. Mergilio^ se- 
conded their countryman Plancus; for they 
were all Italians. L. Licinius Squillus flew 
upon Longinus himself, and gave him several 
slight wounds as he lay upon the ground. By 
this time, his guards came up to his assistance, 
(for he always h&d a body of veterans, armed 
with darts, to attend him,) and surrounded the 
rest of ihe conspirators, who were advancing 
to complete the assassination. Of this number 
were Cidphurnias Salvianus, and Manilius 
Tuseuhis. Cassius was carried home; and 
Minutius Silo, stumbling upon a stone, as he 
endeavoured to make his escape, was taken 



and brought to him. Eaciliiis relifed to the 
neighbouring house of a friend till he should 
have certain information of the fate of Cassius. 
L. Laterensis not doubting but he was des- 
patchedj ran^ in a transport of joy, to the 
camp, to congratulate the second and the new- 
raised legions upon it, who, he knew, bore a 
particular hatred to Cassius ; and who, im- 
mediately upon this intelligence, placed him 
on the tribunal, and proclaimed him pretor. 
For thfere was not a native of the province, 
nor a soldier of the new-raised legion, nor a 
person, who by long residence was natural- 
ised to the province, of which kind th'e second 
legion consisted, who did not join in thfe gene^ 
ral hatred of Cassius. Meantime Laterensis 
was informed that Cassius was still alive ; at 
which, being rather grieved than disconcerted, 
he immediately so far recovered himself as to 
go and wait upon him. By this time, the 
thirtieth legion having notice of what had 
passed, marched to Cordova, to the assistance 
of their general. The twenty-first and fifth 
followed their example. As only two legions 
remained in the camp, the second, fearing they 
should be left alone, and thereby have their 
sentiments known, did the same. But the 
new-raised legion continued firm, nor could be 
induced by any motives of fear, to stir from its 
place. Cassius ordered all the accomplices of 
the conspiracy to be seized, and sent back the 
fifth legion to the camp, retaining the other 
three. By the confession of Minutius, he 
learned, that L. Racilius, L. Laterensis, and 
Annius Scapula, a man of great authority and 
credit in the province, and equally in his con- 
fidence with Laterensis ahd Racilius, wer 
concerned in the plot : nor did he long defe. 
his revenge, but ordered them to be put to 
death. He delivered Minutiiis to be racked 
by his freed-men ; likewise Calphutnius Sal- 
vlanus ; who, turning evidence, increased the 
number of the conspirators ; justly, as sotne 
think ; but others pretend that h^e was forced. 
L. Mergilio was likewise put to the torture. 
Squillus impeached many others, who were all 
condemned to die, except such as redeemed 
their lives by a fine ; for he pardoned Cal- 
phurnius for ten, and Q. Sextius for fifty 
thousand sesterces ; who though deeply guilty, 
yet having, in this manner, escaped death, 
showed Cassius to be no less covetous than 
cruel. 

XLHI. Some days after, he received let- 



COMMENTARIES. 



301 



ters from Cffisar, with an account of Pompey's 
defeat and flight ; which news equally affected 
him with joy and sorrow. Caesar's success 
gave him pleasure ; but the conclusion of the 
war would put an end to his rapines : insomuch 
that he was uncertain which to wish for, vic- 
tory^ or an unbounded licentiousness. When 
he was cured of his wounds, he sent to all 
who were indebted to him, in any sums, and 
insisted upon immediate payment. Such as 
Were taxed too low, had orders to furnish 
larger sums. Such Roman citizens as had 
been levied in the several colonies of the pro- 
vince, and were alarmed at the thoughts of a 
foreign expedition, obtained their discharge 
for a certain sum. This brought in a vast re- 
venue, but greatly increased the general ha- 
tred. He afterwards reviewed the army, sent 
the legions and auxiliaries, designed for 
Africa, towards the straits of Hercules, and 
went himself to Seville, to examine the condi- 
tion of the fleet. He stayed there some time, 
in consequence of an edict he had published, 
ordering all who had not paid the sums in 
which they were amerced, to tepair to him 
thither ; which created a universal murmuring 
and discontent, 

XLIV. In the mean time, L. Titius, a mili- 
tary tribune of the new-raised legion, sent 
him notice of a report, that the thirtieth legion, 
one of those he was carVying with him to 
Africa, had mutinied at Ilurgis, killed some 
of the centurions that opposed them, and were 
gone over to the second legion, who marched 
another way towards the straits. Upon this 
intelligence, he set out, by night, with five 
cohorts of the twenty-first legion, and came 
up with them in the morning. He stayed 
there that day, to consult what was proper to 
be done, and then went to Carmona, where 
he found the thirtieth and twenty-first legions, 
with four cohorts of the fifth, and all the 
cavalry assembled.. Here he learned, that 
the new-raised legion had surprised four co- 
horts, near Obucula, and forced them along 
with them to the second legion ; where all 
joining, they had chosen T. Thorius, an 
Italian, for their general. Having instantly 
called a council, he sent Marcellus to Cor- 
dova, to secure that town, and Q. Cassius, 
his lieutenant, to Seville. A few days after, 
news was brought that Cordova had revolted, 
and that Marcellus, either voluntarily, or 
through force, (for the reports were various,) 



had joined them ; as likewise the two cohorts 
of the fifth legion, that were in garrison there. 
Cassius, provoked at these mutinies, decamped, 
and the next day came to Segovia upon the 
river Xenil. There, summoning an assembly 
to sound the disposition of the troops, he 
found that it was not out of regard to him 
but to Cffisarj though absent, that they con- 
tinued faithful, and were ready to undergo 
any danger for the recovery of the province. 

XLV. Meantime Thorius marched the 
veteran legions to Cordova ; and that the re- 
volt might not appear to spring from a se- 
ditious inclination in him or the soldiers ; as 
likewise to oppose an equal authority to that 
of Q. Cassius, wjio was drawing together a 
great force, in Caesar's name ; he publicly gave 
out, that his design was to recover the province 
for Pompey. Nay, perhaps he was really in- 
fluenced by a love for Pompey, whose name 
was dear to those legions that had served under 
Varro. Be this as it will, Thorius at least 
made it his pretence ; and the soldiers were 
so infatuated with the thought, that they had 
Pompey's name inscribed upon their bucklers. 
The citizens of Cordova, men, women, and 
children, came out to meet the legions; beg- 
ging they would not enter Cordova as ene- 
mies, seeing they joined with them in their 
aversion to Cassius, and only desired they 
might not be obliged to act against Csesar. 

XLVI. The soldiers, moved by the prayers 
and tears of so great a multitude, and seeing 
they stood in no need of Pompey's name and 
memory, to spirit up a revolt against Cassius, 
as he was equally odious to the partisans of 
both parties ; neither being able to prevail 
with Marcellus, or the people of Cordova, to 
declare against Caesar ; they erased Pompey's 
name from their bucklers, chose Marcellus 
their commander, joined the citizens of Cor- 
dova, and encamped near the town. Two 
days after Cassius encamped on an eminence, 
on this side the Baetis, about four miles from 
Cordova, and within view of the town ; whence 
he sent letters to Bogud, in Mauritania, and 
M. Lepidus, pro-consul of Hither Spain, to 
come to his asistance as soon as possible, for 
Caesar's sake. Meanwhile he ravaged the 
country, and set fire to the buildings round 
Cordova. 

XL VII. The legions under Marcellus, pro- 
voked at this indignity, ran to him, and 
begged to be led against the enemy, that 



302 



PANSA'S 



they might have an opportunity of fighting 
them before they could have time to destroy, 
with fire and sword, the rich and noble pos- 
sessions of the Cordovans. Marcellus, though 
averse to battle, which, whoever was victorious, 
must turn to Caesar's detriment ; yet unable 
to restrain the legions, crossed the Baetis, and 
drew up his men. Cassius did the same, 
upon a rising ground : but as he would not 
quit his advantageous post, Marcellus per- 
suaded his men to return to their camp. He 
had already begun to retire, when Cassius, 
knowing himself to be stronger in cavalry, fell 
upon the legionaries with his horse, and made 
a considerable slaughter in their rear, upon 
the banks of the river. This check making 
Marcellus sensible of the mistake he had com- 
mitted, in passing the river, he removed his 
camp to the other side, where both armies fre- 
quently drew up, but did not engage, on ac- 
count of the inequality of the ground. 

XLVIII. Marcellus was stronger in foot, 
for he commanded veteran soldiers, of great 
experience in war. Cassius depended more 
•on the fidelity than the courage of his troops. 
The two camps being very near each other, 
Marcellus seized a spot of ground, where he 
built a fort, very convenient for depriving the 
enemy of water. Longinus apprehending he 
should be besieged, in a country where all 
were against him, quitted his camp in the night, 
and, by a quick march, reached Ulia, a town 
on which he thought he could rely. There he 
encamped so near the walls, that both by the 
situation of the place (for Ulla stands on an 
eminence ) and the defences of the town, he 
was on all sides secure from an attack. Marcel- 
lus followed him, and encamped as near the 
town as possible. Having taken a view of the 
place, he found himself reduced, by necessity, 
to do what was most agreeable to his own in- 
clination ; and neither engage Cassius, which 
the ardour of his soldiers would have forced 
him to, had it been possible ; nor suffered him 
by his exertions, to infest the territories of 
other states, as he had done those of Cordova. 
He therefore raised redoubts in proper places, 
and continued his works quite round the town, 
enclosing both Ulla and Cassius within his 
lines. But before they were finished, Cassius 
sent out all his cavalry : who he imagined 
might do him great service, by cutting off Mar- 
cellus's provisions and forage ; and could only 
be a useless encumbrance upon him, by con- 



suming his provisions, if he was shut up in his 
camp. 

XLIX. A few days after, king Bogud 
having received Cassius's letters, came and 
joined him with all his forces, consisting of 
one legion, and several auxiliary cohorts. For 
as commonly happens in civil dissensions, 
some of the states of Spain at that time favoured 
Cassius, but a yet greater number, Marcellus. 
Bogud came up to the advanced works of 
Marcellus, where many sharp skirmishes hap- 
pened with various success ; however, Mar- 
cellus still kept possession of his works, 

L. Meanwhile Lepidns, from the higher 
province, with thirty-five legionary cohorts, 
and a great body of horse and auxiliaries, came 
to Ulla, with design to adjust the differences 
between Cassius and Marcellus. Marcellus 
submitted, without hesitation, but Cassius kept 
within his works, either because he thought his 
cause the justest, or from an apprehension that 
his adversary's submission had prepossessed 
Lepidus in his favour. Lepidus encamped 
with Marcellus, at Ulla, prevented a battle, in- 
vited Cassius into his camp, and engaged his 
honour to act without prejudice. Cassius hesi- 
tated long, but at last desired that the circum- 
vallation should be levelled, and free egress 
given him. The truce was not only concluded, 
but the works demolished, and the guards 
drawn off; when king Bogud attacked one 
of Marcellus's forts, that lay nearest to his 
camp, unknown to any, (unless perhaps Lon- 
ginus, who was not exempt from suspicion on 
this occasion,) and slew a great number of his 
men. And had not Lepidus interposed, much 
mischief would have been done. 

LI. A free passage being made for Cassius, 
Marcellus joined camps with Lepidus ; and 
both together marched for Cordova, while 
Cassius retired to Carmona. At the same 
time, Trebonius, the pro-consul, came to take 
possession of the province. Cassius having 
notice of his arrival, sent his legions and cav- 
alry into winter quarters, and hastened, with 
all his effects, to Melaca, where he embarked 
immediately, though it was the winter season ; 
that he might not, as he pretended, come into 
the power of Marcellus, Lepidus, and Trebo- 
nius : as his friends gave out, to avoid passing 
through a province, great part of which had 
revolted from him ; but as was more generally 
believed, to secure the money he had amass- 
ed by his numberless extortions. The wind 



COMMENTARIES. 



303 



favouring him as far as could be expected at 
that season of the year, he put into the Iberus, to 
avoid sailing in the night ; and thence contin- 
uing his voyage, which he thought he might do 
with safety, though the wind blew consider- 
ably fresher, he was encountered by such a 
storm, at the mouth of the river, that neither be- 
ing able to return, because of the stream, nor 
stem the fury of the waves, the ship, and all 
that were in her, perished. 

LII. Caesar arriving in Syria from Egypt, 
.'.nd understanding by those who attended him 
there, from Rome, and the letters he received 
at the same time, that the government there 
was upon a very bad footing, and all the affairs 
of the commonwealth managed indiscreetly : 
that the contests of the tribunes were produc- 
ing perpetual seditions, and the remissness of 
the officers of the legions destroying military 
discipline ; all which required his speedy pres- 
ence to redress them ; thought it yet first in- 
cumbent upon him, to settle the state of the 
provinces through which he passed ; that 
freeing them from domestic conventions, and 
the fear of a foreign enemy, the laws might 
have a free course. This he hoped soon to effect 
in Syria, Cilicia, and Asia, because these pro- 
vinces were not involved in war. In Bithynia 
and Pontus indeed he expected more trouble, 
because he understood Pharnaces still continu- 
ed in Pontus, and was not likely to quit it ea- 
sily, being flushed with the victory he had ob- 
tained over Domitius Calvinus. He made a 
short stay in most states of note, distributing 
rewards both publicly and privately to such as 
deserved them, determining old controversies, 
and receiving into his protection the kings, 
princes, and potentates, as well of the provinces 
as of the neighbouring countries. And having 
settled the necessary regulations for the defence 
of the country, he dismissed them, fully satis- 
fied with himself and the republic. 

LIII. After a stay of some days in those 
parts, he named Sextus Caesar, his friend and 
relation, to the command of Syria, and the 
legions appointed to guard it ; and sailed him- 
self for Cilicia, with the fleet he had brought 
from Egypt. He summoned the states to as- 
semble at Tarsus, the strongest and finest city 
of the province ; where having settled every 
thing that regarded either it or the neighbour- 
ing countries, his warlike ardour would not 
suffer him to tarry longer ; but marching 
through Cappadocia with the utmost expe- 



dition, where he stopped two days at Mazaca, 
he arrived at Comana, renowned for the an- 
cient and sacred temple of Bellona, where she 
is worshipped with so much veneration, that 
her priest is accounted next in power and dig- 
nity to the king. He conferred this dignity 
on Lycomedes of Bithynia, descended of the 
ancient kings of Cappadocia, who demanded 
it in right of inheritance ; his ancestors having 
lost it upon occasion of the sceptre's being 
transferred to another line. As for Ariobar- 
zanes, and his brother Ariarates, who had both 
deserved well of the commonwealth, he con- 
firmed the first in his kingdom, and put the 
other under his protection ; after which, he 
pursued his march with the same despatch. 

LIV. Upon his approaching Pontus, and 
the frontiers of Gallo-gra;cia ; Dejotarus, tet- 
rarch of that province, (whose title, however, 
was disputed by the neighbouring tetrarchs,) 
and king of the Lesser Armenia, laying aside 
the regal ornaments, and assuming the habit not 
only of a private person, but even of a criminal, 
came in a suppUant manner to Caisar, " To beg 
forgiveness, for obeying and assisting Pompey 
at a time when Ccesar could afford him no pro- 
tection : urging, that it was his business to 
obey the governors who were present, with- 
out pretending to judge of the disputes of 
the people of Rome." CsEsar, after putting 
him in mind " of the many services he had 
done him, and the decrees he had procured 
in his favour when consul ; that his defection 
could claim no excuse from want of informa- 
tion, because one of his industry and pru- 
dence could not but know who was master of 
Italy and Rome, where the senate, the people, 
and the majesty of the republic resided ; who 
in fine was consul after Marcellus and Len- 
tulus ; told him, that he would, notwithstand- 
ing, forgive his present fault, in consideration 
of his past services, the former friendship that 
had subsisted between them, the respect due 
to his age, and the solicitation o those who in- 
terceded in his behalf: adding, that he would 
refer the controversy relating to the tetrarchate 
to another time." He restored him the royal 
habit, and commanded him to join him with 
all his cavalry, and the legion he had trained 
up after the Roman manner. 

LV. When he was arrived in Pontus, and 
had drawn all his forces together, which were 
not very considerable either for their number 
or discipline ; (for except the sixth legion, 



304 



v^-^X^- 



PANSA'S 



composed of veteran soldiers, which he had 
brought with him from Alexandria, and which 
by its many labours and dangers, the length 
of its marches and voyages, and the frequent 
wars in which it had been engaged, was re- 
duced to less than a thousand men ; he had 
only the legion of Dejotarus, and two more 
that had been in the late battle between Do- 
mitius and Pharnaces :) ambassadors arrived 
from Pharnaces, " To entreat that Cajsar 
would not look upon him as an enemy, he 
being ready to submit to all his commands." 
Particularly they represented : " That Phar- 
naces had granted no aid to Pompey, as De- 
jotarus had done, whom he had nevertheless 
pardoned." Caesar replied, "That Pharnaces 
should meet with the utmost justice, if he per- 
formed his promises : but at the same time ad- 
monished the ambassadors in gentle terms, to 
forbear mentioning Dejotarus, and not to over- 
rate the having refused aid to Pompey. He 
told them, he was always ready to forgive the 
suppliant, but would never look upon private 
services to himself, as an atonement for pub- 
lic injuries done the province : that Pharna- 
ces's refusal of aiding Pompey had turned 
chiefly to his own advantage, as he had there- 
by avoided all share in the disaster of Phar- 
salia : that he was, however, willing to forgive 
the injuries done to the Roman citizens in 
Pontus, because it was now too late to think 
of redressing them ; as he could neither restore 
life to the dead, nor manhood to those he had 
deprived of it, by a punishment more intolera- 
ble to the Romans than death itself. But 
that he must quit Pontus immediately, send 
back the farmers of the revenues, and restore 
to the Romans and their allies what he un- 
justly detained from them. These things per- 
formed, he might then send the presents which 
successful generals were wont to receive from 
their friends :" (for Pharnaces had sent him a 
golden crown.) With this answer he dismiss- 
ed the ambassadors. 

LVI. Pharnaces promised every thing : 
but hoping that Csesar, who was in haste to be 
gone, would give easy credit to whatever he 
said, that he might the sooner set out upon 
more urgent affairs ; (for every body knew 
that his presence was much wanted at Rome,) 
he performed but slowly, wanted to protract 
the day of his departure, demanded other con- 
ditions, and, in fine, endeavoured to elude his 
engagements. Caesar, perceiving his drift, 



did now, out of necessity, what he was usually 
wont to do through inclination, and resolved to 
decide the affair as soon as possible by a battle. 

LVII. Ziela is a town of Pontus, well for- 
tified, though situated in a plain. For a na- 
tural eminence, as if raised by art, sustains 
the walls on all sides. All around are a great 
number of large mountains, intersected by 
valleys. The highest of these, famed by the 
victory of Mithridates, the defeat of Triarius, 
and the destruction of our army, is not above 
three miles from Ziela, and has a ridge that 
almost extends to the town. Here Pharnaces 
lodged himself, with all his forces, repairing 
the fortifications of a camp which had proved 
so fortunate to his father. 

LVIII. Cffisar encamped about five miles 
from the enemy ; and observing that the val- 
leys which defended the king's camp would 
likewise defend his own, at the same distance, 
if the enemy, who were much nearer, did not 
seize them before him ; he ordered a great 
quantity of fascines to be brought within the 
intrenchments. This being quickly performed, 
next night, at the fourth watch, leaving all 
the baggage in the camp, he set out with the 
legions ; and arriving at day-break, unsuspect- 
ed by the enemy, possessed himself of the 
same post where Mithridates had defeated 
Triarius. Hither he commanded all the fas- 
cines to be brought, employing the servants of 
the army for that purpose, that the soldiers 
might not be called off from the works ; be- 
cause the valley, which divided the eminence 
where he was intrenching himself from the 
enemy, was not above a mile over. 

LIX. Pharnaces perceiving this next morn- 
ing, ranged all his troops, in order of battle, 
before his camp. But the approach towards 
us was so dangerous, that Csesar concluded it 
to be no more than a review ; or done with de- 
sign to retard his works, by keeping a great 
number of his men under arms ; or perhaps 
for ostentation, to show that he trusted no less 
to his army than the advantage of his post. 
Therefore keeping only his first line in order 
of battle, he commanded the rest of the army 
to go on with the works. But Pharnaces 
either prompted by the place itself, which had 
been so fortunate to his father ; or induced by 
favourable omens, as we were afterwards told ; 
or despising the small number of our men that 
were in arms ; for he took all that were em- 
ployed in carrying materials to the works to 



COMMENTARIES, 



305 



be soldiers ; or confiding in his veteran army, 
who valued themselves upon having defeated 
the twenty-second legion ; and at the same 
time, contemning our troops, whom he had 
worsted, under Domitius ; was determined 
upon a battle, and to that end began to cross the 
valley. Cassar, at first, laughed at his ostenta- 
tion, in crowding his army in so narrow a place, 
where no enemy, in his right senses, would 
have ventured ; while, in the mean time, Phar- 
naces continued his march, and began to ascend 
the steep hill on which Caesar was posted. 

LX. Caesar, astonished at his incredible 
rashness and confidence, and finding himself 
suddenly and unexpectedly attacked, called 
ofThis soldiers from the works, ordered them 
to arms, opposed the legions to the enemy, and 
ranged his troops in order of battle. The 
su denness of the thing occasioned some ter- 
ror at first ; and the chariots, armed with 
scythes, falling in with our ranks before they 
were completed, disordered them considerably : 
however, the multitude of darts discharged 
against them, soon put a stop to their career. 
The enemy's army followed them close, and 
began the battle with a shout. Our advan- 
tageous situation, but especially the assistance 
of the gods, who preside over all the events of 
war, and more particularly those where hu- 
man conduct can be of no service, favoured 
us greatly on this occasion. 

LXI. After a sharp and obstinate conflict, 
victory began to declare for us on the right 
wing, where the sixth legion was posted. The 
enemy there was totally overthrown, but in 
the centre and left the battle was long and 
doubtful : however, with the assistance of the 
same gods, we at last prevailed there also, and 
drove them, with the utmost precipitation, 
down the hill, which they had so easily as- 
cended before. Great numbers being slain, 
and many crushed, by the flight of their own 
troops, such as had the good fortune to escape, 
were nevertheless obliged to throw away 
their arms ; so that having crossed the valley, 
and got upon the opposite ascent, they could 
yet, because unarmed, derive no benefit from 
the advantage of the ground. Our men,flushed 
with victory, made no scruple to follow them, 
and even attack their camp ; which they soon 
27 



forced, notwithstanding the resistance made 
by the cohorts left by Pharnaces to guard it. 
Almost all the whole army was cut to pieces 
or made prisoners. Pharnaces himself escaped, 
with a few horse ; and had not our soldiers 
been detained some time, by the assault of the 
camp, he must certainly have fallen aUve into 
Caesar's hands. 

LXII. Though Caesar was accustomed to 
victory, yet the present success gave him no 
small joy ; because he had so speedily put an 
end to a very great war. The remembrance 
too of the danger to which he had been ex- 
posed, enhanced the pleasure, as he had ob- 
tained an easy victory in a very difficult con- 
juncture. Having thus recovered Pontus, and 
abandoned the plunder of the enemy's camp to 
the soldiers, he set out next day, with a guard 
of light horse. The sixth legion had orders to 
return to Italy, to receive the honours and re- 
wards they had merited : the auxiliary troops 
of Dejotarus were sent home : and Caelius 
Vincinianus was left with two legions to pro- 
tect the kingdom of Pontus. 

LXIII. Through Gallo-graecia and Bithy- 
nia he went into Asia, settling all the con- 
troversies of the provinces as he passed, and 
establishing the limits and jurisdictions of the 
several kings, states, and tetrarchs. Mithri- 
dates of Pergamus, who had so speedily and 
successfully served him in Egypt, as we have 
related above, a man of royal descent and 
education, (for Mithridates, king of all Asia, 
out of regard to his birth, had carried him 
along with him when very young, and kept 
him in his camp several years,) was appointed 
king of Bosphorus, which had belonged to 
Pharnaces. And thus were the provinces of 
the Roman people screened from the attempts 
of barbarous and hostile kings, by the interpo- 
sition of a prince steadily attached to the in- 
terests of the republic. To this was added 
the tetrarchate of Gallo-graecia, which be- 
longed to him of right, though it had been pos- 
sessed for some years by Dejotarus. Thus 
Caesar, staying nowhere longer than the neces- 
sity of aflTairs required, and having settled all 
things relating to the provinces with the ut- 
most success and despatch, returned to Italy 
much sooner than was expected. 
2R 



P ANSA'S COMMENTARIES 



OF THE 



AFRICAN WAR. 



807 



THE ARGUMENT. 

f . Caesar sets out for Africa.— III. And lands at Adrumetum.— IV. He treats with Considius about the surrender 
of that town ; but in vain.-^V. Thence he removes his camp to Ruspina. — VI. And agam to Leptis, which he 
immediately takes possession of. — VII. Here he draws together his auxiliary troops.— VIII. And afterwards 
returns to Ruspina, to provide himself with corn. — IX. Whence preparing to sail in quest of his transports, 
they unexpectedly appear before the port. — XI. Skirmishes between Caesar and Labienus, near Ruspina. — 
XVII. Petreius and Piso advance to support Labienus, but they are nevertheless all repulsed. — XT' III. The 
number of LalMenus's troops, and his presumption. — XIX. Scipio joins Labienus. Caesar fortifies his camp. — 
XXI. Young Pompey, by Cato's advice, prepares for war, but without success.— XXII. Caesar suffers greatly 
for want of corn. — XXIII. King Juba, marching to the assistance of Scipio, is forced to return, to defend his 
own kingdom against Bogud. — XXIV. Caesar resolving to fight the enemy, draws troops together from all 

parts. XXV. The manner of training Scipio's elephants. — XXVI. One of Caesar's ships taken by the 

enemy. — XXVII. Labienus attacks Leptis in vain. — XXV HI. Scipio draws out his troops. Caesar keeps 
within his camp.— XXIX. A great number of Numidians and Getulians desert to Caesar. — ^XXX. The town of 
Acilia demands a garrison from Caesar, and is immediately invested by the enemy. — XXXI. Caesar receives 
a supply of troops and corn by sea. — XXXII. Abody of Getulians, sent out as scouts, by Scipio, desert to 
Caesar. — XXXEI. Cato sends supplies to Scipio. The city of Tisdra demands a garrison of Caesar. — XXXIV. 
Caesar makes choice of a new camp, and strengthens it with works ; wliich the enemy advancing to retard, 
are repulsed with great slaughter. — XXXVIII. Upon which, Caesar draws out his army, but tlie enemy keep 
within tlieir camp. — XL. The siege of Acilia raised. — XLI. The surprising fortitude of one of Caesar's centu- 
rions, taken prisoner by Scipio ; and the cruelty of that general. — XLII. The great mischief done by a sud- 
den storm of rain. — XLIII. King Juba arrives in Scipio's camp, at the head of a great body of troops. — XLIV. 
Caesar having dislodged Labienus, seizes the hill on which he was posted. — XLV. Ccesar's works for the se- 
curity of his camp.— XL VI. Juba and Labienus, attacking a party of Caesar's men as they returned from the 
works, are repulsed with great slaughter. — XLVII. Two legions arrive to Caesar's aid.— XL VIH. Caesar's 
steadiness in maintaining military discipline. — XLIX. Tlie Getulians, revolting from Juba, oblige him to 
divide his forces. — L. Caesar feigns a design upon Uzita, whence a great many persons of illustrious rank 
join him. — LI. Juba's pride. — LII. Both armies drawn up. — LIIL The order of battle, on each side. — LIV. 
After a few skirmishes between the horse, both retire to their camps.— LV. Some of Caesar's ships burned 
by the enemy, and others taken. — LVI. Caesar embarking in person, follows the enemy, defeats them, and 
returns to his camp. — LVII. Caesar in want of corn. — LVIII. Which compels him to leave his camp. Scipio 
pursues him. — LIX. He possesses himself of Zeta, a town beyond the enemy's camp. — LX. The enemy, at- 
tacking him as he returns, laden with plunder, are repulsed. — LXI. Difficulty of fighting with the Numidians: 
Caesar's contrivance for that purpose. — LXII. The townof Vacca, demanding a garrison of Caesar, is plun- 
dered by king Juba. — LXIII, The enemy declining a battle, Cassar decamps, and repulses tlie troops, sent to 
set upon him in liis march. — LXIV. But, not caring to besiege Sarsura, he returns to his old camp. — LXV. 
The Tlaabenenses demand Caesar's protection.— LXV. Caesar receives fresh succours. — LXVH. A battle of 
tlie cavalry,in which Caesar has the advantage.— LXATIII. The enemy still declining an engagement, Caesar be- 
sieges Thapsus.-LXIX. Scipio attempts to relieve it.— LXX. Caesar encouraging his men, and finding them 
full of alacrity, attacks the enemy. — LXXII. The surprising bravery of a private soldier. — XXIII. Scipio's 
army defeated, and almost totally cut oflf.— LXXIV. Caesar marches for Utica. — LXXV. Whither Scipio's 
cavalry had retired — LXXVI. Cato kills himself Utica surrenders. — LXXVII. Caesar, in his march to 
Utica, possesses himself of Usceta and Adrumetum.— LXXVIII. He pardons the Uticans.— LXXIX. Juba 
flying to Zama, is refused admittance.— LXXX. Zama, and several of the king's generals, surrender to 
Cossar. — LXXXI. Considius surrenders Tisdra, and Vergilius, Thapsus.— LXXXII. The death of Juba and 
Petreius.- LXXXIIl. Also of Paustus and Afranius.— LXXXIV. And of Scipio.— LXXXV. Caesar converts 
Juba's kingdom into a province.— LXXXVI. And returns to Rome. 



308 



PAIVSA'S COMMENTARIES 



OF 



THE AFRICAN WAR 



I. C^sah setting out from Rome, advanced by 
moderate journeys towards Sicily ; and con- 
tinuing his march without intermission, arrived 
on the nineteenth of December at Lilybfeum. 
Designing to embark immediately, though he 
had only one legion of new levies, and not 
quite six hundred horse, he ordered his tent to 
be pitched so near the sea-side, that the waves 
flowed up to the very foot of it. This he did 
with a view to take away all hopes of delay, 
and keep his men in readiness at a day or an 
hour's warning. The wind at that time proving 
contrarj', he nevertheless suffered none of the 
soldiers or mariners to come on shore, that 
he might lose no opportunity of sailing ; the 
rather, because the inhabitants of the province 
were perpetually talking of the mighty forces 
of the enemy ; a cavalry not to be numbered ; 
four legions headed by Juba, together with a 
great body of light armed troops ; ten legions 
under the command of Scipio ; a hundred and 
twenty elephants, and fleets in abundance. 
Yet all these reports alarmed him not, nor 
aught abated his resolution and confidence. 
Meantime the number of galleys and transports 
increased daily ; the new levied legions flocked 
in to him from all parts ; among the rest the 
fifth, a veteran legion, and about two thousand 
horse. 

II. Having got together six legions, and 
about two thousand horse, he embarked the 
legions as fast as they arrived, in the galleys, 
and the cavalry in the transports. Then send- 
ing the greatest part of the fleet before, with 
orders to sail for the island of Aponiana, not 
far from Lilyba;um ; he himself continued a 
27* 



little longer in Sicily, to expose to public sa»i, 
some confiscated estates. Leaving all other 
affairs to the care of Allienus the pretor, who 
then commanded in the island ; and strictly 
charging him to use the utmost expedition in 
embarking the remainder of the troops ; he 
set sail the twenty-seventh of December, and 
soon came up with the rest of the fleet. As 
the wind was favourable, and afforded a quick 
passage, he arrived the fourth day within sight 
of Africa, attended by a few galleys : for the 
transports, being mostly dispersed and scat- 
tered by the winds, were driven different ways. 
Passing Clupea and Neapolis with the fleet, 
he continued for some time to coast along the 
shore, leaving many towns and castles behind 
him. 

III. When he came before Adrumetum, 
where the enemy had a garrison, commanded 
by C. Considius, and where Cn. Piso ap- 
peared upon the shore, towards Clupea, with 
the cavalry of Adrumetum, and about two 
thousand Moors ; having stopped a while, 
facing the port, till the rest of the fleet should 
come up, he landed his men, though their 
number at that time did not exceed three 
thousand foot, and a hundred and fifty horse. 
There, encamping before the town, he con- 
tinued quiet in his intrenchments, without of- 
fering any act of hostility, or suffering his menv 
to plunder the country. Meantime the in- 
habitants manned the walls, and assembled 
in great numbers before the gates, to defend 
the town, whose garrison amounted to two 
legions. Caesar having taken a view of the 
place, and thoroughly examined its situation 
309 



310 



PANSA'S 



on all sides, returned to his camp. Some 
blamed his conduct on this occasion, and 
charged him with a considerable oversight, 
in not appointing a place of rendezvous to 
the pilots and captains of the fleet, or at least 
not delivering them sealed instructions, ac- 
cording to his usual custom ; which being 
opened at a certain time, might have directed 
them where to assemble. But in this Cssar 
acted not without design : for as he knew of 
no port in Africa that was clear of the ene- 
my's forces, and where the fleet might ren- 
dezvous in security, he chose to rely en- 
tirely upon fortune, and land where occasion 
oflered. 

IV, In the mean time, L. Plancus, one 
of Csesar's lieutenants, desired leave to treat 
•with Considius, and try, if possible, to bring 
him to reason. Leave being granted ac- 
cordingly, he wrote him a letter, and sent it 
into the town by a messenger. When the 
messenger arrived, and presented the letter, 
Considius demanding whence it came, and 
being told from Cassar, the Roman general, 
answered ; that he knew no general of the 
Roman forces but Scipio. Then commanding 
the messenger to be immediately slain in his 
presence, he delivered the letter, unopened, 
to a trusty partisan, with orders to carry it 
directly to Scipio. 

V. Caesar had now continued a day and 
a night before the town, without receiving 
any answer from Considius ; the rest of the 
forces were not yet arrived ; his cavalry was 
very inconsiderable ; the troops he had with 
him were mostly new levies, and not sufBciently 
numerous to invest the place : neither did he 
think it advisable, upon his first landing, to 
expose the army to wounds and fatigue ; more 
especially, as the town was strongly fortified, 
extremely difficult of access, and the garrison 
full of spirits, in expectation of a great body 
of horse, who were said to be upon their march 
to join them. For all these reasons, he de- 
termined not to attempt a siege ; lest while he 
pursued that design, the enemy's cavalry 
should come behind and surround him. But 
as he was drawing off his men, the garrison 
made a sudden sally ; and Juba's horse, whom 
he had sent to receive their pay, happening 
just then to come up, they jointly took posses- 
sion of the camp Csesar had left, and began to 
harass his rear. This being perceived, the 
legionaries immediately halted ; and the cav- 



alry, though few in number, boldly charged 
the vast multitude of the enemy. On this 
occasion it was, that less than thirty Gallic 
horse, by an incredible and astonishing effort 
of valour, repulsed two thousand Moors, and 
drove them quite within the town. Having 
thus compelled the enemy to retire, and shel- 
ter themselves behind their walls, Csesar re- 
sumed his intended march : but observing 
that they often repeated their sallies, renewing 
the pursuit from time to time, and again 
flying when attacked by the horse ; he posted 
some veteran cohorts, with part of the cavalry, 
in the rear, to cover his retreat, and so pro- 
ceeded slowly on his march. The farther he 
advanced from Adrumetum, the less eager 
were the Numidians to pursue. Meantime, 
deputies arrived from the several towns and 
castles on the road, offering to furnish him 
with corn, and receive his commands. Towards 
the evening of that day, which was the first of 
January, he reached Ruspina, and there fixed 
his camp. 

VI. Thence he removed, and came before 
Leptis, a free city, and governed by its own 
laws. Here he was also met by deputies 
from the town, who came, in the name of the 
inhabitants, to make an offer of their submis- 
sion and services. Whereupon, placing cen- 
turions and a guard before the gates, to pre- 
vent the soldiers from entering, or offering 
violence to any of the inhabitants, he himself 
encamped towards the shore, not far distant 
from the town. Hither by accident arrived 
some of the galleys and transports, by whom 
he was informed, that the rest of the fleet, 
uncertain what course to pursue, had been 
steering for Utica. This obliged him to keep 
with the army near the sea, and avoid march- 
ing into the inland provinces, that he might 
be at hand to join his troops upon their 
arrival. He likewise sent the cavalry back to 
their ships, probably to hinder the country 
from being plundered, and ordered fresh water 
to be carried to them on board. Meanwhile 
the rowers, who were employed in this ser- 
vice, were suddenly and unexpectedl}- attacked 
by the Moorish horse, who killed some, and 
wounded many with their darts. For the 
manner of these barbarians is, to lie in am- 
bush with their horses among the valleys, 
and suddenly launch upon an enemy ; they 
seldom choosing to engage hand to hand in 
a plaim 



COMMENTARIES 



311 



VII. In the mean time, Caesar despatched 
letters and messengers into Sardinia and the 
neighbouring provinces, with orders, as soon 
as the letters came to hand, to send supplies of 
men, corn, and warlike stores ; and having 
unloaded part of the fleet, detached it with 
Rabirius Posthumus, into Sicily, to bring over 
the second embarkation. At the same time 
he ordered out ten galleys, to get intelligence 
of the transports that had missed their way, 
and maintain the freedom of the sea. C. Sal- 
lustius Crispus, the pretor, was likewise sent 
out at the head of a squadron, to seize Cercina, 
then in the hands of the enemy, because he 
heard there was a great store of corn in that 
island : in giving these orders and instructions, 
he used all possible endeavours to leave no 
room for excuse or delay. Meanwhile having 
informed himself, from the deserters and na- 
tives, of the condition of Scipio and his fol- 
lowers ; and understanding that they were at 
the whole charge of maintaining Juba's cav- 
alry ; he could not but pity the infatuation of 
men, who thus rather chose to be tributaries 
to the king of Numidia, than securely en- 
joy their fortunes at home with their fellow 
citizens. 

VIII. The third of January he decamped ; 
and leaving six cohorts at Leptis, under the 
command of Saserna, returned with the rest 
of the forces to Ruspina, whence he had come 
the day before. Here he deposited the bag- 
gage of the army ; and marching out with a 
light body of troops to forage, ordered the 
inhabitants to follow with their horses and 
carriages. Having by this means got together 
a great quantity of corn, he came back to 
Ruspina. His design was, as far as I can 
judge, that by keeping possession of the mari- 
time cities, and providing them with garrisons, 
he might secure a retreat for his fleet. 

^*^ IX. Leaving therefore P. Saserna, the bro- 
ther of him who commanded at Leptis, to take 
charge of the town, with one legion, and or- 
dering all the wood that could be found to be 
carried into the place, he set out from Rus- 
pina with seven cohorts, part of the veteran 
legions who had behaved so well in the fleet 
under Sulpicius and Vatinius ; and marching 
directly for the port, which lies at about two 
miles' distance, embarked with thcni in the 
evening, without imparting his intentions to 
the army, who were extremely inquisitive con- 
cerning the general's design. His departure 



occasioned the utmost sadness and consterna- 
tion among the troops ; for being few in num. 
ber, mostly new levies, and those not all suf- 
fered to land ; they saw themselves exposed 
upon a foreign coast, to the mighty forces of a 
crafty nation, supported by an innumerable 
cavalry. Nor had they any resource in their 
present circumstances, or expectation of safety 
in their own conduct; but derived all their 
hope from the alacrity, vigour, and wonderful 
cheerfulness that appeared in the general's 
countenance : for he was of an intrepid spirit, 
and behaved with undaunted resolution and 
confidence. jLOn his conduct, therefore, they 
entirely relied, and promised themselves to a 
man, that under so able and experienced a 
leader, all difficulties would vanish before 
them. 

X. Csesar having continued the whole night 
on board, about day-break prepared to set 
sail : when, all on a sudden, the part of the 
fleet that had given so much concern, ap- 
peared unexpectedly in view. Wherefore, 
ordering his men to quit their ships imme- 
diately, and receive the rest of the troops in 
arms upon the shore, he made the new fleet 
enter the port with the utmost diligence ; and 
landing all the forces, horse and foot, returned 
again to Ruspina. Here he cstabhshed his 
camp ; and taking with him thirty cohorts, 
without baggage, advanced into the country 
to forage. Thus was Ca;sar's purpose at 
length discovered : that he meant, unknown 
to the enemy, to have sailed to the assistance 
of the transports that had missed their way, 
lest they should unexpectedl)' fall in with the 
African fleet. Nor would he even impart his 
design to his own soldiers left behind in gar- 
rison ; from an apprehension, that when they 
came to reflect upon their own weakness, and 
the strength of the enemy, they might too 
much give way to fear. 

XI. Caesar had not marched above three 
miles from his camp, when he was informed 
by his scouts, and some advanced parties of 
horse, that the enemy's forces were in view. 
At the same time a great cloud of dust began 
to appear. Upon this intelligence, Cajsar or- 
dered all his horse, of which he had at that 
time but a very small number, to advance, as 
likewise his archers, only a few of whom had 
followed him from the camp ; and the legions 
to march after him in order of battle, while he 
went forward at the head of a small party,. 



312 



PANSA'S 



Soon after, having discovered the enemy at 
some distance, he commanded the soldiers to 
repair to their arms, and prepare for battle. 
Their number in all did not exceed thirty co- 
horts, vpith about four hundred horse, and the 
archers. 

XII. Meanwhile the enemy, under the com- 
mand of Labienus, and the two Pacidii, drew 
up, with a very large front, consisting mostly 
of horse, whom they intermixed with light 
armed Numidians and archers ; forming them- 
selves in such close order, that Caesar's army 
at a distance mistook them all for infantry ; 
and strengthening their right and left with 
many squadrons of horse. Caesar drew up his 
army in one line, obliged to it by the smallness 
of his numbers ; covering his front with the 
archers, and placing his cavalry in the two 
wings, with particular instructions not to suffer 
themselves to be surroundod by the enemy's 
numerous horse ; for he imagined that he was 
to have to do only with infantry. 

XIII. As both sides stood in expectation of 
the signal, and Caesar chose to continue with- 
out stirring from his post, as being sensible, 
that with such few troops, against so great a 
force, he must depend more on conduct and 
contrivance than strength ; on a sudden, the 
enemy began to extend themselves, spread out 
upon the hills, on every side, and prepared to 
surround our horse, who were hardly able to 
maintain their ground against them. Mean- 
while both the main bodies advancing to en- 
gage, the enemy's cavalry, intermixed with 
some light-armed Numidians, suddenly sprung 
forward, and attacked the legions with a 
shower of darts. Our men, preparing to re- 
turn the charge, their horse retreated a little, 
while the foot continued to maintain their 
ground, till the others having rallied, came on 
again, with fresh vigour, to sustain them. 

XIV. Caesar perceiving that his ranks were 
in danger of being broken by this new way of 
fighting, (for our foot, in pursuing the enemy's 
horse, as they retreated, being forced to ad- 
vance a considerable way beyond their colours, 
were flanked by the light-armed Numidians ; 
while, at the same time, they could do but lit- 
tle execution against the cavalry, by reason of 
the quickness wherewith they retired,) gave 
express orders, that no soldier should advance 
above four feet beyond the ensigns. Mean- 
while Labienus's cavalry, confiding in their 
numbers, endeavoured to surround those of 



CfBsar ; who, being few in number, and over- 
powered by the multitude of the enemy, were 
forced to give ground a little, their horses be- 
ing almost all wounded. The enemy, encour- 
aged by this, pressed on more and more ; so 
that in an instant, the legions being surrounded, 
on all sides, were obliged to cast themselves 
into an orb, and fight, as if inclosed with 
barriers. 

XV. Labienus, with his head uncovered, 
advanced on horseback to the front of the 
battle, to encourage his men. Sometimes ad- 
dressing Caesar's legions : " So ho ! you raw 
soldiers there !" says he, " why so fierce 1 Has 
he infatuated you too with his words 1 Truly 
he has brought you into a fine condition ! I 
pity you sincerely." Upon this, one of the 
soldiers : " I am none of your raw warriors, 
but a veteran of the tenth legion." " W^here's 
your standard 1 " replied Labienus. " I'll soon 
make you sensible who I am," answered the 
soldier. Then pulling off his helmet, to dis- 
cover himself, he threw a javelin with all his 
strength at Labienus, which wounding his 
horse severely in the breast : " Know, Labie- 
nus," says he, " that this dart was thrown by a 
soldier of the tenth legion." However, the 
whole army was not a little daunted, especially 
the new levies ; and began to cast their eyes 
upon Caesar, minding nothing, for the pre- 
sent, but to defend themselves from the ene- 
my's darts. 

XVI. Caesar meanwhile perceiving the ene- 
my's design, endeavoured to extend his or- 
der of battle as much as possible, directing 
the cohorts to face about alternately to the 
right and left. By this means, he broke the 
enemy's circle with his right and left wings ; 
and attacking one part of them, thus separated 
from the other, with his horse and foot, at 
last put them to flight. He pursued them but 
a little way, fearing an ambuscade, and re- 
turned again to his own men. The same was 
done by the other division of Caesar's horse 
and foot ; so that the enemy being driven back, 
on all sides, he retreated towards his camp, in 
order of battle. 

XVII. Meantime M. Petreius, and Cn. 
Piso, with eleven hundred select Numidian 
horse, and a considerable body of foot, arrived 
to the assistance of the enemy : who recovering 
from their terror, upon this reinforcement, and 
again resuming courage, fell upon the rear 
of the legions, as they retreated, and endea- 



COMMENTARIES. 



313 



vourcd to hinder them from reaching their 
camp. Cffsar perceiving this, ordered his 
men to wheel about, and renew the battle. 
As the enemy still pursued their former plan, 
and avoided a close engagement, Ctcsar, con- 
sidering that the horses had not yet recovered 
the fatigue of their late voyage ; that they 
were besides weakened with thirst, weariness, 
and wounds, and of course unfit for a vigorous 
and long pursuit, which even the time of the 
day would not allow, ordered both horse and 
foot to fall at once briskly upon the enemy, and 
not slacken the pursuit till they had driven 
them quite beyond the farthest hills, and 
taken possession of them themselves. Accord- 
ingly, upon a signal given, the enemy fight- 
ing in a faint and careless manner, he sud- 
denly charged them with his horse and foot : 
who in a moment driving them from the field, 
and over the adjoining hill, kept possession of 
that post for some time, and then retired slowly, 
in order of battle, to their camp. The enemy, 
who, in this last attack, had been very rudely 
handled, thought proper likewise to do the 
same. 

XVIII. The action being over, a great 
number of deserters, of all kinds, flocked to 
Caesar's camp, besides multitudes of horse and 
foot, that were made prisoners. By them we 
learned, that it was the design of the enemy 
to have astonished our raw troops, with their 
new and uncommon manner of fighting ; and 
after surrounding them with their cavalry, to 
have cut them to pieces, as they had done 
Curio ; and that they had marched against us 
expressly with that intention. Labienus had 
even said, in the council of war, that he 
would lead such a numerous body of troops 
against us, as should fatigue us with the very 
slaughter, and defeat us even in the bosom of 
victory ; for he relied more on the number 
than the valour of his troops. He had heard 
of the mutiny of the veteran legions at Rome, 
and their refusal to go into Africa ; and was 
likewise well assured of the fidelity of his 
troops, who had served three years under him 
in Africa. He had a great number of Numi- 
dian cavalry and light-armed troops, besides 
the Gallic and German horse, whom he had 
drawn together, out of the remains of Pom- 
pey's army, and carried over with him from 
Brundusium ; he had likewise the freedmen 
raised in the country, and trained to fight on 
horseback : and the multitude of Juba's for- 



ces, his hundred and twenty elephants, his in- 
numerable cavalry and legionaries, amounting 
to above twelve thousand. Emboldened by 
the hope such mighty forces raised in him, on 
the fourth of January, six days after Csesar's 
arrival, he came against him, with sixteen 
hundred Gallic and German horse, nine hun- 
dred under Petreius, eight thousand Numidians, 
four times that number of light-armed foot, 
with a multitude of archers and slingers. The 
battle lasted from eleven till sun-set, during 
which Petreius, receiving a dangerous wound, 
was obliged to quit the field. 

XIX. Meantime Csesar fortified his camp 
with much greater care, reinforced the guards, 
and threw up two intrenchments ; one from 
Ruspina quite to the sea, the other from his 
camp to the sea likewise ; to secure the com- 
munication, and receive supplies without dan- 
ger. He landed a great number of darts and 
military engines, armed part of the mariners, 
Gauls, Rhodians, and others, that, after the 
example of the enemy, he might have a num- 
ber of light-armed troops, to intermix with his 
cavalry. He likewise strengthened his army 
with a great number of Syrian and Iturean 
archers, whom he drew from the fleet into his 
camp ; for he understood, that within three 
days Scipio was expected, with all his forces, 
consisting of eight legions, and four thousand 
horse. At the same time, he established 
work-shops, made a great number of darts and 
arrows, provided himself with leaden bullets 
and palisades, wrote to Sicily for hurdles and 
wood to make rams, because he had none in 
Africa, and likewise gave orders for sending 
com ; for the harvest, in that country, was 
like to be inconsiderable, the enemy having 
taken all the labourers into their service the 
year before, and stored up the grain in a few 
fortified towns, after demolishing the rest, 
forcing the inhabitants into the garrisoned 
places, and laying waste the whole country. 

XX. In this necessity, by soothing the 
people, he obtained a small supply, and hus- 
banded it with care. Meantime he was very 
exact in visiting the works, and relieving the 
guards. Labienus sent his sick and wounded, 
of which the number was very considerable, 
in wagons, to Adrumetum. Meanwhile Cse- 
sar's transports, unacquainted with the coast, 
or where their general had landed, wandered 
up and down, in great uncertainty ; and being 
attacked, one after another, by the enemy's. 

2S 



314 



PANSA'S 



coasters, were, for the most part, either taken 
or burned. Cssar being informed of this, 
stationed his fleet along the coast and islands, 
for the security of his convoys. 

XXI. Meanwhile M. Cato,who commanded 
in Utica, never ceased urging and exhorting 
young Pompey, in words to this effect : " Your 
father, when he was at your age, and observed 
the commonwealth oppressed by wicked and 
daring men, and the honest party either slain 
or driven, by banishment, from their country 
and relations ; incited by the greatness of his 
mind, and the love of glory, though then very 
young, and only a private man, had yet the 
courage to rally the remains of his father's 
army, and deliver Rome from the yoke of 
slavery and tyranny under which it groaned. 
He also recovered Sicily, Africa, Numidia, 
Mauritania, with amazing despatch; and, 
by that means, gained an illustrious and ex- 
tensive reputation among all nations, and 
triumphed at three-and-twenty, while but a 
Roman knight. Nor did he enter upon the 
administration of public affairs, distinguished 
by the shining exploits of his father, or the 
fame and reputation of his ancestors, or the 
honours and dignities of the state. You, on 
the contrary, possessed of these honours, and 
the reputation acquired by your father ; suf- 
ficiently distinguished by your own industry 
and greatness of mind ; will you not bestir 
yourself, join your father's friends, and vindi- 
cate your own liberty, that of the common- 
wealth, and of every good and honest manl" 
The youth, roused by the remonstrances 
of that grave and worthy senator, got to- 
gether about thirty sail, of all sorts, of 
which some few were ships of war, and sailing 
from Utica to^ Mauritania, invaded the king- 
dom of Bogud. And leaving his baggage be- 
hind him, with an army of tAvo thousand men, 
partly freemen partly slaves, some armed some 
not, approached the town of Ascurum, in 
which the king had a garrison. The inhabitants 
suffered him to advance to the very walls and 
gates ; when, sallying out, all on a sudden, 
they drove him quite back to his ships. This ill 
success determined him to leave that coast, nor 
did he afterwards land in any place, but steered 
directly for the Balearean Isles. 

XXII. Meantime Scipio, leaving a strong 
garrison at Utica, began his march, with the 
forces we have described above, and encamped 
first at Adrumetum ; when after a stay of a 



Petreius and Labienus, lodging all the forces 
in one camp, about three miles distant from 
Ceesar's. Their cavalry were making con- 
tinual excursions to our very works, intercepted 
those who ventured too far in quest of wood 
or water, and obliged us to keep within our 
intrenchments. This soon occasioned a great 
scarcity of provisions among Csesar's men, 
because no supplies had yet arrived from 
Sicily or Sardinia. The season too was dan- 
gerous for navigation, and he did not possess 
above six miles, every way, in Africa, which 
also greatly straitened him for want of forage. 
The veteran soldiers and cavalry, who had 
been engaged in many wars, both by sea 
and land, and often struggled with wants 
and misfortunes of this kind, gathering sea- 
weed and washing it in fresh water, by 
that means subsisted their horses and cat- 
tle. 

XXIII. While things were in this situation, 
king Juba, being informed of Ctesar's diffi- 
culties, and the few troops he had with him, 
resolved not to allow him time to remedy his 
v/ants, or increase his army. Accordingly he 
left his kingdom, at the head of a great body 
of horse and foot, and marched to join his 
allies. Meantime, P. Sitius, and king Bo- 
gud, having intelligence of Juba's march, 
joined their forces, entered Numidia, and lay- 
ing siege to Cirta, the most opulent city in 
the country, carried it in a few days, with two 
others belonging to the Getulians. They had 
offered the inhabitants leave to depart in safety, 
if they would peaceably deliver up the towns ; 
but these conditions being rejected, they were 
taken by storm, and the citizens all put to 
the sword. They then fell to ravaging the 
country, and laying all the cities under con- 
tribution : of which Juba having intelligence, 
though he was upon the point of joining 
Scipio and the other chiefs, he determined to 
return to the relief of his own kingdom, rather 
than run the hazard of being driven from it 
while he was assisting others, and perhaps, 
after all, miscarry too in his designs against 
Caesar. He therefore retired with his troops, 
leaving only thirty elephants behind him, 
and marched to the relief of his own cities 
and territories, 

XXIV. Meanwhile Csesar, knowing that 
the province still doubted of his arrival, and 
imagined that not himself in person, but some 
of his lieutenants had come over with the for- 



few days, setting out in the night, he joined ees lately sent, despatched letters to all the 



COMMENTARIES, 



315 



several states, to inform them of his presence. 
Upon this many persons of rank fled to his 
camp, complaining of the barbarity and cruelty 
of the enemy. Hitherto he had continued 
quiet in his post ; but touched with their fears, 
and a sense of their sufferings, he resolved to 
take the field as soon as the weather would 
permit, and he could draw his troops together. 
He immediately despatched letters into Sicily, 
to Allicnus and Rabirius Posthumus the pre- 
tors, that without delay or excuse, either of 
the winter or the winds, they must send over 
the rest of the troops, to save Africa from ut- 
ter ruin ; because without some speedy re- 
medy, not a single house would be left stand- 
ing, nor any thing escape the fury and ravages 
of the enemy. But such was his impatience, 
and so long did the time appear, that from the 
day the letters were sent, he complained with- 
out ceasing of the delay of the fleet, and had 
his eyes night and day turned towards the sea. 
Nor ought we to wonder at his behaviour on 
this occasion : for he saw the villages burned, 
the country laid waste, the cattle destroyed, 
the towns plundered, the principal citizens ei- 
ther slain or put in chains, and their children 
dragged into servitude under the name of host- 
ages, nor could he, amidst all this scene of 
misery, afford any relief to those who implored 
his protection, because of the small number 
of his forces. He kept the soldiers, however, 
at work upon the intrenchments, built forts 
and redoubts, and carried on his line quite to 
the sea. 

XXV. Meanwhile Scipio made use of the 
following contrivance for training and disci- 
plining his elephants. He drew up two parties 
in order of battle ; one of slingers, who were 
to act as enemies, and discharge small stones 
against the elephants ; and fronting them, the 
elephants themselves, in one line, with his 
whole army behind them in battle-arrajr ; that 
when the enemy, by their discharge of stones, 
had frightened the elephants, and forced them 
to turn upon their own men, they might again 
be made to face the enemy, by the vollies of 
stones from the army behind them. The work, 
however, went on but slowly, because these 
animals, after many years' teaching, are often 
no less prejudicial to those who bring them 
into the field, than to the enemy against whom 
they were intended. 

XXVI. Whilst the two generals were thus 
employed near Ruspina, C. Virgilius Pretor- 



ius, who commanded in Thapsus, a maritime 
city, observing some of Ctesar's transports that 
had missed their way, uncertain where he had 
landed or held his camp ; and thinking that a 
fair opportunity offered of destroying them, 
manned a galley that was in the port with 
soldiers and archers, and joining with it a few 
armed barks, began to pursue Ccesar's ships. 
Though he was repulsed on several occasions, 
he still pursued his design, and at last fell in 
with one, on board of which were two young 
Spaniards, of the name of Titus, who were tri- 
bunes of the fifth legion, and whose father had 
been made a senator by Caesar. There was 
with them a centurion of the same legion, T. 
Salienus by name, who had invested the house 
of M. Messala, Caesar's lieutenant, at Mes- 
sana, and expressed himself in very seditious 
language ; nay even seized the money and or- 
naments destined for Caesar's triumph, and for 
that reason dreaded his resentment. He, con- 
scious of his demerits, persuaded the young 
men to surrender themselves to Virgilius, by 
whom they were sent, under a strong guard to 
Scipio, and three days after put to death. It 
is said that the elder Titus begged of the cen- 
turions who were charged with the execution, 
that he might be first put to death ; which be- 
ing easily granted, they both suffered accord- 
ing to their sentence. 

XXVII. The cavalry that mounted guard 
in the two camps were continually skirmishing 
with one another. Sometimes, too, the Ger- 
man and Gallic cavalry of Labienus entered 
into discourse with those of Caesar. Mean- 
time Labienus, with a party of horse, endea- 
voured to surprise the town of Leptis, which 
Saserna guarded with three cohorts ; but was 
easily repulsed, because the town was strongly 
fortified, and well provided with warlike en- 
gines : but at several times he renewed the at- 
tempt. One day, as a strong squadron of 
the enemy had posted themselves before the 
gate, their officer being slain by an arrow dis- 
charged from a scorpion, the rest were terrified 
and took flight ; by which means the town was 
delivered from any further attempts. 

XXVIII. At the same time Scipio daily 
drew up his troops in order of battle, about 
three hundred paces from his camp ; and after 
continuing in arms the greatest part of the day, 
retreated again to his camp in the evening. 
This he did several times, no one meanwhile 
offering to stir out of Cesar's camp, or approach 



316 



PANSA'S 



his forces ; which forbearance and tranquillity 
gave such a contempt of Cassar and his army, 
that drawing out all his forces, and his thirty 
elephants, with towers on their backs, and ex- 
tending his horse and foot as wide as possible, 
he approached quite up to Csesar's intrench- 
ments. Upon this Caesar quietly, and without 
noise or confusion, recalled to his camp all 
that were gone out either in quest of forage, 
wood, or to work upon the fortifications : he 
likewise ordered the cavalry that were upon 
guard, not to quit their post until the enemy 
were within reach of dart ; and if they persisted 
to advance, to retire in good order within the 
intrenchments. The rest of the cavalry were 
enjoined to hold themselves in readiness upon 
the first notice. These orders were not given 
by himself in person, or after viewing the dis- 
position of the enemy from the rampart ; but 
sitting in his tent, and informing himself of 
their motions by his scouts, such was his con- 
summate knowledge in the art of war, that he 
gave all necessary directions by his officers. 
He very well knew, that, whatever confidence 
the enemy might have in their numbers, they 
would yet never dare to attack the camp of a 
general, who had so often repulsed, terrified, 
and put them to flight ; who had frequently 
pardoned and granted them their lives; and 
whose very name had weight and authority 
enough to intimidate their army. He was be- 
sides well intrenched with a high rampart and 
deep ditch, the approaches to which were 
rendered so difficult by the sharp spikes which 
he had disposed in a very artful manner, that 
they were even sufficient of themselves to 
keep oflF the enemy. He was likewise well 
provided with military engines, and all sorts 
of weapons necessary for a vigorous defence, 
which compensated in some measure for the 
fewness of his troops, and the inexperience of 
his new levies. His forbearan-ce therefore 
did not proceed from fear, or any distrust of 
the valour of his troops ; but because he was 
unwilling to purchase a bloody victory over 
the shattered remains of his dispersed ene- 
mies, after such a series of great actions, con- 
quests, and triumphs; and therefore resolved 
to bear their insults and bravadoes, till the 
arrival of his veteran legions by the second 
embarkation. 

XXIX. Scipio, after a short stay before 
the intrenchments, as if in contempt of Csesar, 
withdrew slowly to his camp ; and having 



called his soldiers together, enlarged upon the 
terror and despair of the enemy : when en- 
couraging his men, he assured them of a com- 
plete victory in a short time. Csesar made his 
soldiers again return to their works, and under 
pretence of fortifying his camp, inured the 
new levies to labour and fatigue. Meantime 
the Numidians and Getulians deserted daily 
from Scipio's camp. Part returned home ; 
part came over to Csesar, because they un- 
derstood he was related to C. Marius, from 
whom their ancestors had received considera- 
ble favours. Of these he selected some of dis- 
tinguished rank, and sent them home, with 
letters to their countrymen, exhorting them to 
levy troops for their own defence, and not 
listen to the suggestions of his enemies. 

XXX, While these things pass near Rus- 
pina, deputies from Acilla, and all the neigh- 
bouring towns, arrived in Csesar's camp, with 
offers of submission, and to supply him with 
corn and other necessaries, if he would send 
garrisons to protect them from the enemy, 
Csesar readily complied with their demands, 
and having assigned a garrison, sent C. Mes- 
sius, who had been edile, to command in Acilla, 
Upon intelligence of this, Considius Longus, 
who was at Adrumetum with two legions 
and seven hundred horse, leaving a garrison 
in that city, posted to Acilla at the head of 
eight cohorts: but Messius having accom- 
plished his march with great expedition, arrived 
first at the place. When Considius therefore 
approached, and found Ca3sar's garrison in 
possession of the town, not daring to make 
any attempt, he returned again to Adrumetum, 
But some days after, Labienus having sent 
him a reinforcement of horse, he found him- 
self in a condition to renew the siege, 

XXXI. Much about the same time, C. 
yallustius Crispus, who, as we have seen, had 
been sent a few days before to Cercinia with 
a fleet, arrived in that island. Upon which 
C, Decimus, the questor, who, with a strong 
party of his own domestics, had charge of the 
magazines erected there, went on board a 
small vessel and fled, Sallustius meanwhile 
was well received by the Cercinates, and find- 
ing great store of corn in the island, loaded 
all the ships then in the port, whose number 
was very considerable, and despatched them 
to Caesar's camp. At the same time Allienus, 
the proconsul, put on board the transports 
at Lilybseum the thirteenth and fourteenth 



COMMENTARIES 



317 



legions, with eight hundred Gallic horse, and 
a thousand archers and slingers, and sent them 
over into Africa. This fleet meeting with a 
favourable wind, arrived in four days at Rus- 
pina, where Caesar had his camp. Thus he 
experienced a double pleasure on this occasion, 
receiving at one and the same time, both a 
supply of provisions, and a reinforcement of 
troops ; which animated the soldiers, and de- 
livered them from the apprehensions of want. 
Having landed the legions and cavalry, he 
allowed them some time to recover from the 
fatigue and sickness of their voyage, and then 
distributed them into the forts, and along the 
works. 

XXXII. Scipio and the other generals 
were greatly surprised at Caesar's conduct, 
and could not conceive how one, who had 
always been forward and active in war, should 
all of a sudden change his measures ; which 
they therefore suspected must proceed from 
some very powerful reasons. Uneasy and 
disturbed to see him so patient, they made 
choice of two Getulians, on whose fidelity they 
thought they could rely ; and promising them 
great rewards, sent them under the name of de- 
serters, to get intelligence of Csesar's designs. 
When they were brought before him, they 
begged they might have leave to speak without 
offence ; which being granted : " It is now a 
long time, great general," said they, " since 
many of us Getulians, clients of C. Marius, 
and almost all Roman citizens of the fourth 
and sixth legions, have wished for an oppor- 
tunity to come over to you ; but have hitherto 
been prevented by the guards of Numidian 
horse. Now we gladly embrace the occasion, 
being sent by Scipio under the name of de- 
serters, to discover what ditches and traps you 
have prepared for his elephants, how you in- 
tend to oppose these animals, and what dis- 
positions you are making for battle." Csesar 
commended them, rewarded them liberally, and 
sent them to the other deserters. We had soon 
a proof of the truth of what they had advanced ; 
for next day a great many soldiers of these le- 
gions mentioned by the Getulians, deserted to 
Cassar's camp. 

XXXIII. Whilst affairs were in this pos- 
ture at Ruspina, M. Cato, who commanded 
in Utica, was daily enlisting freed men, Afri- 
cans, slaves, and all that were of age to bear 
arms, and sending them without intermission 
to Scipio'fi camp. Meanwhile deputies from 

28 



the town of Tisdra came to Caesar, to inform 
him, that some Italian merchants had brought 
three hundred thousand bushels of corn into 
that city ; and to demand a garrison, as well 
for their own defence as to secure the corn. 
Cxsar thanked the deputies, promised to send 
the garrison they desired ; and having en- 
couraged them, sent them back to their fellow- 
citizens. Meantime P. Sitiiis entered Nu- 
midia with his troops, and made himself master 
of a castle situated on a mountain, where 
Juba had laid up a great quantity of pro- 
visions, and other things necessary for carry- 
ing on the war. 

XXXIV. Csesar having increased his forces 
with two veteran legions, and all the cavalry 
and light-armed troops that had arrived in 
the second embarkation, detached six trans- 
ports to Lilybaeum, to bring over the rest of 
the army. On the twenty-seventh of January, 
ordering the scouts and lictors to attend him 
at six in the evening, he drew out all the le- 
gions at midnight, and directed his march 
towards Ruspina, where he had a garrison, 
and which had first declared in his favour, 
no one knowing or having the least suspicion 
of his design. Thence he continued his 
route, by the left of the camp, along the sea, 
and passed a little declivity, which opened 
into a fine plain, extending fifteen miles, and 
bordered upon a chain of mountains of mode- 
rate height, that formed a kind of theatre. 
In this ridge were some hills that rose higher 
than the rest, where forts and watch-towers 
had formerly been erected, and at the far- 
thest of which Scipio's out-guards were 
posted. 

XXXV. Csesar having gained the ridge, 
began to raise redoubts upon the several 
eminences, which he executed in less than 
half an hour. When he was near the last, 
which bordered on the enemy's camp, and 
where, as we have said, Scipio had his out- 
guard of Numidians, he stopped a moment ; 
and having taken a view of the ground, and 
posted his cavalry in the most commodious 
situation, he ordered the legions to throw up 
an intrenchment along the middle of the ridge, 
from the place at which he was arrived, to 
that whence he set out. This being observed 
by Scipio and Labienus, they drew all their 
cavalry out of the camp, formed them in order 
of battle ; and advancing about a thousand 
paces, posted their infantry by way of a second 



318 



PANSA'S 



line, somewhat less than half a mile from their | 
camp. 

XXXVI. Caesar, unmoved by the appear- 
ance of the enemy's forces, encouraged his 
men to go on with the work. But when he 
perceived that they were within fifteen hun- 
dred paces of the intrenchment, and that their 
design was to interrupt and disturb the soldiers, 
and oblige him to draw them off from the 
work ; he ordered a squadron of Spanish 
cavalry, sustained by some light-armed infantry, 
to attack the IVumidian guard upon the nearest 
eminence, and drive them from that post. 
They easily possessed themselves of the place, 
the Numidians being partly killed, and partly 
made prisoners. This being perceived by La- 
bienus, that he mi^ht the more effectually 
succour the fugitives, he wheeled off almost 
the whole right wing of the horse. Caesar 
waited till he was at a considerable distance 
from his own men, and then detached his left 
■wing to intercept his return. 

XXXVII. In the plain where this hap- 
pened was a large villa, with four turrets, 
which prevented Labienus from seeing that 
he was surrounded. He had therefore no ap- 
prehension of the approach of Caesar's horse, 
till he found himself charged in the rear ; 
which struck such a sudden terror into the 
Numidian cavalry, that they immediately be- 
took themselves to flight. The Gauls and 
Germans who stood their ground, being sur- 
rounded on all sides, were entirely cut off. 
This being perceived by Scipio's legions, who 
were drawn up in order of battle before the 
camp, they fled in the utmost terror and con- 
fusion. Scipio and his forces being driven 
from the plain and the hills, Caesar sounded a 
retreat, and ordered all the cavalry to retire 
behind the works. When the field was cleared, 
he could not forbear admiring the huge bodies 
of the Gauls and Germans, who, partly in- 
duced by the authority of Labienus, had fol- 
lowed him out of Gaul ; partly had been 
drawn over by promises and rewards. Some 
being made prisoners in the battle with Curio, 
and, having their lives granted them, con- 
tinued faithful, out of gratitude. Their bodies, 
of surprising shape and largeness, lay scat- 
tered all over the plain. 

XXXVIII. Next day, Caesar drew all his 
forces together, and formed them, in order of 
battle, upon the plain. Scipio, discouraged 
by so unexpected a check, and the numbers 



of his wounded and slain, kept within his lines. 
Caesar, with his army in battalia, marched 
along the roots of the hills, and gradually ap- 
proached his trenches. The legions were, by 
this time, got within a mile of Uzita, a town 
possessed by Scipio, whence he had his water, 
and other conveniences for his army. Re- 
solving therefore to preserve it, at all hazards, 
he brought forth his whole army, and drew 
them up, in four lines, forming the first of ca- 
valry, supported by elephants, with castles on 
their backs. Caesar, believing that Scipio ap- 
proached with design to give battle, continued 
where he was posted, not far from the town. 
Scipio meanwhile, having the town in the cen- 
tre of his front, extended his two wings, where 
were his elephants in full view of our army. 

XXXIX. W^hen Caesar had waited till 
sun-set, without finding that Scipio stirred 
from his post ; who seemed rather disposed to 
defend himself by his advantageous situation, 
than hazard a battle in the open field ; he did 
not think proper to advance farther that day, 
because the enemy had a strong garrison of 
Numidians in the town, which besides covered 
the centre of their front ; and he foresaw 
great diflSculty in forming, at the same time, 
an attack upon the town, and opposing their 
right and left, with the advantage of the 
ground ; especially as the soldiers had con- 
tinued under arms, and fasted since morning. 
Having therefore led back his troops to their 
camp, he resolved next day to extend his lines 
nearer the town. 

XL. Meantime Considius, who besieged 
eight mercenary cohorts of Numidians and 
Getulians in Acilla, where C. ]\Iessius com- 
manded ; after continuing long before the 
' place, and seeing all his works burned and 
I destroyed by the enemy ; upon the report of 
! the late battle of the cavalry, set fire to his 
' corn, destroyed his wine, oil, and other stores ; 
I and abandoning the siege of Acilla, divided 
\ his forces with Scipio, and retired, through the 
kingdom of Juba, to Adrumetum. 

XLI. Meanwhile one of the transports be- 
longing to the second embarkation, in which 
I were Q. Cominius, and L. Ticida, a Roman 
j knight, being separated from the rest of the 
fleet, in a storm, and driven to Thapsus, was 
taken by Virgilius, and all the persons on 
I board sent to Scipio. A three-benched gal- 
I ley likewise, belonging to the same fleet, 
1 being forced, by the winds, to .^gimurum, 



COMMENTARIES. 



319 



was intercepted, by the squadron under Varus 
and M, Octavius. In this vessel were some 
veteran soldiers, with a centurion, and a few 
new levies ; whom Varus treated respectfully, 
and sent, under a guard, to Scipio. When 
they came into his presence, and appeared 
before his tribunal : " I am satisfied," said he, 
'< it is not by your own inclination, but at the 
instigation of 'your wicked general, that you 
impiously wage war on your fellow-citizens, 
and on the honestest part of the republic. If, 
therefore, now that fortune has put you in 
our power, you will take this opportunity to 
unite with the good citizens, in the defence 
of the common-weal, I not only promise you 
your life, but you may expect to be rewarded. 
Let me know what you think of the proposal." 
Scipio having ended his speech, and expecting 
a thankful return to so gracious an offer, 
permitted them to reply : when the centurion, 
who on this occasion was spokesman, thus 
addressed him : '< Scipio," says he, " (for I 
cannot give you the appellation of general.) 
I return you my hearty thanks for the good 
treatment you are wilhng to show to pri- 
soners of war ; and perhaps I might accept of 
your kindness, were it not to be purchased 
at the expense of a horrible crime. What ! 
shall I carry arms, and fight against Cssar, 
my general, under whom I have served as 
centurion ; and against his victorious army, 
to whose renown I have so many years en- 
deavoured to contribute by my valour 1 It 
is what I will never do ; and even advise you 
not to push the war any further. You know 
not what troops you have to deal with, nor 
the difference betwixt them and yours ; of 
which, if you please, I will give you an in- 
disputable instance. Do you pick out the 
best cohort you have in your army : and give 
me only ten of my comrades, which are now 
your prisoners, to engage them. You shall 
see, by the success, what you are to expect 
from your soldiers." When the centurion 
had made this reply, Scipio, incensed at his 
boldness, and resenting the affront, made a 
sign to some of his officers to kill him on the 
spot, which was immediately put in execution. 
At the same time ordering the other veteran 
soldiers to be separated from the new levies : 
" Carry away," said he, " these villains, pam- 
pered with the blood of their fellow-citizens." 
Accordingly they were conducted without the 
rampart, and cruelly massacred. The new- 



raised soldiers were distributed among his le- 
gions; and Cominius and Ticida forbid to 
appear in his presence. Cresar, concerned 
for this misfortune, broke, with ignominy, the 
officers, whose instructions being to secure 
the coast, and advance to a certain distance 
into the main sea, to protect and facilitate the 
approach of the transports, had been negli- 
gent on that important station. 

XLII. About this time, a most incredible 
accident befell CiEsar's army. For the Plei- 
ades being set, about nine at night, a terrible 
storm arose, attended with hail of an uncom- 
mon size. But what contributed to render 
this misfortune the greater, was, that Csesar 
had not, hke other generals, put his troops into 
winter quarters ; but was every three or four 
days changing his camp, to gain ground on the 
I enemy ; which keeping the soldiers continually 
employed, they were utterly unprovided of 
! any conveniences to protect them from the 
I inclemency of the weather. Besides, neither 
' officer nor soldier had been permitted to take 
I their equipages or utensils with them, nor 
I so much as a vessel, or a single slave, when 
j they parted from Sicily ; and so far had they 
I been from acquiring or providing themselves 
with any thing in Africa, that by reason of 
the great scarcity of provisions, they had even 
consumed their former stores. Impoverished 
by these accidents, very few of them had 
! tents : the rest had made themselves a kind 
! of covering, either by spreading their clothes, 
• or with mats and rushes. But these being 
soon penetrated by the storm and hail, the 
soldiers had no resource left, but wandered 
up and down the camp, covering their heads 
with their bucklers, to shelter them from the 
weather. In a short time the whole camp 
was under water, the fires extinguished, and 
all their provisions washed away or spoiled. 
The same night, the shafts of the javelins be- 
longing to the fifth legion, of their own ac- 
cord, took fire. 

XLIII. In the meantime king Juba, having 
received advice of the horse-engagement with 
Scipio, and being earnestly solicited by letters, 
from that general, to come to his assistance, 
left Sabura at home, with part of the army, 
to carry on the war against Sitius ; and ima- 
gining his name and presence sufficient to 
free Scipio's troops from the dread they had 
of CsBsar, began his march, with three legions, 
eight hundred horse, a body of Numidian ca- 



320 



PANSA'S 



valry, great numbers of light-armed infantry, 
and thirty elephants. When he arrived, he 
lodged himself, with all his forces, in a se- 
parate camp, at no great distance from that of 
Scipio. Caesar's army had, for some time 
past,been possessed with no small terror of 
Juba's forces ; and the report of his approach 
had increased the inquietude, and produced a 
general suspense and expectation among the 
troops. But his arrival, and the appearance 
of his camp, soon dispelled all these apprehen- 
sions, and they as much despised the king of 
Mauritania, now he was present, as they had 
feared him, when at a distance. It was easy 
to be seen, however, that the reinforcement 
brought by the king, greatly raised the cou- 
rage and confidence of Scipio, For next day, 
drawing out all his own and the royal forces, 
with sixty elephants, he ranged them, in or- 
der of battle, with great ostentation, advanced 
a little beyond his inirenchments, and after a 
short stay, retreated to his camp. 

XLIV. CsBsar, knowing that Scipio had re- 
ceived all the supplies he expected, and 
judging he would no longer decline coming to 
an engagement, began to advance along the 
ridge with his forces, extend his lines, secure 
them with redoubts, and possess himself of the 
eminences between him and Scipio, The 
enemy, confiding in their numbers, seized a 
neighbouring hill, and thereby prevented the 
progress of our works. Labienus had formed 
the design of securing this post, and as it lay 
nearest his quarters, soon got thither, Csesar 
had the same project in view : but before he 
could reach the place, was necessitated to 
pass a broad and deep valley, of rugged de- 
scent, broken with caves, and beyond which 
was a thick grove of olives. Labienus per- 
ceiving that Caesar must march this way, and 
having a perfect knowledge of the country, 
placed himself in ambush, with the light- 
armed foot, and part of the cavalry. At the 
same time, he disposed some horse behind 
the hills, that when he should fall unexpectedly 
upon Csesar's foot, they might suddenly ad- 
vance from behind the mountain. Thus the 
enemy, attacked in front and rear, surrounded 
with danger on all sides, and unable either to 
retreat or advance, would, he imagined, fall an 
easy prey to his victorious troops. Cffisar, 
who had no suspicion of the ambuscade, sent 
his cavalry before ; and arriving at the place, 
Labienus's men, either forgetting or neglecting 



the orders of their general, or fearing to be 
trampled to death in the ditch by our cav- 
alry, began to issue in small parties from the 
rock, and ascend the hill. Caesar's horse pur- 
suing them, slew some, and took others pri- 
soners : then making towards the hill, drove 
thence Labienus's detachment, and immedi- 
ately took possession. Labienus, followed by 
a small party of horse, escaped with great dif- 
ficulty. 

XLV. The cavalry having thus cleared the 
mountain, Caesar resolved to intrench 'him- 
self there, and distributed the work to the le- 
gions. He then ordered two lines of commu- 
nication to be drawn from the greater camp, 
across the plain on the side of Uzita, which 
stood between him and the enemy, and was 
garrisoned by a detachment of Scipio's army, 
These lines were so contrived, as to meet at 
the right and left angles of the town. His 
design in this work was, that when he ap- 
proached the town with his troops, and began 
to attack it, these lines might secure his 
flanks, and hinder the enemy's horse from sur- 
rounding him, and compelling him to aban- 
don the siege. It likewise gave his men more 
frequent opportunities of conversing with the 
enemy, and facilitated the means of desertion 
to such as favoured his cause ; many of whom 
had already come over, though not without 
great danger to themselves. He wanted also, 
by drawing nearer the enemy, to see how they 
stood inclined to a battle. Add to all these 
reasons, that the place itself being very low, 
he might there sink some wells ; whereas be- 
fore he had a long and troublesome way to 
send for water. While the legions were em- 
ployed in these works, part of the army stood 
ready drawn up before the trenches, and had 
frequent skirmishes with the Numidian horse 
and light-armed foot. 

XLVI. In the evening, when Caesar was 
drawing off his legions from the works, Juba, 
Scipio, and Labienus, at the head of all their 
horse and light-armed foot, fell furiously upon 
his cavalry : who, overwhelmed by the sudden 
and general attack of so great a multitude, 
were forced to give ground a little. But the 
event was very different from what the enemy 
expected : for Caesar, leading back his legions 
to the assistance of his cavalry, they immedi- 
ately rallied, turned upon the Numidians, and 
charging them vigorously whilst they were 
dispersed and disordered with the pursuit, drove 



COMMENTARIES. 



82} 



them with great slaughter to the king's camp. 
And had not night intervened, and the dust 
raised by the wind obstructed the prospect, 
Juba and Labienus would both have fallen 
into Caesar's hands, and their whole cavalry 
and light-armed infiintry been cut off. Mean- 
while Scipio's men, of the fourth and sixth 
legions, left him in crowds, some deserting to 
Caesar's camp, others flying to such places as 
were most convenient for them. Curio's 
horse likewise, distrusting Scipio and his 
troops, followed the same counsel. 

XLVII. While these things passed near 
Uzita, the ninth and tenth legions sailing in 
transports from Sicily, when they came before 
Ruspina, observing Cccsar's ships that lay at 
anchor about Thapsus, and fearing it might be 
the enemy's fleet stationed there to intercept 
them, they imprudently stood out to sea ; and 
after being long tossed by the winds, provisions 
and water failing them, at last arrived at 
Caesar's camp, 

XLVIII. Soon after they were landed, 
Cffisar calling to mind their licentious beha- 
viour in Italy, and the rapines of some of their 
oflicers, seized the pretence furnished by C. 
Avienus, a military tribune of the tenth legion, 
who, when he set out from Sicily, filled a ship 
entirely with his own equipage and attend- 
ants, without taking on board one single 
soldier. Wherefore, summoning all the mili- 
tary tribunes and centurions to appear before 
his tribunal next day, he addressed them in 
these terms : " I could have wished that those, 
whose insolence and former licentious charac- 
ter have given me cause of complaint, had 
been capable of amendment, and of making a 
good use of my mildness, patience, and moder- 
ation. But since they know not how to con- 
fine themselves within bounds, I intend to 
make an example of them, according to the 
law of arms, in order that others may be taught 
a better conduct. . You, C. Avienus, when 
you was in Italy, instigated the soldiers of the 
Roman people to revolt from the republic : 
you have been guilty of rapines and plunders 
in the municipal towns ; and you have never 
been of any real service, either to the com- 
monwealth, or to your general ; lastly, in lieu 
of soldiers, you have crowded the transports 
with your slaves and equipage ; so that, 
through your fault, the republic fails in 
soldiers, who at this time are not only useful, 
but necessary. For all these causes, I break 
28* 



you with ignominy, and order you to leavp 
Africa this very day. In like manner, I break 
you, A. Fonteius, because you have behaved 
yourself as a seditious oflScer, and as a bad 
citizen. You, T. Salienus, M. Tiro, C. Clusi- 
nus, have attained the rank of centurions 
through my indulgence, and not through your 
own merit ; and since you have been invested 
with that rank, have neither shown bravery in 
war, nor good conduct in peace. Instead of 
endeavouring to act according to the rules of 
modesty and decency, your whole study has 
been to stir up the soldiers against your general. 
I therefore think you unworthy of continuing 
centurions in my army ; I break you, and or- 
der you to quit Africa as soon as possible." 
Having concluded this speech, he delivered 
them over to some centurions, with orders to 
confine them separately on board a ship, al. 
lowing each of them a single slave to wait on 
them. 

XLIX. Meantime the Getulian deserters, 
whom Caesar had sent home with letters and 
instructions, as we have related above, arrived 
among their countrymen : who, partly swayed 
by their authority, partly by the name and 
reputation of Caesar, revolted from Juba ; and 
speedily and unanimously taking up arms, 
scrupled not to act in opposition to their king. 
Juba having thus three wars to sustain, was 
compelled to detach six cohorts from the army 
destined to act against Caesar, and send them 
to defend the frontiers of his kingdom against 
the Getulians. 

L. Caesar having finished his lines of com- 
munication, and pushed them so near the 
town, as to be just without reach of dart, in- 
trenched himself there. He caused warlike 
engines in great numbers to be placed in the 
front of his works, wherewith he played per- 
petually against the town ; and to increase the 
enemy's apprehensions, drew five legions out 
of his other camp. This opportunity gave se- 
veral persons of rank in both armies a desire 
to see and converse with their friends, which 
Caesar foresaw would turn to his advantage. 
For the chief officers of the Getulian horse, 
with other illustrious men of that nation, whose 
fathers had served under C. Marius, and from 
his bounty obtained considerable estates in 
their country, but after Sulla's victory had 
been made tributaries to King Hiempsal ; 
taking the opportunity of the night, when the 
fires were lighted, with their horses and ser- 
2 T 



322 



PANSA'S 



vants, to the number of about a thousand, came 
over to Csesar's camp near Uzita. 

LI. As this accident could not but disturb 
Scipio and his followers, they perceived, much 
about the same time, M. Aquinius in discourse 
with C. Saserna. Scipio sent him word, that 
he did not do well to correspond with the 
enemy. Aquinius paid no attention to this 
reprimand, but pursued his discourse. Soon af- 
ter one of Juba's guards came to him, and told 
him in the hearing of Saserna, The king for- 
bids you to continue this conversation. He no 
sooner received this order than immediately he 
retired, for fear of offending the king. One 
cannot wonder enough at this step in a Roman 
citizen, who had already attained to considera- 
ble honours in the commonwealth; that 
though neither banished his country, nor 
stripped of his possessions, Ee should pay a 
more ready obedience to the orders of a for- 
eign prince, than those of Scipio ; and choose 
rather to behold the destruction of his party, 
than return into the bosom of his country. 
Nor was Juba's arrogance confined to M. 
Aquinius, a new man and an inconsiderable 
senator ; but reached even Scipio himself, a 
man of illustrious birth, distinguished honours, 
and high dignity in the state. For as Scipio, 
before the king's arrival, always wore a purple 
coat of mail, Juba is reported to have told him, 
that he ought not to wear the same habit as 
he did. Accordingly Scipio changed his pur- 
ple robe for a white one, submitting to the 
caprice of a haughty barbarian monarch. 

LII. Next day they drew out all their forces 
from both camps ; and forming them on an 
eminence not far from Csesar's camp, continued 
thus in order of battle. Csesar likewise drew 
out his men, and disposed them in battle array 
before his lines ; not doubting but the enemy, 
who exceeded him in number of troops, and 
had been so considerably reinforced by the arri- 
val of king Juba, would advance to attack him. 
Wherefore, having rode through the ranks, en- 
couraged his men, and given them the signal 
of battle, he stayed expecting the enemy's 
charge. For he did not think it advisable to 
remove far from his lines ; because the enemy, 
having a strong garrison in Uzita, which was 
opposite to his right wing, he could not ad- 
vance beyond that place, without exposing his 
flank to a sally from the town. Besides, the 
access to Scipio's army was rough and difficult. 



and would have disordered his troops before 
they gave the onset. 

LIII. And here it may not be improper to 
describe the order of battle of both armies. 
Scipio's troops were drawn up in this manner : 
he posted his own legions, and those of Juba, 
in the front ; behind them the Numidians, as 
a body of reserve ; but in so very thin ranks, 
and so far extended in length, that to see 
them at a distance, you would have taken the 
main battle for a simple line of legionaries, 
which was doubled only upon the wings. 
The elephants were placed at equal distances 
on the right and left, and sustained by the 
light-armed troops and auxiliary Numidians. 
All the bridled cavalry were on the right ; 
for the left was covered by the town of Uzita, 
nor had the cavalry room to extend themselves 
on that side. Accordingly he stationed the 
Numidian horse, with an incredible multitude 
of light-armed foot, about a thousand paces 
from his right, towards the foot of a mountain, 
considerably removed from his own and the 
enemy's troops. His design in this was, that 
during the progress of the battle, the cavalry 
having room to extend themselves, might 
wheel round upon Csesar's left, and disorder 
it with their darts. Such was Scipio's disposi- 
tion. Csesar's order of battle, to describe it 
from left to right, was as follows : the ninth 
and seventh legions formed the left wing ; 
the thirteenth, fourteenth, twenty-eighth, and 
twenty-sixth, the main body ; and the thirtieth 
and twenty-ninth the right. His second line 
on the right, consisted partly of the cohorts of 
those legions we have already mentioned, partly 
of the new levies. His third line was posted 
to the left, extending as far as the middle le- 
gion of the main body, and so disposed, that 
the left wing formed a triple order of battle. 
The reason of this disposition was, because his 
right wing being defended by the works, it 
behoved him to make his left the stronger, 
that they might be a match for the numerous 
cavalry of the enemy ; for which reason he 
had placed all his horse there, intermixed with 
light-armed foot ; and as he could not rely 
much upon them, had detached the fifth legion 
to sustain them. The archers were dispersed 
up and down the field, but principally on the 
two wings. 

LIV. The two armies thus facing one an- 
other in order of battle, with a space of no 



COMMENTARIES. 



323 



more than tliree hundred paces between, con- 
tinued so posted from morning till night with- 
out fighting, of which perhaps there never was 
an instance before. But when Cjesar began 
to retreat within his lines, suddenly all the 
Numidian and Getulian horse without bridles, 
who were posted behind the enemy's army, 
made a motion to the right, and began to ap- 
proach Cffisar's camp on the mountain ; while 
the regular cavalry under Labienus continued 
in their post, to keep our legions in check. 
Upon this, part of Cajsar's cavalry, with the 
light-armed foot, advancing hastily, and with- 
out orders, against the Getulians, and ven- 
turing to pass the morass, found themselves 
unable to deal with the superior multitude of 
the enemy ; and being abandoned by the 
light-armed troops, were forced to retreat in 
great disorder, after the loss of one trooper, 
twenty-six light-armed foot, and many of their 
horses wounded. Scipio, overjoyed at this 
success, returned towards night to his camp. 
But as fortune's favours are seldom permanent 
to those engaged in the trade of war, the 
day after a party of horse, sent by Caesar to 
Leptis in quest of provisions, falling in unex- 
pectedly with some Numidian and Getulian 
stragglers, killed or made prisoners about a 
hundred of them. Caesar, meanwhile, omitted 
not every day to draw out his men, and labour 
at the works : carrrying a ditch and rampart 
quite across the plain, to prevent the incur- 
sions of the enemy. Nor was Scipio less 
active in forwarding his works, and securing 
his communication with the mountain. Thus 
both generals were busied about their intrench- 
ments, yet seldom a day passed, without some 
skirmish between the cavalry. 

LV. In the meantime. Varus, upon notice 
that the seventh and eighth legions had sailed 
from Sicily, speedily equipped the fleet he 
had brought to winter at Utica ; and manning 
it with Getulian rowers and mariners, went 
out a cruising, and came before Adrumetum 
with fifty-five ships. Caesar, who knew 
nothing of his arrival, sent L. Cispius, with a 
squadron of twenty-seven sail, to cruise about 
Thapsus, for the security of his convoys ; 
and likewise despatched Q. Aquila to Adru- 
metum, with thirteen galleys, upon the same 
errand. Cispius soon reached the station ap- 
pointed to him : but Aquila being attacked by 
a storm, could not double the cape, which 
obliged him to put into a creek at some dis- 



tance, that aflTorded convenient shelter. The 
rest of the fleet anchored before Leptis, where 
the mariners went on shore, some to refresh 
themselves, others to buy provisions in the 
towns, and left their ships quite defenceless. 
Varus having notice of this from the deserters, 
and resolving to take advantage of the enemy's 
negligence, left Adrumetum about nine at 
night, and arriving early next morning with his 
whole fleet before Leptis, burned all the , 
transports that were out at sea, and took, 
without opposition, two five-benched galleys, 
in which were none to defend them. 

LVL CaBsar had an account brought him 
of this unlucky accident, as he was inspecting 
the works of his camp. Whereupon he im- 
mediately took horse, went full speed to Leptis, 
which was but two leagues distant, and going 
on board a brigantine, ordered all the ships in 
the port to follow him, and, in this manner, 
put to sea. He soon came up with Aquila, 
whom he found dismayed and terrified at the 
number of ships he had to oppose ; and con- 
tinuing his course, began to pursue the enemy's 
fleet. Meantime Varus, astonished at Cjesar's 
boldness and despatch, tacked about with 
his fleet, and made the best of his way for 
Adrumetum. But Caesar, after four miles 
sail, came up with him, recovered one of his 
galleys, with the crew and a hundred and 
thirty men, left to guard her: and took a 
three-benched galley belonging to the enemy, 
with all the soldiers and mariners on board. 
The rest of the fleet doubled the cape, and 
made the port of Adrumetum. Caesar could 
not double the cape with the same wind, but 
keeping the sea all night, appeared early 
next morning before Adrumetum. He set 
fire to all the transports without the haven, 
took what galleys he found there, or forced 
them into the harbour ; and having waited 
some time to offer the eiiemy battle, returned 
again to his camp. On board the ship he 
had taken was P. Vestrius, a Roman knight, 
and P. Ligarius Afranianus, the same who had 
prosecuted the war against him in Spain, and 
who, instead of acknowledging the conqueror's 
generosity, in granting him his liberty, had 
joined Pompey in Greece ; and after the 
battle of Pharsalia, had gone into Africa to 
Varus, there to continue in the service of the 
same cause. Ca!sar, to punish his perfidy and 
breach of oath, gave immediate orders for his 
execution. But he pardoned P. Vestrius, 



PANSA'S 



because his brother had paid his ransom at 
Rome, and he made it appear, that being 
taken in Nasidius's fleet, and condemned to 
die. Varus had saved his hfe, since which, 
no opportunity had offered of making his 
escape. 

LVII. It is usual for the people of Africa 
to deposit their corn privately in vaults, under 
ground, to secure it in time of war, and guard 
it from the sudden incursions of an enemy. 
Gaesar, having intelligence of this from a spy, 
drew out two legions, with a party of cavalry, 
at midnight, and sent them about ten miles off; 
whence they returned, loaded with corn, to 
the camp. Labienus being informed of it, 
marched about seven miles, through the moun- 
tains Caesar had passed the day before, and 
there encamped with two legions ; where ex- 
pecting thatCsesar woujd often come the same 
way in quest of corn, he daily lay in ambush, 
with a great body of horse and light-armed 
foot. Caesar having notice of this from the 
deserters, suffered not a day to pass, till the 
enemy, by repeating the practice often, had 
abated a little of their circumspection. Then 
issuing unexpectedly one morning, by the De- 
cuman port, with eight veteran legions, and a 
party of horse, he ordered the cavalry to march 
before ; who coming suddenly upon the enemy's 
light-armed foot, that lay in ambush among 
the valleys, slew about five hundred, and put 
the rest to flight. Meantime Labienus ad- 
vanced, with all his cavalry, to support the 
run-aways, and was on the point of overpower- 
ing our small party with his numbers, when 
suddenly Caesar .appeared with the legions, in 
order of battle. This sight checked the ardour 
of Labienus, who thought proper to sound a 
retreat. The day after, Juba ordered all the 
Numidians who had deserted their post and 
fled to their camp to be crucified. 

LVin. Meanwhile Caesar, being straitened 
for want of corn, recalled all his forces to the 
camp ; and having left garrisons at Leptis, 
Ruspina, and Acilla, ordered Cispius and 
Aquila to cruise with their fleets, the one be- 
fore Adrumetum, the other before Thapsus, 
and set fire to his camp at Uzita, he set out, in 
order of battle, at three in the morning, dis- 
posed his baggage in the left, and came to 
Agar, a town that had been often vigorously 
attacked by the GetuUans, and as valiantly 
defended by the inhabitants. There encamping 
in the plain before the town, he went, with 



part of his army, round the country in quest 
of provisions ; and having found store of barley, 
oil, wine, and figs, with a small quantity of 
wheat, after allowing the troops some time to 
refresh themselves, he returned to his camp. 
Scipio meanwhile hearing of Caesar's departure, 
followed him along the hills, with all his for- 
ces, and posted himself about six miles off, in 
three different camps. 

LIX. The town of Zeta lying on Scipio's 
side of the country, was not above ten miles 
from his camp; but might be about eighteen 
from that of Caesar. Scipio had sent two le- 
gions thither to forage ; which Caesar having 
intelligence of from a deserter, removed his 
camp from the plain to a hill, for the greater 
security ; and leaving some troops to guard it, 
marched at three in the morning, with the rest 
of his forces, passed the enemy's camp, and 
possessed himself of the town. Scipio's le- 
gions were gone farther into the country to 
forage ; against whom setting Out immediately, 
he found the whole army come up to their 
assistance, which obliged him to give over the 
pursuit. He took, on this occasion, C. Mutius 
Reginus, a Roman knight, Scipio's intimate 
friend, and governor of the town ; also P. 
Atrius, a Roman knight likewise, of the pro- 
vince of Utica, with twenty-two camels, be- 
longing to king Juba. Then leaving a garri- 
son in the place, under the command of Op- 
pius, his lieutenant, he set out upon his return 
to his own camp. 

LX. As he drew near Scipio's camp, by 
which he was necessitated to pass, Labienus 
and Afranius, who lay in ambuscade among 
the nearest hills, with all their cavalry and 
light-armed infantry, started up and attacked 
his rear. Caesar, detaching his cavalry to re- 
ceive their charge, ordered the legions to throw 
all their baggage into a heap, and face about 
upon the enemy. No sooner was this order 
executed, than upon the first charge of the le- 
gions, the enemy's horse and light-armed foot 
began to give way, and were, with incredible 
ease, driven from the higher ground. But 
when Caesar, imagining them sufficiently de- 
terred from any further attempts, began to 
pursue his march, they again issued from the 
hills ; and the Numidians, with the light-armed 
infantry, who are wonderfully nimble, and ac- 
custom themselves to fight intermixed with 
the horse, with whom they keep an equal pace, 
either in advancing or retiring, fell a second 



COMMENTARIES. 



325 



time upon our foot. As they repeated this often, 
pressing upon our rear when we marched, 
and retiring when we endeavoured to engage, 
always keeping at a certain distance, and with 
singular care avoiding a close fight, as holding 
it enough to wound us with their darts ; Cassar 
plainly saw that their whole aim was, to oblige 
him to encamp in that place where no water 
was to be had ; that his soldiers, who had tasted 
nothing from three in the morning till four in 
the afternoon, might perish with hunger, and 
the cattle with thirst. Sun-set now ap- 
proached ; when Caesar, finding he had not 
gained a hundred paces complete in four hours, 
and that, by keeping his cavalry in the rear, 
he lost many horse, ordered the legions to fall 
behind, and close the march. Proceeding 
thus, with a slow and gentle pace, he found 
the legions fitter to sustain the enemy's charge. 
Meantime the Numidian horse, wheeling round 
the hills, to the right and left, threatened to 
inclose Csesar's forces with their numbers, 
while part continued to harass his rear : and 
if but three or four veteran soldiers faced 
about, and darted their javelins at the enemy, 
no less than two thousand of them would take 
to flight ; but suddenly rallying, returned to 
the fight, and charged the legionaries with 
their darts. Thus Caesar, one while marching 
forward, one while halting, and going on but 
slowly, reached the camp safe, about seven 
that evening, having only ten men wounded. 
Labienus too retreated to his camp, after hav- 
ing thoroughly fatigued his troops with the 
pursuit ; in which, besides a great number 
wounded, his loss amounted to about three 
hundred men. And Scipio withdrew his le- 
gions and elephants, whom, for the greater 
terror, he had ranged before his camp within 
view of Caesar's army. 
V^ LXI. Caesar having such an enemy to deal 
with, was necessitated to instruct his soldiers, 
jiot like a general of a veteran army, which 
had been victorious in so many battles ; but 
like a fencing-master, training up his gladia- 
tors : with what foot they must advance or re- 
tire ; when they were to oppose and make 
good their ground, when to counterfeit an at- 
tack ; at what place, and in what manner, to 
launch their javelins. For the enemy's light- 
armed troops gave wonderful trouble and dis- 
quiet to our army ; because they not only 
deterred the cavalry from the encounter, by 
killing their horses with their javelins, but 



likewise wearied out the legionary soldiers by 
their swiftness : for as often as these heavy- 
armed troops advanced to attack them, they 
evaded the danger by a quick retreat. This 
gave Caesar no small trouble; because as often 
as he engaged with his cavalry, without being 
sustained by the infantry, he found himself by 
no means a match for the enemy's horse, sup- 
ported by their light-armed foot : and as he 
had no experience of the strength of their le- 
gions, he foresaw still greater difficulties when 
these should be united, as the shock must then 
be wonderful. The number too and size of 
the elephants greatly increased the terror of 
the soldiers ; for which, however, he found a 
remedy, in causing some of those animals to 
be brought over from Italy, that his men might 
be accustomed to the sight of them, know their 
strength and courage, and in what part of the 
body they were most likely to be wounded. 
For as the elephants are covered with trap- 
pings and ornaments, it was necessary to in- 
form them what parts of the body remained 
naked, that they might direct their darts 
thither. It was likewise needful to familiarize 
his horses to the cry, smell, and figure of these 
animals ; in all which he succeeded to a won- 
der : for the soldiers quickly came to touch 
them with their hands, and to be sensible of 
their tardiness ; and the cavalry attacked them 
with blunted darts, and, by degrees, brought 
their horses to endure their presence. For 
these reasons already mentioned, Caesar was 
not without his anxieties, and proceeded with 
more slowness and circumspection than usual, 
abating considerably of his wonted expedition 
and celerity. Nor ought we to wonder ; for 
in Gaul his troops had been accustomed to 
fight in a champaign country, against an open 
undesigning enemy, who despised artifice, and 
valued themselves only on their bravery. But 
now he was to habituate his soldiers to the 
arts and contrivances of a crafty enemy, and 
teach them what to pursue, and what to avoid. 
The sooner, therefore, to instruct them in these 
matters, he took care not to confine his legions 
to one place, but, under pretence of foraging, 
engaged them in frequent marches and counter- 
marches ; knowing well that the enemy would 
take care not to lose sight of him. Three days 
after, he drew up his forces with great art, and 
marching past Scipio's camp, waited for him in 
an open plain ; but seeing that he still declined 
a battle, he retreated to his camp in the evening. 



326 



PANSA'S 



LXII. Meantime ambassadors arrived from 
the town of Vacca, bordering upon Zeta, of 
■which we have observed Csesar had pos- 
sessed himself. They requested and entreated 
that he would send them a garrison, promising 
to furnish many of the necessaries of war. At 
the same time, by an uncommon piece of 
good fortune for Caesar, a deserter informed 
him, that Juba had, by a quick march, reached 
the town, massacred the inhabitants, and 
abandoned the place itself to the plunder of 
his soldiers. Thus was Csjsar's garrison pre- 
vented from setting out, and by that means 
saved from destruction. 

LXIII. Caesar having reviewed his army 
the eighteenth of February, advanced next 
day, with all his forces, five miles beyond his 
camp, and remained a considerable time in 
order of battle, two miles from Scipio's. When 
he had waited sufficiently long to invite the 
enemy to an engagement, finding them still 
decline it, he led back his troops. Next day 
he decamped, and directed his march towards 
Sassura, where Scipio had a garrison of Nu- 
midians, and a magazine of corn. Labienus 
being informed of this motion, fell upon his 
rear, with the cavalry and light-armed troops : 
and having made himself master of part of the 
baggage, was encouraged to attack the legions 
themselves, believing they would fall an easy 
prey, under the load and encumbrance of a 
march. But Caesar, from a foresight of what 
might happen, had ordered three hundred 
men out of each legion, to hold themselves in 
readiness for action. These being sent against 
Labienus, he was so terrified at their approach, 
that he shamefully took to flight, great num- 
bers of his men being killed or wounded. The 
legionaries returned to their standards, and 
pursued their march. Labienus still followed 
us at a distance along the summit of the moun- 
tains, and kept hovering on our right. 

LXIV. Caesar arriving before Sassura, took 
it in presence of the enemy, who durst not 
advance to its relief ; and put to the sword the 
garrison which had been left there by Scipio, 
under the command of P. Cornelius, who, 
after a vigorous defence, was surrounded and 
slain. Having given all the corn in the place 
to the army, he marched next day to Tisdra, 
where Considius was with a strong garrison, 
and his cohort of gladiators. Caesar having 
taken a view of the town, and being deterred 
from besieging it for want of corn, set out im- 



mediately, and, after a march of four miles, en- 
camped near a river. Here he stayed about 
four days, and retreated to his former camp at 
Agar. Scipio did the same, and retreated to 
his old quarters. 

LXV. Meantime the Thabenenses, a nation 
situated in the extreme confines of Juba's 
kingdom, along the sea-coast, and who had 
been accustomed to live in subjection to that 
monarch, having massacred the garrison left 
there by the king, sent deputies to Caesar to 
inform him of what they had done, and to beg 
he would take under his protection a city 
which deserved so well of the Roman people. 
Caesar, approving their conduct, sent M. Cris- 
pus, the tribune, with a cohort, a party of arch- 
ers, and a great number of warlike engines, 
to charge himself with the defence of Thabena. 

LXVL At the same time the legionary 
soldiers, who, either on account of sickness, or 
for other reasons, had not been able to come 
over into Africa with the rest, to the number 
of four thousand foot, four hundred horse, and 
a thousand archers and slingers, now arrived 
all together. With these, and his former 
troops, he advanced into a plain eight miles 
distant from his own camp, and four from that 
of Scipio, where he waited the enemy in order 
of battle. 

LXVn. The town of Tegea was below 
Scipio's camp, where he had a garrison of 
four hundred horse. These he drew up on 
the right and left of the town ; and bringing 
forth his legions, formed them in order of 
battle, upon a hill somewhat lower than his 
camp, and which was about a thousand paces 
distant from it. After he had continued a con- 
siderable time in this posture, without offering 
to make any attempt, Caesar sent some squad- 
rons of horse, supported by his light-armed 
infantry, archers, and slingers, to charge the 
enemy's cavalry, who were posted before the 
town. Our men advancing upon the spur, 
Placidius began to extend his front, that he 
might at once surround and give us a warm 
reception. Upon this Caesar detached three 
hundred legionaries to our assistance, while 
at the same time Labienus was continually 
sending fresh reinforcements, to replace those 
that were wounded or fatigued. Our cavalry, 
who were only four hundred in number, not 
being able to sustain the charge of four thou- 
sand, and being besides greatly incommoded 
by the light-armed Numidians, began at last 



COMMENTARIES. 



327 



to give ground ; which Caesar observing, de- 
tached the other wing to their assistance ; who 
joining those that were like to be overpowered, 
they fell in a body upon the enemy, put them 
to flight, slew or wounded great numbers, 
pursued them three miles quite to the moun- 
tains, and then returned to their own men. 
Cffiiar continued in order of battle till four 
in the afternoon, and then retreated to his 
camp without the loss of a man. In this 
action Placidius received a dangerous wound 
in the head, and had many of his best officers 
either killed or wounded. 

LXVIII. When he found that the enemy 
were by no means to be prevailed with to fight 
him upon equal terms, and that he could not 
encamp nearer them for want of water, in 
consideration of which alone, not from any 
confidence in their numbers, the Africans had 
dared to despise him ; he decamped the four- 
teenth of April at midnight, marched sixteen 
miles beyond Agar to Thapsus, where Ver- 
gilius commanded with a strong garrison, and 
there fixed his camp. The very first day he 
began the circumvallation, and raised redoubts 
in proper places, as well for his own security, 
as to prevent any succours from entering the 
town. This step reduced Scipio to the ne- 
cessity of fighting, to avoid the disgrace of 
abandoning Vergilius and the Thapsitani, 
who had all along remained firm to his party ; 
and therefore following Caesar without delay, 
he posted himself in two camps, eight miles 
from Thapsus. 

LXIX. Between a morass and the sea was 
a narrow pass of about fifteen hundred paces, 
by which Scipio hoped to throw succours into 
the place. But Caesar, from a foresight of 
what might happen, had the day before raised 
a very strong fort at the entrance of it, where 
he left a triple garrison; and encamping with 
the rest of his troops ia form of a half moon, 
carried his works round the town. Scipio, 
disappointed of his design, passed the day and 
night following a little above the morass ; but 
early next morning advanced within a small 
distance of our fort, where he began to in- 
trench himself about fifteen hundred paces 
from the sea. Ca;sar being informed of this, 
drew off his men from the works ; and leaving 
Asprenas the proconsul, with two legions, to 
guard the camp and the baggage, marched 
all the rest of his forces with the utmost ex- 
pedition to the place where the enemy were 



posted. He left part of the fleet before 
Thapsus, and ordered the rest to make as 
near the shore as possible towards the ene- 
my's rear, observing the signal he should give 
them, upon which they were to raise a sudden 
shout, that the enemy, alarmed and disturbed 
by the noise behind them, might be forced to 
face about. 

LXX. When Csesar came to the place, he 
found Scipio's army in order of battle before 
the intrenchments, the elephants posted in 
the two wings, and part of the soldiers em- 
ployed in fortifying the camp. Upon sight of 
this disposition, he drew up his army in three 
lines, placed the second and tenth legions on 
the right wing, the eighth and ninth in the 
left, five legions in the centre, covered his 
flanks with five cohorts posted over against 
the elephants, disposed the archers and slingers 
in the two wings, and intermingled the light- 
armed troops with his cavalry. He himself 
on foot went from rank to rank, to rouse the 
courage of the veterans, putting them in mind 
of their former bravery, and animating them 
by his soothing address. He exhorted the 
new levies to emulate the bravery of the vete- 
rans, and endeavour by a victory to attain the 
same degree of glory and renown. 

LXXI. As he ran from rank to rank, he 
observed the enemy very uneasy, hurrying 
from place to place, one while retiring behind 
the rampart, another coming out again in 
great tumult and confusion. As the same 
was observed by many others in the army, his 
lieutenants and volunteers begged him to 
give the sign of battle, as the immortal gods 
promised him a certain victory. While he 
hesitated with himself, and strove to repress 
their eagerness and desires, as being unwilling 
to yield to the importunity of men, whose 
duty it was to wait his orders; on a sudden a 
trumpet, in the right wing, without his leave, 
and compelled by the soldiers, sounded a 
charge. Upon this all the cohorts ran to battle, 
in spite of the endeavours of the centurions, 
who strove to restrain them by force, but to 
no purpose. Ccesar perceiving that the ar- 
dour of his soldiers would admit of no re- 
straint, giving good-fortune for the word, 
spurred on his horse, and charged the ene- 
my's front. On the right wing the archers 
and slingers poured their javelins without in- 
termission upon the elephants, and by the 
noise of their slings and stones, so terrified 



328 



PANSA'S 



these unruly animals, that turning upon their 
own men, they trode them down in heaps, 
and rushed through the gates of the camp, 
that were but half finished. At the same 
time the Mauritanian horse, who were in the 
same wing with the elephants, seeing them- 
selves deprived of their assistance, betook 
themselves to flight. Whereupon the legions, 
wheeling round the elephants, soon mastered 
the enemy's intrenchments. Some few that 
made resistance were slain : the rest fled with 
all expedition to the camp they had quitted 
the day before. 

LXXII. And here we must not omit tak- 
ing notice of the bravery of a veteran soldier 
of the fifth legion. For when an elephant, 
which had been wounded in the left wing, 
and roused to fury by the pain, ran against an 
unarmed sutler, threw him under his feet, and 
leaning on him with his whole weight, bran- 
dishing his trunk, and raising hideous cries, 
crushed him to death; the soldier could not 
refrain from attacking the animal. The ele- 
phant, seeing him advance with his javelin in 
his hand, quitted the dead body of the sutler, 
and seizing him v/ith his trunk, wheeled him 
round in the air. But the soldier, amidst all 
the danger, losing nothing of his courage, 
ceased not with his sword to strike at the 
elephant's trunk, v?ho at last overcome with 
the pain, quitted the prey, and fled to the rest 
with hideous cries. 

LXXIII. Meanwhile the garrison of Thap- 
sus, either designing to assist their friends, 
or abandon the tov?n, sallied by the gate next 
the sea, and wading navel deep in the water, 
endeavoured to reach the land. But the ser- 
vants and followers of the camp, attacking 
them with darts and stones, obliged them 
to return again to the town. Scipio's camp 
meanwhile being forced, and his men flying 
on all sides, the legions instantly began the 
pursuit, that they might have no time to rally. 
When they arrived at their former camp, by 
means of which they hoped to defend them- 
selves, they began to think of choosing a 
commander, to whose authority and orders 
they might submit ; but finding none on 
whom they could rely, they threw down 
their arms and fled to Juba's quarters. This 
being likewise possessed by our men, they re- 
tired to a hill; where despairing of safety, 
they endeavoured to soften their enemies, 
saluting them by the name of brethren. But 



this stood them in little stead : for the veterans, 
transported with rage and anger, were not only 
deaf to the cries of their enemies, but even 
killed or wounded several citizens of dis- 
tinction in their own army, whom they up- 
braided as authors of the war. Of this num- 
ber was Tullius Rufus the questor, whom a 
soldier knowingly ran through with a javelin ; 
and Pompeius Rufus, who was wounded with 
a sword in the arm, and would doubtless have 
been slain, had he not speedily fled to Caesar 
for protection. This made several Roman 
knights and senators retire from the battle, 
lest the soldiers, who after so signal a victory 
assumed an unbounded license, should be in- 
duced by the hopes of impunity to wreak th6ir 
fury on them likewise. In short, all Scipio's 
soldiers, though they implored the protection 
of Csesar, were yet in the very sight of that 
general, and amidst his entreaties to his men 
to spare them, universally, and without ex- 
ception, put to the sword. 

LXXIV. Csesar having made himself mas- 
ter of the enemy's three camps, killed ten 
thousand of them, and put the rest to flight, 
retreated to his own quarters, with the loss of 
no more than fifty men, and a few wounded. 
In this way he appeared before Thapsus, and 
ranged all the elephants he had taken in the 
battle, amounting to sixty-four, with their 
ornaments, trappings, and castles, in full view 
of the place. He was in hopes by this evi- 
dence of his success to induce Vergilius to 
surrender. He even called and invited him 
to submit, reminding him of his clemency and 
mildness ; but no answer being given, he re- 
tired from before the town. Next day, after 
returning thanks to the gods, he assembled 
his army before Thapsus, praised his soldiers 
in presence of the inhabitants, rewarded the 
victorious, and from his tribunal extended his 
bounty to every one, according to their merit 
and services. Setting out thence immediately, 
he left the proconsul C, Rebellius, with three 
legions, to continue the siege, and sent Cn. 
Domitius with two, to invest Tisdra, where 
Considius commanded. Then ordering M. 
Messala to go before with the cavalry, he 
began his march to Utica. 

LXXV, Scipio's cavalry, who had escaped 
out of the battle, taking the road of Utica, 
arrived at Parada; but being refused admit- 
tance by the inhabitants, who heard of Ca- 
sar's victory, they forced the gates, lighted a 



COMMENTARIES. 



329 



great fire in the middle of the forum, and 
threw all the inhabitants into it, without dis- 
tinction of age or sex, with their effects ; 
avenging in this manner, by an unheard of 
cruelty, the affront they had received. Thence 
they marched directly to Utica. M. Cato, 
some time before, distrusting the inhabitants 
of that city, because of the privileges granted 
them by the Julian law, had disarmed and 
expelled the populace, obliging them to dwell 
without the warlike gate, in a small camp en- 
vironed with a slight intrenchment, round 
which he had planted guards, while at the 
same time he held the senators under con- 
finement. The cavalry attacked their camp, as 
knowing them to be well-wishers to Cspsar, and 
to avenge, by their destruction, the shame of 
their own defeat. But the people, animated by 
Caesar's victory, repulsed them with stones and 
clubs. They therefore threw themselves into 
the town, killed many of the inhabitants, and 
pillaged their houses. Cato, unable to prevail 
with them to abstain from rapine and slaughter, 
and undertake the defence of the town, as he 
was not ignorant what they aimed at, gave 
each a hundred sesterces to make them quiet. 
Sylla Faustus did the same out of his own 
money ; and marching with them from Iftica, 
advanced into the kingdom of Juba. 

LXXVI. A great many others that had 
escaped out of the battle, fled to Utica. These 
Cato assembled, with three hundred more who 
had furnished Scipio with money for carrying 
on the war, and exhorted them to set their 
slaves free, and, in conjunction with them, 
defend the town. But finding that though 
part assembled, the rest were terrified and de- 
termined to fly, he gave over the attempt, and 
furnished them with ships to facilitate their 
escape. He himself, having settled all his 
affairs with the utmost care, and commended 
his children to L. Csesar, his questor, without 
the least indication which might give cause of 
suspicion, or any change in his countenance 
and behaviour, privately carried his sword 
into his chamber when he went to sleep, and 
stabbed himself with it. But the wound not 
proving mortal, and the noise of his fall 
creating a suspicion, a physician, with some 
friends, broke into his chamber, and endea- 
voured to bind up the wound ; which he no 
sooner was sensible of, than tearing it open 
with his own hands, he expired, with undaunted 
resolution and presence of mind. The IJticans, 
29 



though they hated his party, yet in con- 
sideration of his singular integrity, his be- 
haviour so different from that of the other 
chiefs, and the wonderful fortifications he had 
directed to defend their town, interred him 
honourably. L. Caesar, that he might procure 
some advantages by his death, assembled the 
people, and after haranguing them, exhorted 
them to open their gates, and throw them- 
selves upon Csesar's clemency, from which 
they had the greatest reason to hope the best. 
This advice being followed, he came forth to 
meet Csesar. Messala having reached Utica, 
according to his orders, placed guards at the 
gates. 

LXXVII. Meanwhile Csesar leaving 'J'hap- 
sus, came to Usceta, where Scipio had laid 
up great store of corn, arms, darts, and other 
warlike provisions, under a small guard. He 
soon made himself master of the place, and 
marched directly to Adrumetum, which he 
entered without opposition. He took an ac- 
count of the arms, provisions, and money in 
the town; pardoned Q. Ligarius, and C, 
Considius ; and leaving Livineius Regulus 
there, with one legion, set out the same day 
for Utica. L. Ca;sar meeting him by the 
way, threw himself at his feet, and only 
begged for his life. Caesar, according to his 
wonted clemency, easily pardoned him : as he 
did likewise Cascina, C. Ateius, P. Atrius, L. 
Colla, father and son, M. Eppius, M. Aquinius, 
Cato's son, and the children of Damasippus. 
He arrived at Utica in the evening by torch- 
light, and continued all that night without the 
town. 

LXXVHI. Next morning early he entered 
the place, summoned an assembly of the peo- 
ple, and thanked them for the afl'ection they 
had shown to his cause. At the same time, 
he censured severely, and enlarged upon the 
crime of the Roman citizens and merchants, 
and the rest of the three hundred, who had 
furnished Scipio and Varus with money ; but 
concluded with telling them that they might 
show themselves without fear, as he was de- 
termined to grant them their lives, and con- 
tent himself with exposing their effects to 
sale ; yet so, that he would give them notice 
when their goods were to be sold, and the 
liberty of redeeming ihem upon payment of 
a certain fine. The merchants, half dead with 
fear, and conscious that they merited death, 
hearing upon what terms life was offered 
2U 



330 



PANSA'S 



them, greedily accepted the condition, and en- 
treated Cffisar that he would impose a certain 
sum in gross upon all the three hundred. Ac- 
cordingly he amerced them in two hundred 
thousand sesterces, to be paid to the republic, 
at six equal payments, within the space of 
three years. They all accepted the condition, 
and considering that day as a second nativity, 
joyfully returned thanks to Csesar. 

LXXIX. Meanwhile king Juba, wTio had 
escaped from the battle with Petreius, hiding 
himself all day in the villages, and travelling 
only by night, arrived at last in Numidia. 
When he came to Zama, his ordinary place of 
residence, where were his wives and children, 
with all his treasures and whatever he held 
most valuable, and which he had strongly for- 
tified at the beginning of the war ; the in- 
habitants, having heard of Caesar's victory, 
refused him entrance, because upon declaring 
war against the Romans, he had raised a 
mighty pile of wood in the middle of the 
forum, designing, if unsuccessful, to massacre 
all the citizens, fling their bodies and effects 
upon the pile, then setting fire to the mass, 
and throwing himself upon it, destroy all 
without exception, wives, children, citizens, 
and treasures, in one general conflagration. 
After continuing a considerable time before 
the gates, finding that neither threats nor en- 
treaties would avail, he at last desired them to 
deliver him his wives and children, that he 
might carry them along with him. But re- 
ceiving no answer, and seeing them deter- 
mined to grant him nothing, he quitted the 
place, and retired to one of his country seats 
with Petreius and a few horse. 

LXXX. Meantime the Zamians sent am- 
bassadors to Caesar at Utica, to inform him 
what they had done, and to request his assis- 
tance against Juba, who was drawing his forces 
together to attack them. They assured him 
of their submission, and resolution to defend 
the town for him. Cjesar commended the 
ambassadors, and sent them back to acquaint 
their fellow-citizsns, that he was coming him- 
self to their relief. Accordingly setting out 
the next day from Utica, with his cavalry, he 
directed his march towards Numidia. Many 
of the king's generals met him on the way, 
and sued for pardon : to all whom, having 
given a favourable hearing, they attended him 
to Zama. The report of his clemency and 
mildness spreading into all parts, the whole 



Numidian cavalry flocked to him at Zama, 
and were there delivered of their fears. 

LXXXI. During these transactions, Con- 
sidius, who commanded at Tisdra, with his 
own retinue, a garrison of Getulians, and a 
company of gladiators, hearing of the defeat 
of his party, and terrified at the arrival of 
Domitius and his legions, abandoned the town ; 
and privately withdrawing, with a few of the 
barbarians, and all his money, took his way 
towards Numidia. The Getulians, to render 
themselves masters of his treasures, murdered 
him by the way, and fled every man where he 
could. Meantime C. Vergilius, seeing him- 
self shut up by sea and land, without power of 
making a defence ; his followers all slain or 
put to flight ; M. Cato dead by his own hands 
at Utica ; Juba despised and deserted by his 
own subjects ; Sabura and his forces defeated 
by Sitius ; Ccesar received without opposition 
at Utica : and that of so vast an army, nothing 
remained capable of screening him or his chil- 
dren ; thought it his most prudent course to 
surrender himself and the city to the procon- 
sul Caninius, by whom he was besieged. 

LXXXII. At the same time king Juba, 
seeing himself excluded from all the cities of 
his kingdom, and that there remained no hopes 
of safety ; having supped with Petreius, pro- 
posed an engagement, sword in hand, that 
they might die honourably. Juba, as being 
the stronger, easily got the better of his ad- 
versary, and laid him dead at his feet; but en- 
deavouring afterwards to run himself through 
the body, and wanting strength to accomplish 
it, he was obliged to have recourse to one of 
his slaves, and, by his entreaties, prevailed 
upon him to perform that mournful office. 

LXXXIII. In the meantime, P. Sitius, 
having defeated the army of Sabura, Juba's 
lieutenant, and slain the general, and march- 
ing with a few troops through Mauritania, to 
join Caesar, chanced to fall in with Faustus 
and Afranius, who were at the head of the 
party that had plundered Utica, amounting in 
all to about fifteen hundred men, and design- 
ing to make the best of their way to Spain. 
Having expeditiously placed himself in am- 
buscade during the night, and attacking them 
by day-break, he either killed or made them 
all prisoners, except a few that escaped from 
the van. Afranius and Faustus were taken 
among the rest, with their wives and children : 
but some few days after, a mutiny arising 



COMMENTARIES. 



331 



among the soldiers, Faustus and Afranius were 
slain. Caesar pardoned Pompeia, the wife of 
Faustus, with her children, and permitted her 
the free enjoyment of all her effects. 

LXXXIV, Meanwhile Scipio, with Da- 
masippus, and Torquatus, and Plastorius Rus- 
tianus, having embarked on board some gal- 
leys, with a design to make for the coast of 
Spain; and being long and severely tossed 
by contrary winds, were at last obliged to put 
into the port of Hippo, where the fleet com- 
manded by P. Sitius chanced at that time to be. 
Scipio's vessels, which were but small and few 
in number, were easily surrounded and sunk, 
by the larger and more numerous ships of 
Sitius; on which occasion Scipio, and all 
those whom we have mentioned above, as 
having embarked with him, perished. 

LXXXV. Meanwhile Cassar, having ex- 
posed the king's effects to public sale at Zama, 
and confiscated the estates of those, who, 
though Roman citizens, had borne arms against 
the republic; after conferring rewards upon 
such of the Zamans as had been concerned in 
the design of excluding the king, he abolished 
all the royal tribunes, converted the kingdom 
into a province ; and appointing Crispus Sal- 
lustius to take charge of it, with the title of 
proconsul, returned again to Utica. There 
he sold the estates of the officers that had 
served under Juba and Petreius, fined the 
people of Thapsus twenty thousand sesterces, 
and the company of Roman merchants there 



! thirty thousand ; fined likewise the inhabitants 
of Adrumetum in thirty thousand, and their 
company in fifty thousand ; but preserved the 
cities and their territories from insult and 
plunder. Those of Leptis, whom Juba had 
pillaged some time before, and who, upon 
complaint made to the senate by their deputies, 
had obtained arbitrators and restitution, were 
enjoined to pay yearly three hundred thousand 
j pounds of oil ; because, from the beginning 
of the war, in consequence of a dissension 
I among their chiefs, they had made an alliance 
with the king of Numidia, and supplied him 
with arms, soldiers, and money. The people 
of Tisdra, because of their extreme poverty, 
were only condemned to pay annually a cer- 
tain quantity of corn. 

LXXXVI. These things settled, he em- 
barked at Utica on the thirteenth of June, 
and three days after arrived at Carales, in 
Sardinia. Here he condemned the Sulcitani 
in a fine of one hundred thousand sesterces, 
for receiving and aiding Nasidius's fleet ; and 
instead of a tenth, which was their former 
assessment, ordered them now to pay an eighth 
to the public treasury. He likewise confiscated 
the estates of some who had been more active 
than the rest, and weighing from Carales on 
the twenty-ninth of June, coasted along the 
shore, and, after a voyage of twenty-eight 
days, during which he was several times 
obliged to put into port, by contrary winds, 
arrived safe at Rome. 



PANSA'S COMMENTARIES 



OF THE 



SPANISH WAR. 



29* 



333 



THE ARGUMENT. 

I. The commencement of the Spanish war. — 11. Caesar marches to attack Cordova. — III. At the same time 
throws succours into Ulia, besieged by Pompey.— IV. The attempt upon Cordova obliges Pompey to raise 
the siege of Ulia. — V. Pompey advancing to the relief of Cordova, Cassar attacks Ategua, whither he is fol- 
lowed by Pompey.— VII. Both intrench themselves in mountainous places, of diflicult access.— IX. Pompey 
attacking a fort belonging to Caesar, is repulsed. — X. Caesar continues the siege of Ategua. — XI. Repulses a 
sally from the town. — XIII. Various skirmishes between the two armies. — XV. Cruelty of the townsmen. — 
XVI. Caesar repulses them in a second sally. — XVII. TuUius treats with Caesar about a surrender. — XVIII. 
Continuation of the siege. — XIX. The town surrenders. — XX. Pompey removes his camp towards Ucubis. — 
XXII. Behaviour of the Bursavolenses. — XXIII. Caesar and Pompey both encamp near Ucubis, where soma 
skirmishes happen. — XXV. Single combat of Turpio and Niger. — XXVI. Great numbers of the enemy 
desert to Csesar. Some of Pompey's letters intercepted. — XXVII. Both parties encamp in the plain of 
Munda.— XXVIII. A great battle ensues. — XXXI. In which Pompey is totally defeated. — XXXII. Caesar be- 
sieges the runaways in Munda. — XXXIII. Attacks and makes himself master of Cordova. — XXXV. Likewise 
of Hispalis ; whence he is expelled, and again recovers it. The Mundenses, under the pretence of a surren 
der, preparing to attack our men, are themselves put to the sword. — XXXVU. Carteia surrenders to Caesar. 
Pompey makes his escape.— XXXIX. Pompey is slain. — XL. Some of Caesar's ships burned.— XIJ. Caesar's 
troops take possession of Munda, and afterwards invest Ursao.— XLII. Caesar's speech to the people of 
Hispalis. 



334 



PAIVSA'S COMMENTARIES 



OF 



THE SPANISH WAR. 



I. Phaunaces being vanquished, and Africa 
reduced, those who escaped fled into Spain, to 
young Cn. Pompey ; who having got posses- 
sion of the farther province, whilst CiEsar was 
employed in distributing rewards in Italy, en- 
deavoured to strengthen himself by engaging 
the several states to join him : and partly by 
entreaty, partly by force, soon drew together a 
considerable army, with which he began to 
lay waste the country. In this situation of 
things, some states voluntarily sent him sup- 
plies, others shut the gates of their towns 
against him ; of which, if any chanced to fall 
into his hands by assault, how well soever a 
citizen might have deserved of his father, yet 
if he was known to be rich, some ground of 
complaint was never wanting, under pretence 
of which to destroy him, that his estate might 
fall a prey to the soldiers. Thus the enemy, 
encouraged by the spoils of the vanquished, 
increased daily, in number and strength ; in- 
somuch that the states in Csesar's interest 
were continually sending messengers into 
Italy, to press his immediate march to their 
relief. 

II. CfBsar, now' a third time dictator, and 
nominated also a fourth time to the same dig- 
nity, hastening, with all diligence, into Spain, 
to put an end to the war, was met upon the 
way by the ambassadors of Cordova, who had 
deserted from the camp of Cn. Pompey. They 
informed him that it would be an easy matter 
to make himself master of the town by night, 
because the enemy as yet knew nothing of 
his arrival in the province, the scouts sent out 
by Cn. Pompey to inform him of Caesar's ap- 



proach having been all made prisoners. They 
alleged besides many more other very pro- 
bable reasons ; all which so far wrought upon 
him, that he sent immediate advice of his ar- 
rival to Q. Pedius, and Q. Fabius Maximus, 
his lieutenants, to whom he had left the com- 
mand of the troops in the province, ordering 
them to send him all the cavalry they 
had been able to raise. He came up with 
them much sooner than they expected, and 
was joined by the cavalry, according to his 
desire. 

III. Sextus Pompey, the brother of Cnieus, 
commanded at this time at Cordova, which 
was accounted the capital of the province. 
Young Cnieus Pompey himself was employed 
in the siege of Ulia, which had now lasted 
some months. The besieged having notice 
of Coesar's arrival, sent deputies to him, who 
passed unobserved through Pompey 's camp, 
and requested with great earnestness, that he 
would come speedily to their relief. Caesar, 
who was no stranger to the merit of that peo- 
ple, and their constant attachment to the Ro- 
mans, detached about nine at night eleven 
cohorts, with a like number of horse, under 
the command of L. Julius Paciecus, a good 
officer, well known in the province, and who 
was besides perfectly acquainted with the 
country. When he arrived at Pompey's 
quarters, a dreadful tempest arising, attended 
with a violent wind, so great a darkness 
ensued, that it was difficult to distinguish 
even the person next you. This accident 
proved of great advantage to Paciecus ; for be- 
ing arrived at Pompey's camp, he ordered the 
335 



336 



PANSA'S 



the cavalry to advance two by two, and march 
directly through the enemy's quarters to the 
town. Some of their guards calling to know 
who passed, one of our troopers bid them be 
silent, for they were just then endeavouring 
by stealth to approach the wall, in order to 
get possession of the town ; and partly by this 
answer, partly by favour of the tempest, which 
hindered the sentinels from examining things 
diligently, they were suffered to pass without 
disturbance. When they reached the gates, 
upon a signal given, they were admitted ; and 
both horse and foot raising a mighty shout, 
after leaving some troops to guard the town, 
sallied in a body upon the enemy's camp ; who 
having no apprehension of such an attack, 
were almost all like to have been made pri- 
soners. 

IV. Uha being relieved, Ca;sar, to draw 
Pompey from the siege, marched towards Cor- 
dova ; sending the cavalry before, with a select 
body of heavy-armed foot ; who as soon as 
they came within sight of the place, got up 
behind the troopers, without being perceived 
by those of Cordova. Upon their approach 
to the walls, the enemy sallied in great num- 
bers, to attack our cavalry ; when the infantry 
leaping down, fell upon them with such fury, 
that out of an almost infinite multitude of men, 
very few returned to the town. This so alarmed 
Sextus Pompey, that he immediately sent 
letters to his brother, requesting him to come 
speedily to his relief, lest Caesar should make 
himself master of Cordova before his arrival. 
Thus Cn. Pompey, moved by his brother's let- 
ters, quitted the siege of Ulia, which was upon 
the point of surrendering, and began his march 
towards Cordova. 

V. Caesar arriving at the river Baetis, which 
he found too deep to be forded, sunk several 
baskets of stones in it ; and raising a bridge 
upon them, supported by double beams, carried 
over his forces in three bodies. Pompey ar- 
riving soon after with his troops, encamped 
directly over against him. Caesar, to cut off 
his provisions and communication with the 
town, ran a line from his camp to the bridge. 
Pompey did the same ; insomuch that a struggle 
arose between the two generals, which should 
first get possession of the bridge ; and this 
daily brought on small skirmishes, in which 
sometimes the one, sometimes the other party 
had the better. At last the dispute becoming 
more general, they came to a close fight, 



though upon very disadvantageous ground : 
for both sides striving earnestly to obtain the 
bridge, they found themselves as they ap- 
proached straitened for want of room, and 
extending themselves towards the river side, 
many fell headlong from the banks. Thus 
the loss was pretty equal ; for on either side 
lay heaps of slain : and Caesar, for many days, 
used all possible endeavours to bring the 
enemy to an engagement on equal terms, that 
he might bring the war to a conclusion as soon 
as possible. 

VI. But finding that they carefully avoided 
a battle, with a view to which chiefly he had 
quitted the route of Ulia; he caused great 
fires to be lighted in the night, repassed the 
river with all his forces, and marched towards 
Ategua, one of their strongest garrisons. 
Pompey having notice of this from the de- 
serters, retreated the same day to Cordova, by 
a very narrow and difficult road, with a great 
number of carriages and machines of war. 
Caesar began his attack upon Ategua, and 
carried lines quite round the town ; of which 
Pompey having intelligence, set out upon his 
march the same day. But CsBsar had taken 
care beforehand to secure all the advantageous 
posts, and possess himself of the forts ; partly 
to shelter his cavalry, partly to post guards of 
infantry for the defence of his camp. The 
morning of Pompey's arrival was so foggy, 
that he found means, with some cohorts and 
troops of cavalry, to hem in a party of Caesar's 
horse, and fell upon them in such a manner, 
that very fev/ escaped slaughter. 

VII. The following night Pompey set fire 
to his camp, passed the river Salsus, and 
marching through the valleys, encamped on a 
rising ground, between the towns of Ategua 
and Ucubis. Cassar meanwhile continued 
his approaches, cast up a mount, and brought 
forward his machines. The country all 
around is mountainous, and seems formed for 
war. The river Salsus runs through the plains, 
and divides them from the mountains, which 
all lie upon the side of Ategua, at about two 
miles distance from the river. Pompey's camp 
was upon these mountains, within view of both 
the towns, but nearer to Ategua ; to which he 
could however send no relief, though his army 
consisted of thirteen legions. Of these he 
chiefly relied on four : two Spanish ones, which 
had deserted from Trebonius ; one formed out 
of the Roman colonies in those parts, and a 



COMMENTARIES 



337 



fourth, which he had brought with him from 
Africa, The rest were for the most part 
made up of fugitives and deserters. As to 
light-armed foot and cavalry, we far exceeded 
him both in the number and goodness of the 
troops. 

VIII. But what proved principally service- 
able to Pompey's design of drawing out the 
war into length, was the nature of the country, 
full of mountains, and extremely well adapted 
to encampments. For almost the whole pro- 
vince of Farther Spain, though of an extremely 
fertile soil, and abounding in springs, is never- 
theless very difficult of access. Here too, on 
account of the frequent incursions of the na- 
tives, all the places remote from great towns, 
are fortified with towers and castles, covered, 
as in Africa, not with tiles, but with earth. 
On these they place sentinels, whose high 
situation commands an extensive view of 
the country on all sides. Nay, the greatest 
part of the towns of this province are built on 
mountains, and places exceedingly strong by 
nature, the approaches to which are extremely 
dilRcult. Thus sieges are rare and hazardous 
in Spain, it not being easy to reduce their 
towns by force, as happened in the present 
war. For Pompey, having established his 
camp between Ategua and Ucubis, as related 
above, and within view of both towns, Ccesar 
found means to possess himself of an eminence 
very conveniently situated, and only about 
four miles from his own camp, on which he 
built a fortress. 

IX. Pompey, who, from the nature of the 
ground, was covered by the same eminence, 
and besides at a sufficient distance from Ca;sar's 
quarters, soon became sensible of the impor- 
tance of this post : and as Cajsar was separated 
from it by the river Salsus, he imagined that 
the difficulty of sending relief would prevent 
his attempting any thing of that kind in its 
defence. Relying o^i this persuasion, he set 
out about midnight, and attacked the fort, 
which had been very troublesome to the be- 
sieged. The enemy upon their approach, set- 
ting up a shout, discharged the javelins, in 
great numbers, and wounded multitudes of our 
men : but those in the fort making a vigorous 
resistance, and despatching messengers to the 
greater camp to inform Caesar of what had 
happened, he hastened to their relief, with 
three legions. His approach struck the 
enemy with terror : many were slain, and a 



great number made prisoners ; nay, multitudes 
in their flight threw away their arms ; inso- 
much that above four-score shields were found 
which they had left behind them. 

X. The day after Arguetius arrived from 
Italy, with the cavalry, and five standards 
taken from the Saguntines : but was forced to 
quit his post by Asprcnas, who likewise brought 
a reinforcement from Italy to Ccesar. The 
same night Pompey set fire to his camp, and 
drew towards Cordova. A king named Indus, 
who was bringing some troops to Caesar, with 
a party of cavalry, following the pursuit of the 
enemy too briskly, was made prisoner, and 
slain by the Spanish legionaries. Next day 
our cavalry pursued those who were employed 
in carrying provisions from the town to Pom- 
pey's camp, almost to the very walls of Cordova, 
and took fifty prisoners, besides horses. The 
same day, Q. Marcius, a military tribune in 
Pompey's army, deserted to us. At midnight, 
the besieged fell furiously upon our works, 
and by all the methods they could devise, 
threw fire and combustible matter into the 
trenches. When the attack was ended, C. 
Fundanius, a Roman knight, quitted the enemy, 
and came over to us. 

XI. Next day, two .Spanish legionaries, 
who pretended they were slaves, were made 
prisoners by a party of our horse; but being 
brought to the camp, they were known bv the 
soldiers, who had formerly served under Fabius 
and Pedius, and deserted from Trebonius, 
who would grant no quarter, but massacred 
them immediately. At the same time, some 
couriers, sent from Cordova to Pompey, enter- 
ing our camp by mistake, were seized, had 
their hands cut off, and then were dismissed. 
About nine at night, the besieged, according 
to custom, spent a considerable time in casting 
fire and darts upon our soldiers, and wounded 
a great number of men. At day-break they 
sallied upon the sixth legion, who were busy 
at the works, and began a sharp contest, in 
which, however, our men got the better, though 
the besieged had the advantage of the higher 
ground : and fifty of their horse, who had be- 
gun the attack, being vigorously opposed on 
our side, notwithstanding all the inconveniences 
we fought under, were obliged to retire into 
the town, with many wounds. 

XII. Next day Pompey began a line from 
the camp to the river Salsus; and a small 
party of our horse, being attacked by a much 

2X 



338 



PANSA'S 



greater body of the enemy, were driven from 
their post, with the loss of three of their num- 
ber. The same day, A. Valgius, the son of 
a senator, whose brother was in Pompey's 
camp, mounted his horse and went over to the 
enemy, leaving all his baggage behind him. 
A spy, belonging to Pompey's second legion, 
was taken and slain. At the same time, a 
bullet was shot into the town, with this inscrip- 
tion : That notice should be given by the 
signal of a buckler, when Csesar advanced to 
storm the town. This encouraging some to 
hope that they might scale the walls, and 
possess themselves of the town without danger, 
they fell the next day to sapping them, and 
threw down a considerable part of the outward 
wall. They then endeavoured to mount the 
breach, but were made prisoners, and after- 
wards employed by the garrison to make an 
offer of surrendering the town to Ceesar, on 
condition that he would suffer them to march 
out with their baggage. The answer was, 
that it had been always his custom to give, 
not accept of conditions : which being reported 
to the garrison, they set up a shout, and be- 
gan to pour their darts upon our men from 
the whole circuit of the wall ; which gave 
reason to believe that the garrison intended 
that day to make a vigorous sally. Where- 
fore surrounding the town with our troops, 
the conflict was for some time maintained 
with great violence, and one of our batteries 
threw down a tower belonging to the enemy, 
in which were five of their men and a boy, 
whose office it was to observe the battery. 

XIII. After this, Pompey erected a fort on 
the other side of the Salsus, in which he met 
with no interruption from our men, and gloried 
not a little in the imagination of having pos- 
sessed himself of a post so near us. Also 
the following day, extending himself in like 
manner still farther, he came up with our 
out-guard of cavalry ; and charging them 
briskly, obliged several squadrons, and the 
light-armed foot, to give ground ; many of 
whom, by reason of the smallness of their num- 
bers, incapable of any vigorous opposition, 
were trodden down by the enemy's horse. This 
passed within view of both camps, and not 
a little animated the Pompeians, to see our 
men pushed so far ; but being afterwards rein- 
forced by a party from our camp, they faced 
about with design to renew the fight. 

XIV. In all battles of the horse this is 



found to hold ; that when the troopers dis- 
mount with design to charge the infantry, the 
match evermore proves unequal, as happened 
on the present occasion. For a select body 
of the enemy's light-armed foot, coming unex- 
pectedly upon our horse, they alighted to 
sustain the charge. Thus in a very little time, 
from a horse it became a foot skirmish, and 
again from a foot, changed to a horse encounter, 
in which our men were driven back to their 
very lines ; but being there reinforced, about a 
hundred and twenty-three of the enemy were 
slain, several forced to throw down their arms, 
many wounded, and the rest pursued quite to 
their camp. On our side, a hundred and 
eleven men were slain, besides twelve foot 
soldiers and five troopers wounded. 

XV. Towards the evening of the same day, 
the fight, as usual, was renewed before the 
walls ; and the enemy having thrown many 
darts, and a great quantity of fire from the 
battlements, proceeded afterwards to an action 
of unexampled cruelty and barbarity : for 
in the very sight of our troops they fell to 
murdering the citizens, and tumbling them 
headlong from the walls ; an instance of in- 
humanity of which no parallel is to be found 
in the history of the most savage nations. 

XVI. When night came on, Pompey sent 
a messenger, unknown to us, to exhort the 
garrison to make a vigorous sally about mid- 
night, and set fire to our towers and mount. 
Accordingly having poured upon us a great 
quantity of darts and fire, and destroyed a 
considerable part of the rampart, they opened 
the gate which lay over against, and within 
view of Pompey's camp, sallied out with 
all their forces, carrying with them fascines 
to fill up the ditch ; hooks and fire to destroy 
and reduce to ashes the barracks, which the 
soldiers had built mostly of reeds to defend 
them from the winter; and some silver and 
rich apparel to scatter among the tents, that 
while our men should be employed in securing 
the plunder, they might fight their way through, 
and escape to Pompey ; who, in expectation 
that they would be able to effect their design, 
had crossed the Salsus with his army, where 
he continued all night in order of battle, to 
favour their retreat. But though our men had 
no apprehension of this design, their valour 
enabled them to frustrate the attempt, and 
repulse the enemy, with many wounds. They 
even made themselves masters of the spoil. 



COMMENTARIES. 



J39 



their arms, and some prisoners, who were put 
to death next day. At the same time a de- 
serter from the town informed us, that Junius, 
who was employed in the mine when the citi- 
zens were massacred, exclaimed against it as 
a cruel and barbarous action, which ill suited 
the kind treatment they had received, and was 
a direct violation of the laws of hospitality. 
He added many things besides, which made 
such an impression upon the garrison, that 
they desisted from the massacre. 

XVII. The next day Tullius, a lieutenant- 
general, accompanied by C. Antonius of Lusi- 
tania, came to Caesar, and addressed him to 
this effect : " Would to heaven I had rather 
been one of your soldiers, than a follower of 
C. Pompey, and given those proofs of valour 
and constancy in obtaining victories for you, 
rather than in suffering for him. The only 
advantage we reap from following his banners 
are doleful applauses ; being reduced to the 
condition of indigent citizens, and by the 
melancholy fate of our country ranked among 
its enemies ; who having never shared with 
Pompey in his good fortune, find ourselves 
yet involved in his disgrace ; and after sus- 
taining the attack of so many armed legions, 
employing ourselves day and night in works 
of defence, exposed to the darts and swords 
of our fellow-citizens: vanquished, deserted 
by Pompey, and compelled to give way to the 
superior valour of your troops, find ourselves 
at last obliged to have recourse to your 
clemency, and implore that you will not 
show yourselves less placable to fellow- 
citizens, than you have so often been to 
foreign nations." " I am ready," returned 
CsBsar, " to show the same favour to citizens 
which vanquished nations have always re- 
ceived at my hands." 

XVIII. The ambassadors being dismissed, 
when they arrived at the gate of the town, 
Tiberius Tullius observing that C. Antony 
did not follow him, returned to the gate and 
laid hold of him, upon which drawing a poniard 
from his breast, he wounded him in the hand, 
and in this condition they both fled to Cresar. 
At the same time the standard-bearer of the 
first legion came over to our camp, and re- 
ported that the day when the skirmish hap- 
pened between the horse, no less than thirty- 
five of his company fell ; but it was not allowed 
to mention it in Pompey's camp, or so much 
as own the loss of one man. A slave, whose 



master was in Caesar's camp, and who had left 
his wife and son in the city, cut his master's 
throat, and deceiving the guards, escaped 
privately to Pompey's camp ; whence, by 
means of a bullet, on which he inscribed his 
intelligence, he gave us notice of the prepara- 
tions made for the defence of the place. When 
we had read the inscription, those who were 
employed to throw the bullet returning to the 
city, two Lusitanian brothers deserted, and 
informed us, that Pompey in a speech made 
to his soldiers had said : That as he found it 
impossible to relieve the town, he was resolved 
to withdraw privately in' the night, and retire 
towards the the sea ; to which one made an- 
swer, that it was better to hazard a battle, 
than take refuge in flight ; for which he was 
immediately killed. At the same time some 
of his couriers were intercepted, who were en- 
deavouring to get into the town. Caesar sent 
the letters to the inhabitants, and one of the 
messengers begging his life, he granted it, 
with promise of further reward, if he would 
set fire to the enemy's wooden turret. The 
enterprise was not without difficulty : he under- 
took it, however, but was slain in the attempt. 
The same night a deserter informed us that 
Pompey and Labienus were greatly offended 
at the massacre of the citizens. 

XIX. About nine at night, one of our 
wooden towers, which had been severely bat- 
tered by the enemy's engines, gave way as far 
as the third story. At the same time a sharp 
action happened near the walls, and the be- 
sieged, assisted by a favourable wind, burned 
the remaining part of that tower and another. 
Next morning a matron threw herself from 
the wall, and came over to our camp, reporting, 
that the rest of her family had intended the 
same, but were apprehended and put to death : 
likewise a letter was thrown over, in which 
was written ; " Minutius to Caesar : Pompey 
has abandoned me ; if you will grant me my 
life, I promise to serve you with the same 
fidelity and attachment I have hitherto mani- 
fested towards him." At the same time the 
deputies who had been sent before to Caesar 
by the garrison, now waited on him a second 
time, offering to deliver up the town next day, 
upon a bare grant of their lives ; to which he 
replied that he was Ctesar, and would perform 
his word. Thus having made himself master 
of the place the nineteenth of February, he 
was saluted emperor by the army. 



340 



PANSA'S 



XX. Pompey, being informed by some de- 
serters that the town had surrendered, re- 
moved his camp towards Ucubis, wliere he 
began to build redoubts, and secure liimself 
with lines. Caesar also decamped and drew 
near him. At the same time a Spanish le- 
gionary soldier deserting to our camp, in- 
formed us, that Pompey had assembled the 
people of Ucubis, and given it them in charge 
to inquire diligently who favoured his party, 
who that of the enemy. Some time after, 
the slave, who, as we have related above, had 
murdered his master, was taken in a mine and 
burnt alive. About the same time eight Span- 
ish centurions came over to Cssar; and in a 
skirmish between our cavalry and that of the 
enemy, we were repulsed, and some of our 
light-armed foot wounded. The same night 
we took four of the enemy's spies. One, 
as being a legionary soldier, was beheaded, 
but the other three, who v,^ere slaves, were 
crucified. 

XXI. The day following, some of the 
enemy's cavalry and light-armed infantry de- 
serted to us ; and about eleven of their horse 
falling upon a party of our men that were sent 
to fetch water, killed some, and took others 
prisoners ; amongst which last were eight 
troopers. Next day Pompey beheaded seventy- 
four persons as favourers of Cesar's cause, 
ordering the rest, who lay under the same 
suspicion, to be carried back to the town, 
of whom a hundred and twenty escaped to 
Csesar. 

XXII. Some time after, the deputies of 
Bursavola, whom Ctesar had taken prisoners 
in Ategua, and sent along with his own am- 
bassadors to their city, to inform them of the 
massacre of the Ateguans, and what they had 
to apprehend from Pompey, who suffered his 
soldiers to murder their hosts, and commit all 
manner of crimes with impunity, arriving in 
the town, none of our deputies, except such as 
were natives of the place, durst enter the city, 
though they were all Roman knights and sen- 
ators. But after many messages backward and 
forward, when the deputies were upon their 
return, the garrison pursued and put them all 
to the sv7ord, except two, who escaped to Coe- 
sar, and informed him of what had happened. 
Some time after, the Bursavolenses sending 
spies to Ategua, to know the truth of what 
had happened, and finding the report of our 
deputies confirmed, were for stoning to death 



him who had been the cause of the murder of 
the deputies, and were with difficulty restrained 
from laying violent hands upon him, which 
in the end proved the occasion of their own 
destruction. For having obtained leave of 
the inhabitants to go in person to Cssar and 
justify himself, he privately drew together 
some troops ; and when he thought himself 
strong enough, returned in the night, and was 
treacherously admitted into the town ; where 
he made a dreadful massacre of the inhabi-* 
tants, slew all the leaders of the opposite 
party, and reduced the place under his obe- 
dience. Soon after, some slaves who had 
deserted informed us, that he had sold all the 
goods of the citizens, and that Pompey suffered 
none of his soldiers to quit the camp but 
unarmed, because since the taking of Ategua, 
many despairing of success, fled into Be- 
thuria, having given over all expectation of 
victory ; and that if any deserted from our 
camp, they were put among the light-armed 
infantry, whose pay was only sixteen asses a 
day. 

XXIII. The day following Csesar removed 
his camp nearer to Pompey's, and began to 
draw a line to the river Salsus. Here, while 
our men were employed in the work, some of 
the enemy fell upon us from the higher ground, 
and as we were in no condition to make re- 
sistance, wounded great numbers, obliging us, 
contrary to custom, to retreat. This being 
perceived, two centurions of the fifth legion 
passed the river, and restored the battle ; 
when urging the enemy with astonishing bra- 
very, one of them fell overwhelmed by the 
multitude of darts discharged from above. 
The other continued the combat for some 
time; but seeing himself in danger of being 
surrounded, as he was endeavouring to make 
good his retreat, he stumbled and fell. His 
death being known, the enemy flocked to- 
gether in still greater numbers, upon which 
our cavalry passed the river, and drove them 
quite back to their intrenchments ; but pursu- 
ing them with too much heat, were surrounded 
by their cavalry and light-armed foot : where, 
but for the most astonishing efforts of bravery, 
they must all unavoidably have been made 
prisoners ; for the}' were so hemmed in by 
the enemy's lines, that they wanted room to 
defend themselves. Many were wounded on 
our side in these two encounters, and among 
the rest Clodius Aquitius ; but as the fight 



COMMENTARIES. 



341 



was carried on mostly at a distance, only the 
two centurions, of whom mention has been al- 
ready made, and whom the desire of glory ren- 
dered regardless of their own safety, were killed. 

XXIV. Next day both parlies withdrawing 
from Soricaria, we continued our works. But 
Pompey, observing that our fort had cut off 
his communication with Aspavia, which is 
about five miles distant from Ucubis, judged 
it necessary to come to a battle. Yet he did 
not offer it upon equal terms, but chose to 
draw up his men upon a hill, that he might 
have the advantage of the higher ground. 
Meanwhile both sides endeavouring to possess 
themselves of an eminence that lay extremely 
convenient, we at last got the better of the 
Pompeians, and drove them from the plain. 
The slaughter was very great, and would have 
been still greater, had they not been protected 
by the mountain rather than their valour. 
Night came on very opportunely to favour their 
escape ; without which our men, though few 
in number, would have entirely cut off their 
retreat. Pompey lost on this occasion three 
hundred and twenty-four light-armed foot, and 
about a hundred and thirty-eight legionary 
soldiers, besides those whose armour and spoils 
we carried off. Thus the death of the two 
centurions, which happened the day before, 
was fully revenged. 

XXV. The day after, Pompey's horse ad- 
vanced according to their usual custom to our 
lines ; for only the cavalry durst venture to 
draw up on equal ground. They therefore 
began to skirmish with our men who were at 
work, the legionaries calling out to us at the 
same time to choose our field of battle, with de- 
sign to make us believe that they desired 
nothing so much as to come to blows. Upon 
this invitation our men quitted the eminence 
where they were encamped, and advanced a 
great way into the plain, desiring no ad- 
vantage of ground. But none of the enemy 
had the boldness to present themselves, An- 
tistius Turpio excepted ; who, presuming on 
his strength, and fancying no one on our side 
a match for him, offered us defiance. Upon 
this ensued a combat not unlike that recorded 
of Memnon and Achilles. For Q. Pompeius 
Niger, a Roman knight, born in Italy, quitting 
his rank, advanced to the encounter. The 
fierce air of Antistius having engaged the 
attention of all, the two armies drew up to be 
spectators of the issue of this challenge, and 

30 



expressed no less impatience than if the whole 
fortune of the war had depended upon it; and 
the wishes on both sides for success were 
equal to the anxiety and concern each felt 
for his own combatant. They advanced into 
the plain with great courage, having each a 
resplendent buckler of curious workmanship. 
And doubtless the combat would have been 
soon decided, had not some light-armed foot, 
drawn up near the lines, to serve as a guard to 
the camp, because of the approach of the 
enemy's horse * * * Our horse in retreating 
to the camp, being warmly pursued by the 
enemy, suddenly faced about with great cries ; 
which so terrified the Pompeians, that they 
immediately betook themselves to flight, and 
retreated to their camp with the loss of many 
of their men. 

XXVI. Cffisar, to reward the valour of the 
Cassian troops, presented them with thirteen 
thousand sesterces, distributed ten thousand 
more among the light-armed foot, and gave 
Cassius himself two golden chains. The 
same day, A. Bebius, C. Flavius, and A. 
Trebellius, Roman knights of Asti, with their 
horses richly caparisoned and adorned with 
silver, came over to Caesar, and informed him, 
that all the rest of the Roman knights in 
Pompey's camp had, like them, conspired to 
come and join him, but that a discovery being 
made of their design, by a slave, they had 
been all seized, themselves excepted, who 
during the confusion found means to escape. 
The same day letters were intercepted, sent 
by Pompey to Ursao, importing : " That 
hitherto he had all the success against the 
enemy he could desire, and would have ended 
the war much sooner than was expected, 
could he have brought them to fight him 
upon equal terms : that he did not think it 
advisable to venture new -levied troops on a 
plain : that the enemy defending themselves 
with their lines, seemed inclinable to draw out 
the war to length, investing city after city, 
and thence supplying themselves with provi- 
sions ; that he would therefore endeavour to 
protect the towns of his party, and bring the 
war to as speedy an issue as possible : that he 
would send them a reinforcement of some co- 
horts, and made no doubt of forcing Csesar in a 
short time to an engagement, by cutting off 
his provisions." 

XXVII. Some time after, as our men 
were carelessly dispensed about the works, a 



342 



PANSA'S 



few horse were killed, who had gone to a 
forest of olives to fetch wood. Several slaves 
deserted at this time, and informed us, that 
ever since the action at Soritia on the seventh 
of March, the enemy had been under continual 
alarms, and appointed Attius Varus to guard 
the lines. The same day Pompey decamped, 
and posted himself in an olive-wood over 
against Hispalis, Caesar, before he removed, 
waited till midnight, when the moon began 
to appear. At his departure he ordered fire 
to be set to the fort of Ucubis, which the ene- 
my had abandoned, and that the whole army 
should rendezvous in the greater camp. He 
afterwards laid siege to Ventisponte, which 
surrendered ; and marching to Carruca, en- 
camped over against Pompey, who had burned 
the city, because the garrison refused to open 
the gates to him. A soldier who had mur- 
dered his brother in the camp, being intercepted 
by our men, was scourged and put to death. 
Csesar, still pursuing his march, arrived in the 
plains of Munda, and pitched his camp op- 
posite to that of Pompey. 

XXVIII. Next day as Caesar was preparing 
to set out with the army, notice was sent him 
by his spies, that Pompey had been in order of 
battle ever since midnight. Upon this intel- 
ligence he ordered the standard to be erected. 
Pompey had taken this resolution in conse- 
quence of his letter to the inhabitants of Ursao, 
who were his firm adherents, in which he told 
them that Caesar refused to come down into 
the plain, because his army consisted mostly of 
new-levied troops. This had greatly con- 
firmed the city in its allegiance, which there- 
fore serving as a sure resource behind him, he 
thought he might hazard a battle without 
danger ; and the rather, as he was very ad- 
vantageously encamped : for, as we observed 
before, this country is full of hills, which run 
in a continued chain, without any considerable 
breaks or hollows. 

XXIX. But we must by no means omit an 
accident which fell out about this time. The 
two camps were divided from one another by a 
plain about five miles in extent, insomuch that 
Pompey by his situation enjoyed a double de- 
fence. On one side, the town seated on an 
eminence ; on the other, the nature of the 
ground where the camp stood : for across this 
valley ran a rivulet, which rendered the ap- 
proach of the mountain extremely difficult, 
because it formed a de^ morass on the right. 



Caesar made no doubt but the enemy would 
descend into the plain and come to a battle, 
and his whole army were of the same mind ; 
the rather because the plain would give their 
cavalry full room to act, and the day was so 
serene and clear, that the gods seemed to have 
sent it on purpose to bring on an engagement. 
Our men rejoiced at the favourable opportu- 
nity : some, however, were not altogether ex- 
empt from fear, when they considered that 
their all was at stake, and the uncertainty of 
what might be their fate an hour after. He 
advanced, however, to the field of battle, fully 
persuaded that the enemy would do the same ; 
but they durst not venture above a mile from 
the town, being determined to shelter them- 
selves under its walls. Our men still con- 
tinued before them in order of battle ; but al- 
though the equality of the ground sometimes 
tempted them to come and dispute the victory, 
they nevertheless still kept their post on the 
mountain, in the neighbourhood of the town. 
We doubled our speed to reach the rivulet, 
without their stirring from the place where 
they stood. 

XXX. Their army consisted of thirteen 
legions : the cavalry was drawn up on the 
wings, with six thousand light-armed infantry, 
and about the same number of auxiliaries. We 
had only eighty heavy armed cohorts, and 
eight thousand horse. When we came to the 
extremity of the plain, as the ground was very 
disadvantageous, it would have been dangerous 
for us to advance farther, because the enemy 
were ready to charge us from the eminences : 
and therefore, that we might not rashly en- 
tangle ourselves, Caesar had taken care to 
mark beforehand how far we might advance 
with safety. The army when commanded to 
halt, murmured greatly, as if they had been 
kept back from a certain victory. The delay, 
however, served to enliven the enemy, who 
fancied that our troops were afraid of coming 
to blows. They therefore had the boldness 
to advance a little way, yet without quitting 
the advantage of their post, the approach to 
which was extremely dangerous. The tenth 
legion, as usual, was on the right ; the third 
and fifth on the left, with the auxiliary troops 
and cavalry. At length the battle began with 
a shout. 

XXXI. But though our men were superior 
to the enemy in courage, they nevertheless 
defended themselves so well by the advantage 



COMMENTARIES. 



343 



of the higher ground, the shouts were so loud, 
and the discharge of darts on both sides so 
great, that we almost began to despair of vic- 
tory. For the first onset and clamour, with 
which an enemy is most apt to be dismayed, 
were pretty equal in the present encounter. 
All fought with equal valour ; the place was 
covered with arrows and darts, and great num- 
bers of the enemy fell. We have already ob- 
served that the tenth legion was on the right, 
which, though not considerable for the number 
of men, was nevertheless formidable on ac- 
count of its courage ; and so pressed the enemy 
on that side, that they were obliged to draw 
a legion from the right wing to reinforce the 
left, and prevent its being taken in flank. 
Upon this motion, our cavalry on the left fell 
upon Pompey's right wing, weakened by the 
departure of the legion : but they defended 
themselves with so much bravery and resolu- 
tion, as to stand in need of no new troops to 
support them. Meanwhile the clashing of 
armour, mingled with the shouts of the com- 
batants, and the groans of the dying and 
wounded, terrified the new-raised soldiers ; 
for, as Ennius says, they fought hand to hand, 
foot to foot, and shield to shield. But though 
the enemy fought with the utmost vigour, they 
were obliged to give ground, and retire to- 
wards the town. The battle was fought on 
the feast of Bacchus, and the Pompeians were 
entirely routed and put to flight ; insomuch 
that not a man could have escaped, had they 
not sheltered themselves in the place whence 
they advanced to the charge. The enemy 
lost on this occasion upwards of thirty thousand 
men, and among the rest Labienus and Attius 
Varus, whose funeral obsequies were per- 
formed upon the field of battle. They had 
likewise three thousand Roman knights killed, 
partly of Italy, partly of the province. About 
a thousand were slain on our side, partly foot, 
partly horse ; and five hundred wounded. 
We gained thirteen' eagles and standards, and 
made seventeen officers prisoners. Such was 
the issue of this action. 

XXII. The remains of Pompey's army 
retreating to Munda, with design to defend 
themselves in that town, it became necessary 
to invest it. The dead bodies of the enemy, 
heaped together, served instead of a rampart, 
and their javelins and darts were fixed up as 
palisades. Upon these we hung their buck- 
lers to supply the place of a breast-work, and 



fixing the heads of the deceased upon swords 
and lances, planted them all around the work, 
to strike the greater terror into the besieged, 
and keep awake in them a sense of our bravery. 
Amidst these mournful objects did they find 
themselves shut in, when our men began the 
attack, which was managed chiefly by the 
Gauls. Young Valerius, who had escaped to 
Cordova with some horse, informed Sextus 
Pompey of what had happened ; who, upon 
receipt of the mournful news, distributing 
what money he had about him to the troopers, 
left the town about nine at night, under pre- 
tence of going to find out Caesar, to treat of an 
accommodation. On the other side Cn. 
Pompey, attended by a few horse and foot, 
took the road of Carteia, where his fleet lay, 
and which was about a hundred and seventy 
miles distant from Cordova. When he was 
arrived within eight miles of the place, he 
sent P. Calvitius, his camp-marshal, before, to 
fetch a litter to carry him to the town, be- 
cause he found himself out of order. The 
litter came, and when he entered the town, 
those of his party waited on him privately, to 
receive his orders about the management of 
the war. As they assembled round the place 
in great crowds, Pompey, quitting his litter, 
put himself under their protection. 

XXXIII. Caesar, after the battle, seeing 
the circumvallation of Munda completed, 
marched to Cordova. Those of the enemy 
who had escaped the slaughter, possessing 
themselves of a bridge upon the approach of 
our men, called out to them with an air of de- 
rision. What ! we are no more than a handful 
of men escaped from the battle, and shall we 
be allowed no place of retreat ] Immediately 
they prepared to defend the bridge. Caesar 
passed the river, and encamped on the other 
side. Scapula, who had stirred up the freed- 
men to a revolt, escaping after the battle to 
Cordova, when he found himself besieged, as- 
sembled all his followers, ordered a funeral 
pile to be erected, and a magnificent supper 
served up ; when, putting on his richest dress, he 
distributed his plate and ready money among 
his domestics, supped cheerfully, anointed him- 
self once and again, and last of all, ordered 
one of his freedmen to despatch him, and 
another to set fire to the pile. 

XXXIV. Caesar had no sooner encamped 
before the place, than a division arose among 
the inhabitants, between those who favoured 



344 



PANSA'S 



Caesar, and those who were in the interest of 
Pompey, attended with so rude a clamour, 
that it reached our camp. During the contest, 
some legions, composed partly of fugitives, 
partly of slaves manumitted by Pompey, came 
and surrendered themselves to Cssar. But 
the thirteenth legion prepared to defend the 
place, and with that view possessed them- 
selves of the walls and some towers, in spite 
of all the opposition they met with ; which 
obliged the other party to send deputies to 
Cffisar for aid. Upon this, those who escaped 
out of the battle set fire to theplace,andou.rmen 
entering at the same time, slew about twenty- 
two thousand of them, besides those who were 
slain without the walls ; and thus became mas- 
ters of the town. Whilst Cssar was employed 
in this siege, those who were blocked up at 
Munda made a sally, but were driven back 
into the town with considerable loss. 

XXXV. Thence Csesar marched to His- 
palis, which sent deputies to sue for pardon, 
and obtained it. Though the citizens assured 
him that they were able to defend the town 
with their own forces, he nevertheless thought 
it proper to send Caninius, his lieutenant, 
thither with some troops, and encamped him- 
self before the place. There was in the town 
a strong party of Pompeians, who, displeased 
to see CoBsar's troops received within the walls, 
deputed secretly one Philo, a zealous partisan 
of Pompey, and well known in Lusitania, to 
beg assistance of Cecilius . Niger, surnamed 
The Barbarous, who lay encamped near Le- 
nius, with a strong army of Lusitanians. These 
approached the town towards night, got over 
the walls, surprised the sentinels and garrison, 
shut the gates, and began to defend the place. 

XXXVI. During these transactions, de- 
puties arrived from Carteia, with accounts of 
their having secured Pompey ; hoping by this 
service to atone for their former fault of shut- 
ting the gates against Caesar. Meantime the 
Lusitanians in Hispalis still continued pillag- 
ing the town, which, though known to Ctesar, 
did not yet determine him to press it too hard, 
lest they should in despair set fire to the town, 
and destroy the walls. It was resolved in 
council to sufTor the Lusitanians to escape in 
the night by a sally, yet so that the thing 
might not appear designed. In this sally, 
they set fire to the ships that were in the river 
Bsetis, and while our men were employed in 
extinguishing the flames, endeavoured to get 



off; but being overtaken by the cavalry, were 
mostly cut to pieces. 'J'hence he marched to 
Asta, which submitted. Munda having been 
now a long while besieged, many of those who 
had escaped out of the battle, despairing of 
safety, surrendered to us ; and being formed 
into a legion, conspired among themselves, 
that, upon a signal given, the garrison should 
sally out in the night, while they at the same 
time should begin a massacre in the camp. 
But the plot being discovered, they were next 
night, at the changing of the third watch, all 
put to death without the rampart. 

XXXVII. The Carteians, while Cffisar was 
employed in reducing the other towns upon 
his route, fell into a dissension about young 
Pompey. There were two parties in the 
town, one that had sent the deputies to Caesar, 
and another in the Pompeian interest. These 
last prevailing, seized the gates, and made a 
dreadful slaughter of their adversaries. Pom- 
pey himself was wounded in the fray, but 
escaping to his ships, fled with about thirty 
galleys. Didius, who was at Cadiz, wilh Cae- 
sar's fleet, hearing of what had happened, im- 
mediately sailed in pursuit of them, stationing 
at the same time some cavalry and infantry 
along the coast, to prevent his getting oflfby 
land. Pompey had departed with so much 
precipitation from Carteia, that he took no time 
to furnish himself with water, which obliging 
him to stop by the way, Didius came up with 
him after four days' sailing, took some of his 
ships, and burned the rest. 

XXXVIII, Pompey, with a few followers, 
escaped to a place strongly fortified by na- 
ture ; of which the troops sent in pursuit of 
him having certain intelligence by their scouts, 
followed day and night. He was wounded 
in the shoulder and left leg, and had besides 
strained his ancle, all which greatly retarded 
his flight, and obliged him to make use of a 
litter. A Lusitanian having discovered the 
place of his retreat, he was quickly surrounded 
by our cavalry and cohorts. Seeing him- 
self betrayed, he took refuge in a post naturally 
strong, and which could easily be defended 
by a few men, because the approach to it 
was extremely difficult. We attempted to 
storm it, but were repulsed, and vigorously 
pursued by the enemy ; and meeting with no 
better success, after several trials, we at length 
resolved to lay siege to the place, it seeming 
too hazardous to force it. Accordingly a ter- 



COMMENTARIES. 



345 



face was raised, and lines drawn round the 
place ; which the enemy perceiving, thought 
proper to betake themselves to flight. 

XXXIX. Pompey, as we have observed 
above, being lame and wounded, was in no 
condition to make a speedy retreat ; and the 
rather, because the place was such, that he 
could use neither horse nor litter. He saw 
his people driven from the fort, massacred on 
all sides, and himself left without resource. 
In this extremity he fled to a cave, where he 
could not easily be discovered, unless he was 
betrayed by the prisoners. Here he was slain, 
and his head brought to Cfesar, the twelfth of 
April, just as he was setting out for Hispalis, 
and afterwards exposed to the view of the peo- 
ple. 

XL. After the death of young Pompey, 
Didius, proud of his success, hauled some of 
his vessels ashore to be refitted, and retired 
himself to a neighbouring fort. The Lusita- 
nians who had escaped from the battle of 
Munda, rallying in great bodies, found them- 
selves strong enough to make head against 
him. Though the preservation of the fleet was 
what principally engaged his attention, he was 
yet necessitated to make frequent sallies, to 
check the insolence of the enemy. These daily 
skirmishes gave an opportunity of projecting 
an ambuscade ; for which purpose they divided 
their troops into three bodies. Didius sallied 
according to custom; when, upon a signal 
given, one of the parties advanced to set fire 
to the fleet, and another counterfeiting a re- 
treat, drew him insensibly into t!ie ambuscade, 
where he was surrounded and slain with 
most of his followers, fighting valiantly. Some 
escaped in boats which they found on the 
coast ; others made for the galleys by swim- 
ming, and weighing anchor, stood out to sea. 
A great many saved themselves in this manner, 
but the Lusitanians got all the baggage. Cx- 
sar meanwhile returneJ from Gales to Hispalis. 

XLI. Fabius Maximus, whom he had left 
to continue the siege of Munda, carried on the 
approaches with great success ; insomuch that 
the enemy seeing themselves shut up on all 
sides, resolved to attempt a sally ; but were 
repulsed with great loss. Our men seized 
this opportunity to get possession of the town, 
and made all the rest prisoners. Thence they 
drew towards Ursao, a town exceedingly strong 
both by nature and art, and capable of resisting 
an enemy. For tliere is not so much as a 
30* 



rivulet within eight miles of the place, nor 
any spring, but that which supplies the town. 
Add to all this, that the wood necessary for 
building towers and other machines, was to be 
fetched from a distance of six miles ; because 
young Pompey, to render the siege more diffi- 
cult, had cut down all the wood round the place; 
which obliged our men to bring all the materials 
for carrying on the siege from Munda. 

XLII. During these transactions at Munda 
and Ursao, Caesar, who was returned from 
Cales to Hispalis, assembled the citizens, and 
made the following speech : " That when he 
was advanced to the questorship, he had chosen 
their province preferably to all others, and 
during his continuance in that office, done 
them every service in his power : that during 
his pretorship, he had obtained for them of the 
senate the abolition of the taxes imposed by 
Metullus, declared himself their patron, pro- 
cured their deputies a hearing at Rome, and 
made himself many enemies, by undertaking 
the defence both of their private and public 
rights. In fine, that when he was consul, he 
had, though absent, rendered the province all 
the services in his power ; that instead of mak- 
ing a suitable return for so many favours, they 
had always discovered the utmost ingratitude, 
both towards him and the people of Rome ; as 
well in the last war as the preceding. You," 
says he, " though no strangers to the law of 
nations, and the rights of Roman citizens, have 
yet, like barbarians, often violated the sacred 
persons of Roman magistrates. You attempted 
in open day, in the public square, to assas- 
sinate Cassius. You have been always such 
enemies to peace, that the senate could never 
suffer the province to be without legions. You 
take favours for offences, and insults for bene- 
fits, are insolent and restless in peace, and 
cowardly and effeminate in war. Young Pom- 
pey, though only a private citizen, nay a fu- 
gitive, was received among you, and suffered 
to assume the ensigns of magistracy. After 
putting many citizens to death, you still fur- 
nished him with forces, and even urged him to 
lay waste the country and province. Against 
whom do you hope to be victorious] Can you be 
ignorant, that upon the supposition of my over- 
throw, the people of Rome have still ten legions 
capable not only of making head against you, 
but of bringing the whole earth under subjec- 
tion 1" 

2 Y 



AN 

INDEX 

OP 

ANCIENT AND MODERN GEOGRAPHY 

TO 

CiESAR'S COMMENTARIES. 



13" The words in Roman Letters denote the ancient names, and those in Italic, the modern. 



AcARNANiA, a region of Epirus, Camia. 
Achaia, sometimes taken for all Greece ; but most 
commonly for a part of it only, in Peloponnesus, 
Romania Alta. 
Acilla, or Acholla, a city of Africa, unknown. 
Actium, a promontory of Epirus, now called the 
Cape of Tigalo, famous for a naval victory gained 
near it, by Augustus, over M. Antony. 

Addua, the Adda, a river that rises in the Alps, and 
parting the dutchy of Milan from the slate of Venice, 
falls into the Po, above Cremona. 
Adduasdubis, a river of Burgundy, the Doux. 
Adriatic Sea, the Gulf of Venice, at the bottom of 
which that city is situate. 
Adrumetum, a town in Africa, Mahometta. 
Mdui, the Autunois, a people of Gaul, near Autun, 
in the country now called Lower Burgundy. 

^gean Sea, the Archipelago, a part of the Mediter- 
ranean, which lies between Greece, Asia Minor, and 
the Isle of Crete, 
.ffigimurus, an island in the African Sea, Galetta. 
^ginium, a town of Thessaly. 
.ffigyptus, Egypt, one of the most ancient, fertile, 
and celebrated kingdoms in Africa. 

.SImilia Via, a Roman road in Italy, from Rimini to 
Aquileia, and from Pisa to Dertona. 
.ffilolia, a country of Greece, Despotato. 
Africa, one of the four great continents into which 
the earth is divided. 
Agar, a town in Africa, unknown. 
Agendicum, a city of the Senones, Sens. 
Alba, a town of Latium in Italy, Albano. 
Albici, a people of Gaul unknown : some make them 
the same with the Vivarois. 

Albis, the Elbe, a large and noble river in Germany, 
which has its source in the Giant's mountains, in 
Silesia, on the confines of Bohemia, and passing 
through Bohemia, upper and lower Saxony, falls into 
the North Sea at Rilzbuttel, about sixty miles below 
Hamburgh. 

Alemanni, a people of ancient Germany, who inha- 
bited between the Maine, the Rhine, and the Danube, 
and from whom the French still give this name to all 
the Germans. 
Alemannia, the country inhabited by the Alemanni 
Aiesia, or Alexia, a town of the Mandubians, Alise. 



Alexandria, a city of Egypt, Scanderia. It was built 
by Alexander the Great, 330 years before Christ. 

Aliso, by some supposed to be the town now called 
Iselbtirg ; or, according to Junius, Wesel, in the dutchy 
of Cleves ; but more probably Elsen. 

Allobroges, an ancient people of Gallia Transalpina, 
who inhabited that country wliich is now called Dau- 
phiny. Savoy and Piedmont. 

Alps, a ridge of high mountains, which separate 
France and Germany from Italy. That part of them 
which separates Dauphiny from Piedmont, had the 
name of the Coltian Alps. 

Alsatia, a province of Germany, in the upper circle 
of the Rhine. Alsace. 
Amagetobria, a city of Gaul, unknown. 
Amantia, a town in Macedonia, Porto Roguseo. 
Amanus, a mountain of Syria, Scanderona. 
Amani Pylae, or Amanicae Portae, Straits of Scander- 
onat. 
Ambarri, a people of Gaul, uncertain. 
Ambialites, a people of Gaul, of Lambelle in Bre- 
tagne. Others take the word to be only a different 
name for the Ambiani. 
Ambiani, or Ambianenses, the people oi Amiens. 
Ambianum, a city of Belgium, Amiens. 
Ambibari, a people of Gaul, those of Ambie in Nor- 
mandy. 
Ambivareii, a people of Gaul, the Vivarais. 
Ambivarili, an ancient people of Brabant, between 
the Rhine and the Maese. 
Ambracia, a city of Epirus, Arta. 
Ambrones, an ancient people, who lived in that 
country which is now called the Canton of Berne, in 
Switzerland. 
Amphilochia, a region of Epirus, Anfilocha. 
Amphipolis, a city of Macedonia, Cristopoli or Em- 
boli. 

Anartes, a people of Germany, Wallachians, Ser- 
vians, or Bulgarians. 

Anas, a river of Spain, the Guadiana or Rio Roy- 
dera. 

Ancalites, a people of Britain, of the Hundred of 
Henley, in Oxfordshire. 

Anchialos, a city of Thrace, near the Euxine Sea, 
now called Kenkis. 
Ancona, a city of Italy, Aneona. 

I Andes, Angers, in France, the capital of the dutchy 
of Anjou, 

347 



348 



INDEX OF THE 



Andes, a people of Gaul, the ancient Inhabitants of 
the Dutchy of Anjou. 

Andomadunum Lingonum, a large and ancient city 
of Champagne, at the source of the river Marne, Lan- 
gres. 

Angrivarii, an ancient people of lower Germany, 
who dwelt between the Ems and the Weser, below the 
Lippe. 

Ansibarii, or Ansivarii, an ancient people of lower 
Germany, of and about the town of Ansesiaet, or Am- 
slin. 

Antioch, Antachia. an ancient and famous city, once 
the capital of Syria, or rather of the East. It is situate 
on two rivers, the Orontes and the Phaspar, not far 
from the iVledilerranean. 

Apamea, jlp'^'"^, a city of Bilhynia, builiby Nicome- 
des, the son of Prusias. 

Apennine Alps, part of the Alps so called, which run. 
from the other Alps through the middle of Italy. 

AppoUonia, a city of Macedonia, Piergo. 

Aponiana. an island near the promontory of Lily- 
baeum, in Sicily. 

Appia Via, the Appian highway, which led from 
Eome into Campania, and from the sea to Brundusium. 

Apsus, a river of Macedonia, the Aspro. 

Apulia, a region of Italy, la Puglia. 

Aquilaria, a town of Africa, near Clupea. 

Aquileia, formerly a famous and considerable city 
of Italy, not far from the Adriatic, now little more than 
a heap of ruins, Aquilegia. 

Aquilain, a third part of Ancient Gaul, now contain- 
ing Guienne, Gascony, &c. 

Aquitani, the people inhaljiting Aquitain. 

Arar, or Araris, a river of Gaul, the Saone. 

Arduenne Silva, the forest of Ardenne in France, 
reaching from the Rhine to the city of Tournay, in the 
Low Countries. 

Arelate, or Arelatum, a city of Gaul, Aries. 

Argentuaria, the castle oi Horburg, near the city of 
Colmar, in upper Alsace. 

Areentoratum, Strusburg, a city of Germany, an- 
ciently the capital of the Tribocci, on the Rhine, now 
the chief city of Alsace, belonging to the French. 

Argos, a noted city of Peloponnesus, of which Juno 
was tutelar goddess, Argo. 

Arimirium, a city of Italy, Rimini. 

Armenia, a country of Asia, divided into the greater 
and lesser, and now called Turcomania. 

Armorici, the ancient people of Armorica, a part of 
Gallia Celtica, now Bretagne. 

Arretium, a city of Hetruria in Italy, Arezo. 

Artesia,a province oflhe Spanish NelherlandSj^r/ois. 

Arverni, an ancient people of France, on the Loire, 
whose chief city was Arvernum, now Clermont, the 
capital oi Auvergne. 

Asciburgum, a city of ancient Germany, between Ve- 
tera and Gelduba. The present city of Aschafenburg, 
in Franconia, is so called ; but, by the situation, does 
not seem to be this. 

Asculum, a town of Italy, Ascoli. 

Ascurum, a maritime city of Mauritania, unknown. 

Asparagium, a town in Macedonia, unknown. 

Aspavia, a town in Hispania Bjetica, Espejo. 

Assona, a river of Champagne, in France, which runs 
into the Oise, near Compegne, now called the Aisne. 

Asta, a town in Hispania Bffitica, Massa de Asia. 

Asta, Asti, the capital of the country of the same 
name on the river Tanaro, in Piedmont. 
Astigi, or Astingi, a people of Andalusia in Spain. 



Athens, one of the most ancient and noble cities of 
Greece, the capital of Attica. 

Athos, a mountain in Macedonia, in the province of 
Jamboli, which runs into the .ffigean Sea, like a penin- 
sula, and is ninety miles in compass. 

Ategua, a town in Hispania Baelica, Tebala Veja. 

Atrebates, an ancient people of Gaul, who lived in 
that part of the Netherlands which is now called Artois- 

Attica, a country of Greece, between Achaia and Ma- 
cedonia, famous on account of its capital, Athens. 

Attuarii, a people of ancient Germany who inha- 
bited between the Maese and the Rhine, whose coun- 
try is now a part of the dutchy of Gueldres. 

Atuatuca, the capital of the Eburones, now Tongres, 
in Brabant. 

Atuatuci, the inhabitants of those parts, the remains 
of the Cimbri. 

Avaricum, a city of Aquitain, the capital of the Bitu- 
rigians, Bourges. 

Augusta Nemetum, y^>e,an ancient city of Germany, 
in the now upper circle of the Rhine, and on that river. 

Augusta, Rauracorum,J.iA(5'si, now a village only! 
but a famous pass in Switzerland, on the Rhine, two 
German miles from Basil. 

Augusta Trevirorum, Triers, a very ancient city in 
lovyfer Germany,on the fvloselle, said to have been built 
by Trebetas, the brother of Ninus, 1496 years before 
Christ ; made a Roman colony in the time of Augustus, 
and afterwards the most famous city of Gallia Belgica. 
It was for sometime the seat of the western empire, now 
only the seat of the ecclesiastical elector of that name. 

Augusta Vangionum, Worms, a city of Germany, 
within the bounds of the palatinate, free and imperial 
on the western bank of the Rhine. 

Augusta Vindelicorum, Augsburg, a famous city of 
Germany, and a place of great trade, a free imperial 
city, the capital of Suabia, on the Lech, not far from 
the Danube ; famous for the Augustan confession. 

Augustodunum, Autun, a very ancient city of Bur- 
gundy, on the river Arroux. 

Aulerci Ebrannovices, a people of Gaul, Morienne. 

Aulerci Eburovices, a people of Gaul, the country 
of Evereux, in Normandy. 

Aulerci Cenomanni, a people of Gaul, the country 
of Maine. 

Aulerci Diablintes, a people of Gaul, le Perche. 

Ausci, a people of Gaul, those of Aucks or Aux, in 
Gas cony. 

Ausetani, a people of Spain, under the Pyrenaean 
mountains. 

Auximum, a town in Italy, Osimo, or Osmo. 

Axona, a river of Belgic Gaul, the Aisne. 
B 

Bacenis, a forest of ancient Germany, which parted 
the Suevi from the Cherusci, by some supposed to be 
the forests of Tliuringia, by others the Black Forest. 

Btetica, in the ancient geography, about a third part 
of Spain, containing Andalusia, and a part of Granada. 

Bcetis, a river of Spain, now called Guadalquivir. 

Bagandce, an ancient people of Gaul, who twice re- 
volted from the Romans, and were both times defeated. 

Bagrada, a river of Africa, near XJtica, the Megrada. 

Baleares, Insulce, several islands in the Mediter- 
ranean Sea, formerly so called, of which Majorca and 
Minorca are the chief. 

Basilea, Basil, a city of ancient Germany, now the 
principal city of all Switzerland, on the Rhine. 

Batavia, the ancient inhabitants of the island of 
Batavia. 



NAMES OF PLACES. 



349 



Batavia, or Batavorum Insula, Holtaiid, a part of 
which still retains the name of Betuire. 

Belgae, the inhabitants of Gallia Belgica. The origi- 
nal Belgae were supposed to be of German extraction ; 
but passing the Rhine, settled themselves in Gaul. 

Belgia, Belgium, or Gallia Belgica, the Low Coun- 
tries, or Netherlands. 

Bellocassi, or Velocasses, a people of Gaul, inhabit- 
ing the country of Bayeus in Normandy. 

Bellovaci, an ancient renowned people among the 
BelgEB, inhabiting the country now called Beauvais in 
France. 

Bergea, a city of Macedonia, now called Veria. 

Bessi, a people of Thrace, Bessarabia. 

Bethuria, a region of Hispania Lusitanica, Estrema- 
dura. 

Betones, or Berones, a people of Hispania Tarraco- 
nensis, Birones. 

Bibracle, a town of Burgundy, now called Autun, 
the capital of the yEdui. 

Bibrax, a town of Rheims, Biaine, or Bresne. 

Bibroci, a people of Britain ; according to Camden, 
the Hundred of Bray, in Berkshire. 

Bigerriones, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the coun- 
try now called Bigorre, in Gascony. 

Biihynia, a country of Asia Minor, adjoining to 
Troas, over against Thrace, Becsangial. 

Biturigies, a people of Guienne, in France, of the 
country of Berry. 

Bceoiia, a country in Greece ; parted from Attica by 
Mount Citheron. It had formerly several other names, 
and wa s famous for its capital, Thebes ; but is now 
called Strainulipa. 

Boii, an ancient people of Germany, who, passing 
the Rhine, settled in Gaul, the Bourbonnois. 

Bonini, an ancient people of Germany, supposed by 
some to be the same as the Burii. 

Bosphorani, a people bordering upon the Euxine 
Sea, the Tartars. 

BosphoruSjlwo straits of the sea so called ; one Bos- 
phorus Tliracius, now the Straits of Constantinople ; 
llie other Bosphorus Cimmerius, now the Straits of 
Caffa. 

Brannovices, the people of Morienne, In France. 

Bratuspantium, a city of Gaul, belonging to the Bel- 
lovaci, Beauvais. 

Britannia, Britain, an island containing England, 
Scotland, and Wales. 

Bructeri, an- ancient people of the Netherlands, in 
East Friesland, afterwards called Broeck/norela7id. 

Brundusium, a city of Italy, Briiidisi. 

Brulii, a people of Italy, tlie Calabrians. 

Bucinobantcs, an ancient people of Germany, who 
lived opposite to Mentz. 

Bulgaria, a part of the Lower Mossia, between Mount 
Haemus and the Danube, 

Bullis, a town in Macedonia, unknown. 

Burii, an ancient people of Germany, who inhabited 
the island of Bornholm. 

Bursa volenses, a people of Hispania Bstica, thought 
to be the same with the Ursaonenses. 

Buthrolum, a city of Epirus, Butrinlo ov Botronto. 

Byzantium, an ancient city of Thrace, called at seve- 
ral times Ligos, Nova Roma, and now Constantinople. 

Byzazyna, a city and province of Africa, within the 
kingdom of Tunis. 

C 

Cabilionum, a city of ancient Gaul, Chalons sur 
Saone. 



Cadetes, a people of Gaul, unknown. 

Cadurci, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country 
of Quercy. 

Caecinus, a river of Locris, in ancient Greece. 

Caeresii,a people ofBelgicGaul, inhabiting the coun- 
try round Namur. 

Cffisarea, the chief city of Cappadocia. 

Csesia Silva, the Casian Forest, supposed to be r, 
part of the Hercynian Forest, about the dulchy of 
Cleves and Westphalia. 

Calagurritani, a people of Hispania Tarraconensis, 
inhabiting the province of Calultorra. 

Caletes, an ancient people of Belgic Gaul, inhabiting 
tlie country called Le Pais de Caulx, in Normandy, 
betwixt the Seine and the S':a. 

Caletum, the town of Calais, in Picardy, over against 
Dover. 

Calydon, a city of .SItolia, Ayto7i, 

Camerinum, a city of Umbria, in Italy, Camarino. 

Campania, the pleasantest part of Italy, in the king- 
dom of Naples, now called Terra di Lavori. 

Campi Canini, a place in the Milanese, in Italy, not 
far from Belizona. 

Campi Catalaunici, supposed to be the large plain, 
which begins about two miles from Chalons surMarne. 

Candavia, a country of Macedonia, Canovia. 

Caninefales, an ancient people of the lower part of 
Germany, near Batavia, about where Gorckura, on 
the Maese, in South Holland, now is. 

Canae, a poor village in Apulia, famous only for a 
great overthrow of the Romans there by Hannibal. 

Canopus, Bochir, a famous city of Egypt, whence the 
Canopic branch of the Nile derived its name. 

Canlabria, an ancient warlike people of Spain, pro- 
perly of the provinces of Guipuscoa, and Biscay. 

Cantium, a part of England, the county of Kent. 

Canusium, a city of Apulia in Italy, Cansoa. 

Capitol, one of the seven hills in : ncient Rome, on 
which the Romans had a famous fortress, founded by 
Tarquinius Priscus, and perfected by Tarquinius Su- 
perbus. 

Cappadocia, a large country in Asia Minor, upon the 
Euxine Sea. 

Caprea, Caprose, an island on the coast of Campania. 

Capua, Capoa. a city in the kingdom of Naples, in 
th3 province di Lavoro. 

Caralcs, a city of Sardinia, Cagliari. 

Caralitani, the people of Cagliari, in Sardinia. 

Carbillo, a city of Spain, near Corduba. 

Carcaso, a city of Gaul, Carcassone. 

Carmana, a town of Hispania Baetica, Carmone. 

Carni, an ancient people, who inhabited a part of 
Noricum, whoso country is yet called Carnioli. 

Carnutes, an ancient people of France, inhabiting 
the territory yet called Chartrai7i. 

Carpi, an ancient people near the Danube-. 

Carucca, a town in Spain, uncertain. 

Carteia, a town of Spain, Algeviza, or Tariffa. 

Carthago, once the most famous city of Africa, the 
rival of Rome, built by Queen Dido, about 70 years 
after Rome, according to some: but Justin will have 
it built before Rome ; Appian befire the destruction 
of Troy ; and Vossius befire Tyre itself 

Carthago Nova : Carlhagenia, a city of Murcia, in 
Spain, built by Asdrubal, general of the Carthaginians. 

Casilinum, a town in Italy, Castelluzzo. 

Caspian Sea, a vast lake between Persia, great Tar- 
tary, Muscovy, and Georgia, said to be six hundred 
miles long, and near as broad. 



350 



INDEX OF THE 



Cassandrea, a city of Macedonia, Cassandria. 
Cassi, a people of ancient Britain, the Hundred of 
Caishow, in Hertfordshire. 

Caslellum Menapiorum, Kessel, a town in Brabant, 
on the river Neerse, not far from the Maese. 

Castra Posthumiana, a town in Hispanla Bsetica, 
Castro el Rio. 

Castra Vetera, an ancient city in Lower Germany, 
in the dutchy of Cleves ; some say where Santon, 
others where Byrtheji now is. 

Castulonenis Saltus, a city of Hispania Tarracon- 
ensis, Castona la Vieja. 

Catti, an ancient people of Germany, who inhabited 
part of the country now called Hesse, and Thuringia ; 
from the mountains of Hartz, to the Weser and the 
Rhine. 

Catuaci, corrupted probably from Atuatici. Some 
make them the same with the people of Douay, in 
France. 

Caturiges, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
country oi Embrun, or Ainbrun, alias Charge?. 

Cebenna Mons, the mountains of the Cevennes, in 
Gaul, separating the Helvians from Auvergne. 

Celeja, a city of Noricum Mediterraneum, now Cilley. 

Celtae, a people of Thrace, about the mountains of 
Rhodope and Hsemus. 

Celtae, an ancient people of Gaul, in that part called 
Gallia Comato, between the Garumna and Sequana, 
from whom that country was likewise called Gallia 
Celtica. 

Celtiberi, an ancient people of Spain, descended from 
the CeltEe, who settled about the river Iberus, or Ebro, 
from whom the country was called Celtiberia, now Ar- 
ragon. 

Cenimagni, or Iceni, an ancient people of B ritain, 
inhabiting the counties of Suffolk, Norfolk, Cambridge- 
shire, and Huntingdoyishire. 

Cenis Mons, that part of the Alps which separates 
Savoy from Piedmont. 

Cenni, an ancient people of Celtic extraction. 

Cenomani, a people of Gallia Celtica, in the country 
now called Le Manseau, next adjoining to that of the 
Insubres. 

Centrones, an ancient people of Flanders, about the 
ci of Courtray, dependent on the Nervians. 

Centrones, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
country of Tarantaise. 

Cerauni Montes, mountains of Epirus, Monti di 
Chimera. 

Cercina, an island on the coast of Africa, Chercara, 
Cercare. 

Cheronesus, a peninsula of Africa, near Alexandria. 

Chersonesus Cimbrica, a peninsula on the Baltic, 
now Jutland, pari of Holsfein, Ditmarsh, and Sleswic. 

Cherusci, a great and warlike people of ancient Ger- 
many, between the Elbe and the Weser, about the 
country now called Mansfield, part of the Dutchy of 
Brunswick, and the dioceses of Hildesheim and Hal- 
berstadt. 

Chiavenna, the capital of a country of that name, on 
the river Meir, with a strong castle, in Switzerland. 

Chrysopolis, a city of Bithynia, now called Scutari, 
opposite to Constantinople. 

Cimbri, the Jutlandcrs, a very ancient northern 
people, who inhabited Chersonesus Cimbrica. 

Cimmerii, an ancient people near the Euxine Sea, 
•whence the Bosphorus Cimmerius, Tartars. 

Cinga; a river of Spain, Cinca or Senga. 

Cingulum, a town of Picenum in Italy, Cingoli. 



Cirta, a town in Africa, Cmistantina, or Consantina, 
al. Tadel. 

Clupea, a maritime city of Africa. Quipia. 

Cocasates, a people of Gaul ; according to some the 
Bazadois. 

Coimbra, an ancient city of Portugal, once destroyed, 
but not rebuilt, on the river Mendego. 

Colchis, a country in Asia, near Pontus, including 
the present Mingrelia, and Georgia. 

Comana Pontica, a city of Asia Minor, Com or To- 
bachzan. 

Comana of Ca.xtpa.docia., Arminacha. 

Compsa, a city of Italy, Conza, or Consa, 

Concordia, an ancient city of the province of Friuli, 
in Italy, now in ruins. 

Condrusi, or Condrusones, an ancient people of 
Belgium, dependent on the Treviri, whose country is 
yet called Condrotz, between Liege and Namur. 

Confluens Mosi et Rheni, Coblentz. 

Corcyra, an island of Epirus, Corfu. 

Corduba, a city of Hispania Baetica, Cordova. 

Corfinium, a town belonging to the Peligni in Italy, 
St. Pelino, al. Pentina. 

Corinthus, a famous and rich city of Achaia in Italy, 
in the middle of the isthmus going into Peloponnesus. 

Cornelia Castra, a city of Africa, between Carthage 
and Utica. 

Corsica, a considerable island in the Mediterranean 
Sea, near Sardinia, which still retains its name, and 
at present belongs to France. 

Cosanura, a city of Calabria, in Italy, Cassano, 

Cremona, an ancient city of Gallia Cisalpina, 
which retains its name to this day, and is the metro- 
polis of the Cremonesc, in Italy. 

Creta, one of the noblest islands in the Mediterra- 
nean Sea, now called Candia. 

Ctesiphon, a town of Assyria, over against Seleucia. 

Curiosolitae, a people of Gaul, inhabiting Cor- 
noualle in Bretagne. 

Cyclades, islands in the .ffigean Sea, VIsole delV 
Archipelago. 

Cyprus, an island in the Mediterranean Sea, between 
Syria and Cilicia, Cipro. 

Cyrene, an ancient and once a fine city of Africa, 
situate over against Matapan, the most southern cape 
ofMorea, Cairoan. 

Cyzicus, Chizico, formerly one of the largest cities 
of Asia Minor, in an island of the same name, on the 
White Sea. 

D 

Dacia, an ancient country of Scythia, beyond the 
Danube, containing part of Hungary, Transylvania, 
Wallachia, and Moldavia. 

Dalmatia, a part of lUyricum, now called Sclavonia, 
lying between Croatia, Bosnia, Servia, and the Adri- 
atic Gulf. 

Danube, the largest river in Europe, which has its 
rise in Suabia, and after flowing through that country, 
Bavaria, Austria, Hungary, Servia, Bulgaria, Mol- 
davia, Bessarabia, and part of Tartary, taking in its 
course a great number of noted rivers, some say sixty, 
falls into the Black or Euxine Sea, in two arms. 

Dardania, the ancient name of a country in upper 
Mossia, which became afterwards a jjart of Dacia, 
Rascia, and part of Servia. 

Decetia, a town in Gaul, Decise, on the Loire. 

Delphi, a city of Achaia, Delpho, al. Salona. 

Delta, a very considerable province of Egypt, at the 
mouth of the Nile, Errif. 



NAMES OF PLACES. 



351 



Diablintes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
country called Le Perche ; al. Diableres in Bretagne ; 
al. imies 01 Brabant ; al, Lendout, over against Bri- 
tain. 

Dubis, a river of Burgundy, Le Doux. 

Duratium, commonly supposed to be a city of Gaul, 
in the province of Poiiou ; but in fact Csesaruses Dur- 
atius for the name of a nobleman of considerable rank. 

Durocortorum, a city of Gaul, Rheims. 

Dyrrhachium, a city of Macedonia, Durazzo, Drazzi. 

E 

Eburones, an ancient people of Germany, inhabiting 
part of the country, now the bishopric of Liege, and 
the country oi Namur. 

Eburovices, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country 
of Evreux, in Normandy. 

Egypt, one of the most ancient, fertile, and cele- 
brated kingdoms in Africa. 

Elaver, a river of Gaul, the Allier. 

Eleutheri, a people of Celtic Gaul, la Rouergue. 

Elis, a city of Peloponnesus, BeZjjidere. 

Elusates, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
country of Euse, in Gascony. 

Ephesus, an ancient and celebrated city of Asia Mi- 
nor, Efeso. 

Epidaurus, a maritime city of Dalmatia, Ragusa. 

Epirus, a country in Greece, between Macedonia, 
.\chaia, and the Ionian Sea, by some now called Al- 
bania Inferior. 

Essui, a people of Gaul, those of Seez ; but tlie word 
seems rather a corruption from jEdui. 

Eusubii, corrupted from Unelli, or Lexovii, properly 
the people oi Lisieux, in Normandy. 



Fanum, a city of Umbria, in Italy, Fano. 

Fesole, an ancient city of Italy, in the Putchy of 
Florence, anciently one of the twelve considerable 
cities of Hetruria. 

Fini, an ancient people of Prussia. 

Flavum, anciently reckoned the eastern mouth of 
the Rliine,now called tlie Ulie, and is a passage out 
of the Zuyder Sea into the North Sea. 

Forum Flaminii, a city of Umbria, three miles from 
Fulginium, yet called Forflamine. 

Forum Julium, Frejus, an ancient town on the coast 
of Provence in France. 

Fossa Mariana, a canal made by C. Marius, near 
Marseilles, for the conveyance of ships from the sea, 
into the Rhone. 

Fossae Marinse, a city of Gallia Narbonensis, now 
called Aigues Mortes. 

Frentani, an ancient people of Italy, Abruzzo Capi- 
tanata. 

Frisii, the ancient inhabitants of Friesland. 

G 

Gabali, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
country of CHvaudan. 

Gades, Cadiz, an ancient and considerable city of 
Spain. 

Gaditani, the people of Gades, or Cadiz in Spain. 

Galatia, a country of Asia Minor, lying between 
Cappadocia, Pontus, and Paphlagonia; now called 
Chiangare. 

Galli, the people of ancient Gaul, now the French. 

Gallia, the ancient and renowned country of Gaul, 
now France. It was divided by the Romans into, 



Gallia Cisalpina, Tonsa, or Togata, now Lombardy, 
between the Alps and the river Rubicon ; and 

Gallia Transalpina, or Comata, comprehending 
France, Holland, the Netherlands ; and farther subdi- 
vided into, 

Gallia Belgica, now a part of Lower Germany and 
the Netherlands ; with Picardy ; divided by Augustus, 
into Belgica and Germania ; and the latter into prima 
and SBCunda. 

Gallia Celtica, now France, properly so called, di- 
vided by Augustus into Lugdunensis and Rolhoma- 
gensis. 

Gallia Aquitanica, now Gascony ; divided by Au- 
gustus into prima, secunda, and tenia; and 

Gallia Narbonensis, or Braccata, now Languedoc, 
Davphiny, and Provence. 

Gallicia,a province of Spain, of a large extent, once 
a kingdom, and comprehending oW Cosit7e, but now 
a part of the kingdom of Leon. 

Gallogrsecia, a country of Asia Minor, the same as 
Galatia. 

Garites, a people of Gaul, inhabiting the country 
now called Gavre, Gavaraan. 

Garoceli, or Graioceli, an ancient people of Gaul, 
about Mount Cenis, or Mount Genevre : others place 
them in the Val de Morienne. 

Garumna, the Garonne, one of the largest cities of 
France, which rising in the Pyrenees, flows through 
Guienne, forms the vast bay of Garonne, and falls, by 
two mouths, into the British Seas. 

Garumni, an ancient people of Gaul, in the neigh- 
bourhood of the Garonne. 

Gebenna Mons, the mountains of the Cevenneg, 
which separated the Helvians from the Arverni. 

Geldura, a fortress of the Ubii, on the Rhine, not im- 
probably the present village of Gelb, on that river, 
eleven German miles from Neus. 

Genabum, Orleans, an ancient town in Gaul, famous 
for Uie massacre of the Roman citizens committed 
there by the Carnules. 

Geneva, a city of Savoy, now a free republic, upon 
the borders of Helvetia, at the going out of the Rhone 
from the Lake Lemanus, anciently a city of the Al- 
lobroges. 

Genusus, a river of Macedonia, uncertain. 

Gepidae, orGepidi,an ancient northern people, sup- 
posed to have dwelt about the mouth of the Vistula. 

Gergovia, the name of two cities in ancient Gaul, 
the one belonging to the Boii, the other to the Arver- 
ni. Their situation is not certainly known. 

Germania, Germany, one of the largest countries of 
Europe, and the nother of those nations, which, in 
the fall of the Roman empire, conquered all the rest, 

Gesatae, a kind of militia among the ancient Germans. 

Getae, an ancient people of Scythia, who inhabited 
betwixt Mcesia and Dacia, on each side of the Danube. 
Some think their country the same with the present 
Wallachia, or Moldavia. 

Getulia, a province in the kingdom of Morocco, in 
Barbary. 

Gomphi, a town in Thessaly, Gonfi. 

Gorduni, a people of Belgium, the ancient inhabi- 
tants of Ghent; according to others, of Courtray, 

Gotini, an ancient people of Germany, who were 
driven out of their country by Maroboduus. 

Graecia, Greece, a large part of Europe, called by 
the Turks Romelia, containing many countries, pro- 
vinces, and islands, once the nursery of arts, learning, 
and sciences. 



352 



INDEX OF THE 



Graioceli, the ancient inhabitants of Mount Cents. 
See Naroceli. « 

Grudii, the ancient inhabitants about Louvain, or, 
according to some, about Bruges. 

Gugerni, a people of ancient Germany, who dwelt on 
the right banks of the Rhine, betweenthe Ubii and the 
Batavi. 

Guitones, Gythones, an ancient people of Germany, 
inhabiting about the Vistula. 

H 

Haemus, a mountain dividing Mossi and Thrace, Ar- 
gentaro. 

Haliacmon, a river of Macedonia, uncertain. 

Harudes, or Harudi, a people of Gallia Celtica, sup- 
posed to have been originally Germans; and by some 
to have inhabited about Constance. 

Hellespont, Straits of Gallipolli, the famous straits 
by Constantinople, dividing Europe from Asia, be- 
tween Propontis and the ^gean sea. 

Helvetia, Switzerlmid, now divided into thirteen 
cantons. 

Helvetii, the Switzers, ancient inhabitants of the 
country of Switzerland. 

Helvii, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
country now possessed by the Vivarois. 

Heraclea, a city of Thrace, on the Euxine Sea, Pan- 
tiro. 

Heraclea Sentica, a town in Macedonia, Chesia. 

Hercynia Silva, the Hercynian Forest, the largest 
forest of ancient Germany, being reckoned by Csesar 
to have been sixty days' journey in length, and nine in 
breadth. Many parts of it have been since cut down, 
and many are yet remaining; of which among others, 
is that called the Black Forest. 

Hermanduri, an ancient people of Germany, particu- 
larly in the country now called Misnia, in Upper Sax- 
ony ; thoughthey possessed a much larger tract of land, 
according to some, all Bohemia^ 

Herminius Mons, a mountain of Lusitania, Monte 
Armeno ; according to others, Monti delta Strella. 

Heruli, an ancient Northern people, who came first 
out of Scandanavia, but afterwards inhabited the coun- 
try now called Mecklenburgh, in lower Saxony, to- 
■vyards the Baltic. 

Hibernia, Ireland, a considerable island to the west 
of Great Britain. 

Hippo, Bona, a city of the province of Constantine, 
in the kingdom of Tunis, in Africa, upon the Mediter- 
ranean. 

Hispalis, a city of Hispania Bsetica, Seville. 

Hispania, Spain, one of the most considerable king- 
doms in Europe, divided by the ancients into Tarra- 
conensis, BjEtica, and Lusilania. 

Hyrcania, a country of Asia : bordering on the Cas- 
pian sea, Tabariston, Gorgian. 

I 

Jacetani, or Lacetani, a people of Spain, near the 
Pyrenean mountains. 

Jadertini, a people so called, from their capital Ja- 
dera, a city of lUyricum, Zara. 

Jazygse, or Jazygeis, a people of Sarmatia Europsea, 
inhabiting about the countries now called Livonia, and 
Prussia. 

Iberus, a river of Hispania Tarraconensis, the Ebro. 

Iccius, or Itius Portus, a sea-port town of ancient 
Gaul ; Boulogne, or, according to others, Calais. 

Igilium, an island in the Tuscan Sea, il Giglio, 
L'Isle du Lys. 



Iguvium, a city of Umbria, in Italy, Gubio. 

Ilerda, a city of Catalonia, in Spain, now called Leri- 

da, on the Segre. 

lUurgavonensis, a people of Hispania Tarraconensis, 
near the Iberus. 

lllyricum, formerly the country between Pannonia 
to the north, and the Adriatic Sea to the south, divided 
into Liburnia and Dalmatia. It is now chiefly com- 
prehended under Dalmatia and S'clavonia, and bor- 
dered by Panonia, Istria, Macedonia, and the Adriatic 
Gulf; almost wholly under the respective dominions 
of the Venetians and the Turks. 

Illurgis, a town of Hispania Baetica, Elera. 

Insubbria, a country of Gallia Cisalpina, now the 
dutchies of Milan, Mantua, and Brecia. 

Ionia, a country of Asia Minor, anciently inhabited 
by a colony from Greece, Sarchan. 

Issa, an island of the Adriatic Sea, Lissa. 

Ister, that part of the Danube which passed by llly- 
ricum. 

Istria, a country in Italy, now under the Venetians, 
bordering on lllyricum, so called from the river Ister. 

Istropolis, a city of Lower Mcesia, near the south en- 
trance of the Danube, Prostraviza. 

Isara, the Isere, a river of France, which rises in 
Savoy, and falls into the Rhone above Valence. 

Isauria, a province anciently of Asia Minor, now a 
part of Caramania, and subject to the Turks. 

Italia, Italy, one of the most famous countries in 
Europe, once the seat of the Roman empire, now under 
several princes, and free commonwealths. 

Italica, a city of Hispania BjEtica, Sevila la Veja; 
according to others, Alcala del Rio. 

Ituraea, a country of Palestine, Bacar. 

Jura, a mountain in Gallia Belgica, which separated 
the Sequani from the Helvetians, most of which is now 
called Mount St. Claude. 

Juvavia, formerly the capital of Noricum Mediterra- 
nean, now Saltzburg. 

L 

Lacetani, a people of Spain, near the Pyreneanhills. 

Lacus Benacus, Lago di Guardo, a lake now be- 
longing to the Venetians, between Verono, Brescia, 
and Trent. 

Larinates, the people of Larinum, a city of Italy, 
Larino. 

Larissa, the principal city of Thessaly, a province 
of Macedonia, on the river Peneo. 

Latini, the inhabitants of Latium, an ancient part of 
Italy, whence the Latin tongue is so called. 

Latrobriges, a people of Gallia Belgica, between the 
AUobroges and Helvetii, in the country now called 
Lausanne. 

Lazi, an ancient people of Sarmatia Europsea, ac- 
cording to some, on the banks of the Paulus Maeotis, 
but, according to others, towards the Caspiae Portse, 
near the Iberi. 

Lamanus Lacus, the lake upon which Geneva stands, 
made by the river Rhone, between Switzerland to the 
north and Savoy to the south, commonly called the 
Lake of Geneva. 

Lemnos, an island in the .ffilgean Sea, now called 
Stalimane. 

Lemovices, an ancient people of Gaul, le Limosin. 

Lemovices Armnrici,the people oi St.Paul de Leon. 

Lcnium, a town in Lusitania, unknown. 

Lepontii, a people of the Alps, near the valley of 
Leventini. 

Leptis, a town in Africa, Lebeda or Lepida. 



NAMES OF PLACES. 



353 



Levaci, a people of Brabant, not far from Lou vain, i 
whose chief town is now called Leew. 

Leuci, a people of Gallia Belgica, where now Lorrain 
IS, well skilled in darting. Their cliief city is now 
called Foul. 

Lexovii, an ancient people of Gaul, Lisieux in Nor- 
mandy. 

Liburni, an ancient people of Ulyricum, inhabiting 
part of the present Croatia. 

Ligeris, the Loire, one of the greatest and most cele- 
brated rivers of France, said to take one hundred and 
twelve rivers in its course : it rises in Valey, and falls 
into the Atlantic 40 miles below Nantes. 

Heruli, an ancient northern people, who came first 
out of the Bay of Aquitain, below Nantz. 

Liguria, a part of ancient Italy, extending from the 
Apennines to the Tuscan Sea, containing Ferrara, 
and the territories of Genoa. 

Lilybeum, tlie most western promontory of the is- 
land of Sicily, where stood a city of the same name, 
now Cupo Boco. 

Limo, or Limomum, a city of ancient Gaul, Poictiers. 

Liiigones, a people of Gallia Belgica, inhabiting in 
and about Langres, in Cliampagnc. 

Lissus, an ancient city of Macedonia, Alessio. 

Lucani, an ancient people of Italy, inhabiting tlie 
country now called Balisicate. 

Luceri, an ancient city of Italy, Lucera. 

Lusitania, Portugal, a kingdom on the west of Spain, 
formerly a part of it. 

Lutetia, Pom, an ancient and famous city, the capi- 
tal of all France, on the river Seine. 

Lydia, an inland country of Asia Minor, formerly 
governed Ijy the famous Crcesus, who was the last king 
of it, Carasia. 

Lygii, an ancient people of upper Germany, who in- 
habited the country now called Silesia, and on the 
borders of Poland. 

M 

Macedonia, a large country, of great antiquity and 
fame, in Greece, containing several provinces, now 
under the Turks. 

MtEOtis Palas, a vast lake in the north part of 
Scythia, now called Marbianco, or Mare della Tana. 
It is about six hundred miles in compass, and the 
river Tanais disembogues itself into it. 

Magetobria,or Amagetobria, a city of Gaul, uncertain. 

Malaca, a city of Hispania Baetica, Malaga. 

Mandubii, an ancient people of Gaul, I'Anxois, in 
Burgundy. 

Marcomanni, a nation of the Suevi, whomCluverius 
places between the Rliine, the Danube, and the 
Neckar; who settled, however, under Maroboduus, in 
Bohemia and Moravia. 

Marrucini, an ancient people of Italy, inhabiting the 
country now called Abruzzo. 

Marsi, an ancient people of Italy, inhabiting the 
country now called Ducato de Marsi. 

JVIassilia, Marseilles, a large and flourishing city of 
Provence, in France, on the Mediterranean ; said to 
be very ancient, and, according to some, built by the 
Phosnicians ; luit as Justin will have it by the Phocians, 
in the time of Tarquinius, king of Rome. 

Mastico, an ancient city of Gaul, Mascon. 

Matrona, a river in Gaul, the Marne. 

Mauritania, Barbary, an ancient large region of 
Africa, divided into Caesariensis, Tingitatana, and Si- 
tofensis. 

Mazaca, a city of Cappadocia, Tisaria. 
31 



Mediomatrices, a people of Lorrain, on the Moselle, 
about the city ofMetz. 

Mediterranean sea, the first discovered sea in the 
world, still very famous, and much frequented, which 
breaks in, from the Atlantic Ocean, between Spain and 
Africa, by the Straits of Gibraltar, or Hercules' Pillar, 
the ne plus ultra of the ancients. 

Medobrega, a city of Lusitania, Armenna. 

Meldce, according to some, the people of the Meaux, 
but more properly corrupted from Belgx. 

Melodunum, an ancient city of Gaul, upon the Seine, 
aljove Paris, Melun. 

Menapii, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica, who 
inliabited on both sides of the Rhine. Some take them 
for the inhabitants of Cleves ; and others of Antwerp, 
Ghent, &c. 

Mesopotamia, a large country in the middle of Asia, 
between the Tigris and the Euphrates, Diarheck. 

Messana, an ancient and celebrated city of Sicily, 
still known by the name oi Messiria. 

Metaurus, a river of Umbria, now called Metoro, in 
the Dutchy of Urbino. 

Metiosedum, an ancient city of G.iul, on the Seine 
below Paris, Corbeil. 

Metropolis, a city of Thessaly, between Pharsalus 
and Gomphi. 

Mitylene, a city of Lesbos, Metelin. 

Moesia, a country of Europe, and a province of the 
ancient Ulyricum, bordering on Panonia, divided into 
the Upper, containing Bosnia and Servia, and the 
Lower, called Bulgaria. 

Mona, in Caesar, the Isle of Man ; in Ptolemy, An- 
glesey. 

Morini, an ancient people of the Low Countries, who 
probably inhabited on the present coast of Boulogne, 
on the confines of Picardy and Artois, because Caesar 
observes that from their country was the nearest pas- 
sage to Britain. 

Mossa, the Maese or Meuse, a large river of Gallia 
Belgica, which falls into the German Ocean below the 
Briel. 

Mosella, the Moselle, a river which, running through 
Lorrain, jiassesby Triers and falls into the Rhine at 
Coblentz, famous for the vines growing in the neigh- 
bourhood of it. 

Munda, an ancient city of Spain, Mauda ; al. Ronda 
la Veja. 

Mursa, a town and castle in Sclavonia, at the con- 
flux of the Draw and Danube, now called Esseek, fa- 
mous for a bridge three miles over. 

Mysia, a country of Asia Minor, not far from the 
Hellespont, divided into Major and Minor. 

N 

NabathaM, an ancient people of Arabia, uncertain. 

Nrtunetes, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting 
about Nantes. 

Nantuates, an ancient people of the nortli part of Sa- 
voy, whose country is now called Le Chablias. 

NarlDO, Narbonne, an ancient Roman city, in Lan- 
guedoc, in France, said to be Ijuilt a lumdred and thir- 
ty-eight years before the birth of Christ. 

Narisci,the ancient peojjle of the country now called 
Nortgow, in Germany, the capital of which is the fa- 
mous city of Nuremburg. 

Naupactus, an ancient and considerable city of 
.Sltolia, now called Lepanto. 

Neapolis, a city of Italy, which still retains the name 
oi Naples. 

2 Z 



354 



INDEX OF THE 



Neapolis, a city of Africa, between Clupea and Adru- 
tnetum, now called NapoU. 

Nemetes, a people of ancient Germany, about the city 
of Spires, on tiie Rhine. 

Neraetocenna, a town of Belgium, not certainly 
known ; according to some, Arras. 

Ne^caEsa^ea, the capital of Pontus, on the river Ly- 
cus, now called Tocat. 

Nervii, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica, thought 
to have dwelt in the now diocese of Cambray. 

Nessus, or Nestus, a river in Trace, Nesto. 

Nicaea, a city of Bithynia, now called /sraz'cA, famous 
for the first general council, anno 324, against Arianism. 

Nicomedia, a city of Bithynia, where Coustantine 
the Great died, Comidia. 

Nicopolis, a city of Armenia the Less, Cfianich; like- 
wise of Bulgaria, at the confluence of the Isicar, and 
the Danube, commonly called Nigeboli. * 

Nilus, the Nile, a river of Egypt, famous for its an- 
nual overflow. 

Nitobriges, an ancient people of Gaul, VAgenois. 

Noreia, a city on the borders of Illyricum, about 
nine German miles from Aquileia. 

Noricas Alpes, that part of the Alps, which were in, 
or bordering upon Noricum. 

Noricum, anciently a large country, now containing 
several, as a great part of Austria, Sliria, Cari.nthia, 
part of Tyrol, Bavaria, &c. and divided into Noricum 
Mediterraneuni, and Ripense. 

Noviodunum Belgarum, an ancient city of Belgic 
Gaul, now called Noyon. 

Noviodunum Biturigum, Neuvy or Neufvy, 

Noviodunum jEduorum, Ncvers. 

Noviodunum Suessionum, Soissons al. Noion. 

Noviomagnum, Spires, an ancient city of Germany, 
in the now upper circle of the Rhine, and on that river. 

Numantia, a celebrated city of ancient Spain, fa- 
mous for a gallant resistance against the Romans, in a 
siege of fourteen years ; Almasan. 

Numidia, an ancient and celebrated kingdom of 
Africa, bordering on Mauritania ; Algiers, Tunis, Tri- 
poli, 6fc. 

Numicus, the Numico, a river of ancient Latium, in 
Italy. 

Nymphaeum, a promontory of Macedonia, in the 
confines of Sclavonia. 

O 

Obucula, a town in Hispania Baetica, uncertain. 

Ocelum, a town situated among the Alps, in Gaul, 
Exilles. 

Octodorus, a town belonging to the Veragrians, Mar- 
tinao. 

Octogesa, a city of Hispania Tarraconensis, Mequi- 
nenza. 

Orchomenus, a town in BcEotia, Orcomeno. 

Oricum, a town in Epirus, Oreo, or Orcha. 

Oscenses, the people of Osca, a town in Hispania 
Tarraconensis, now Huescar. 

Osismii, an ancient people of Gaul, uncertain. 



Padus, the Po, the largest river in Italy, which rises 
in Piedmont, and dividing Lombardy into two parts, 
falls into the Adriatic Sea, by many mouths. 

Paemani, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica ; ac- 
cording to some, those of Luxemburg ; according to 
others, the people oi Pemont, near the Black Forest. 

Palaeste, a town in Epirus, near Oricum. 



Pannonia, a very large country, in the ancient divi- 
sion of Europe, divided into the Upper and Lower, and 
comprehended betwixt Illyricum, the Danube, and the 
uiMuntains Cithi. 

Parada, a town in Africa, not far from Utica. 

ParsEtonium, a maritime city of -Africa, Alberton. 

Parisii, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
country now called the Isle of France. 

Parthia, a country in Asia, lying between Media, 
Caramania, and the Hircanian Sea. 

ParthinI, a people of Macedonia. 

Peligni, a people of Italy, in Abruzzo. 

Peloponnesus, the Morea, a famous, large, and fruit- 
ful peninsula in Greece, now belonging to the Vene- 
tians. 

Pelusium, an ancient and celebrated city of Egypt, 
Belbais. 

Pergamus, an ancient and famous city of Mysia, 
Pergamo. 

Perinthus, a city of Thrace, about a day's journey 
west of Constantinople, now in a decaying condition, 
and called Heraclea. 

Persia, one of the largest, most ancient, and cele- 
brated kingdoms of Asia. It anciently contained many 
countries, and now many provinces. 

Petra, an ancient city of Macedonia, uncertain. 

Petrogorii, a country in Gaul, Perigord. 

Peucini, the inhabitants of the island of Pence, in 
one of the mouths of the Danube. 

Pharsalia, a part of Thessaly, famous for the battle 
between Caesar and Pompey, which decided the fate of 
the Roman Commonwealth. 

Pharus, an isle facing the port of Alexandria, in an- 
cient Egypt, Farion. 

Phasis, a large river in Colchis, now called Fasso, 
which flows into the Euxine Sea. 

Philippi, a city of Macedonia, on the confines of 
Thrace, Filippo. 

Philippopolis, a city of Thrace, near the river He- 
brus, Filippopoli. 

Phrygia, two countries in Asia Minor, one called 
Major, the other Minor. 

Picenum, an ancient district of Italy, lying eastward 
of Umbria ; the March of Ancona, according to others, 
Piscara. 

Picti, Picts, an ancient barbarous northern people, 
who, by intermarriages became, in course of time, one 
nation with the Scots ; but are originally supposed to 
have come out of Denmark or Scythia, to the Isles of 
Orkney, and from thence into Scotland. 

Pictones, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting the 
country of Poitou. 

Pirustae, an ancient people of Illyricum, Albanesi. 

Pisaurum, a city of Umbria in Italy, Pisaro. 

Placentia, an ancient city of Gallia Cisalpina, near 
the Po, now the metropolis of thedutchyof Piacenza; 
which name it also bears. 

Pleumossii, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica, 
subject to the Nervians, and inhabiting near Toumay. 

Polentia, an ancient city near the Alps, though the 
learned disagree as to the particular situation of it. 

Pontus, an ancient kingdom of Asia Minor, between 
Bithynia and Paphlagonia upon the Euxine Sea. 

Pontus Euxinus, the Euxine or Black Sea, from the 
jEgean along the Hellespont, to the Mseotic Lake, be- 
tween Europe and Asia. 

Posthumiana Castra, an ancient town in Hispania 
Baetica, now called Castro el Rio. 

Praeciania, an ancient people of Gaul, Precius. 



NAMES OF PLACES. 



355 



Provincia Romana, or Romanorum, one of the south- 
ern provinces of France, the first the Romans con- 
quered and brought into the form of a province, 
whence it obtained its name, which it still in some 
degree retains, being called at this day Provence. 

Prusa or Prusas, Bursa, a city of Bithynia, at the 
foot of Olympus, built by Hannibal. 

Ptolemais, an ancient city of Africa, Sl.JeanD^Acre. 

Pyrenaei Montes, the Pyrenees, or Pyrenean Moun- 
tains, ont of the largest chains of mountains in Europe, 
which divided Spain from France, running from east 
to west eighty-five leagues in length. 

R 

Ravenna, a very ancient city of Italy, near the coast 
of the Adriatic Gulf, which still retains its ancient 
name. In the decline of the Roman empire, it was 
some time the seat of the emperors of the West ; as it 
was likewise of the Visi-Gothic kingdom. 

Rauraci, a people of ancient Germany, near the 
Helvelii, who inhabited near where Basil in Switzer- 
land now is. 

Rhedones, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting 
about Rennes, in Bretagne. 

Rhsetia, the country of the Grisons, on the Alps, 
near the Hercynian Forest. 

Rhemi, the people of Rheims, a very ancient, fine, 
and populous city of France, in the province of Cham- 
pagne, on the river Vcsle. 

Rhenus, the Rhine, a great and famous river in Ger- 
many, which formerly divided it from Gaul. It springs 
out of the Rhaetian Alps, in the western Ijorders of 
Switzerland, and the northern of the Grisons, from 
two springs which unite near Coire, and falls into the 
Maese and the German Ocean, by two mouths, whence 
Virgil calls it Rhenus bicornis. 

Rhodanus, the Rhone, one of the most celebrated ri- 
vers of France, which rises from a double spring in 
Mont de la Fourche, a part of the Alps, on the borders 
of Switzerland, near the springs of the Rhine, and 
after a vast circuit through France, falls into the Me- 
diterranean, by five mouths. 

Rhodope, a famous mountain of Thrace, now called 
Valiza. 

Rhodus, Rhodes, a celebrated island in the Mediter- 
ranean, upon the coast of Asia Minor, over against 
Caria. 

Rhyndagus, a river of Mysia, in Asia, which falls 
into the Propontis. 

Roma, Rome, once the scat of the Roman empire, 
and the capital of the then known world, now the im- 
mediate capital of Campagna di Roma only, on the 
river Tiber, and the papal seat ; generally supposed 
to have been built by Romulus, in the first year of the 
seventh Olympiad. 

Roxolani, a people of Scythia Europaea, bordering 
upon the Alani : their country, anciently called Roxo- 
lania, is now Red Russia, belonging to the crown of 
Poland. 

Ruspina, an ancient maritime city of Africa, Souse. 

Rulheni, an ancient people of Gaul, la Rouergue. 

S 

Sabis, the Sambre, a river of the Low Countries, 
which rises in Picardy, and falls into the Maese at 
Namur. 

Saguntini, the people of Saguntum, a noble city of 
ancient Spain, the memory of which is recorded with 
honour, for the fidelity shown to its allies the Romans, 
Mmvedre. 



Salassii, an ancient city of Piedmont, whose Chief 
town was where now Aosta is situate. 

Salluvii, Sallyes, a people of Gallia Narbonensis, 
about where Aix now is. 

Salona, an ancient city of Dalmatia, and a Roman 
colony ; the place where Dioclesian was born, and 
whither he retreated, after he had resigned the impe- 
rial dignity. 

Salsum, a river of Hispania Baetica, Rio Salado, or 
Guadajos. 

Samarobriva, Amiens, an ancient city of Gallia Bel- 
gica, enlarged and beautified by the emperor Antoni- 
nus Pius, now the chief city of Picardy, on the river 
Somme. 

Santones, the ancient inhabitants of Guienne or 
Xantoigne. 

Sardinia, a great island in the Mediterranean, which 
in the time of the Romans had forty-two cities, now 
belonging to the Duke of Savoy, with the title of king. 

Sarmatia, a very large northern country, divided in- 
to Sarmatia Asiatica, containing Tarlary, Petigora, 
Circassia, and the country of the Mordtuta; and Sar- 
matia Europaea, containing Russia, part of Poland, 
Prussia, and Lithuania. 

Sarsnra, a town in Africa, unknown. 

Savus, the Sure, a large river, which rises in upper 
Carniola, and fiills into the Danube at Belgrade. 

Scaldis, the Scheldt, a noted river in the Low Coun- 
tries, which rises in Picardy, and washing several of 
the principal cities of Flanders and Brabant, in its 
course, falls into the German Ocean by two mouths,one 
retaining its own name, and the other called the Honte. 

Scandavia, anciently a vast northern peninsula, 
containing what is yet called Schonen, anciently Sca- 
nia, belonging to Demnark ; and part of Sweden, Nor- 
icay, and Lapland. 

Scythia, a large country, properly Crim-Tartary, but 
in history and geography greatly extended, and parti- 
cularly divided into Scythia Asiatica, on either side 
of Mount Imaus ; and Scythia Europaea, about the 
Euxine Sea ; and the Maeotic Lake. 

Seduni, an ancient people of Switzerland, Sion. 

Sedusii, an ancient people of Germany, on the bor- 
ders of Suabia. 

Segni, an ancient German nation, neighbours of the 
Condrusi, Zulpich. 

Segontiaci, a people of ancient Britain, inhabiting 
about Holshot in Hampshire. 

Segovia, a city of Hispania Baetica, Segovia lamenos. 

Segusiana, a people of Gallia Celtica, about where 
now Lionois Forest is situate. 

Senones, an ancient nation of the Celtae, inhabiting 
about the Senonois, in Gaul. 

Sequana, the Seine, one of the principal rivers of 
France, arising in the dutchy of Burgundy, not far 
from a town of the same name, and running through 
Paris, and by Roan, forms at Candebec a great arm of 
the sea. 

Sequani, an ancient people of Gallia Belgica, inha- 
biting the country now called the Franche Comte, or 
the Upper Burgundy. 

Sesuvii, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting about 
Seez. 

Sibutzates, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting 
the country of Buck. 

Sicilia, Sicily, a large island in the Tyrrhene Sea, 
at the south-west point of Italy, formerly called the 
store-house of the Roman empire, and the first pro- 
vince the Romans possessed out of Italy. 



356 



INDEX OF THE 



Sicoris, a river in Catalonia, the Segre. 

Sigambri, or Sicambri, an ancient people of Lower 
Germany, between the Maese and the Rhine, where 
Guelderland is ; though by some placed on the banks 
of the Maine. 

Silicensis, a riverof Hispania Bastica, i?/o de las Al- 
gamidas. Others think it a corruption from SinguU. 

Sinuessa, a city of Campania, not far from the Save, 
an ancient Roman colony, now in a ruinous condition ; 
Rocca di Mondragone. 

Soricaria, a city of ancient Spain, unknown. 

Soritia, an ancient town in Spain, unknown. 

Sotiates, or Sontiates, an ancient people of Gaul, in- 
habiting the country about Aire. 

Sparta, a city of Peloponnesus, now called Musithra, 
said to be so ancient as the days of the Patriarch Jacob. 

Spoletum, Spoleto, a city of great antiquity, of Um- 
bria, in Italy, the capital of a dutchy of the same name, 
on the river Tesino, where are yet some stately ruins 
of ancient Roman and Gothic edifices. 

Suessiones, an ancient people of (ia.v\,le Soissonnois. 

Suevi, an ancient, great and warlike people of Ger- 
many, who possessed the greatest part of it, from the 
Rhine to the Elbe, but afterwards removed from the 
northern parts, and settled about the Danube, and some 
marched into Spain, where they established a kingdom. 

Sulcitani, an ancient people of Sardinia, unknown. 

Sulmo, an ancient city of Italy, Sulmona. 

Sunici, an ancient people of the dutchy of Liinburg, 
where there is yet a place called Sunich, a name pro- 
bably borrowed from them. 

Syracusae, Saragusa, once one of the noblest cities 
of Sicily, said to be built by Archias, a Corinthian, 
aoove seven hundred years before Christ. The Romans 
besieged and took it during the second Punic war, on 
which occasion the great Archimedes was killed. It 
has been so entirely destroyed, that it has no remains 
to show of its antiquity. 

Syria, a large country of Asia, containing several 
provinces, now called Souristan. 

Syrtes, the Deserts of Barbary ; also two dangerous 
sandy gulfs, in the Mediterranean, upon the coast of 
Barbary, in Africa, called the one Syrtis magna, now 
the Gulf of Sidra ; the other Syrtis parva, now the 
Gulf of Capes. 



Tamesis, the TVtames, a celebrated and well known 
river of Great Britain. 

Tanais, the Don, a very large river in Scythia. divid- 
ing Asia from Europe. It rises in the province of Re- 
san, in Muscovy, and flowing through the Crim-Tar- 
lary, runs into the Maeotic Lake, near a city of the 
same name, now in ruins, and in the hands of the 
Turks. 

Tarbelli,a people ofancient Gaul, near the Pyrenees, 
inhabiting about ^ys, and Bayonne, in the country of 
Labourd. 

Tarracina, an ancient city of Italy, which still retains 
the same name. 

Tarraco, Tarragona, a city of Spain, which, in an- 
cient time, gave name to that part of it called Hispania 
Tarraconensis ; by some said to be built by the Scipios, 
though others say before the Roman conquest, and that 
only enlarged it. It stands on the mouth of the river 
Tulcis, now el Fraeoli, with a small haven on the Me- 
diterranean. 

Tarsus, Tarso, the metropolis of Cilicia, famous for 
being the birth-place of St. Paul. 



Tarusates, an ancient people of Gaul, uncertain ; 

according to some, le Teursan. 

Taurus, an island in the Adriatic Sea, unknown. 

Taurois, tlie name of a castle near Marseilles. 

Tauros Mons, the greatest mountain in all Asia, ex- 
tending from the Indian to the iEgean Sea, called by 
different names in different countries, viz. Imaus, Cau- 
casus, Caspius, Cerausius, and in Scripture, Ararat. 
Herbert says it is fifty English miles over, and fifteen 
hundred long. 

Tectosages, see Volcse. 

Tegea, a city of Africa, unknown. 

Tenchtheri, a people ofancient Germany bordering 
on the Rhine, near Overyssel. 

Tergestini, an ancient people inhabiting about 
Aneste, in the confines of Istria and the Carni. 

Terni, an ancient Roman colony, on the river Nare, 
twelve miles from Spoletum. 

Teutones, or Teutoni, an ancient people bordering 
on the Cimbri, the common ancient name for all the 
Germans, whence they yet call themselves Teutsche, 
and their country Teutschland. 

Thabena, a city of Africa, unknown. 

Thapsus, a maritime city of Africa, uncertain. 

Thebs, a city of Boeotia, in Greece, said to have been 
built l)y Cadmus, destroyed by Alexander the Great, 
but rebuilt, and now known loy the name of Stives. 

Thermopylse, a famous pass on the great mountain 
Oeta, leading into Phocis, inAchaia, now called Bocca 
di Lt/pa. 

Tliessaly, a country of Greece, formerly a great part 
of Macedonia, now called Janna. 

Tiiessalonica,the chief city of Macedonia, now called 
Salonichi. 

Thracia, a large country of Europe, eastward from 
Macedonia, commonly called Romania, bounded by 
the Euxine and .ffigean Seas. 

Thurii, or Turii, an ancient people of Italy, .4orre 
Trodogneto. 

Tigurinas Fagus, a nation of the Helvetians, the an- 
cient inhabitants of the canton of Zurich, in Switzer- 
land. 

Tisdra,or Tisdrus, an ancient city of Africa,Ca«roara. 

Tolosa, Tlioulouse, a city of Aquitain, of great anti- 
quity, the capital of Languedoc, on the Garonne. 

Toxandri, an ancient people of the Low Countries, 
about Treda and Gertruydenburg; but, according to 
some, of the diocese of Liege. 

Tralles, an ancient people of Lydia, in Asia Minor, 
Chara. 

Treviri, the people of Treves, or Triers, a very an- 
cient city of Lower Germany, on tlie Moselle, said to 
have been built by Trebetas, the brother of Ninus. It 
was made a Roman colony in the time of Augustus, 
and became afterwards the most famous city of Gallia 
Belgica. It was for some time the seat of the western 
empire, but it is now only the seat of the Ecclesiastical 
Elector named from it. 

Tribocci, or Triboces, a people ofancient Germany, 
inhabiting the country of Alsace. 

Trinobantes, a people of ancient Britain, inhabitants 
of the counties of Middlesex and He-rtfordshire. 

Troja, Troy, a city of Phrygia, in Asia Minor, near 
Mount Ida, destroyed by the Greeks after a ten years' 
siege. 

Tubantes, an ancient people of Germany, about 
Westphalia- 

Tugiam, a city and canton of Helvetia, or Switzer- 
land, now called Zug. 



NAMES OF PLACES. 



357 



Tulingi, an ancient people of Germany, who inha- 
bited about where Stiilingen in Switzerland is. 

Tuneri, an ancient people inhabiting about where 
Toneres, in Liege, now is. 

Turones, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting about 
Tours. 

Tuscia, Tuscany, a very large and considerable re 
gion of Italy, anciently called Tyrrhcnia, and Etruria 

Tyber, one of the most noted, though not largest ri- 
vers of Italy, which rises in one of the Apennines, and 
among otlier places, passing througli Rome, falls inln 
the Tyrrhenian Sea at Ostia. 

Tygris, a rapid river of Asia, which, in its coursi', 
unites with the Euphrates. 

Tyrus, Tyre, an ancient city of Phoenicia, upon the 
Mediterranean, famous for its traffic and riches. 

V 

Vacca, a town in Africa, unknown. 

Valialis, the Waal, the middle branch of the Rhine, 
which, passing by Nimeguen, falls into the Maese, 
above Gorcum. 

Valencia, a city of Spain, which gives name to a 
whole kingdom, about a mile from the Mediterranean, 
supposed to be built by Junius Brutus. 

Valencia, Vale7ice, a city of Gallia Narbonensis, now 
in Dauphiny, on the rivers Rhnne and Isere. 

Vangiones, an ancient people of Germany, about the 
city of Worms. 

Varus, the Var, a river in Gaul, that flows into the 
Ligurian Sea. 

Ubii, an ancient people of Lower Germany, who in- 
habited about where Cologne and the dutcliy of Juliers 
now are. 

Ucubis, a town in Hispania Bfftica, Lucubi. 

Velauni, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting about 
Veial. 

Vellaunodunum, a town in Gaul, about which geo- 
graphers are much divided ; some making it Auxerre, 
others Chasteau Landon, others Villeneuve in Lorrain, 
others Veron, 

Velocasses, an ancient people of Normandy, about 
Rouen. 

Veneti : this name was anciently given as well to the 
Venetians, as to the people of Vannes, in Bretagne, in 
Gaul, for which last it stands in Caesar. 

Venetia, Venice, a noble city of Italy, built upon 
sixty islands, joined together by five hundred bridges, 
at the top of the Adriatic Gulf, the capital of a powerful 
commonwealth. 

Ventisponte, a town of Spain, unknown. 

Veragri, a people of Gallia Lugdunensis, whose chief 
town was Aguaniim, now St. Maurice. 

Verbigenus, or Urbigenus Pagus, a nation or canton 
of the Helvetians, inhabiting the country in the neigh- 
bourhood of Orbe. 

Vercelli Campi, the Plains of Vercella, famous for a 

victory the Romans obtained there over the Cimbri. 

The city of that name is in Piedmont, on the river Se- 

sia, on the borders of the dutchy of Milan. 

31* 



Veromandui, a people of Gallia Belgica, whose coun- 
try, now a part of Pieardy, is still called Vermandois. 

Verona, a city of Lombardy, the capital of a province 
of the same name, on the river Adige, said to be built 
by the Gauls two hundred and eiglity-two years Ijefore 
Clirist. It lias yet several remains of antiquity. 

Vesontio, Besancon, the capital of tlie Sequani, now 
the chief city of Burgundy. 

Vettones, a people of Spain, inhabiting the province 
of Estremadiira. 

A''ibo, a town in Italy, not far from the Sicilian Straits, 
Bibonu. 

Vienna,a city of Narbonese Ga.\\\,Vienne inDauphiny. 

Vindelici, an ancient people of Germany, inhabitants 
of the country of Vindelicia, otherwise called Raetia 
Secunda. 

Vistula, the Weichsel, a famous river of Poland, 
which rises in the Carpathian mountains, in upper Si- 
lesia, and falls into the Baltic, not far from Dantzic, 
by three mouths. 

Visurgis, the Weser, a river of Lower Germany, 
which rises in Franconia, and, among other places of 
note, passing by Bremen, falls into the German Ocean, 
not far from the mouth of the Elbe, between that and 
the Ems. 

Ulla, or Ulia, a town in Hispania Baetica, in regard 
to whose situation geographers are not agreed ; some 
making it Monte major, others Vae?ia, others Vilia. 

Umbria, a large country of Italy, on both sides of 
the Apennines. 

Unelli, an ancient people of Gaul, uncertain. 

Vocates, a people of Gaul, on the confines of the La- 
purdenses. 

Vocontii, an ancient people of Gaul, inhabiting about 
Die, in Dauphiny, and Vaison in the county of Venisse. 

Vogesus Mons, the mountain of Vauge, in Lorrain, 
or, according to others, de Faucilles. 

Volcae Arecomici, and Tectosages, an ancient people 
of Gaul, inhabiting the Upiier and Lmcer Lang uedoc. 

Ursao, a town of Hispania Baetica, Ossuna. 

Usaea, a town of Africa, whose situation is not cer- 
tainly known. 

Usipetes, an ancient people of Germany, who fre- 
quently changed their habitation. 

Utica, a city of Africa, famous for the death of Cato ; 
Biserte. 

Uxellodunum, a town in Gaul, whose situation is not 
known ; according to some Ussoldun. 

Uzita, a town unknown. 

X 

Xantones, the same with the Santones, or people of 
Xantonge. 

Z 

Zama, a town in Africa, famous for the defeat of 
Hannibal there Ijy Scipio, now called Zamora. 

Zetta, a maritime city of Africa, now Zerbi. 

Ziela, or Zela, a city of Pontus, Arzila. 

Zingitana, a part of ancient Africa, now included in 
the kingdom of Algiers. 



AN 

INDEX 

OF 

PERSONS AND THINGS. 



• The Numerals refer to the Book, the Figures to the Section. G. stands for the Wars in Gaul ; C. for the 
Civil "Wars ; Al. for the Alexandrian ; Af. for the African ; Sp. for the Spanish War. 



Acco, prince of the Senones, his conduct on Caesar's 
approach, G. vi. 3. Condemned in a council of the 
Gauls, ibid. 41. 
Achillas, captain of Ptolemy guards, sent to kill Pom- 
pey, C. iii. 85. Appointed by Pothinus commander 
of all the Egyptians' forces, ibid. 89. Heads an army 
of twenty thousand veteran troops, ibid. 91. Va- 
riance between him and Arsinoe, Ptolemy's sister, 
Al. 3. 
Acilla, demands a garrison from Csesar, Af. 30. Be- 
sieged in vain by Considius, 30, 40. 
Adiatomus, sallies upon Crassus at the head of a chosen 

body of troops, G. iii. 23. 
Adrumetum, held by Considius Longus with a garrison 
of one legion, C. ii. 21. Caesar makes himself mas- 
ter of it, Af 77. 
.ffiduans, complain to Caesar of the ravages committed 
in their territories by the Helvetians, G. i. 9. Join 
in a petition against Ariovistus, ibid. 23. At the 
head of one of the two leading factions of Gaul, G. vi. 
12. Caesar quiets an intestine commotion among 
them, G. vii. 30. And prevents their revolting from 
the Romans, ibid. 35. Which nevertheless comes 
to pass soon after, ibid, 52. 
^gimurus, a trireme belonging to Caesar, taken there 

by Varus and Octavius, Af 41. 
.aiginium, Domitius joins Caesar near that place, C. iii. 

56. 
^gus and Koscillus, their perfidious behaviour to- 
wards Caesar, C. iii. 21. 
^tolia, recovered from Pompey by the partizans of 

Caesar, C. iii. 30. 
Afranius, Pompey's lieutenant, his exploits in con- 
junction with Petreius, C. i. 36. Carries the war in- 
to Celtiberia, ibid. 55. Surrenders to Caesar, ibid, 
76. Prevails with one of his slaves to despatch 
him, Af 81, 
Africans, a crafty warlike people, Af 9, Their man- 
ner of concealing their corn, ibid. 57. 
Agar, defended with great bravery against the Getu- 

lians, Af 58, 
Agendicum, Caesar quarters four legions there, G, vi, 
40. Labienus leaves his baggage in it under a guard 
of new levies, and sets out for Lutetia, G, vii. 54. 
Alba, Domitius levies troops in that neighbourhood, C. 

i, 13. 
Albicl, a kind of mountaineers taken into the service 
of the Marseillians, C. i. 32. 



Alces, a species of animals resembling in some re- 
spects a goat, to be found in the Hercynian forest, 
G, vi, 25, 
Alesia, Caesar shuts up Vercingetorix there, G. vii. 62. 
Surrounds it with lines of circumvallation and con- 
travallation, ibid. 66. Obliges it to surrender, ibid. 
82. 
Alexandria, Caesar pursues Pompey thither, C. iii. 87. 
Is unexpectedly entangled in a war at that place, 
ibid. 88, Difficulties Csesar had to encounter there 
for want of water, Al, 4. Caesar enters the town 
with his victorious army, and receives it into his 
protection, ibid. 23. 
Alexandrians, an acute and ingenious people, Al. 2. 
But treacherous and without faith, ibid. 4. They pe- 
tition Caesar to send them their king, ibid, 16. 
Allier, Caesar eludes the vigilance of Vercingetorix, 

and by an artifice passes that river, G. vii. 33. 
AUobrogians, supposed to be not well affected to the 
Romans, G. i. 5. Complain to Caesar of the ravages 
of the Helvetians, ibid. 9. 
Alps, Caesar crosses them with five legions, G. i. 8. 
Sends Galba to open a free passage over them to the 
Roman merchants, G. iii. 1. 
Amagetobria, famous for a defeat of the Gauls there by 

Ariovistus, G. i. 23. 
Amantia submits to Caesar, and sends ambassadors to 

know his pleasure, C, iii, 10. 
Amanus, a mountain in Asia near which Scipio sus- 
tains some losses, C, iii. 28. 
Ambarri, complain to Caesar of the ravages committed 

in their territories by the Helvetians, G. i. 9. 
Ambialites, join in a confederacy with the Veneti 

against Caesar, G. iii. 9. 
Ambiani furnish ten thousand men, to the general con- 
federacy of the Belgians against Caesar, G, ii, 4, 
Join with the Veneti in their revolt from the Romans, 
G, iii. 9. Sue for peace, and submit themselves to 
Caesar's pleasure, G, ii, 16. 
Ambiorix, his artful speech to Sabinus and Cotta, G. 
V. 23. Csesar marches against him, G, vi, 27, Ra- 
vages and lays waste his territories, ibid. 31, En- 
deavours in vain to get him into his hands, ibid. 40. 
Ambivareti, ordered to furnish their contingent for 

raising the siege of Alesia, G, vii. 69. 
Ambivariti, the German cavalry sent to forage among 

them, G. iv. 6. 
Ambracia, Cassius directs his march towards that 

place, C. iii. 31. 
Amphilochi, reduced by Cassius Longinus, C. iii. 47. 
358 



PERSONS AND THINGS. 



359 



Amphipolis, an edict in Pompey's name published at 
that place, G. iii. 84. 

Anates, a people bordering upon the Hercyuian forest, 
G. vi. 25. 

Anas, a river bounding that part of Spain under the 
government of Petreius, C. i. 36. 

Ancalites, send ambassadors to Caesar, with an offer 
of submission, G. v. 17. 

Ancon, CcEsar takes possession of it with a garrison 
of one cohort, C. i. 10. 

Andes, Caesar puts his troops into winter quarters 
among them, G. ii. 36. 

Anglesey, an island situated between Britain and Ire- 
land, where the night, during the winter, is said to 
be a month long, G. v. 10. 

Antiochia, refuses to admit the fugitives after the bat- 
tle of Pharsalia, C. iii. 81. 

Antony, obliges Libo to raise the siege of Brundusium, 
C. iii. 22. And in conjunction with Kalenus, trans- 
ports Caesar's troops to Greece, ibid. 24. 

ApoUonia, Pompey resolves to winter there, C. iii. 3. 
Caesar makes himself master of it, ibid. 10. 

Aponiana, CiEsar orders his fleet to rendezvous near 
that island, Af. 2. 

Aspus, Caesar and Pompey encamp over against each 
other on the banks of that river, C. iii. 11. 

Apulia, Pompey quarters the legions Caesar had sent 
him there, C. i. 14. 

Aquilaria, Curio arrives there with the troops designed 
against Africa, C. ii. 21. 

Aquileia, Caesar draws together the troops quartered 
there, G. i. 8. 

Aquitains, reduced under the power of the Romans by 
Crassus, G. iii. 21. Very expert in the art of mining, 
ibid. 22. 

Arar, the Helvetians receive a considerable check in 
passing that river, G. i. 10. 

Arden, Indutiomarus conceals the infirm and aged in 
that forest, G. v. 3. Caesar crosses it in quest of Am- 
biorix, G. vi. 27. 

Arecomici Volcae, Caesar plants garrisons among them, 
G. vii. 7. 

Ariminum, Caesar having sounded the disposition of 
his troops, marches thither, C. i. 7. 

Ariovistus, king of the Germans, his oppressive beha- 
viour towards the Gauls, G. i. 23. Caesar sends am- 
bassadors to him demanding an interview, ibid, 26. 
He is defeated and driven entirely out of Gaul, ibid. 
41. 

Aries, Caesar orders twelve galleys to be built there, 
C. i. 34. 

Armorici, assemble in great numbers to attack L. Ros- 
cius in his winter quarters, G. v. 44. 

Arretium, Antony sent thither with five cohorts, C. i. 10. 

Arsinoe, the daughter of Ptolemy, at variance with 
Achillas, Al. 3. Caesar removes her out of Egypt, 
ibid. 24. 
Arverni, suddenly invaded, and their territories ra- 
vaged by Caesar, G. vii. 8. 
Asculum, Caesar takes possession of it, C. i. 13. 
Ascurum, attacked without success by young Pompey, 

Af 21. 
Asparagium, Pompey encamps near it with all his 

forces, C. iii. 27. 
Aspavia, Pompey's communication with that place cut 

off by Caesar's works, Sp. 24. 
Asta, sends ambassadors to Caesar with an offer of sub- 
mission, Sp. 36. 
(Vtegua, Caesar lays siege to the place, Sp. 6. Compels 
it to surrender, ibid. 19. 



Athens, contributes to fit out a fleet for Pompey, C. iii. 
3. 

Atrebatians, furnish fifteen thousand men to the gene- 
ral confederacy of Gaul, G. ii. 4. 

Atuatuca, a strong castle, where Caesar deposits all his 
baggage, when he sets out in pursuit of Ambiorix, 
G. vi. 30. The Germans unexpectedly attack it> 
ibid. 32. 

Atuatuci, furnish twenty-nine thousand men to the 
general confederacy of Gaul, G. ii. 4. Caesar obliges 
them to submit, ibid. 21). Descendants of the Teu- 
tones and Cimbri, ibid. 

Avaricum, besieged by Caesar, G. vii. 12. And at last 
taken by storm, ibid. 27. 

Aulerci, reduced by P. Crassus, G. ii. 35. Massacre 
their senate, and join Viridovix, G. iii. 17. Aulerci 
Brannovices ordered to furnish their contingent to 
the relief of Alesia, G. vii. 69. Aulerci Cenomani 
furnish five thousand, ibid. Aulerci Eburovices three 
thousand, ibid. Aulerci Diablintes associate with 
the Venetians in their revolt, G. iii. 9. 

Ausci, submit to Crassus, and send hostages, G. iii. 28. 

Ausetani, send ambassadors to Caesar, with an offer 
of submission, C. i. 54. 

Auximum, Caesar makes himself master of it, C. i. 11. 

Axona, Caesar crosses it in his march against the Bel- 
gians, G. ii. 6. 

B 

Bacenis, the Suevians encamp at the entrance of that 
wood, resolving there to wait the approach of the 
Romans, G. vi. 10. 

Baculus, P. Sextius, his remarkable bravery, G. vi. 35. 

Baetis, Cassius encamps on the banks of that river, G. 
46. 

Bagradas, Curio arrives with his army at that river, 
C. ii. 22. 

Balearean Isles, young Pompey sails thither with his 
fleet, Af 21. The inhabitants famous for their dex- 
terity in the use of the sling, G. ii. 8. 

Batavorum Insula, formed by the Meuse and the Waal, 
G. iv. 7. 

Belgians, tlie most warlike people of Gaul, G. i. 1. 
Withstand the invasion of the Teutones and Cimbri, 
G. ii. 4. Originally of German extraction, ibid. 
Caesar obliges them to decamp, and return to their 
several habitations, ibid. 11. 

Bellocassians, furnish tliree thousand men to the re- 
lief of Alesia, G. vii. 69. 

Bellona, a famous and ancient temple of hers in Cap- 
padocia, whose priest was next in authority to the 
king, Al. 53. 

Bellovaci, furnish a hundred thousand men to the gen- 
eral confederacy of Belgium, G. ii. 4. Join in the 
general defection under Vercingetorix, G. vii. 55. 
Again take up arms against Caesar, viii. 5. But are 
compelled to submit and sue for pardon. 

Berones, fly to the rescue of Cassius, threatened with 
an assassination, A1.42. 

Bessi, make part of Pompey's army, C. iii. 3. 

Bibracte, Caesar distressed for want of corn, marches 
thither to obtain a supply, G. i. 19. 

Bibrax, attacked with great fury by the confederate 
Belgians, G. ii. 7. 

Bibroci, send ambassadors to Caesar to sue for peace, 
G. V'. 17. 

Bibulus, admiral of Pompey's fleet, takes some of Cae- 
sar's transports, C. iii. 6. His cruelty towards the 
prisoners that fell into his hands, ibid. 12. 



360 



INDEX OF 



Bigerronies, surrender and give hostages to Crassus, 
G. iii. -28. 

Biturigians join with the Arverni in the general defec- 
tion under Vercingetorix, G. vii. 5. 

Bugud, liing of Mauritania, his exploits in behalf of 
Cffisar, Al. 46. Invades Juba's kingdom, in order to 
create a diversion, Af. '23. 

Boii, join with the Helvetians in their expedition 
against Gaul, G. i. 4. Altaclts the Romans in flanli, 
ibid. 20. Caesar allows them to settle among the jEdu- 
ans, ibid. 1, 

Bosphorus, Csesar invests Mithridates with the sover- 
eignty of that country, Al. 63. 

Brannovii, furnish tlieir contingent to the relief of Ale- 
sia, G. vii. 69. 

Bratuspantium, submits and obtains pardon from Cs- 
sar, G. ii. 14. 

Bridge, built by Caesar over the Rhine, described, G. iv. 
15. 

Britain, Caesar's expedition thither, G. iv. 18. Descrip- 
tion of the British coast, 21. The Romans land, in 
spite of the vigorous opposition of the islanders, 22, 
The Britons send ambassadors to Caesar to desire a 
■pgace, which they obtain on delivery of hostages, 
a4. They break the peace on hearing that Caesar's 
fleet was destroyed by a storm, and set upon the Ro- 
man foragers, 26. Tlie manner of their fighting in 
chariots ; they fall upon the Roman camp, but are 
repulsed, and petition again for peace, 29. which Cee- 
sar grants them. Caesar passes over into tlieir island 
a second time, v. 7. Drives them from the woods 
where they had taken refuge, S. Describes their man 
ners and way of living, 10. Defeats them in several 
encounters, 11—18. Grants them a peace, on the de 
livery of hostages, and agreeing to pay a yearly trl 
bute, 1. 9. 

Brundusium, Pompey retires thither with his forces 
C. i. 23. Caesar lays siege to it, 24. Pompey escapes 
from it by sea, upon which the place immediately 
surrenders to Casar, 26. Libo blocks up the port 
with a fleet, C. iii. 21. But by the valour and con- 
duct of Antony, is obliged to retire, 22. 

Brotherly love, a remarkable example of it, G. iv. 9, 
Another in the conduct of the two Titi, Af 26. 

Brutus, appointed to command the fleet in the war 
against the Vannes, G. iii. 11. Engages and defeats the 
Venetians at sea, 14. Defeats the people of Marseilles 
in a sea figlit, C. i. 52. Engages them a second time 
with the same good fortune, ii. 3. 

BuUis, sends ambassadors to Caesar with an offer of 
submission, C. iii. 10. 

Bursavolenses, their conduct towards Caesar and his 
followers, Sp. 22. 

c 

Caeresi, join in the general confederacy of Belgium 
against Caesar, G. ii. 4. 

Caesar takes post for Gaul, G. i. 6. Refuses the Helve- 
tians a passage through the Roman province, ibid 
His answer to tlieir ambassadors, 12. Defeats and 
sends them back into their own country. Sends am 
bassadors to Ariovistus, 26. Calls a council of war: 
his speech, 31. Begins his march, 32. His speech to 
Ariovistus, 34. Totally routs the Germans, and 
obliges them to repass the Rhine, 41. His war with 
the Belgians, ii. 2. Reduces the Suessiones and 
Bellovaci, 13. His prodigious slaughter of the Ner- 
vians, 16—23. Obliges the Atuatuci to submit, 29. 
Prepares for the war against the Venetians, iii. 9. De- 



feats tliem in an engagement at sea, and totally sub- 
dues them, 14. Is obliged to put his army into win- 
ter quarters, before he can complete the reduction 
of the Menapians and Morini, 29. Marches to find 
out the Germans ; his answer to their ambassadors, 
iv. 5. Attacks them in their camp, and routs them, 
10. Crosses the Rhine, and returns to Gaul, 13—17. 
His expedition into Britain described, 18. Refits 
his navy, 27. Comes to the assistance of his fora- 
gers, whom the Britons had attacked, 28. Returns 
to Gaul, 32. Gives orders for building a navy, v. 1. 
His preparations for a second expedition into Bri- 
tain, 2. Marches into the country of Treves to prevent 
a rebellion, 3. Marches to Port Itius, and invites all 
the princes of Gaul to meet him there, 4. Sets sails 
for Britain, 7. Describes the country and customs of 
the inhabitants, 10. Fords the river Thames, and 
puts Cassibelanus, Captain-general of the Britons, 
to flight, 14. Imposes a tribute upon the Britons, and 
returns into Gaul, 19. Routs tlie Nervians, and 
relieves Cicero, 30. Resolves to winter in Gaul, 44. 
His second expedition into Germany, vi. 9. His 
description of the manners of the Gauls and Ger- 
mans, 12. His return into Gaul, and vigorous pro- 
secution of the war against Ambiorix, 27. Crosses 
the mountains of the Cevennes in the midst of win- 
ter, and arrives at Auvergne, whicli submits, vii. 8. 
Takes and sacks Genabum, 11. Takes Noviodunum, 
and marches from thence to Avaricum, 12. His 
works before Alesia, 66. Withstands all the attacks 
of the Gauls, and obliges the plice to surrender, 81. 
Marches into the country of the Biturigians, and 
compels them to submit, viii. 2. Demands Gutur- 
vatus, who is delivered up and put to death, 31. 
Marches to besiege Uxellodunum, 32. Cuts oft' the 
hands of the besieged at Uxellodunum, 36. Marches 
to Corfinium, and besieges it, C. 1. 14. Which in a 
short time surrenders, 22. He afterwards marched 
througli Abruzzo, and great part of the kingdom ol 
Naples, 23. His arrival al Brundusium, and block- 
ade of the haven, 24. Commits the siege of Mar- 
seilles to tlie care of Brutus and Trebonius, 34. His 
expedition to Spain, 35. His speech to Afranius, 77. 
Comes to Marseilles, which surrenders, C. ii. 20. 
Takes Oricum, iii. 9. Marches to Dyrrhachiumto 
cut offPompey's communication with that place, 35. 
Sends Canuleius into Epirus for corn, 36. Besieges 
Pompey in his camp ; his reasons for it, 39. Encloses 
Pompey's works williin his fortifications ; a skirm- 
ish between them, 39. His army reduced to great 
straits for want of provisions, 40. Offers Pompey 
battle, which he declines, '&. Sends Clodius to 
Scipio, to treat about a peace, whose endeavours 
prove ineffectual, 49. Joins Domitius, storms and 
takes the towns of Gomphus in Thessaly, in four 
hours' time, 67. Gains an entire victory over Pom- 
pey in the battle of Pharsalia, 76. Summons Ptole- 
my and Cleopatra to attend him, 88. Burns the 
Alexandrian fleet, 92. Conducts his transports safe 
to Alexandria, Al. 6. Obtains a victory, takes two 
ships, and sinks three, 12. Routs the Pharians, gains 
the island and the town several taken and killed, 
then fortifies the castle, gains the shore, stops up an 
arch under the bridge, and begins to throw up a 
rampart, 13. Marches to Ptolemy's camp, and de- 
feats him, 22. Returns to Alexandria, and performs 
Ptolemy the father's will,23. Defeats Pharnaces in a 
great battle, 59. Passes over into Africa, Af. 1. Has 
several skirmishes with Labienus near Buspina, 12. 



PERSONS AND THINGS. 



361 



Irrecoverably defeats Scipio in the battle of Thapsus, 
and cuts his whole aimy to pieces, 73. Converts 
Juba's kingdom into a province, and returns to 
Rome, 85. Arrives in Spain, and lays siege to Cor- 
dova, Sp. 2. Defeats young Pompey with great 
slaughter in the plains of Munda, 31. 
Calagurritani, send ambassadors to Caesar with an 

offer of submission, C. i. 54. 
Caletes, furnish ten thousand men in the general re- 
volt of Belgium, G. ii. 4. 
Camulogenus, appointed commander in chief by the 
ParisianSjG. vii. 54. Obliges Labienus to decamp 
from before Paris, ibid. Is slain in disputing va- 
liantly the victory with his enemy, 56. 
Caninius sets Duracius at liberty, who had been shut 
up in Limo by Uumnacus, G. viii. 21. Pursues 
Drapes, 24. Lays siege to Uxellodununi, 27. 
Canopus, Euphranor perishes in a sea-fight there, Al. 

17. 
Cantabrians, obliged by Afranius to furnish a supply 

of troops, C. i. 36. 
Caraliiui, declare against Pompey, and expel Cotta 

with his garrison, C. i. 29. 
Carmona,.^eclares for Caesar, and expels the enemy's 

garrison, C. ii. 17. 
CarnutesjCaesar quarters some troops among them, G. 
ii. 36. They openly assassinate Tasgetius, G. v. 21. 
They send ambassadors to Caesar and submit, vi. 3. 
Offer to be the first in taking up arms against the 
RomanSjVii. 2. Attack the Biturigians, but arc dis- 
persed and forced to fly by Caesar, viii. 4. 
Carsulenus, detached to storm the highest part of the 

enemy's camp which he forces, Al. 22. 
Cassi,send ambassadors and submit to Caesar, G. v. 17, 
Cassibelanus, chosen commander in chief of the con- 
federate Britons, v. 9. Endeavours in vain to stop 
the course of Caesar's conquests, 14. Is obliged to 
submit, and accept of Caesar's terms, 19. 
Cassius, Pompey's lieutenant, burns Caesar's fleet in 

Sicily, C. iii. 83. 
Cassius Longinus, his ill conduct in Spain, Al. 38. A 
plot formed to assassinate him, 40. The conspira- 
tors endeavour to put it in execution at Cordova, 42. 
He is wounded as he lay on the ground by Squillus, 
ibid. Upon his recovery, he orders all the assassins 
to be seized, puts several to death, and compounds 
with the rest for money, ibid. Behaves more tyran- 
nically than ever, which occasions new disturban- 
ces, 43. Is cast away in the mouth of tho Iberus, 51. 
Casticus, the sou of Catamantales, solicited by Orge- 

torix to invade the liberty of his country, G. i. 3. 
Cativulcus, takes up arms against the Romans at the 
instigation of Indutiomarus, G. v. 22. Poisons him- 
self, vi. 29. 
Cato, of Utica, the source of his hatred to Caesar, C. i. 
3. Made pretor of Sicily, prepares for war, and ab- 
dicates his province, 29. Excites young Pompey to 
war, Af. 21. Sends a reinforcement to Scipio, 33. 
Kills himself, and is honourably buried by the Uti- 
cans, 76. 
Cavalry, their institution and manner of fighting 
among the Germans, G. i. 39. iv. 2. And among the 
Spaniards, Sp. 14. 
Caturiges, oppose Caesar's passage over the Alps, G. i. 

8. 
Cavarillus, taken and brought before Caesar, G. vii. 61. 
Cavarinus, the Senones attempt to assassinate him, G. 
V. 45. Caesar orders him to attend him with the ca- 
valry of Senones, vi. 4. 



Cevennes, mountains of, Caesar passes them in the 
midst of winter, though covered with snow six feet 
deep,G. viii. 8. 
Celliberians, .'i.franius obliges them to furnish a supply 

of troops, C. i. 36. 
Celtillus, the father of Vercingetorix, assassinated by 

the Arverni, G. vii. 4. 
Chara, a root which served to subsist Caesar's army in 
extreme necessity, C. iii. 40. Manner of preparing 
it, ibid. 
Chariots,manner of fighting with them among the Bri- 
tons, G. iv, 29. Dexterity of the British charioteers, 
ibid. Chariots armed with scythes in Pharnaces' 
army, Al. 60. 
Cicero, Quintus, attacked in his winter-quarters by 
Anibiorix, G. v. 30. Informs Caesar of his distress, 
who marches to relieve him, 37. Attacked unex- 
pectedly by the Sigambri, who are nevertheless ob- 
liged to retire, vi. 32. 
Cingetorix, at the head of one of the factions among 
the Treviri, and firmly attached to Caesar. G. v. 3. 
Declared a public enemy, and his goods confiscated 
by Indutiomarus, 47. 
Cleopatra, engaged in a war with her brother Ptole- 
my, C. iii. 85. She and her younger brother consti- 
tuted king and queen of Egypt, Al. 24. 
Clodius, sent by CiEsar to Scipio, to treat about a 

peace, but without effect, C. iii. 49. 
Clusinas, a centurion, dismissed from Caesar's army 

with ignominy, Af. 48. 
Cffilius, Rufus, raises a sedition in Rome, C. iii. 18. Is 
expelled that city, then joins with Milo, 19. He is 
killed,20. 
Combat, between Turi)io and Niger, Sp. 25. 
Comius, sent by Caesar into Britain to dispose the Bri- 
tish states to submit. G. iv. 19. Persuades the Bello- 
vaci to furnish their contingent to the relief of Ale- 
sia, vii. 69. His distrust of the Romans occasioned 
by an attempt to assassinate him, viii. 19. Infests 
the Romans greatly, and intercepts their convoys, 
38. Attacks Volusenus Quadratus, and runs him 
through the thigh, 39. Submits to Antony, on condi- 
tion of not appearing in the presence of any Roman, 
ibid. 
Cometodunus, heads the Carnutes in their revolt from 
the Romans, and the massacre atGenabum,G. viii.3. 
Considius, his cruel treatment of a messenger sent to 
him with a letter by Plancus, Af. 4. Slain by the Ge- 
tulians for the sake of his treasure, 81. 
Constancy and firmness of Vercingetorix preserve 
him in the chief command, and increase his author- 
ity even amidst losses sustained, G. vii. 28. 
Convictolitanis, a division on his account among the 
.ffiduans, G. vii. 30. Caesar confirms his election to 
the supreme magistracy, 31. He persuades Litavi- 
cus and his brothers to rebel, 35. 
Cordova, Caesar summons the leading men of the 
several states of Spain to attend him there, C. ii, 17. 
Transactions of that assembly, 19. Caesar lays 
siege to it, and obliges it to surrender, Sp. 33. 
Corfiniura, Caesar lays siege to it, C. i. 14. And obliges 

it to surrender, 22. 
Corn, the manner of concealing and securing it 

among the Africans, Af. 57. 
Cornificius, Q. maintains Caesar's cause in Illyricum 

with great reputation, Al. 32. 

Correus, general of the Bellovaci, with six thousand 

foot, and a thousand horse, lies in ambush for the 

Roman foragers ; he attacks the Roman cavalry 

3 A 



362 



INDEX OF 



with a small party, is routed and killed, G. viii. 16. 
Cotta, L. Arunculeius, dissents from Sabinus in rela- 
tion to the advice given them oy Ambioriz, G. v. 24. 

His behaviour vfhen attacked by the Gauls, 27. Is 

slain with the greatest part of his men, after a brave 

resistance, 29. 
Cotuatus and Conetodunus, massacre all the Roman 

merchants at Genabum, G. vii. 3. 
Cotus, a division on his account among the ^duans, 

G. vii. 30. Obliged to desist from his pretensions to 

the supreme magistracy, 31. 
Counsel, the danger of deferring it to the very last, G. 

V. 27. 
Crassus, P. his expedition into Aquitain, G. iii. 21. He 

reduces the Sotiates, ZJ. Also other states, obliging 

them to give hostages, 28. 
Crastinus's character and courage at the battle of 

Pharsalia, C. iii. 75. He is killed there, 76. 
Crispus, C. Sallustius, makes himself iftaster of Cer- 

cina, and sends a great quantity of corn thence to 

Caesar's camp, Af. 31. 
Critognatus, his extraordinary speech and proposal to 

the garrison of Alesia, G. vii. 71. 
Curio, obliges Cato to abandon the defence of Sicily, 

C. i. 39. Sails for Africa, and successfully attacks 

Varus, ii. 21. His fine speech to revive the courage 

of his men, 28. Defeats Varus, 30. Giving too easy 

credit to a piece of false intelligence, is cut off with 

his whole army, 34. 

D 

Dejotarus, complains to Domitius Calvinus of the hos- 
tilities committed by Pharnaces, Al. 25. Addresses 
Caesar in suppliant terms, and obtains pardon, 54. 

Didius, pursues young Pompey, who is slain, and his 
head brought to Caesar, Sp. 37. He falls into an am- 
buscade, and is killed, 40. 

Divitiacus, the JEduan, his attachment to the Romans 
and Caesar, G. i. 16. Caesar, for his sake, pardons his 
brother Dumnorix, ibid. He complains to Caesar, in 
behalf of the rest of the Gauls, of the cruelties exer- 
cised by Ariovistus, 23. Advises Caesar to avoid the 
defiles, by taking a circuit of forty miles, 32. Marches 
against the Bellovaci to create a diversion in fa- 
vour of Caesar, ii. 11. Intercedes for the Bellovaci, 
and obtains their pardon from Caesar, 15. Goes to 
Rome to implore aid of the senate, but without effect, 
vi. 12. 

Domitius Ahenobarbus, besieged by Caesar in Corfi- 
nium, writes to Pompey for assistance, C. i. 15 
Seized by his own troops, who offer to deliver him 
up to Caesar, 19. Caesar's generous behaviour to- 
wards him, 22. He enters Marseilles, and is entrust- 
ed with the supreme command, 34. Is defeated in a 
sea-fight by Decimus Brutus, 52. Escapes with great 
difficulty a little before the surrender of Marseilles, 
ii.20. 

Domitius Calvinus, sent by Caesar into Macedonia, 
comes very opportunely to the relief of Cassius 
Longinus, G. iii. 31. Gains several advantages over 
Scipio, 32. Is unsuccessful against Pharnaces in 
Armenia, Al. 25. 
Drapes, in conjunction with Luterius, seizes Uxellodu- 
num, G. viii. 26. His camp stormed, and himself 
made prisoner, 29. He starves himself, 36. 
Druids, priests so called, greatly esteemed in Gaul, 
and possessed of many valuable privileges, G. vi. 13. 
Pumnacus, besieges Duracius in Limo, G. viii. 21. Is 
defeated by Fabius, 22. 



Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, his character, G. 

i. 15. He persuades the noblemen of Gaul not to go 

with Caesar into Britain, v. 5. He deserts, and is 

killed for his obstinacy, 6. 
Duracius, besieged in Lixno, by Dumnacus, general 

of the Andes, C. vii. 21. 
Dyrrhachium, Caesar endeavours to enclose Pompey 

within his lines near that place, C. iii. 36. 

E 

Eburones, Caesar takes severe vengeance on them for 
their perfi^dy, G. vi. 29. 

Eburovices, massacre their senate, and join with Vir- 
idovix, G. iii. 17. 

Elephants, the way of exercising and training them, 
Af. 25. Surprising courage of a soldier attacked by 
an elephant, Af. 72. 

Eleutheri, furnish troops to the relief of Alesia, G. vii. 
69. 

Ephesus, the temple of Diana there in danger of be- 
ing stripped, C. iii. 28. 

Eporedorix, treacherously revolts from Caesar, G. vii. 
51. 

Etesian winds, detain Caesar at Alexandria, which in- 
volves him in a new war, C. 88. 

Euphranor, admiral of the Rhodian fleet, his valour 
and magnanimity, Al. 11. 

Excommunication, the dreadful consequences of it 
among the Gauls, G. vi. 13. 
F 

Fabius, C. one of Caesar's lieutenants, sent into Spain, 
with three legions, C. i. 35. Builds two bridges over 
the Sicoris for the convenience of forage, 38. 

Frustus Sylla, his death, Af. 83. 

Fortune, her wonderful power and influence in mat- 
ters of war, G. vi. 28, 32. 

G 

Gabali, join the general confederacy of Vercingetorix, 

and give hostages to Luterius of Quercy, G. vii. 7. 
Gabinius, one of Caesar's lieutenants, receivesa con- 
siderable loss in Illyricum, A1.32. 

Galba Sergius, sent against the Nantuates, Veragri- 
ans, and Seduni,G. iii. 1. The barbarians attack his 
camp unexpectedly, but are repulsed with great loss, 
ibid. 5. 

Gauls, their country preferable to that of the Germans, 
G. i. 23. Their manner of attacking towns, ii. 7. Of 
greater stature than the Romans, 30. Quick and 
hasty in their resolves, iii. 8. Forward in undertak- 
ing warSjbut soon fainting under misfortunes, 20. 
Their manner of entering upon a war, v. 47. Their 
manners, chiefs, druids, discipline, cavalry, religion, 
origin, marriages, and funerals, vi. 13. Their coun- 
try geographically described, i. 1. 

Ganymed, made commander of the Egyptian army, Al. 
3. Irritates people by his tyrannical behaviour, 16. 

Gergovia, of the Arverni, Vercingetorix expelled 
thence by Gobanitio, G. vii. 4. The Romans attack- 
ing it eagerly, are repulsed with great slaughter, 44. 
Of the Boii, besieged in vain by Vercingetorix, 10. 

Germans, habituated from their infancy to arms, G. i. 
27. Their manner of training their cavalry, 39. 
Their superstition, 40. Defeated by Caesar, 41. Their 
manners, religion, and strength in wars, vi. 19. 
Men of huge stature and strength, G. i. 32. Af. 30. 

Getulians, desert in great numbers from Scipio to Cae- 
sar, Af. 32. 

Gomphi, refusing to open its gates to Caesar, is taken 
by assault, C. iii. 67. 



PERSON AND THINGS. 



363 



Gorduni, join with Ambiorix in his attack of Cicero's 

camp, G. V. 31. 
Graioceli, oppose Caesar's passage over the Alps, G, i. 

8. 
Grudii, join with Ambiorix in his attack of Cicero's 

camp, G. V. 31. 

H 
Heliacmon, Scipio leaves Favonius with orders to 

build a fort on that river, C. iii. 31. 
Helvetians, the most warlike people of Gaul, G. i. 1. 

Their design of abandoning tlieir own country, 2. 

Attacked with considerable loss near the river 

Arar, 10. Vanquished and obliged to return home 

by Caesar, 21. 
Helvians, Caesar marches into their territories, G. vii. 

8. 
Hercynian Forrest, its prodigious extent, G. vi. 23. 
Hippo, Scipio attacked by P. Silius, perishes there, Af. 

84. 
Hispalis, Caesar makes himself master of it, Sp. 35. 
Human flesh, Critognatus advises the garrison of Ale- 

sia to submit to eat it rather than surrender, G. vii. 

71. 

I 

Jacetani, revolt from Afranius and submit to Caesar, 
C. i. 54. 

Iguvium, forsakes Pompey, and submits to Caesar, C. i. 
11. 

lUurgavonenses, submit to Caesar, and supply him 
with corn, C. i. 54. 

Illyricum, Gabinius receives a considerable check 
there, Al 32. 

Indutiomarus, at the head of a considerable faction 
among the Treviri, G. v. 3. Endeavouring to make 
himself master of Labienus's camp, is repulsed and 
slain, 47. 

Issa, revolts from Caesar at the instigation of Octavius, 
C. iii. 7. 

Italica, shuts its gates against Varro, C. 18. 

Ilius Portus, Caesar embarks there for Britain, G. v. 4. 

Juba, king of the Numidia, strongly attached to Pom- 
pey, C. ii. 22. Advances with a great army to the 
relief of Utica, 32. Detaches a part of his troops to 
sustain Sabura, 36. Is obliged to return and defend 
his own kingdom against king Bogud, Af. 23. Joins 
Scipio with a great body of troops, 43. Attacking a 
party of Caesar's men, is repulsed with great loss, 
46. His haughty behaviour towards Scipio, 51. Fail- 
ing in an attempt upon his own life, prevails with a 
slave to despatch him, 82. 

Jura, the boundary of the Helvetians towards the Se- 
quani, G. i. 2. 

K 

Kalenus Fufius, intercepted by Bibulus in returning 
with the transports to Brundusium, C. iii, 6. Em- 
barks with the troops for Greece, but understandin" 
that the enemy's fleet was on the coast, returns in- 
stantly to Brundusium, 12. Re-embarks some time 
after, and brings all the troops safe to Cssar, 24. 
Makes himself master of several towns in Achaia 
and endeavours by his ambassadors to bring over the 
rest, 47. 

L 

Labienus, Titus, despatched by Caesar to take posses- 
sion of the top of the mountain under which the 
Helvetians were encamped, G. i. 17. Detaches the 
tenth legion to Caesar's assistance, ii. 2(j. Marches 



at the head of the cavalry into the country of the 
Treviri; iii. II. Sallies upon Indutiomarus, who is 
repulsed and slain with the greatest part of his 
troops, v. 41). Counterfeiting fear, falls suddenly 
upon the Treviri, and puts them to flight, vi. 6. Joins 
Caesar after a successful expedition against the Pari- 
sians, vii. 54. Attempts to lake off" Comius, whom 
he found plotting against Caesar, viii. 19. Joining 
Pompey's party, obliges the army to take an oath of 
fidelity to tlial general, C. iii. 11. Confers with Va- 
linius in relation to a peace, 17. Insults the prisoners, 
and puts tliem to death, (ji). Vilifies Caesar's troops, 
and extols tlie conduct of Pompey, 72. Has several 
confliels with Caesar near Ruspina, Af. 12. Attacks 
Leptis, but without success, 27. Takes possession 
of a hill, but is dislodged by Caesar, 44, Attacks 
Caesar's men returning from their work, but is re- 
pulsed with great slaughter, 46. Lying in ambush 
for Caesar, is attacked and put to flight, 57. Is slain 
in the ijaltle of Munda, Sp. 31. 

Laelius, one of Pompey's admirals, blocks up the port 
of Brundusium, C. iii. 82. 

Lentulus, the consul, ground of his opposition to Cae- 
sar, C. i. 3. 

Lepidus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, quiets the com- 
mulions in Spain, occasioned by the dissension be- 
tween Marcellus and Cassius, Al. 50. 

Lejjtis, sends ambassadors to Caesar with an ofTer of 
submission, Af 6. 

Liberty, all men naturally aspire after it, and abhor 
servitude, G. iii. 10. 

Libo, one of Pompey's admirals, blocks up the port of 
Brundusium, C. iii. 21. 

Lissus, abandons the party of Pompey, and opens its 
gales to Antony, C. iii. 26. Besieged in vain by young 
Cneus Pompey, ibid. 34. 

Lilavicus, his artful stratagem to draw off the^Slduana 
from Caesar's alliance, G. vii. 36. 

Lusitania, lield by Varro for Pompey with two legions, 
C. i. 36. 

Luterius, in conjunction with Drapes, takes possession 
of Uxellodunum, G. viii. 26. Is attacked at the head 
of a large convoy, and put to flight, 28. Falling into 
the hands of Epasnaclus, is by him delivered bound 
to Caesar, 36. 

Lutetia, Labienus, marches thither with four legions, 
G. vii. 54. 

M 

Macedonia, Domitius and Scipio arrive much about 
the same time in that country, C. iii. 31. 

Mandubii, expelled Alesia, perish miserably between 
the town and Caesar's lines, G. vi. 71. 

Marcellus, the consul, endeavours to deprive Caesar of 
his province before the time, G. viii. 44. 

Marcellus, M. a partisan of Caesar, his dissension with 
Cassius Longinus, Al. 44. 

Marseilles, shuts its gates against Caesar, C. i. 32. Cae- 
sar invests il, and commits the conduct of the siege 
to Brutus and Trebonius, 34. The Marseillians are 
defeated in a naval engagement by Brutus, 52. Tre- 
bonius pushes the siege with great vigour, ii. 1. The 
Marseillians sue for a truce, which they afterwards 
break, 11. Again sue for peace, 15. The place sur- 
renders to Caesar, 20. 

Mediomatrici, furnish their contingent to the relief of 
Alesia, G. vii. 69. 

Menapians, furnish nine thousand men to the general 
confederacy of Belgium, G. ii. 4. Join with the peo- 



364 



INDEX OF 



pie of Vannes in their revolt Irom Csesar, lii. 9. 
Csesar attacks them and makes some progress, but 
the season being far advanced is obliged to desist, 
29. Titurius and Cotta destroy their territories 
with fire and sword, iv. 34. Ccesar at length obliges 
them to submit, vi. 5. Originally settled on the 
banks of the Rhine, till driven tlience by the Usipe- 
tes and Tenchtheri, iv. 4. 

Metropolis, hearing of the fate of Gomphi, surrenders 
to Cffisar, C. iii. 68. 

Milo, endeavouring to raise disturbances in Italy, is 
killed, C. iii. 20. 

Minerva, prodigies In her temple at Elis, on the day 
of the battle of Pharsalia, C. iii. 86. 

Mithridaies, raises an army in Syria and Cilicia, and 
marches into Egypt to Caesar's assistance, Al. 18. 
Ptolemy endeavours in vain to prevent his junction 
with Csesar, 20. 

Morini, furnish five and twenty tliousand men to the 
general confederacy of Belgium, G. ii. 4. Join willi 
the people of Vannes in tlieir revolt from Coesar, iii. 
9. Caesar attacks tliem and makes some progress, 
but the season being far advanced is obliged to de- 
sist, 29. Attacking the Romans, dispersed for the 
sake of plunder, are repulsed with great slaughter, 
iv. 34. 

Munda, Csesar encamps m the neiglibourhood of that 
city, Sp. 27. Battle of JMunda, in which young Pom- 
pey is totally defeated, 29. Csesar besieges the run- 
aways in that place, 32. Which at length is compell- 
ed to surrender at discretion, 41. 

Musculus, of prodigious length, made use of in the 
siege of Marseilles, C. ii. 9. 
N 

Nantuates, Galba's expedition against themi C. iii. 1. 

Narbonne, Luierius of Quercy makes an attempt upon 
it, G. vii. 7. 

Nasidius, L. a partisan of Pompey, comes to the relief 
of Marseilles with a fleet, C. ii. 3. But is defeated 
in a naval engagement by Brutus, 5. 

Nervians, furnish fifty thousand men to the general 
confederacy of Belgium, G. ii. 4. Their manners and 
warlike spirit, 16. Their methodof defending their 
country from sudden incursions, 17. Defeated by 
Caesar in a great battle, and almost totally cut off, 
23. Attack Cicero's camp, but are repulsed, v. 30. 
Again defeated and put to flight by Csesar, 42. Still 
continuing their endeavours to shake oft" the yoke, 
Caesar quells them by a sudden invasion, vi. 2. 

Niger, Q. Pompeius, accepts the cliallenge of Antistius 
Turpio, and advances into the field against him, Sp. 
25. 

Nitobrigians, Luterius of Quercy compels them to 
join in the general confederacy of Gaul, under Ver- 
cingetorix, G. vii. 7. 

Noviodunum, of the Suessiones, surrenders to C^sar, 
G. ii. 15. Of the Biturigians, treacherously breaks 
the capitulation made with Caesar, vii. 12. Of the 
.ffiduans, revolts from Caesar, and massacres all the 
Romans in the place, 52. 

Numidians, their manner of fighting described, Af 13. 
The difficulty of making head against them, 61. 

Nymphaeum, a promontory and harbour where Cae- 
sar's transports find shelter when pursued by C. 
Caponius, C. iii. 24. 



Octaviug, M. a commander under Pompey, lays siege 
to Salonae, but is repulsed by a sudden sally from 
the town, C. iii. 7. Is defeated in a naval engagement 
by Vatinius, near the isle of Tauris, Al. 35. 



Octodurus, Galba resolves to take up his winter quar- 
ters there, G, ii. 1. 
Orchomenus, submits to Kalenus, one of Caesar's lieu- 
tenants, C. iii. 47. 
Orgetorix, persuades the Helvetians to go in quest of 
new habitations, G. i. 2. Is suspected of having 
made away with himself, to avoid the ignominy of a 
public trial, 5. 

Oricum, Caesar makes himself master of it, C. iii. 9. 
Some of Caesar's galleys burnt there by young Pom- 
pey, 34. 
Oscenses, quit the party of Afranius, and submit to 
Caesar, C. i. 54. 

Osismians, reduced under the power of the Romans 
by young P. Crassus, G. ii. 35. Join with the people 
of Vannes, iii. 9. 

P 

Pacidius, extends his front of cavalry, with design to 
inclose Caesar's troops, Af 67. 

Paemani, join in the general confederacy of the Belgi- 
ans, G. ii. 4. 

Parada, ScipJo's cavalry, in their retreat, seize and re- 
duce it to ashes, Af. 75. 

Parisians, join in the general confederacy of Gaul 
under Vercingetorix, G. vii. 4. 

Pelusium, Pompey flying thither for refuge, is murder- 
ed by Ptolemy's order, C. iii. 36. Mithridates marcli- 
ing to the assistance of Caesar, attacks and makes 
himself master of it, Al. IS. 

Petra, Pompey encamps near that place, C. iii. 36. 

Petreius, in conjunction with Varro and Afranius, pre- 
pares to defend Spain for Pompey. C. i. 36- Trans- 
fers the war into Celtiberia, 55. Breaks off the con- 
ferences between his and Caesar's troops, 67. Sur- 
renders to Caesar, 76. Dies voluntarily by the hand 
of Juba, Af 82. 

Pharnaces, slights the orders of Domitius Calvinus, Al. 
25. Defeats the Romans in a great battle, 30. Is de- 
feated in his turn by C»sar with great slaughter, 69. 

Pharsalia, a decisive battle fought there between Cse- 
sar and Pompey, C. iii. 76. 

Pharus, Caesar takes possession of it on account of its 
commanding the port of Alexandria, C. iii. 93. 

Picenum, Caesar overruns that whole region, and 
obliges it to submit, C. i. 12. 

Pirustae, send ambassadors to Caesar with offers of 
submission, G. v. 1. 

Pisaiirum, Caesar takes possession of it with one co- 
hort, C. i. 10. 

Pleumosii, jointly with the Nervians,fall upon Cicero's 
camp, G. v. 31. 

Pompey, his confidence and presumption before the 
battle of Pharsalia, C. iii. 59. Is totally defeated by 
Caesar with the loss of his camp, 76. Flies into 
Egypt, where he is murdered by order of king Ptole- 
my, 85. 

Pompey, Cn. the son, burns part of Caesar's fleet at 
Oricum, C. iii. 34. Attacks Ascurum, but without 
success, Af 21. Is totally defeated by Caesar, in the 
plains of Munda, Sp. 28. Being retarded in his flight 
by a wound he had received, is overtaken and slain, 
39. 

Pothinus, administrator of Egypt for young Ptolemy, 
involves him in a war with Caesar, C. iii. 89. 

Praetorius, C, Virgilius, an admiral under Pompey, 
makes a capture of a vessel belonging to Caesar, Af, 
26. 

Preciani, submit to Crassus, and give hostages, G. iii. 
28. 

Procillus. C. Valerius, sent upon an embassy to Ario- 



PERSONS AND THINGS 



365 



vislus, G. i. 38. Recovered from the treacherous 
Germans to the gieat jiy of Caesar, 41. 

Ptulemy, king of Egypt, defeated by Caesar in a great 
kuile, Al.2-2. 

Pulfio, T. his contest with Varenus for the prize of va- 
lour, G. V. 36. 

Pyrenean mountains, divide Aquitain from Spain, G. i. 
1. 

R 

Ravenna, the tribunes fly thither to Caesar from Rome, 
C. i. 4. 

Rauraci, join with the Helvetians in their expedition 
in quest of new settlements, G. i. 4. 

Kebilus, lieutenant-general, his advice to Curio in the 
battle against Varus, C. li. 30. 

Rhedones, reduced under obedience to Caesar by 
young Crassus, G. ii. 35. 

Rhemi, refuse to join the Belgian confederacy, G. ii. 3. 
Succeed the Sequani in their authority over the rest 
of Gaul, vi. 12. 

Roscillus and jEgus, their perfidious behaviour to- 
wards Coisar, C. ii. 51. 

Ruteni, reduced under the dominion of the Romans by 
Q. Fabius iVlaximus, G. i. 36. 
S 

Sabinus, Q. Titurius, by an artful stratagem engages 
and defeats the Unellians and their confederates, 
G. iii. 17. Is circumvented and cut off with his 
whole army by Ambiorix, v. 23. 

Sabura, commander of the Numidian troops under 
King Juba, cuts off Curio with his whole army, C. 
ii. 34. 

Salonae, invested by M. Octavius, who, by a sudden 
sally of the garri3on,is obliged to raise the siege, C. 
iii. 7. 

Samarobriva, Caesar holds a general assembly of the 
states of Gaul there, G. v. 20. 

Santones, furnish their contingent to the relief of Ale- 
sia, G. vii. 69. 

Sardinia, Valerius takes possession of it for Caesar, C. 
i. 29. 

Scipio, Pompey's lieutenant, behaves in a very tyran- 
nical manner in Asia, C. iii. 28. Is very near sur- 
prising Domitius in Macedonia, 31. Joins Petreius 
and Labienus, encamps within three miles of Caesar, 
Af. 22. His manner of training his elephants, 25. 
Draws up his troops in order of battle, with a view 
to bring on an engagement with Caesar, 28. His 
cruelty towards some of Caesar's soldiers who had 
been made prisoners, 41. Vigorously attacks Ce- 
sar's horse, but is repulsed with great slaughter, 46. 
Is totally defeated by Caesar in the battle of Thapsus, 
70. Perishes in a sea-fight with P. Sitius, 84. 

Seduni, Galba's expedition against them, G. iii. 1. 

Senones, submit with impatience to the Roman yoke, 
G. V. 45. But are obliged at length to submit and 
give hostages, vi. 3, 

Sicily, abandoned by Cato, receives Curio, and sub- 
mits to Caesar, C. i. 29. 

Sicoris, Fabius makes two bridges over it, C. i. 38. 

Sicambri, refuse to deliver up the Usipetes and Tench- 
theri who had taken refuge among them, G. iv.l3. 
Caesar lays waste their territories, 16. They fall 
unexpectedly upon Cicero's camp, but are repulsed, 
vi. K. 

Silo Minutius, stabs Cassius Longinus twice with a 

dagger, Al. 42. 
Sitius, P. enters Numidia, and storms a fort belonging 
32 



to king Juba, stored with ammunition and provision, 
Af. 33. Defeats Sabuia, Juba's lieutenant, and 
makes Faustus and Afranius prisoners, S3. 

Suevians. under the conduct of Nasua and Cimberius, 
endeavour to cross the Rhine, G. i. 28. Their man- 
ners, way of living, and regulations with respect to 
war, iv. 2. Their high reputation for bravery, 6. 
Their preparations to secure themselves and with- 
stand Caesar, vi. 8. 

Sulla, P. advances with two legions to the assistance 
of a cohort, that had been attacked by the Pompe- 
ians, who are repulsed, C. iii. 43. 
'J' 

Tarbelli, submit and send hostages to Crassus, G. iii. 
28. 

T.irusates, Crassus marches into their territories, G. 
iii. 24. They submit and send hostages, 28. 

Tauris, Vatinius attacks and defeats Octavius's fleet, 
near that island, Al. 35. 

Tenchlheri, in conjunction with the Usipetes, pass the 
Rhine, G. iv 1. Expel the Menapians their own 
territories, 4. Are defeated and almost totally cut 
off by Caesar, 10. 

Teutones, the Belgians alone refuse them entrance in- 
to their territories, G. ii. 4. 

Thapsus, a great battle there Ijetween Caesar and Sci- 
pio, in which the latter was totally defeated, Af. 70. 

Thebes, voluntarily submits to Kalenus, C. iii. 47. 

Tigurinus, acantonof the Helvetians so called, almost 
totally cut off by Cjesar, G. i- 10. 

Tisdra, demands a garrison from Caesar, Af. 33. 

Torquatus, L. a commander under Pompey, obliged to 
abandon the defence of Oricum, C. iii. 9. 

Trebonius, C. his prodigious works before Marseilles, 
C. ii. 1. 

Treviri, complain to Caesar of the hardships they suf- 
fered from the Germans, G. i. 28. Their cavalry 
accounted the bravest and best disciplined in Gaul, 
ii. 24. Caesar quiets the domestic dissensions arisen 
among them, and espouses the party of Cingetorix, 
V. 3. They rebel against the Romans, but are de- 
feated and brought back to their duty by Labienus, 
vi. 6. 

Trinobantes, send ambassadors to Caesar with offers 
of submission, and to request hia protection for their 
king Mandubratius, G. v. 16. 

Tulingi, join with the Helvetians in their expedition 
in quest of new settlements, G. i. 4. 
V 

Vacca, petitions Caesar for a garrison, but is seized 
and sacked by Juba before the troops arrive, Af. 62. 

Valerius Flaccus, takes possession of Sardinia for 
Cssar, C. i. 29. 

Varenus, his contest with Pulfio for the prize of va- 
lour, G. V. 36. 

Varro, M. Pompey's'lieutenant in Spain, prepares to 
oppose Caesar, C. ii. 16. But being forsaken by the 
whole province, desists from his purpose, and sub- 
mits, 18. 

Varus Attius, one of Pompey's ofiicers, withdraws 
v^ith his garrisoD from Auximum, C. i. 2. Passes 
over into Africa, and seizes it for Pompey, 29. Cu. 
rio at first wars against him with success, ii. 22. 
But receiving afterwards succours from Juba, Curio 
is totally defeated and slain, 34. Burns Caesar's 
transports near Leptis, and takes two quinqueremes, 
Af 55. 
Vatinius, defends the port of Brundusium against D. 



366 



INDEX. 



Laelius, C. iil. 82. Defeats Octavius In a sea-fight 
near Taurus, Al. 35. 

Ubians, their country, manners, and way of life de- 
scribed, G. iv. 3. 

"Venetians, reduc ' by young Crassus under the domi- 
nion of the Roi..jns, G. ii. 35. But soon after rebel, 
and draw other states into the revolt, iii. 7. Power- 
ful in their fleets and shipping, 8. Form and struc- 
ture of their vessels, 13. They are totally defeated 
in an engagement at sea, 14. 

Veragrians, Galba's expedition against them, G. iii. 1. 

Vercingelorix rouses the several states of Gaul against 
the Romans, and with universal consent is declared 
generalissimo of the league, G. vii. 4. Lays siege to 
Gergovia, a town belonging to the Boii, 10. Clears 
himself from the charge of treason, 9. Consoles 
his followers upon the loss of Avaricum, 28. Not 
being able to hinder Csesar's passing the AUier, he 
encamps under Gergovia, of the Averni, 34. Attacks 
Csesar with his cavalry, and is repulsed with great 
loss, 59. He takes refuge in Alesia, 62. Dismisses 
all his cavalry, with instructions to rouse their seve- 
ral Slates, to his relief, 65. Prepares to assist his 
countrymen by a vigorous sally, 72. Is obliged at 
last to surrender himself with the town to Caesar, 82. 

Vergasillaunus, appointed one of the commanders of 
the confederate forces for the relief of Alesia, G. vii 



70. Charged with the detachment destined to attack 
the upper camp, 76. 

Vergobret, the name given to the chief magistrate an- 
nually chosen by the .Sduans, G. i. 14. 

VibuUius Rufus, sent by Pompey into the district of 
Picenum, C. i. 13. Made prisoner by Caesar atCorfi- 
nium, 22. Set at liberty, and afterwards sent into 
Spain by Pompey, 32. 

Virdumarus, revolts from Cssar, and sets fire to No- 
viodunum, G. vii. 52. Appointed one of the com- 
manders of the confederate forces for the relief of 
Alesia, 70. 

Viridovix, heads the Unellians against Sabinus, but ia 
defeated by an artful stratagem, G. iii. 17. 

Volusenus, sent by Csesar to take a view of the British 
coast, G. iv. 18. Antony sends him in pursuit of 
Comius, viii. 39. 

Uxellodunum, Canmins lays siege to it, G. viii. 27. 
Caesar, by depriving the besieged of water, forces the 
town to surrender, 33. 

z 

Zama, shuts its gates against Juba, Af. 79. Surrenders 

to Caesar, 80. 
Zieta, Caesar seizes and puts a garrison in it, Af. 59. 
Ziela, Pharnaces toully defeated by Caesar near that 

place, Al. 57. 



THE END. 



34n-7 



M) 



